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varṇavat sarvabhāveṣu vyajyate naca kenacit // | nor is it manifested in all things, like the letters, by anything; |
varṇeṣu vyajyamānasya nāsya pratyāyanāṅgatā / | and if it is manifested in the letters, it cannot form a factor in the expression of the meaning of words; |
anyāviśeṣānnānyatra sadbhāvāccāsya nityatā // | as it is not different from other things, and as it does not exist elsewhere, it cannot be eternal. |
tadānupūrvī varṇānāṃ hrasvadīrghaplutāś ca ye / | Thus then, the order of the letters, as also their shortness, length, etc. |
kālasya pravibhāgās te na yuktā dhvanyupādhayaḥ // | are all adjuncts of the articulation, and are not so many phases of time. |
tasmān na padadharmo 'sti nityaste kaścid īdṛśaḥ / tenānityaṃ padaṃ siddhaṃ varṇānityatvavādinām // | Thus for you, there is no property in words which is eternal; hence it becomes established that the word is not-eternal, for those who regard the letter as non-eternal. |
paradharmo 'pi cā{nā---}ṅgatvaṃ bhavedaśvajavādivat / yadi vyaktiḥ prakalpeta vyañjakaiḥ pratyayair iha // | Nor could it form part of the property of anything else, like tee fleetness of the horse, if it were assumed that the manifesting cognitions bring about the manifestation of the words. |
pūrvam eveti / ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣāyām / | ‘Already’ under the chapter on the ‘Six Categories’. |
vyajyate naca kenacid iti / | ‘It is not manifested by anything’ simply because it does not exist; |
asattvādeva, sattve 'pi nityasya vyakter ni{ya}tatvāt / | even if it existed, the manifestation of the eternal thing would also be eternal. |
anyasmād [p.719] aviśeṣo anyaviśeṣaḥ / | ‘Not different from other things’ i.e. it is non-different from other things. |
tathā hi bījāṅkuralatādiṣu yo vyajyate kālasyātmā tatas tasya varṇeṣu vyajyamānasya kālātmano na kaścid viṣayo '{śeṣo '---}sti / | Because the nature of the Time that is manifested in the phenomenon consisting of the seed-sprout-creeper does not in any way differ from that which is manifested in the Letters.***** (Lacune in Text). |
na yuktā iti / kālasyāsattvāt, sattve 'pyabhyugatamavibhāgatvam iti / | ‘Not phases of time’ because there is no such thing as Time. Even if it exists, its divisibility is not admitted. |
śeṣaṃ subodham // | The rest is easily intelligible. |
nityatāyāṃ tu sarveṣām arthāpattirapākṛtā / | The presumption put forward in support of the eternality of all things has been already discarded. |
arthapratītirūpatvam anityeṣu hi sādhitam // | It has also been proved that the comprehension of the meanings of words is possible only when words are not eternal. |
yo yadvivakṣāsambhūtavivakṣāntaratasthi{sta---}taḥ / varṇa utpadyate tasya śrutistansamanantaram // | When one letter-sound is produced by the ‘desire to utter,’ following from the desire to utter another letter-sound, the former is heard immediately after the latter; |
pūrvavarṇavidudbhūtasaṃvinnātidrutaśrutiḥ / | the cognition proceeding from the cognition of the preceding letter is not heard very quickly; |
so 'pekṣya tat smṛtiṃ paścāt kurute smṛtimātmani // | in fact, with the aid of the remembrances of the previous letters, the latter brings about its own remembrance later on. |
tat samutthāpakagrāhijñānāni prati janyatā / | Thus it has the character of an effect, in relation to the cognitions leading up to, and apprehending, it. |
hetutā vānupūrvīyaṃ varṇeṣu puruṣāśrayā // | Or, the order of the letters may be dependent upon men. |
ataḥ pratipadaṃ bhinnā varṇā iti parisphuṭam / | From all this it follows that the letters clearly vary with each word; |
damo mado latā tāla ityādikramabhedataḥ // īdṛśena krameṇaite tvarthabhedopapādakaḥ / | as is found in the case of such words as ‘dama’-‘mada’, ‘latā’-‘tāla’ etc., where the letters are the same but their order different in the two words. |
ata eva nirartheha sphoṭasyāpi prakalpanā // | Consequently, the assumption of the ‘sphoṭa’ also is absolutely futile in this connection. |
arthāpattir apākṛteti / tathā hi hastakampāder ityādinā vyabhicārasya bādhakasya ca pramāṇasya varṇanāt / | ‘The Presumption has been discarded.’ Under Text 2617, it has been shown that the Presumption is wrong and also annulled by other means of Cognition. |
anityeṣu.......... | [The text is corrupt.] |
ayamatra tāvat samudāyārthaḥ / | The upshot of the whole of this argument is as follows; |
vaktṛsantāne prativarṇaṃ tat samutthāpakāni jñātā{nā---}ni pūrvapūrvasamanantarapratyayajanyā{ni vivakśāto bhavanti, tataśca varṇāḥ, } teca śrotṛsantāni pūrvapūrvavarṇagrāhivijñānsahakāriṇaḥ svaviṣayābhijñānāni kramavattati{rtīni---} janayanti sākṣāt, tataś ca paścādāvā{tsvasva---}viṣayāṃ {smṛtiṃ}kramabhāvinīṃ janayanti [p.720] pāramparyeṇa / | In the ‘chain’ of the Speaker, from his desire to speak, there arises a series of Cognitions, each member of which is produced by its predecessor; and these ideas arouse each Letter-sound; thus the several Letter-sounds come about; and these directly produce, in the ‘chain’ of the Hearer, successive Cognitions, each member of which is helped by its predecessor; later on, these Cognitions bring about successive remembrances relating to themselves, indirectly in due order. |
tataś ca vaktṛsantānabhāvīni svasamutthāpakāni jñānā na {nya---}pekṣayā{kśya---} teṣāṃ janyatā, śrotṛsantānabhā{vīni} vānya {tanya---} {pekśya} hetutā, saiva teṣām anupūrvī, tānyā / | Consequently, these Remembrances come to be regarded as ‘effects’ in relation to the cognitions appearing in the Speaker’s ‘chain’, which have given rise to the Remembrances; while in relation to the cognitions appearing in the Hearer’s ‘chain’, they come to be regarded as the ‘Cause Herein lies their ‘order of sequence’; |
{nā---} nyā / | nowhere else. |
kāraṇakāryabhedāc ca pratipadaṃ varṇānāṃ bhinnasvabhāvatvāt saro rasa ityādau pratīti bhedo yujyate, na tu nityānām, teṣāṃ sarvadā sarvatraikarūpatvāt / | Thus, as the character of the Letters in every word, is variable, sometimes appearing as causes and sometimes as effects, it is only right that in the case of such similar words as ‘sara’ and ‘rasa’, the resultant cognitions should be different. But this cannot be right if the Letters and words are eternal; as eternal things retain the same form at all times. |
nāpyānupūrvī tebhyo 'rthāntarabhūteṣṭā / arthāntaratve 'pi sambandhāsiddher ityabhiprāyaḥ / | Nor in their case can any order of sequence be regarded as something different from themselves. Even if it were something different, there would be no relationship between them; |
avayavārthastū{cyate} varṇa utpa{dya}ta iti sambadhyate / | The meaning of the words of the Text is now explained: ‘When one Letter-sound is produced’ such is the construction. |
sadā smaya {i} tyādau sakārādeḥ paro 'kārādiḥ, {sakāravivakśā} sambhūta vitatha {vakśā ---}ntaratastataḥ {utpadyate}/ yasya sakārāder vivakṣā yadvivakṣā, tataḥ sambhūtaṃ yadvivakṣāntaraṃ tat tathoktam / | In the case of such words as ‘sadā’ and ‘samaya’, there is the vowel ‘a’ after ‘s’, there is desire to utter this arising from the desire to utter ‘s’; hence this is ‘another desire What is meant is as follows: In the Speaker’s ‘Chain’, there is one ‘desire to utter’ following from another, and so on; this desire is followed by the Letter-Sound produced, this Sound brings about the Remembrance; |
etad uktaṃ bhavati / | such is the connection with what follows in the text later on. |
evaṃ tāvad vaktṛsantānavartivarṇasamutthāpaka {vivakśāva} gā{śā---}dvarṇānāṃ {janyatvaṃ pratipādya śrotṛ } santānavartijñānaṃ i{pra---}ti kāraṇatvaṃ pratipādayati tasye{ti} / | Having thus described the fact of the Letters being ‘effects’ of the series of ‘desires to speak’ in the Speaker’s ‘Chain’, the author proceeds to point out the fact of its being the ‘cause’ of the cognitions appearing in the Hearer’s ‘Chain’ ‘The former is heard, etc. etc.’ ‘Tasya’ refers to ‘yaḥ’ in the previous line; |
tasya śrutiḥ utpadyata iti sambandhaḥ / | its hearing is produced, it is heard ‘immediately’ without anything intervening. |
evaṃ śrotṛjñānahetutvaṃ pratipādya sāmprataṃ smṛtihetutvaṃ pratipādayati / | Having thus shown that it is the cause of the Hearer’s Cognition, the author now proceeds to show that it is the cause of Remembrance. |
nātidrutaśrutir iti / drutaśruteḥ smṛtijanatā samarthatvāt / | ‘Not heard very quickly’ quick hearing being incapable of being produced by Remembrance. |
uttarottaro varṇaḥ / tu smṛti{tatsmṛtim---}pūrvapūrvasmṛtim / {apekśyatatsahakāreṇetyatat, smṛtimsvasvaviṣayām} samutthāpakāni ca grāhīṇi ceti dvandvaḥ / | ‘The latter’ i.e. the later ‘Letter ‘Remembrances’ of the previous Letters in the chain. ‘With the aid’ with the help of it, it arouses the Remembrance with regard to itself; ‘the cognitions leading up to, and apprehending, it’, ‘it’ stands for the Letter; |
teṣāṃ varṇānāṃ, tāni vā samutthāpakagrāhiṇi, tat samutthāpakagrāhiṇi {iti} paścāt {tatpuruṣaḥ karmadhārayo vā / | this is to be treated as a Copulative Compound; or even as a Tatpuruṣa or Karmadhāraya and in relation to these cognitions, these are ‘effects’; |
samutthāpakānyapekṣya janyateti /} grāhīṭabhavasmṛtijñātyana{rūpāṇya---pekṣya hetuteti / | but they are ‘causes’ in relation to the subsequent cognitions and remembrances. |
evamānupūrvimarthāntarabhūtāṃ nirākṛtya vaiyākaraṇādyupakalpitaṃ dhvanibhyo 'rthāntarabhūtaṃ vācakaṃ śabdātmānaṃ sphoṭamanyeti {dya ni---} rācikīrṣannā{ha} ata evetyādi // | Having thus discarded the idea of the ‘order’ being something different (from the Letters or Words), the Author proceeds next to discard the view of the Grammarians that the ‘word’ that is expressive is of the nature of a ‘8phoṭa’, which is something entirely different from the Letter-sounds, by the sentence beginning with ‘Consequently’. |
sa hyarthapratipattyarthaṃ śābdikaiḥ parikalpitaḥ / varṇā eva ca tacchaktā ityanarthāsya kalpanā // [p.721] | The ‘sphoṭa’ has been assumed by the grammarians for the purpose of explaining the cognition of the meanings of words. But the letters themselves being competent to express the meaning of words, the assuming of the said sphoṭa is futile. |
dṛśyasyādṛṣṭitaścāsya nāstitādhyavasīyate / adṛśyatve tu naivāyaṃ liṅavajjñāpako bhavet // | As it would be perceptible (if it existed), but is not perceived, it is concluded that it does not exist. If it is imperceptible, then it cannot be indicative, like the inferential indicative (which is effective only when perceived). |
nahi varṇebhyo vyatirikto{nityaḥ} sa{a---}kalaḥ śabdātmā śro{śrau---}tre ce{ta}si pratibhāsamānaḥ samālakṣyate / | [There is a lacuna in the text of the Commentary]. ‘As it would be perceptible, etc. etc.’ Nothing apart from the Letters, in the form of Word, eternal and indivisible, is ever perceived by auditory perception. |
pratyuta tasya nāsti{tā} siddhyet / | On the contrary, what is clearly proved is the fact that no such ‘Sphoṭa’ exists at all. |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tathāpi bhāvadharmo vā hetur bhaved abhāvadharmo vā ubhayadharmo veti vikalpāḥ / | If the second view is accepted.......[the reference is clearly to the lacuna] the cause could be either positive or negative or both positive and negative, these are the only alternatives possible. |
ādye pakṣe sphoṭākhyadharmidharmo vā heturbhavet, anyadharmidharmo vā / | the Cause could be either the property of what is called ‘Sphoṭa’, or that of something else. |
tatra tasyaiva sphoṭākhyasya dharmiṇo 'siddhatvān na ....... | It cannot be the former, as the Sphoṭa itself has been shown to be non-existent. |
anyadharmo 'pi na hetu{ra}pakṣadharmatvāt / | Nor could it be the property of something else; because it could not subsist in the ‘subject’; |
yathā bāhupadaṃ caya{ghaṭa---}syānityatvādau sādhe / | just like the ‘arms and feet’ in the proving of the non-eternality of the Jar (?). |
abhāvadharmo 'pi na bhavati / | Nor could the cause be the property of something negative; |
tasya viparītasādhakatvāt / | as that could prove only the contrary of what is desired. |
ubhayadharmo 'pi na bhavati / | Nor could it be both positive and negative; |
tasya vyabhicāritvāt / | as that is always ‘inconclusive’. |
svabhāvahetor vā tasya siddhir bhavetkāryahetor vā / | Then again, is the ‘Sphoṭa’ proved by a Reason based upon the nature of the thing? Or by one based upon the Causal Relationship? The former view cannot be right; |
na tāvad ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, tasyātīndriyatvāt tatsvabhāvāsiddheḥ / | because as it is beyond the senses, its nature cannot be known; |
siddhau vā vyartho hetuḥ paryeṣaṇe, yat tatsvabhāvasya siddhatvāt / | if it were known, there would be no point in seeking for the proof of its existence; as its nature would be already known; |
tadarthatvāc ca prayāsasya / | and the whole attempt is to prove its existence and nature. |
nāpi dvitīyaḥ pakṣo 'tīndriyeṇa saha kāryakāraṇabhāvāsiddheḥ / | Nor is the second view acceptable, because no causal relation can be known in relation to what is beyond the senses. |
athāpi syāt yathā śrotrādijñānasya kādācitkatvena kāraṇāntarasāpekṣatvasiddhau sāmarthyācchrotrāder indriyasya siddhir bhavati, tathātrāpyarthapratītiṃ dharmiṇīṃ kṛtvā, varṇāviśeṣe 'pi saro rasa ityādāvarthapratītibhedāt sphoṭākhyaṃ kāraṇāntaraṃ kalpayiṣyāma iti / | It might be argued as follows: “In the case of the Auditory and other perceptions, when it is found that they appear only occasionally, it is concluded that they are dependent upon other causes also; and from that, by implication, it is concluded that there is the Auditory organ; in the same manner, in the case in question, the comprehension of meaning being the ‘subject’, it is found that even when the Letters are the same, as in the case of the words ‘sara’ and ‘rasa’ the meanings comprehended are different; from which we shall infer the presence of another Cause, in the shape of the ‘Sphoṭa’”. |
etadapyasamyak / | This also cannot be right; |
varṇāviśeṣasyāsiddhatvāt / | because nothing apart from the Letters is known. |
tathā hi sāmpratam eva pratipāditam varṇā eva pratipadaṃ bhinnāḥ kāryakāraṇabhedād arthapratītau samarthā ityanarthākalpaneti / evam anumeyatve doṣā vācyā ityabhiprāyaḥ / | As it has just been established that it is the Letters themselves which, varying in each Word, become capable of bringing about the comprehension of the meaning, through the variations in the relation of Cause and Effect. So that the assumption in question is entirely futile. It is also implied that the same objections apply also to the view that the existence of the ‘Sphoṭa’ can be inferred. |
athāpi syān nāsāvanumeyaḥ, kiṃ tarhi ---, atyantādṛśya ity āha adṛśyatve tu naivāyam iti / yathā liṅgam ajñātaṃ jñāpakaṃ na bhavati tadvadayam api syād ajñātatvāt // | It might be argued that “it is not to be inferred, but it is absolutely imperceptible”. The answer to that is ‘If it is imperceptible, etc. etc.’ Just as the inferential Indicative, while it is itself unknown, does not bring about any cognition, so this Sphoṭa also, while itself unknown, cannot bring about the comprehension of the meaning. |
sattāmātreṇa tajjñānaṃ hetubhāvavyavasthiteḥ / | Be it be urged that “the cognition follows from its mere existence; |
tasya jñāpakateṣṭā cennetravat sarvadā bhavet // | then, the answer is that, in that case, the said cognition would be there at all times; |
sa{ṅketā}navabodhe 'pi varṇānām aśrutāvapi / tadbhāvyartheṣu vijñānaṃ śaktakāraṇasannidheḥ // | even when there is no knowledge of the convention, and there is no hearing of the letters, there would be cognition proceeding from the sphoṭa, as its efficient cause would be there always; |
tathā hi nityasattvo 'yaṃ nacāpekṣāsya kācana / | as this entity (sphoṭa) is eternal. (According to the grammarian), and it has no need for anything else. |
dhvanisaṃketavarṇaiś ca tadvyaktir nāpyadarśanāt // | Nor can there be ‘manifestation’ of it by articulation or convention or letters; as it is never perceived; |
jñānaṃ hi vyaktirityāhus tajjñānaṃ naca vidyate / | it is cognition itself that is spoken of as ‘manifestation’ and there is no cognition of it. |
tato nirarthakaivāsya vyañjakasyāpi kalpanā // | Hence it follows that the assumption of the ‘manifester’ of the sphoṭa is also futile. |
atha sattāmātreṇa cakṣurādīndriyavadajñāto 'pyarthapratītihetur bhavet / | It might be argued that “by its mere existence, the Sphoṭa would be the cause of the comprehension of meanings, just as the visual and other organs are the cause of the cognition of things |
evaṃ tarhi tadbhāvi jñānaṃ sarvadā bhavet / | But in that case, the cognition proceeding from it should be there always; |
tathā saṅketagrahaṇādikamantareṇa tadbhāvi jñānaṃ syāt / | so that even without any idea of the Convention, etc. bearing upon the Word, the comprehension of its meaning would be there. |
etadeva saṅketetyādi pradarśayati / tatropapattim āha tathāhīti / | This is what is pointed out by the words ‘Even when there is, etc. etc.’ The reason in support of this is next stated in the words ‘As this entity is eternal, etc. etc.’. |
athāpi syāt saṅketābhivyakta evāsāvarthapratītiheturiṣṭo na sattāmātreṇa, tena na bhavati yathoktadoṣaprasaṅga ity āha dhvanisaṅketavarṇair ityādi / | It might be argued that “It is only when the Sphoṭa has been manifested that it is held to be the cause of the comprehension of the meaning, and not by its mere presence; so that the difficulty pointed out does not arise The answer to this is ‘Nor can there be manifestation, etc. etc.’; |
adarśanāditi / anupalabdheḥ / | ‘as it is never perceived’ never cognised; |
adṛśyatvenābhimatatvāc ca / | because it has been held to be imperceptible. |
etad eva jñānaṃ hītyādinā darśayati // syād etat bhāsamāno na lakṣyata ityetad asiddham / | This same idea is further reiterated by the words ‘there is no cognition of it, etc. etc.’, (2707-2710) |
tathā hi pūrvapūrvavarṇāhitasaṃskārāyām āvṛttasaṃskāraparipākāyāṃ buddhau śabdo 'kalaḥ pratibhāsata evetyāha nādenetyādi / | “What happens is that the articulation plants the seed in consciousness, and it becomes developed by the last articulation, and therefore the word appears in the consciousness”. |
ityetad api tenātra nirnimittaṃ prakalpitam / | This assumption also is made without reason. |
tasyām api na śabdo 'nyo bhāsamāno hi lakṣyate // | Because even so, the word is not perceived to appear as anything different (from the letters). |
āvṛttaḥ sañjātaḥ sarvabuddhyāhitaḥ saṃskāraparipāko yasyāṃ buddhau sā tathoktā / | ‘Āvṛttaḥ’ become; the impressions produced by the cognitions of all the Letters become developed in Consciousness. |
nirnimittam iti varṇā eva hi yathānubhavaṃ paścāt saṅkalanāpratyayena smārtenāvasīyanta ityabhiprāyaḥ / | ‘Without reason’. What is meant is that what happens is that the Letters themselves, after the cognition of each, become subsequently included under the compounded cognition appearing in the form of Remembrance. |
tathā hi naivāntyavarṇapratipatter ūrdhvamanyamakalaṃ śabdātmānamupalakṣayāmo nāpi svayam ayaṃ vaktā vibhāvayati / | Because as a matter of fact, we do not perceive, nor does the Speaker perceive, any Word as an indivisible whole, after the last letter has been cognised. |
kevalam evaṃ yadi syāt sādhu me syād iti kalyāṇakāmatāmūḍham atiratyā{ntyā---}yāṃ buddhau samāptakālaḥ śabdo bhavatīti svapnāyate // | It is a mere dream on the part of the Grammarian, arising from the bewildered feeling that the idea of such word as a whole appearing in Consciousness would make things nice for him. |
janyatāṃ vyajyatāṃ vāpi dhvanibhiḥ kramabhāvibhiḥ / ye 'pi sphoṭasya manyante kramas teṣāṃ virudhyate // | Whether the sphoṭa is produced or manifested by the articulations which appear in succession, such succession is incompatible with the view of those who uphold the sphoṭa. |
nahi krameṇa yujyete vyaktijātī niraṃśake / | When the sphoṭa is indivisible (without parts), there can be neither manifestation nor production of it in succession. |
ekarūpābahir bhāvāt te syātāṃ sarvathaiva hi // | As they would never lie outside the one and the same form, they would be there for all. |
vaibhāṣikā hi kecit padakāryābhidhānena vākyasphoṭamanityatvājjanyaṃ pratipannāḥ / | Some Vaibhāṣikas hold that there is ‘Sphoṭa’ of Sentences also, which is produced as the effect of words. |
niraṃśaka iti / niravayave vastuni / | ‘It is indivisible’ i.e. an entity without component parts. |
ekasmād rūpājjñātād vyaktādvājātāvyaktābhimatasyāpi rūpasyābahir bhāvāt / | ‘They would never lie, etc.’ From the one form produced or manifested what is held to be unproduced or unmanifested could not be different. |
te jātivyaktī sarvasyaiva syātām / | ‘They’ i.e. the production and the manifestation, would be there for all; |
tataś ca śeṣavarṇādiprayogavaiyarthyaṃ syāt // | so that there would be no need for the use of any other letters or words at all. |
sāṃśatve 'pi yathā varṇāḥ krameṇa pratipādakāḥ / sphoṭāṃśā api kiṃ naivaṃ kimadṛṣṭāḥ prakalpitāḥ // | Even if the sphoṭa is with parts (divisible), as the letters expressing them would do so only in succession, why should not the sphoṭa-parts also be likewise? Why should unseen ones be assumed? (2715) |
te hi sphoṭāṃśāḥ pratyekamanarthakā vā syuḥ sārthakā vā / prathame pakṣe kramabhāvitvād varṇātsa{tma ---}vadapratipādakatvaprasaṅgaḥ / | Would each one of the Sphoṭa-parts be without meaning (inexpressive) or with meaning (expressive)? If the former, then, as those parts would be appearing in succession, the whole Sphoṭa like Letters would be inexpressive. Its expressiveness might be assumed; |
kalpitaṃ ca vācakatvaṃ syāt atādrūpye tādrūpyāt / | Because the expressive sentence is said to have one form only, and its components are inexpressive; |
tathā hi arthavānekātmā vākyamucyate, vā {nā---}vayavāḥ svayam anarthakāḥ, teṣu sa ātmā kalpanāropitaḥ syāt, māṇavakādiṣu siṃhatādivat / | hence the expressive character of these latter could be only assumed or figurative, like the character of the Lion attributed to the Boy. The expressiveness thus being assumed, it is far better to regard the component letters themselves as expressive, rather than assume the unseen Sphoṭa-parts, to no purpose. |
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