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TS 2740 | [verses 2740-2742]: |
nityanityārthasambaddhacodanājanitā matiḥ / | The Injunction is itself eternal, and is related to the eternal denotation, in the shape of the ‘Universal’; |
pakṣaś ced āśrayāsiddhiḥ paraṃ praty anuṣajyate // | if that is the ‘Subject’, then the Probans is one that cannot be admitted by the other party. |
tādavasthyaṃ ca nityatvaṃ tadanyatvam anityatā / | ‘Eternality’ consists in continuing in the same condition; and the opposite of this is ‘non-eternality’. |
tādavasthyānivṛttau hi kimavasthitam iṣyate // | in the continuing in the same condition ceases, what is left there that could be held to be ‘extant’? (2743) |
TS 2742 kimavasthitam iṣyata iti / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2743 above] |
avasthāyā avasthāturavyatirekāt, tannivṛttau sāmarthyāt tasyāpi nivṛttiḥ / | ‘What is left, etc. etc.’ The ‘condition’ is not anything different from the entity to which it belongs; hence when the condition has ceased, the entity also, as a consequence, ceases. |
anyathā yadekayogakṣemaṃ na bhavati tat kathaṃ tat svabhāvaṃ yuktam iti bhāvaḥ. | Otherwise, if one thing does not share the fate of another, it cannot be right to say that it is of the same nature as the other. |
svanirbhāsīndriyajñānahetur aindriyako bhavet / na ca nitye 'sti hetutvam iti tad dhi prasādhitam // | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2744, that “If the Reason that is put forward is only amenability to sense-organs, then it is clearly fallacious, etc. etc.”. |
on TS 2745 kāryā caindriyakatvādāvityādāvāha sarveṣām ityādi / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2744 above] ‘Already’ under the chapter dealing with the ‘Universal (2744) |
sarveṣāṃ ca prasiddheyam īdṛgarthasya hetutā / dhūmādāvapi sarvatra vikalpo 'yaṃ samo 'nyathā // | “If there is no ‘fallaciousness’, in view of the ‘Universal’, even so, having its negation suspected, the Reason would be Inconclusive”. |
īdṛk cāsāvarthaśceti tathoktaḥ, īdṛgiti / | That object is spoken of as ‘amenable to the senses’ which serves as the cause of that Sense-perception which envisages that object; |
avicāraramaṇīyaḥ / | in the case of an eternal entity, however, no efficient activity is possible, either successively or Simultaneously. |
anyathā dhūmādāvapi vikalpaḥ śakyate kartum kim aindriyako dhūmo liṅgatvenopātta, āhosvid vijñānaprakṛtikālādipariṇāmaḥ, kiṃvāvayavī paramāṇubhir ārabdho 'nārabdho vetyādi{:} vikalpo{lpe---} 'nyatarasiddhatādidoṣaḥ syāt // | If that were not so, then even in regard to Smoke (as the cause of the Inferential Cognition of Fire), the speculation could be started, as Is the smoke mentioned as the Reason something that is amenable to the Senses? Or is it only a product of ‘Idea’ or ‘Primordial Matter’ or ‘Time’ and so forth? Is it a composite made up of Atoms? Or is it not so composed at all? And in view of such speculations, the ‘Smoke’ as the Reason would become ‘inadmissible’ by one party or the other. |
prayatnānantarajñānaṃ kṛtakānityasādhanam ityatrāha prayatnetyādi / prayatnānantarajñānakāryārambhakatā naca / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2322, that “Being perceived as following from effort has been adduced as a Reason for the Word being a product and non-eternal; this is Inconclusive, etc. etc.”. |
prayatnānatarajñānabhavaṃ kāryaṃ tasyārambhakatā pratisaṅkhyādinodhāder na siddheti sambandhaḥ / | ‘Cognition following from effort’ is the effect, of which the producer or cause, is said to be ‘Intentional Destruction’, etc.; but these are not admitted to be such cause. |
yadi hi sautrāntikanayena pratisaṅkhyādinirodhādinā vyabhicāra, udbhāvyate / | If it is in accordance with the view of the Sautrāntikas that the Inconclusiveness of our Reason is urged by the Mīmāṃsaka, then such ‘Inconclusiveness’ cannot be admitted; |
tadā na siddho vyabhicāras teṣāṃ matena pratisaṅkhyānirodhādeḥ saṃvṛtisattvāt / | because, according to those same philosophers, the ‘Intentional Destruction’, etc. have a purely ‘illusory’ existence and what is illusory cannot be productive of any effect; |
naca sāṃvṛtaṃ kasyacit kāryasyārambhakaṃ yuktaṃ tallakṣaṇahāniprasaṅgāt / | because what is capable of effective action must be real, and everything other than this must be illusory; |
tathā hi yadarthakriyākāri tadeva paramārthas tadanyat tu saṃvṛtisaditi paramārthasaṃvṛtisator lakṣaṇam // | such are the characteristics of reality and illusoriness (unreality). |
pratisaṅkhyānirodho yo visaṃyogaḥ pṛthak pṛthak // utpādātyantavighno 'nyo nirodho 'pratisaṅkhyayā / | If the ‘Inconclusiveness’ urged is from the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣikas, even so, these people do not regard ‘Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha’ and the rest as of the nature of ‘Destruction’, as you have represented them to be. |
tasmād ajñātasiddhāntāḥ plavante 'līkamāninaḥ // | This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verses 2748-2749 above] |
nirodhād iti / pratisaṅkhyāpratisaṅkhyānirodhau / | ‘The two nirodhas’ i.e. Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha and Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha’. |
kīdṛśau nāmeṣṭavityāha sāśravair yata iti / | Question: “In what form then are they regarded?” |
sakleśair vastubhir yo vibhāgaḥ sa pratisaṅkhyayā prajñayā prāpyata iti kṛtvā [p.731] pratisaṅkhyānirodha ucyate, saca pratisaṃyogidravyaṃ bhinnaḥ, ata evāha pṛthak pṛthagiti / | Answer: ‘Sāśrayaiḥ, etc. etc.’ There is ‘nirodha’ ‘dissociation’ from Impurities which is attained by ‘pratisaṇkhyā’, wisdom; hence this is called ‘Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha’, And this varies with each associated object; |
yāvanti hi saṃyogindriyāṇi tāvanti visaṃyogadravyāṇīti siddhāntāt / apratisaṅkhyānirodhas tu anāgatānāṃ dharmāṇām utpādasyātyantavighnabhūto dharmo visaṃyogād anyo yaḥ sa ucyate / | hence the text has added the phrase ‘one after the other’, The idea is that as many of ‘associated’ factors there are, so many are the ‘dissociated’ factors also. As regards the ‘apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha’, this is the name given to that Dissociation which serves as an absolute bar against future impurities. |
sa ca na pratisaṅkhyayā labhyate / | This is due, not to wisdom, but, to the inefficiency of the causal factors; |
kiṃ tarhi pratyayavaikalyādato 'pratisaṅkhyānirodha ucyate / | that is the reason why it is called ‘Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha’. This has been thus declared ‘Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha consists in dissociation one after the other; |
"pratisaṅkhyānirodho yo visaṃyogaḥ pṛthak pṛthak / utpādātyantavighno 'nyo nirodho 'pratisaṅkhyayā" // | the other, Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha, consists in the absolute bar to the birth of the impurities (2748-2749) Even if these were of the nature of ‘Destruction’, there is no ‘falsity’ or ‘Inconclusiveness’ in our Reason. |
iti //2748- | This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verse 2750 next] |
bhavennāma nāsvabhāvau, tathāpi na vyabhicāra ityādarśayann āha nāsvabhāvādityādi / | Even if these were of the nature of ‘Destruction’, there is no ‘falsity’ or ‘Inconclusiveness’ in our Reason. |
kapālālokarāśyādi tathājñānanibandhanam // | This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verse 2750 above] |
prayatnānantarīyakāviti / neti sambandhaḥ / | ‘Prayatnā, etc. etc.’ This compound is to be construed with ‘na’. |
kutaḥ asvabhāvāt / | “Why?” |
tathā hi vastusattāpratiṣedhamātraṃ nāśaḥ, ākāśaṃ ca spraṣṭavyābhāvamātram, tataścaitau svanāśau dvāvapi niḥsvabhāvau, tat kathamanayoḥ prayatnāntarīyakatā bhavet, svabhāvasyaivārthakriyākāritvāt / | ‘Because they are entirely devoid of character’, Because ‘Destruction’ consists merely in the negation of the existence of things, and ‘Ākāśa’ consists merely in the negation of Tangibility; hence both these Ākāśa and Destruction, are devoid of character, featureless. How then can they be following after effort? As it is only character that can be capable of effective action. |
kimidānīṃ tarhi vināśādivijñānanibandhanam ity āha kapāletyādi / | Question: “What then is the basis of the idea of the Destruction, etc.?” Answer: ‘The pieces, etc. etc.’ ‘mass of light’; |
ādiśabdena tamorāśigrahaṇam // | ‘and so forth’ includes mass of darkness also. |
yaduktam aviśeṣe 'pi nānityaṃ na nityaṃ vastu tanmametyādi / | It has been urged by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2333, that “If it is indefinite, then such a thing cannot be either entirely eternal or entirely non-eternal, etc. etc.”. |
tatrāha ekasyetyādi / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2751 above] |
anityatāvikalpyaivam ityādāvāha tādavasthetyādi / tādavasthyapratikṣepamātraṃ cānityate 'psitā / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2335, that “In the same manner the exact nature of non-eternality also has to be considered, etc. etc.”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2752 above] |
tādavasthyapratiṣedhamātram evānityatā sādhyatveneṣṭā, tatrāpi pradīpa udāharaṇaṃ sādhyānvitamastyeveti kutaḥ sādhyahīnatā dṛṣṭāntasya // | The ‘non-eternality’ that is meant to be our Probandum is that which is merely of the nature of the negation of the existing state; and in corroboration of this, we have the instance of the Lamp and such things. Wherefore then can our Corroborative Instance be ‘devoid of the Probandum’? (2752) |
jvālāder ityādinā paramatena pradīpāder api dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyahīnatāmāśaṅkate | In the following texts the Author puts forward from the Opponent’s standpoint the objection that the Instance of the Lamp also is ‘devoid of the Probandum’: [see verses 2753-2755 above] The portions of the Flame pass on from point to point, very quickly; |
jvālāder api nāśitvaṃ natvasiddhaṃ pratikṣaṇam / | and it does not perish in a moment. Question: Why do not they all move along at one and the same time? Answer: [see verse 2756 next] |
[p.732] | [verse 2756]: |
atha yugapat kasmāt sarve na visarpantītyāha uttarāvayavair ityādi / | Question: Why do not they all move along at one and the same time? Answer: [see verse 2756 above] |
nanu yadi prasarpaṇadharmāṇas te tat samīpavarti tṛṇatūlādi kiṃ na dahantītyāha | Question: If the said portions of the Flame are capable of moving about, why do not they burn the grass or cotton that lies near it? |
saṃkrāntāvapītyādi / | Answer: [see verse 2757a above] |
saṃhatāvasthāyām eva upalabdhavṛttayo bhavanti / natu viprakīrṇāvasthāyām iti bhāvaḥ / | [verse 2757a]: What is meant is that it is only when the Flame is in the massed form that it becomes operative, not when it is scattered about. (2757a) |
tadetad ityādinā pratividhatte / | The answer to the above is as follows: [see verse 2757b above] |
dāhavṛttiprasaṅgo 'yaṃ pūrvavan na nivartate // | Granting (for the sake of argument) what the other party has said, the Author points out defects in their argument: [see verse 2758 above] |
avyāhataśaktīnām iti jvālādyavayavānām / | [verse 2758]: ‘So long as, etc.’ of the parts of the Flame. |
pūrvavad iti saṃhatāvasthadaviśeṣāt // | ‘As before’ as in the massed state; there being no difference between the flame in the two states. |
atha viśeṣo 'bhyupagamyate tadā nityatvahāniprasaṅgo durnivāra iti darśayati anyathetyādi / | If it is admitted that there is difference in the Flame in the two states, then the loss of eternality becomes inevitable. This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verse 2759 above] |
subodham // | This is easily understood. |
[p.733] yaduktam "sambandhākaraṇānyāyād vaktavyā vākyanityatā" iti, tatrāha sambandhasya cetyādi / sambandhasya ca nityatvaṃ pratiṣiddhaṃ purā tataḥ / | [verse 2760]: It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2339 that “The eternality of the Sentence may be asserted in the same manner as that of the Relationship (between Word and Meaning)”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2760 above] |
bhavanmatena vākyam eva na sambhavati, yasya tvayā nityatvaṃ prasādhyata iti manyamāno vākyaṃ vicārayann āha katamasyetyādi / | With the idea that under your (Mīmāṃsaka’s) view, the sentence itself is impossible, of which you are seeking to prove the eternality, the author proceeds to discuss the nature of the Sentence [see verse 2761 above] |
{kiṃ}kadācid varṇamātramevāviśiṣṭaṃ vākyaṃ syāt / yadvā varṇā eva viśiṣṭāḥ kramavartino vākyam / | (1) Is the ‘Sentence’ only the Letters pure and simple, without any qualifications? Or (2) is it the Letters with the qualification of appearing in a certain order of sequence? Or (3) is it something different from the |
athavā varṇebhyo bhedinaḥ sphoṭākhyasya vākyatvam iti pakṣatrayam // | Letters, in the form of Sphoṭa? There are these three possible views. |
varṇānāṃ kramaśūnyānāṃ vācakatvaṃ na vidyate / | Letters, devoid of order of sequence, cannot be expressive; |
nātaste tādṛśā vākyaṃ kramo 'pyeṣāṃ na vidyate // | hence such letters cannot constitute the ‘sentence (2762) Nor can the letters have an order of sequence. |
vyāpter nityatayā caiṣāṃ deśakālakramo na hi / lipivat phalapuṣpādibhedavaccopapadyate // | as they are all-pervading and eternal, there cannot be any sequence in them of either time or place, like what there is in the letters reduced to writing, or in the case of fruits and flowers. |
svābhāvike krame caiṣāṃ sara ityevasambhavet / natu syād rasa ityādiḥ sthitakramavirodhataḥ // | If the order of sequence were inherent in the letters themselves, then they would always be in the form ‘sa-ra’, never in the form ‘rasa’; as the latter would be incompatible with the former order, which is eternal. |
sthitā rephādayaścānye naivānyakramayoginaḥ / jāyante vāyuto varṇā nityatvaikatvasādhanam // | The letter ‘ra’ that might be elsewhere cannot be said to appear in any other order of sequence, from out of air. Because every one of the letters has been declared to be one and eternal. |
anyathā pratyabhijñānaṃ nityatvaikatvasādhanam / vyabhicāri tvayaivoktaṃ bhaved bhede 'pi vartanāt // | If it were not so, then ‘recognition’ put forward by you as a reason for eternality’ and ‘oneness’ would be inconclusive; as it would be present even when the letters are diverse. |
dvitīye 'pi pakṣe prāha kramo 'pyeṣāṃ na vidyata iti / | The objections against the second view (that the Sentence consists in the Letters arranged in a certain order) are stated in the following Texts: [see verses 2763-2766 above] |
tathā hi dvividha eva bhāvānāṃ kramaḥ, deśakṛto vā pipīlikālipyakṣarādivat, kālakṛto vā yathā bījāṅkurakāṇḍapuṣpaphalādīnām, na tāvad ādyaḥ kramo varṇānāṃ sambhavati, vyāpteḥ, sarvagatatvād varṇānām, nahyākāśavat sakaladeśāvaṣṭambhenāvasthitasya deśavicchedakṛtaḥ kramo [p.734] yuktaḥ, sarveṣām ekanabhodeśāvasthānāt / | [verses 2763-2766]: ‘Nor can the Letters, etc. etc.’ Because the order of sequence among things can be of only two kinds spacial and chronological; there is order of sequence in space, as in the Letters reduced to writing; and there is order of sequence in Time as in the case of the series consisting of the seed-sprout-trunk flower-fruit. The first kind of sequence (that is of space) is not possible in the case of Letters, because they are all-pervading; |
nāpi kālakṛtaḥ, nityatvena sarveṣāṃ samakālatvāt / | Nor can sequence in time belong to Letters; because, being eternal, they must be all synchronous. |
kiñca puruṣakṛto vā kramo bhavet svābhāviko vā / | Then again, the order of sequence could either be made by man or be inherent in the Letters. |
na tāvat puruṣakṛta iṣṭaḥ, vedasya pauruṣeyatvaprasaṅgāt / | It is not held to be due to man; as in that case the Veda would have to be regarded as the work of man. |
atha svābhāvikaḥ, tadā sara ityeva nityaṃ bhavet, na kadācid rasa iti / | If then, the sequence is inherent in the Letters, then the form would always be ‘sa-ra’, never ‘rasa’, |
nacāpi pratipadaṃ bhinnā varṇā ityabhyupeyam, pratyabhijñayā varṇānāṃ nityatvasya siddhatvāt / | Nor can it be admitted that the Letters appearing in different words are different; because Letters have been proved to be eternal on the ground of their being recognised as the same everywhere. |
tat pratiṣedhasyaiva ca sādhayitumiṣṭatvāt, anyathā pratyabhijñānaṃ vyabhicāri syāt // | And it is the denial of this sameness that would be asserted in the said proposition (that they are different in different words). Otherwise Recognition (as the reason for eternality) would be Inconclusive. |
athāpi syād abhivyaktikramas tarhi vākyaṃ bhaviṣyatītyāha nacetyādi / naca vyaktikramo vākyaṃ nitye vyaktiniṣedhanāt / | For this reason the eternality of the sentence cannot be due to its being related to the universal ‘sentence (2767) It might be argued that “the Sentence shall consist in the order of sequence in the manifestation (and appearance of the Letters) |
vākyatāyogatas tasmānnityatvaṃ nopapadyate // caśabdānnāpi varṇebhyo bhinnaṃ sphoṭākhyaṃ vākyam iti sūcayati / tasya mīmāṃsakair eva nirastatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 2767 above] The particle ‘ca’ implies that the Sentence cannot consist of the Sphoṭa as something different from the Letters; the idea being that that idea has been rejected by the Mīmāṃsakas themselves. |
nitye vyaktiniṣedhanād iti / nityasya vyakter niṣiddhatvād ity arthaḥ // | ‘Nitye vyakti, etc. etc.’ That is, it having been shown that there can be no ‘manifestation’ of what is eternal. |
yathā vṛddhādayaḥ śabdā icchāviracitārthakāḥ / svargayāgādayaḥ śabdāḥ sambhāvyante tathaiva ca // | Just as the technical words like ‘vṛddhi’ have their meanings created by the whim of man, so may also be regarded to be the case with words like ‘svarga’, ‘yāga’ and so forth. |
nacotpādyakathārūpanāṭakākhyāyikādiṣu / nityaḥ śabdārthasambandho vāstavo 'sti vivakṣitaḥ // | In the case of such works of men as stories, dramas and novels, the connection between words and meanings is never meant to be real and eternal. |
icchayā racito 'rtho yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2768-2769 above] |
utpādyā svayam apūrvaiva puruṣeṇa yā kathā mahāśvetādikā, saiva rūpaṃsvabhāvo yeṣāṃ nāṭakākhyāyikādīnāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | ‘Icchāracita, etc.’ Whose meanings have been created by the wish of man. ‘Utpādya’ The unheard of story created by the writer, like that of Mahāśvetā; and the drama, etc. which also have the same character. |
naca teṣu nityaḥ śabdārthasambandho 'sti nivakṣitaḥ śaktilakṣaṇas tadvad vede 'pisambhāvyata iti bhāvaḥ // | In the case of these the connection between words and their meanings is not. meant to be eternal, in the shape of an inherent potency. The same may be regarded to be the case with the Veda also. |
tatrāpītyādinā paramatena dṛṣṭāntāsiddhimāśaṅkate / | This is the sense of the Text. |
tatrāpi śaktinityatvaṃ niyogasya tvanityatā / | “In the case of the works cited also, the potency is eternal; |
tadvaśād eva nityāyāṃ śaktau bhrāntiḥ pravartate // | and it is on account of this latter fact that there arise doubts regarding the eternal potency.” (2770) |
tatrāpyutpādyakathādiṣu nityā śaktiriṣṭaiva, kintvasatyevārthe yo niyogaḥ puruṣaiḥ kriyate, so 'nityas tadvaśād eva nityāyāṃ śaktau pratītivibhramo bhavati, tasmād asiddho dṛṣṭānta iti // | In the case of the said stories, etc. also, the potency is held to be eternal. But the particular use of the words which is made even when the things spoken of are not real, which is made by men, is what is not-eterrnal; and it is by reason of this that there arise doubts regarding the eternal potency. Hence the corroborative Instance cited (by the Buddhist) is ‘inadmissible’, (2770) |
[p.735] nanvityādinā pratividhatte / | The answer to the above is as follows: [see verse 2771 next] |
nanu bāhye na tatrāsti vyaktiḥ kvārthe prakalpyate / vikalpapratibimbe cet tadvadvede 'pi śaṅkyate // | In reality, the thing spoken of in these works has no real existence outside; wherein then could the meaning be attributed? If it be said that “the meaning is attributed to the reflected conceptual content”, then, the same may be said regarding the Veda also. |
bāhya iti / mahāśvetādirity arthaḥ // | ‘Existence outside’ Things like Mahāśvetā have had no real existence in the external world. |
atīndriyārthasambandhāṃ ko vā śaktiṃ prapadyate / nāto vede niyogo 'pi narāyattaḥ prakalpyate // | Who can ever cognise the potency, in the form of the connection between the word and its meaning? That is why in the case of the Veda, even the use is not regarded as due to human agency. |
vṛddhebhyo naca tadbodhas te 'pi hyajñāḥ svataḥ sthitāḥ / | It could not be learnt from more experienced people; because, by themselves, these also are equally ignorant. |
sambhāvyā pratipattis tu vyākhyānāt puruṣāśrayāt // | the only cognition therefore that may be possible is through the explanations provided by men. |
anenaitadāha svayam eva bhavatā sāmarthyād darśitam, yathā yo 'yaṃ vedārthapratyayo bhavati sa puruṣāśrayād vyākhyānādeveti / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2772-2773 above] What is meant is as follows: By implication, you have yourself shown that the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda that there is proceeds only from the explanations provided by men. |
tathā hi prakṛtyaiva tāvat pūrvā{dapūrvai---}śaktir atīndriyārthaśritā, tataścātīndriyāyāṃ śaktau na puruṣakṛto niyogaḥ śabdasya sambhavati, nāpi vṛddhebhyas tasyāḥ pratītiḥ sambhavati, teṣāṃ sarveṣām evānabhijñatvāt, andhānām iva vacanād rūpaviśeṣapratītiḥ / | Because by its very nature, the potency rests in supersensuous things; hence the use or employment of the Word in regard to this potency cannot be due to man; nor can the cognition of it be derived from the more experienced people; because all these also are equally ignorant; |
tasmāt sāmarthyādiyam arthapratītiḥ puruṣavyākhyānādevāvatiṣṭhate gatyantarābhāvād iti // | the case therefore would be like the knowledge of Colour being obtained from blind men. Hence, by implication, it follows that the said cognition must be due to explanations provided by men; |
nanvityādinā paraścodayati / | The Opponent brings forward the following objection: [see verse 2774 next] |
nanu paryanuyogo 'yaṃ kṛtakepyāgame samaḥ / | “This objection is equally applicable to the scriptures composed (by persons).” (2774a) |
na tatra śraddhayā vṛtter arthasaṃśayato 'pi vā // | Not so; because to these (scriptures) people have recourse through faith and confidence, even in regard to things that are open to doubt. (2774b) |
nanvayaṃ sāmānyaḥ pauruṣeyeṣvapyāgameṣu prasaṅgaḥ / | The objection that has been urged is applicable also to those scriptures that have been composed (by Persons). |
tathā hi kimidānīntanāḥ parokṣadeśikānāṃ buddhādivacanānām arthaṃ yathābhiprāyaṃ pratiyanti, āhosvid viparyayam iti / | For instance, the question can reasonably be raised whether the ideas that modern people derive from the words of Buddha and others dealing with supersensuous things are in accordance with the intentions of those Persons, or the reverse. |
na tatretyādinā pratividhatte / | The answer to the above is as follows: [see verse 2774b above] |
tatreti / | [verse 2774b]: |
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