sanskrit
stringlengths 4
615
| english
stringlengths 2
1.3k
|
|---|---|
athāpītyādinā dvitīyapakṣam āha | The following text takes up the second alternative view (suggested in the commentary on Text 2531, that the Air is not perceptible): [see verse 2534 above] |
kāṇādāḥ vaiśeṣikāḥ / | ‘Followers of Kaṇāda’ the Vaiśeṣikas; |
teṣāṃ śabdaliṅgo vāyuḥ / | according to whom Air is indicated by (inferred from) Sound. |
bhāṣyakṛtāpi śabareṇoktam "vāyavīyāḥ saṃyogavibhāgā apratyakṣasya vāyoḥ karṇaśaṣkulīpradeśāt prādurbhavanto nopalabhyanta" iti / | The author of your own Bhāṣya, Śabara has also declared that “when the aerial Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the imperceptible Air proceed from the Ear-drum, they are not perceived”. |
atra dūṣaṇam āha spṛṣṭyāptis tasya kiṃkṛteti / spṛṣṭiḥ sparśaḥ tasyāptiḥ prāptiḥ prasaṅga iti yāvat / | The objection to this view is set forth in the words ‘To what can its amenability to Touch be due?’ ‘Spṛṣṭyāpti’ is the ‘āpti’ possibility of ‘spṛṣti’ touch. |
etad uktaṃ, bhavati tasya vāyoḥ sparśaprasaṅgo yo 'yaṃ bhāṣyakāreṇa kṛtaḥ sa katham tathā hi vāyurāpadyate śabdatāmityevaṃvādinaḥ śikṣākārān pratibhāṣyakṛtoktam "vāyavīyaś ca śabdo bhaved vāyoḥ sanniveśaviśeṣaḥ syāt / | This is what the author of your Bhāṣya has spoken of; how is that? As against the view of the author of the Śikṣā, that ‘the Air becomes the Sound’, the author of the Bhāṣya (Śabara) has said (under Sū, I. 22) as follows “If the Word-Sound were the product of Air, then it could only be Air in a particular shape; |
naca vāyavīyānavayavān śabde sataḥ pratyabhijānīmaḥ / yathā paṭasya tantumayān / | as a matter of fact, however, we do not recognise any particle of Air in the constitution of the Word-Sound, in the manner in which we recognise the particles of yarn in the constitution of the Cloth; |
na caivaṃ bhavati / | therefore the Word-Sound cannot be a product of Air; |
syāccedevaṃ sparśanenopalabhemahi / naca vāyavīyānavayavān śabdagatān spṛśāma" iti // | if the Word-Sound were the product of Air, then we could perceive it with our tactile organ (as we perceive Air); and yet we do not feel by touch any air-particles in the Word-Sound”. |
abhyupagamyāpyatīndriyatvaṃ doṣāntaram āha astu vetyādi / | (Translation, p. Even granting (for the sake of argument) that Air is beyond the senses, imperceptible, the Author proceeds to point out defects in the Opponent’s arguments: [see verse 2535 above] |
astu vātīndriyo vāyus tatadyogigatasya tu / | ‘Tadyogaḥ’ contact with the different air-currents; |
tena tena vāyunā yogas tattadyogataḥ, sa yasyāsti jalatejogatīsaṃjñakasya bhūtatrāyasya tat tathoktam / | that which has this contact is ‘tattadyogin’, i.e. the substances known as ‘Water’, ‘Fire’ and ‘Earth’; |
tadgataṃ tatprāptaṃ tadāśritam iti yāvat / | and that which is ‘gala’ resting, residing in these, is ‘tattadyogigata’; |
dvitīyāśritetyādinā dvitīyāsamāsaḥ / etac ca spraṣṭavyasyetyanena samānādhikaraṇam / | The compounding is in accordance with Pāṇini’s Sūtra ‘Dvītīyā-śṛṭā, etc. etc.’ This compound qualifies ‘spraṣṭavya’ the tangible Air; |
tasya spraṣṭavyasya śītoṣṇetarasvabhāvasya vit vedanā prāpnoti / | which is of a nature that is different from hot and cold. There should be ‘vit’ Cognition of the said Air. |
anyavad iti / śabdavyañjakābhimatakoṣṭhavāyugatād anyasyeva / | ‘Just as there is of other Airs’ i.e. of Air other than that within the body of the Speaker, which Air is held (by the Opponent) to be the manifester of the particular Word-Sound. |
ṣaṣṭhyantād vatiḥ / | The ‘vati’-affix is added to the word ending in the Locative. |
yathā śiśirasamaye himanicayavyāsaṅgavāhinaḥ pavanasya, yathā vā taruṇaraṇikaraprasaṅgāvaruddhāśeṣadigvibhāge vahato nidāghasamaye samīraṇasya, tathā śītetaravirahitakālavartino mātariśvanaḥ spraṣṭavyasya śītādeḥ saṃvidbhavati, tathehāpi syāt // | What is meant is that there would be cognition of the Air in question, just as there is of the air during winter, carrying with it the coolness of the snows, of that during summer, when all the quarters are filled with the burning rays of the sun, of that during the season which is neither hot nor cold, which is yet felt by the touch to be cool or warm. |
athāpītyādinā parasyottram āśaṅkate / [p.687] | In the following Text, the Author anticipates and refutes the Opponent’s answer: [see verses 2536-2537 next] |
tasyeti / vāyoḥ / | ‘Tasya’ of the Air. |
ayoga iti / asaṃsargaḥ / | ‘Ayogaḥ’ non-contact, ‘with the tympanum’. |
śeṣaṃ subodham // | The rest is clear. |
yaduktam yadvā vedānusāreṇetyādi, tatra samānatvād dūṣaṇasyetyatraivātideśaṃ kurvannāha ye niraṃśam ityādi / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2198, that “or, the idea that should be entertained is that the Auditory Organ consists of space, which idea would be in accordance with the Veda”. |
doṣā jñeyā niraṃśaikadikchrotratve 'pi te samāḥ // | As this is open to the same objections, the Author applies them to that view, in the following: [see verse 2538 above] |
niraṃśākāśātmakaśrotrapakṣe ye prāguktā doṣāḥ saṃskāravaiyarthyaṃ saṃskārānupapattiścetyādayas te dikchrotrapakṣe 'pi samānā iti na pṛthak dūṣaṇaṃ vācyam // | The view that the Auditory Organ consists of the indivisible Space, is open to all those objections the futility of embellishment, the impossibility of embellishment, etc. that have been urged against the view that it consists of the indivisible Ākāśa. Hence it is not necessary to state the objections against this other view separately. |
yaduktam yadyapi vyāpi caikaṃ cetyādi, tatrāha ekavyāpinabhaḥpakṣa ityādi / ekavyāpinabhaḥpakṣe vibhāgo na prakalpyate / | Under the view that ākāśa is one and all-pervading, there can be no such division as that the one is the substratum of the embellished organ and the other is not so; because ākāśa is one (and indivisible). |
ekavyomātmakaṃ śrotraṃ nāstyasaṃskṛtaśaṣkuli / | If the auditory organ consists of the one ākāśa, then it cannot have its tympanum ‘unembellished’. |
ato 'dhiṣṭhānabhedena saṃskāraniyamo 'sthitaḥ // | Consequently, any restriction in the embellishment on the basis of the substratum cannot stand. |
tenaikasminnadhiṣṭhāne labdhasaṃskāramindriyam / bodhakaṃ sarvadeheṣu syād ekendriyavādinaḥ // | Consequently, when the organ has secured the embellishment in one substratum, it should bring about the cognition in the bodies of all men; according to those who declare the organ to be one only. |
puṃsāṃ dehapradeśeṣu vijñānotpattir iṣyatām / | You may hold that cognitions (sensations) appear in the various parts of the bodies of men; |
kintu pradhānavaideśyamekatvānnabhaso na te // | but according to you, there can be no diversity of place for the principal factor, in relation to ākāśa which is one only. |
niṣpradeśo 'pi cātmā naḥ kārtsnyena ca vidannapi / | as there is no difference between the two. |
śarīra eva gṛhṇātītyevam ukte 'pi duṣyati // bādhiryādyavyavasthānam etenaiva ca hetunā / tadevābhogyamanyasya nāviśeṣāddhi yujyate // | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2185, that “Even if the Auditory Organ were one and all-pervading, the Embellishment due to Articulation could affect only the material substratum of that organ, etc. etc.”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2539-2544 above] |
anyacceti / asaṃskṛtāśrayam / | ‘Anyat’ the substratum of the unembellished organ. |
nahyanavayavasyāyaṃ vibhāgo yuktaḥ, sāvayavatvapra [p.688] saṅgāt / | Such distinction is not possible in the case of what is without parts, indivisible. |
kālpanike tu vibhāge 'rthakriyāvṛttyā{tya---}vṛttivirodhaḥ, nahyāropitārthānuvidhāyinyo 'rthakriyā bhavanti, tāsāṃ vastupratibaddhatvāt / | If there were, it would have to be regarded as with parts, divisible. If the distinction were merely assumed (not real), then there would be an incompatibility regarding its being with and also without effective action; because effective actions never follow in the wake of mere assumptions; |
tataścaikasminnadhiṣṭhāne yadi saṃskṛtamindriyaṃ tacca bodhakasvabhāvaṃ tadādhiṣṭhānāntare tadeva tatparamārthata iti sarvatraiva tat saṃskṛtaṃ bodhakañca prāpnoti / | Consequently, if the organ has become embellished in one substratum, it acquires thereby the capacity to bring about the cognition of things; so that in another substratum also, as the organ would really be the same, it would be embellished everywhere, and hence capable of bringing about the Cognition of things. |
tena yaduktaṃ puṃsāṃ dehapradeśeṣvityādi, tat sarvaṃ pratyuktam, ekasya pāramārthikavibhāgāyogād iti darśayann āha puṃsām ityādi / | Thus what has been said (in Text 2542) regarding “the Cognitions, appearing in the several parts of the bodies of men”, becomes set aside; because there can be no real division in what is one only. This is what is shown in the words ‘Puṃsām, etc. etc.’ |
pradhānavaideśyam iti / | ‘Pradhānavaideśyam’. |
pradhānasya śarīrasya vaideśyaṃ bhinnākāśadeśavartitvam / | ‘Pradhāna’, ‘Principal Factor’, stands for the Body; ‘Vaideśya’ residence in different parts of Ākāśa. |
evam ukte 'pi duṣyatīti / ekasya vibhāgāyogāt / | ‘Evamuktepi, etc.’ because there can be no division for what is one only. |
avyavasthānam iti / vyavasthānābhāvaḥ // | ‘Avyavasthānam’ impossibility of such distinctions. |
aviśeṣam eva darśayati atyaktapūrvarūpaṃ hītyādi / | The following Text shows how there is no difference between the two: [see verse 2545 next] |
atyaktapūrvarūpaṃ hi viśeṣānudaye sati / kathaṃ nāma bhavecchrotram abhogyam aparasya te // | When it cannot abandon its previous form, and when no new features can appear in it, why cannot the auditory organ come within range of the experience of another. |
athāpi syādharmādharmābhyāṃ vaśīkṛtatvād viśeṣo 'styevetyāha nityatvādityādi / | It might be argued that “there would be differences, by reason of the Auditory Organ being influenced by Merit and Demerit”. The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 2546 above] |
nityatvād anapekṣatvād dharmādharmāvaśīkṛtam / | ‘Being eternal’ is the reason for ‘being independent’ and also for ‘being not influenced by Merit and Demerit’. |
sadaiva ca nabhaḥśrotraṃ sarvābhogyaṃ prasajyate // nityatvamanapekṣatve hetuḥ, tathāvaśīkaraṇasya // athānapekṣasyāpi vaśīkaraṇaṃ kasmān na bhavatītyāha dharmādharmetyādi / | Says the Opponent: “It is found that even what is not an effect is influenced by things: for instance, the Auditory Organ, which was not within range of one’s experience before (in the case of the deaf) comes within its range, through the influence of medicines and charms. Thus your Reason becomes Inconclusive”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2548 above] |
[p.689] ādiśabdenollekhanādiparigrahaḥ / | ‘Medicines, etc.’ ‘etc? includes scratchings, operations. |
kathaṃ bhaved iti / yadi tatrāpi na kāryatā bhaved ityadhyāhāraḥ / | ‘How could it, etc.’ i.e. if, even so, it did not have the character of an effect. |
nanu cākāryasyāpi sato viśeṣotpattimātreṇa vaśīkriyā bhaviṣyatītyāha nityatvād ityādi // | “Even if it is not an Effect, there would be influencing by the mere production of peculiarities.” Answer: ‘Being eternal, etc. etc.’ (2548) |
adhiṣṭhāne tvanitye 'pi kṣaṇikānityatā na cet / | “even though the substratum is not-eternal, its non-eternality would not be of the nature of momentariness”; |
tadātmātiśayāyogād bādhiryādi na yujyate // | if this is urged, then (the answer is that), inasmuch as no additional properties could be produced in it, deafness, etc. would not be possible. |
anitye 'pīti / kālāntaravināśāt tasyāpi hya{hyā---}vināśamekarūpatvānnityasyeva nātiśayotpattiḥ sambhavatīti kutaḥ saṃskāraḥ // | ‘If it is non-eternal’ as its destruction would be sure to come in course of time, till that time, it would continue to have one and the same form; and hence, as in the eternal thing, so here also no additional properties would appear in it; how then, could there be any ‘embellishment’ of it? (2549) |
abhyupagamyātiśayaṃ doṣamāha astu veti / | Or, the additional property may be produced in the organ; |
astu vātiśayāstasmin vyomni tveṣa na vidyate / | but in no case could it exist in the ākāśa; |
nacādhiṣṭhānasambandhānnityatvād anapekṣaṇāt // | nor could it be due to its connection with its receptacle; because it is eternal and independent. |
atas taddvārako 'pyatra bādhiryādi na yujyate / | Hence, deafness, etc. could not come about through that either. |
nabhaso bhāgavattve 'pi nityatāyām idaṃ samam // | Even if ākāśa were with parts and divisible, the arguments would apply to it, on the ground of its eternality. |
eṣa iti / atiśayaḥ / | ‘Eṣa’, ‘it’ stands for the additional property. |
yadyapi na vidyate tathāpyadhiṣṭhānasambandhāt tasyāpi bhaviṣyatītyāha nacādhiṣṭhānetyādi / | “Even if it does not exist there, it may come to it on account of its connection with its receptacle”. It could not be due to its connection with its Receptacle. |
yaduktam nacānavayaṃ vyometyādi, tatrāpi sāvayavasya nabhaso yadi nityatvamabhyupagamyate tadā yadanavayanityanabhaḥpakṣe dūṣaṇaṃ tat sarvaṃ samānam ityatidiśati nabhasa ityādi // | As regards the argument that Ākāśa is not without parts, the answer is that if the divisible Ākāśa is held to be eternal, then all the objections that have been urged against the view that ‘the indivisible Ākāśa is eternal’, become applicable. This is what is meant by the words ‘Even if Ākāśa were divisible, etc. etc (2550-2551) |
na yuktaṃ yadi tasyāpi kṣaṇikatvaṃ samasti na // | Even for you, this ‘removal from the ownership’ cannot be possible, unless the ownership is momentary. |
ko hi tasyāḥ samutpannaḥ paścād atiśayo yataḥ / svāmitvād apakṛṣṭo 'sau na bhogaṃ punar āpnuyāt // | what additional property has been produced in it, by virtue of which it is removed from the ownership and does not enjoy the same experience again? (2552-2553) |
subodham // | This is quite easy. |
yadā ca saṃskṛtir naivam śrotre śabde ca yujyate / | Thus then, there is no ‘embellishment’ possible, either in the auditory organ or in the word-sound; |
bhedābhedavikalpena saṃskārānupapattitaḥ // | because it is not possible for the embellishment to be either different or non-different (from them). |
vyatireke hi saṃskāre śrotraśabdau na saṃskṛtau / syātāṃ tābhyāṃ ca sambandhaḥ saṃskārasya na kaścana // | For instance, if the embellishment is something different from the auditory organ and the sound, then these two cannot be regarded as ‘embellished’; as these would have no relationship with the embellishment; |
nirbhinnasya hi sambandhaḥ kāryakāraṇatā bhavet / | because between two different things, the only relationship possible is the causal one; |
tasyāṃ ca sarvadaivāyaṃ bhaveddhetoḥ sadā sthiteḥ // anarthāntarapakṣe 'pi tadvannityo bhavedasau / | and if this relationship were there, then the embellishment would be there at all times, as its cause would be there at all times. Even under the view that the embellishment is not something different, it would be eternal, like the auditory organ and the sound; |
tan na śakyakriyas tasmān nityaṃ jñānaṃ prasajyate // | and hence it could not be produced by anything; consequently the cognition (due to the embellishment) would be everlasting. |
tan na sāmarthyaniyamo vāyvāderupapadyate / kartavyaviṣayāyoge sāmarthyasyāpyayogataḥ // | Because all this is so, therefore any regulation or restriction of the capacity of the air-currents, etc. cannot be possible; and when what is to be accomplished is not present, the capacity to accomplish it can be of no use. |
yadeti / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2554-2558 above] |
yataḥ kāraṇād ity arthaḥ / evam anantaroktena prakāreṇa / | ‘Yadā’ Because ‘Evam’ ‘Thus, in the manner just described, this ‘because’ has to be construed with ‘tat’ ‘therefore, etc. etc.’ of Text 2558. |
yathā cāsau saṃskṛtir nopapadyate tathā tāvad vistareṇa darśayann āha bhedābhedetyādi / saṃskṛtir bhavantī vyatiriktā vā bhaved avyatiriktā veti pakṣadvayaṃ, vastunaḥ prakārāntarāsambhavāt / | How this embellishment is not possible is explained in detaū, in the words ‘Because it is not possible for the embellishment, etc, etc.’ What is meant is as follows When the embellishment comes, it could be either different or non-different (from the thing embellished); these are the only two possibilities, as the matter does not admit of a third alternative. |
prathame pakṣe śrotraśabdayoḥ saṃskārāsiddhiprasaṅgaḥ, arthāntarakaraṇāt, nahi ghaṭakaraṇe paṭaḥ saṃskṛto nāma / | In the former case, i.e. if it is different, there could be no ‘embellishment’ of the auditory organ or of the Word-Sound; because what is brought about is different; and when the Jar is brought about, it is not the Cloth that is embellished. |
nāpi tasya saṃskārasya tābhyāṃ saha sambandhaḥ siddhyati, yena tat sambandhisaṃskārakaraṇadvāreṇa tau saṃskṛtau syātām / | Nor can there be any relationship between the Embellishment and the said two (Auditory Organ and the Word-sound); by virtue of which by the bringing about of the Embellishment, which is their relative, those two could become embellished. |
tathā hi bhedābhyupagamān na tādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ / | Because, as it has been held to be different, the relationship of the Embellishment with the Auditory Organ or the Word-Sound could not be of the nature of ‘identity’; |
bhinnaya ca sambandho bhavatkāraṇatālakṣaṇa eva bhaved anyatropakārābhāvāt / | in fact whenever there is a relationship between two different things, it can be only of the nature of Cause and Effect; as there could be no help in any other way. |
tasyāṃ ca kāryakāraṇatāyāṃ satyāṃ sarvadaivāyaṃ saṃskāro bhavet, hetoḥ śrotraśabdātmakasya sarvadāvasthitatvāt / | If there were this relation of Cause and Effect between the Embellishment and the other two (Auditory Organ and Word-Sound), the Embellishment would be there for all time, as its cause, in the shape of the Auditory Organ and the Word-Sound, would be there all the time (both of these being eternal, ex hypothesi). |
dvitīye 'pi pakṣe doṣam āha anarthāntaretyādi / | Under the second alternative (that the Embellishment is not different from the Auditory Organ and the Word-Sound), the difficulty is that |
tadvad iti / śrotraśabdasvarūpavat / asāviti / | ‘Even under the view, etc. etc.’ ‘Tadvat’ Like the Auditory Organ and the Word-Sound. |
saṃskāraḥ / | ‘Asau’ the Embellishment; |
tataś ca nityatvād asau saṃskāro na kenacit kriyate / | and hence, as it would be eternal, the Embellishment could not be produced or brought about by anything. |
tasmāc ca saṃskārādijñānotpattāviṣyamāṇāyāṃ nityaṃ jñānaṃ prasajyeteti nityatve doṣaḥ / | Thus, under the view that Cognitions are produced by the Embellishment, every cognition would be eternal. This is the difficulty in the Embellishment being eternal. |
tannetyādinopasaṃharati // ata ityādinā śabdānityatvasādhane pramāṇayati | The whole argument is summed up in the words ‘Therefore any regulation or restriction, etc. etc.’ (2554-2558) |
ato 'bhivyaktyayogena śabdajñānam idaṃ phalam / grāhyotpādāvinābhāvighaṭādivyaktibuddhivat // | Thus, inasmuch as no ‘manifestation’ (of the word-sound) is possible, the cognition of the word-sound must be regarded as having this character that it is invariably concomitant with the birth (coming into existence) of what is apprehended by it, like the cognition of the individual jar and such things. |
tasmād utpattyabhivyaktyoḥ kāryārthāpattitaḥ samaḥ / sāmarthyabhedaḥ sarvatra syāt prayatnavivakṣayoḥ // | Consequently, both ‘producing’ and ‘manifesting’, as brought about by effort and articulation, will have the diversity of their capacity determined by presumption based upon the nature of the effects produced by them. |
[p.691] prayogaḥ yat kādācitkaṃ tadutpattimatkāraṇajanyam yathā, ghaṭavyaktiviṣayaṃjñānam, kādācitkaṃ ca śabdajñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | The argument may be formulated as follows: What is occasional must be produced by a cause which also has had its production, as for example, the cognition of the individual Jar; and the Cognition of the Word-Sound is occasional; hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things. |
nityaṃ tajjñānāsaṃvitter nāsiddho hetuḥ / | The Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’, because as a matter of fact, the said cognition is not found to appear at all times. |
abhivyakter apāstatvānnāpyanaikāntikaḥ / sapakṣe bhāvān na viruddhaḥ / | as the idea of Sound being ‘manifested’ has been already discarded, Nor again can it be regarded as ‘contradictory’; |
idamphalam iti / idaṃ grāhyotpādāvinābhāvilakṣaṇaṃ phalam asyeti vigrahaḥ / | ‘Idam-phalam’ is a compound, meaning ‘that which has idam’ this, i.e. being invariably concomitant with the birth of what is apprehended by it for its ‘phalam’, net gain, character. |
śeṣaṃ subodham // | The rest is easily understood. |
yāvāṃśca kaścana nyāyo nabhobhāgatvadūṣaṇe / digbhāge 'pi samasto 'sau vijñeyo matiśālibhiḥ // | All those reasons that go to invalidate the view that the auditory organ is part of ākāśa, should be understood by intelligent men to apply also to the view that it is part of space. |
yaduktam "viṣayasyāpi saṃskāre tenaikasyaiva saṃskṛtiḥ / | The assertion that “if the embellishment pertains to the object, it would affect that one object only” cannot be right; |
" ityādi, tatrāha viṣayasyetyādi / | because it has been discarded; |
viṣayasyāpi saṃskāre tenaikasyaiva saṃskṛtiḥ / | also because the capacity of things is limited. Hence there cannot be embellishment of the object. |
neti / | [verse 2561]: |
śaktiniyateśceti cakāro luptanirdiṣṭo draṣṭavyaḥ / | The objections against the view that the Auditory Organ consists of Space have been already stated before; |
tenāyam artho bhavati / | hence they are not stated again; |
avagamyeta śabdo 'yaṃ jñānahetutayā sthiteḥ // kadācidasau śabdaḥ prakṛtyā jñānotpattāvayogyo bhavennaveti pakṣadvayam / | the Author only reminds the reader of what has been said before: [see verse 2561 above] It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, in Text 2204, that “Even if the Embellishment pertains to the Object, it would affect that one object only, etc. etc.” The answer to this is as follows: |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.