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sarvadā caiva puruṣāḥ prāyeṇānṛtāvādinaḥ / | [see verses 2793-2795 next] ‘At all times, men are mostly prone to telling lies; |
yathādyatve na visrambhas tathātītārthakīrtane // | just as there is no confidence in regard to things present, so also there is none regarding the description of past events’ (Ślokavārtika-sūtra 1. |
ityetena tvaduktena nyāyena ca na siddhyati / kartā kaścit kvacid granthe svāṃ kṛtiṃ kathayann api // | by this reason of your own, there can be no person recognised as the author of any work at all; even though he may be declaring it to be his own work. |
tataścāpauruṣeyeṣu satyāśā tyajyatām iyam / | Thus then, please abandon all hope in the truthfulness of the word which does not proceed from a personality; |
vedārthaviparītā hi teṣvarthāḥ pratipāditāḥ // | specially as in such words have been mentioned many things contrary to what has been said in the Veda. |
ityeteneti / | ‘By this reasoning, etc. etc.’. |
syād etad bhavatu sarveṣām apauruṣeyate [p.741] tyāha tataścetyādi / | i.e. the reasoning just stated. The following might be urged “Let all the Scriptures be such as are not the work of Personalities”. |
tataścāpauruṣeyatvaṃ satyārthaṃ na siddhyet / saugatādivacanenānaikāntikatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | The answer to that is ‘Thus then, etc. etc.’ That is, the mere fact of not being the work of Personality cannot prove the truthful character of the Revelation; |
tathā hi vedārthaviparītā nairātmyādayo bhavan matenāpramāṇopapannās teṣu saugatādiṣu vacaneṣu nirdiṣṭāḥ, tathā vaidikā api sambhāvyeran // evaṃ tāvad anaikāntikatvaṃ pratipāditam, idānīmiṣṭavighātakāditvād viruddhatvam asya pratipādayann āha apicetyādi / | Because these latter speak of many things such as ‘there is no Soul’ and so forth, which are contrary to what is said in the Yeda, and which, according to you, are not true. And it is just possible to suspect that the same may be the case with the words of the Veda also. Then again, in this way what would be proved would be only beginninglessness, not freedom from personal authorship. under the circumstances, if the Veda were regarded as not the work of any person, then the same may be said in regard to other revelations also. |
apicānāditā siddhyed evaṃ nānarasaṃśrayaḥ / | The ‘Inconclusiveness’ of the Mīmāṃsaka’s reasoning has been shown. |
tasmād akṛtakatve vā syād anyo 'pyāgamo 'kṛtaḥ // | The Author now proceeds to show that it is ‘Contradictory’ also, inasmuch as it demolishes what is desired by him [see verse 2796 above] |
tathāhyapauruṣeyatvam asya sādhayitum iṣṭam, tac ca na siddham, kiṃ tarhi anāditvamātram aniṣṭam eva siddhyati / | but what is proved by his reason is not this, but, merely the fact of its being without beginning. It might be argued that “when it has been proved that it is without beginning, then, by implication it also becomes proved that it is not the work of man; |
syād etat anāditve siddhe sāmarthyād akṛtakatvaṃ siddhyatyeva, nahi kṛtakasyānāditvaṃ yujyate tadityatrāha tasmād ityādi / tasmād anāditvādyadyatkṛtakatvaṃ syāt tadā pārasīkādivyavahārasyāpi syāt // | because what is the work of a person cannot be without beginning”. The answer to this is “Under the circumstances, etc, etc.” That is, on the ground of there being no beginning, if a Revelation were proved to be not the work of man, then the same may be said regarding the customs of the Pārasīkas and others (in whose case also, there has been no beginning). |
etad eva darśayati tathāhītyādi / | The same idea is further explained [see verse 2797 next] |
tathā hi pārasīkādivyavahārāḥ parāśrayāḥ / nāstikānāṃ ca siddhāntaḥ parasaṃskārabhāvikaḥ // | The customs of the Pārasīkas and others may be based upon others; and the doctrine of the Atheists also may have its source in the ideas of other people. |
parāśrayā iti parapuruṣasaṃksāreṇa pravṛttā ity arthaḥ / parasaṃskārabhāvika iti / parasaṃskāreṇa bhāvaḥ sa yasyāsti sa tathoktaḥ / | ‘Based upon others’ propounded through the ideas of other people. ‘Having their source in, etc. etc.’ i.e. that which has its source in the notions and impressions of other people. Or ‘that which is prone to be brought about by the impressions of other people’. |
parasaṃskāreṇa vā bhavituṃ śīlam asyeti parasaṃskārabhāvī, tataḥ svārthe ko vidheyaḥ / tathā hi ye 'pi tāvat svapratibhāracitasaṅketāḥ siddhāntāḥ, teṣām api yathāśrutārthavikalpavaśenaiva pravṛtteḥ parasaṃskārabalenaiva pravṛttiḥ prāge{syāde---}va prāyeṇa, yathā darśanavṛttīnāṃ lokavyavahārāṇām // | It would be so, because even those doctrines that have been propounded on the strength of the propounder’s own intuition, proceed on the basis of the objective conceptions handed down by other people; hence these also have their source in those same conceptions, just as is the case with the customs of people based entirely upon what is actually visible. Even if such freedom from authorship were proved, what good would that do to you? As the whole attempt of yours has been towards the establishing of truthfulness. |
bhavatu sarveṣām apauruṣeyatvam iti cedityāha īdṛśītyādi / | It might be argued that “all these may be regarded as free from human authorship”. |
avaitathyanimittaṃ hi yatno 'yaṃ bhavato 'khilaḥ // | ‘Such’ i.e. in regard to which there is likelihood of being untrue. |
kālatvapuruṣatvādau saṃdigdhavyatirekitā / | As regards the probans ‘being time’ and ‘being person’, the negative concomitance of these is doubtful; |
pūrvavat karaṇāśakter narāṇām aprasādhanāt // | because, as shown before, it has not been proved that man is incapable of doing the work in question. |
[p.742] vyakteś ca pratiṣiddhatvād vaktā kartaiva gamyatām / | the idea of ‘manifestation’ also has been rejected. hence the speaker himself should be regarded as the ‘author’ (maker). |
tat prayogadvaye 'pyuktaṃ sādhyaśūnyaṃ nidarśanam // | thus then, in both the arguments, the instance is devoid of the pro-bandums. |
sarveṣāṃ hi narāṇāṃ karaṇaśaktiprasādhanaṃ viparyaye hetor bādhakaṃ pramāṇam, tasya cānupadarśanāt sarvahetūnāṃ sādhyaviparyaye vyatirekaḥ saṃdigdhaṃityanaikāntikatā / | The fact that the incapacity of all men to compose the Veda has been proved, that would have served as the reason annulling the contrary conclusion; but as that incapacity has not been proved, the contrary of the Premiss remains in doubt. Hence the Reason becomes ‘Inconclusive’. |
pūrvavad iti / vedādhyayanavācyatvasādhanavat / | ‘As before’ in the case of the Reason ‘because it is spoken of as Vedic study’. |
sādhyaśūnyaṃ nidarśanam iti / vartamānakālavat prākṛtanaravadityetat // | ‘The Instance is devoid of the Probandum’, i.e. the instance cited in the shape of the ‘Common man of the present day’. |
naropadeśāpekṣatvāt kṛtakasya ca sādhanāt / svārthe vaktranapekṣatvaṃ dharmidṛṣṭāntayor na ca // | Because it is dependent upon the teaching of men, and because it has been proved to be the product of effort, therefore ‘freedom from the speaker’ does not reside in the ‘subject’, nor in the corroborative instance. |
dharmidṛṣṭāntayor iti / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 2801 above] |
sādhyadharmiṇi dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi cetyarthaḥ // tatkṛtaḥ pratyaya ityādāvāha nityatve 'stu ityādi / nityatve 'ste ca vākyasya dharmidṛṣṭāntayor api / nityavākyodbhavatvasya spaṣṭāsiddhiḥ pratīyate // | ‘In the Subject or in the Corroborative Instance,’ i.e. in that which has been mentioned as the ‘Minor Term’, or that which has been cited as the Corroborative Instance (in the argument put forward by the Mīmāṃsaka). The eternality of the sentence having been rejected, the character of ‘proceeding from the eternal sentence’ is clearly recognised as non-existent in the ‘subject’ and in the corroborative instance. |
itthaṃ cāpauruṣeyatve codanāyā aniścite / sandigdhāsiddhatā doṣaḥ paścimeṣvapi hetuṣu // | Thus, then the fact of the Vedic injunction not being the work of a person being uncertain, your subsequent reasons also are open to the charge of being doubtful hence inadmissible. |
atrāpi hetor asiddhatā dṛṣṭāntasya ca sādhyavikalatā pūrvavat / | Here also, as before, the Reason is ‘inadmissible’, and the Corroborative Instance is ‘devoid of the Probandum’. |
dharmidṛṣṭāntayor iti saptamī nityavākyodbhavatvasyodbhavatvasyetyetad apekṣā / | The Locative ending in the term ‘Dharmidṛṣṭāntayoḥ’ is with reference to the ‘character of proceeding from the eternal sentence’. |
vākyasyeti nityatva ityetad apekṣā sambandhaṣaṣṭhī / | ‘Vākyasya’ is to be construed with ‘nityatve’; the Genitive ending denoting relationship’. |
nityavākyodbhavatvasyetyasiddhyapekṣā ṣaṣṭhī / | ‘Nityavākyodbhavatvasya’ goes with ‘asiddhiḥ’. |
paścimeṣviti doṣavarjitaiḥ kāraṇair janyamānatvād ityādiṣu ca // | ‘Paścimeṣu’ the subsequent Reasons such as ‘being produced by causes free from defects’ and so forth. |
nityā tāvat svarūpeṇa tat kṛtāto matiḥ kutaḥ // nahi śīryata ityuktaḥ puruṣaś ca śrutāvalam / purastasyoditā bādhā suvyaktā tadasiddhatā // | When the ‘perpetual flux’ has been established, the veda, as something eternal by itself, becomes clearly discarded. How then can there be any cognition produced by it? It has certainly been declared in the veda often enough that ‘it does not perish’ in regard to the Puruṣa (spirit, soul); |
pratyakṣaṃ tatra tenāyaṃ bādhābhāvo 'vasīyate // | but the rejection of this has been clearly set forth above; |
etaduktaṃ bhavati / | hence the reason is clearly ‘inadmissible’. |
spaṣṭaṃ hi [p.743] hetubalapravṛttānumānataḥ sarvapadārthavyāpini kṣaṇabhaṅge prasādhite satiye 'yaṃ nityatvenābhyupagatā śrutiḥ sā tāvad budhyata iti svarūpagrahaṇam abhidheyavyudāsārtham / | “That which is eternal by itself becomes discarded” such is the construction. What is meant is as follows: It having been proved, by Inference based upon valid Reasons, that all things are subject to ‘Perpetual Flux’, the Veda, which has been held to be eternal, becomes discarded. ‘Svarupeṇa’, by itself, has been added with a view to exclude the subject-matter. |
tat kṛtāto matiḥ kuta iti / | ‘How can there be any Cognition produced by it?’ That is, it cannot be. |
naivetyarthaḥ / etanānāptāpraṇītoktijanyatvādityetasyāśrayāsiddhatoktā / | This means that the Reason ‘because it is brought about by assertions not‘proceeding from an unreliable person’ is Inadmissible, in respect of its substratum. |
bādhavarjanādityetasya ca svarūpato 'siddhatāṃ niścitāṃ darśayann āha nahi śīryata ityādi / aśīryo 'yaṃ nahi śīryate avināśī{vā} are ayam ātmeti vede paṭhyate / | The words ‘It has certainly been, etc. etc.’ show that the other Reason ‘because it is free from annulment’, is ‘inadmissible’ by itself. We read in the Veda that ‘being imperishable, it perisheth not’ and ‘Indestructible indeed is this Soul Of this Soul or Spirit, the rejection has been set forth in the chapter dealing with ‘No-Soul’, Hence the Reason is surely ‘inadmissible’, |
nanu ca codaneti kriyāyāḥ pravartakaṃ vacanam āhur iti vacanād vaidikaikadeśaviśeṣa eva codanocyate, na tu sarvo vedaḥ, codanājanitā{tu}buddhiḥ pakṣīkṛtā / | Says the Opponent: “There is the clear declaration (in the Śabara-Bhāṣya) that ‘Injunction is the name given to the assertion that prompts activity’; which shows that it is only a particular portion of the Veda that is called Injunction, not the whole Veda, And it is the ‘Cognition produced by Injunction’ that has been made the ‘Subject’ of our Reasoning. |
tasmād anyārthasya vedasya bādhāyām api na codanāyā bādheti hetoḥ siddhir eva / | Consequently, even though there may be rejection of the Veda in regard to other matters, there can be no rejection of the Injunction. |
naiṣa doṣaḥ codanāgrahaṇena kvacit sarvam eva vaidikaṃ vākyam ucyate, na tu sarvadā pravartakam eva / | This does not affect our position. In some place the entire Veda has been spoken of as ‘Codanā’ (Injunction), which name has not always been applied to the prompting Sentence only. |
anyathā na hiṃsyād bhūtyānītyetad vākyaṃ codanā na syāt, apravartakatvāt / | Otherwise, the sentence ‘One should not injure living beings’ would not be an Injunction; as it does not prompt to activity. |
yac coktaṃ bhāṣye ubhayam iha codanayā lakṣyate 'rtho 'narthaś ca iti, tad api viruddhyeta, na hi codanānarthe pravartayati, yena tayānartho lakṣyata iti syāt / | This also would be incompatible with the assertion in the Śabara-Bhāṣya “Both are here spoken of in the Injunction, that which is conducive to welfare as also that which is conducive to trouble”; because the Injunction does not prompt activity that leads to trouble, which would justify the assertion that ‘Injunction speaks of what is conducive to trouble |
kiṃ ca yad etad aparam uktaṃ bhāṣye viplavate khalvapi kaścit puruṣakṛtād vacanāt pratyayo natu vedavacanasya mithyāvasāye kiñcana pramāṇam astīti / | Then again, the Śabara-Bhāṣya says “The Cognition produced by the words of men is sometimes uncertain and wrong, but there is nothing to show that the Cognition produced by the Veda is wrong |
asya{nityasya---} tāvad bādhanāccodanāyām api bādhā sambhāvyamānā durvāraiva / | As the eternal Veda has been discarded, you cannot prevent the suspicion that the said rejection may apply to the Injunction also. |
tathā hi kumārilenoktam --- akartṛkatvasiddhyā ca hetutvaṃ sādhayiṣyate | As Kumārila has declared “The fact of the Veda being a means of Right Cognition shall be proved by the fact of its not being the work of any Person”. |
yathācākartṛkasyāpi nityapuruṣādiviṣayasya vedavacaso bādhā parisphuṭā samīkṣyate / | As a matter of fact, it is clearly seen that there is rejection of the assertions of the Veda relating to an eternal Soul, even though it may not be the work of a person; |
tathāgnihotrāt svargo bhavatītyādāvapi vā{sā---}śaṅkā durvārairveti sphuṭā tāvat sandigdhāsiddhatā pūrvoktaiva / ata eva punar nirvartya sandigdhasiddhatām eva draḍhayann āha karāmalakavadityādi / | further, in the case of such Vedic assertions as ‘Heaven follows from the performance of the Agnihotra’, the said suspicion (of falsity) is inevitable. Hence, as pointed out above, the Reason remains doubtful hence inadmissible. This is the reason why the Author reverts to his previous position and reaffirms the idea that the Reason is doubtful hence Inadmissible ‘If a man is capable of directly perceiving, etc, etc.’ |
tatreti / | hence it must be true”. |
deśakālanarāntare / | like the attachment of the Pārasīkas to their customs. |
avijñātatadarthāś ca pāpaniṣyandayogataḥ / tathaivāmī pravartante prāṇihiṃsādikalmaṣe // | Hence, like the Pārasīkas, those dull-witted persons also, ignorant of its meaning, have recourse to such sinful acts as the killing of animals and the like, under the influence of the fruition of their past wicked deeds. |
rūpam svarūpam, arthaḥ abhidheyaḥ, narāvijñātau rūpārthāvasyeti vigrahaḥ / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 2807-2808 above] ‘Rūpa’ form, text; ‘abhidheya’ subject-matter. |
[p.744] tatra rūpamavijñātam, kimayameva varṇo 'thānyo viśeṣa eva varṇakrama uta neti svataḥ parataś ca niścayāyogāt / | ‘That of which both these are unknown to men? There is ignorance of the ‘form’ of the Veda; as one cannot, either by himself, or with the help of others, determine whether this is the exact letter, or some other letter, in the Text. |
evam arthe 'pyaniścayo draṣṭavyaḥ / tataś ca tamobhūte niścayābhāvenānālokabhūtatvāt / | Similarly there is uncertainty regarding the subject-matter, meaning, of the Veda. For these reasons, the Veda is like ‘dense darkness’, there being no light illumining it. |
{pāpaṃ }pūrvapāpābhyāsavāsanā, tanniṣyandaḥ / | ‘Past wicked deeds? i.e. evil impressions left by past misdeeds; the ‘nisyanda’, fruition of that. |
tathaiveti / pārasīkavat // | ‘Like them’ i.e. Like the Pārasīkas. |
dharmaṃ prati na siddhātaś codanānāṃ pramāṇatā / | Thus, it has not been proved that the Vedic injunctions are the valid means of right knowledge of dharma; |
svato 'nyebhyaś ca mandebhyas tadarthānavadhāraṇāt // | for the simple reason that its meaning cannot be ascertained by any one, either by himself or with the help of other dull-witted. persons. |
dharmagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam, adharmo 'pi grahītavyaḥ // | ‘Dharma’ has been mentioned by way of illustration; it includes ‘Adharma’ also. |
yadyevaṃ kastarhi dharmādivyavasthāśraya ity āha jñānetyādi / | Question: “If that is so, then how can any definite idea be obtained regarding Dharma and other things?” |
iti śrutiparīkśā. | Answer: [see verse 2810 next] |
antastamaḥ kliṣṭākliṣṭamajñānam, jñānālokena vyapāsto dhvasto 'ntastamorāśir yena sa tathoktaḥ / | For these reasons, please seek for a person whose inner darkness has been dispelled by the light of knowledge, and who is capable of teaching the clear meaning of the Veda. ‘Inner darkness’ Ignorance, ‘Painful and Unpainful’; who has dispelled this by the light of knowledge. |
viviktānām iti / | ‘Clear’ correct; |
anavadyānām sudhīnām, {śuddhānām---} paśuvadhakāmamithyācārādikalaṅkānaṅkitānām ity arthaḥ / | pure, free from impurities like animal-slaughter, wrongful sexual acts and so forth. |
upadeśakṛdiṣyatām iti / | ‘Seek for a teacher’; |
evaṃ hi tadapauruṣeyatvaṃ prakalpitaṃ sārthakaṃ bhavatīti bhāvaḥ / | i.e. it is only then that your idea of the Veda having no personal author would be of any use; |
anyathā hi tasminnavijñātārthe tadapārthakam eva syāt / | otherwise the meaning being not cognisable, the said idea would be futile. What is meant by this is as follows: |
anenaitaduktaṃ bhavati yo 'yaṃ svataḥprāmāṇyābhyupagamo bhavatāṃ, sa na vinā sarvajñena yukta ityato 'vaśyaṃ so 'bhyupagantavyaḥ, anyathā tatra prāmāṇyāsiddhir iti pratipāditatvāt / | The notion of yours, that the Veda is self-sufficient in its authority, cannot be right unless there is an omniscient Person; hence such a Person has got to be admitted; otherwise the authority and reliability of the Veda would be impossible; |
tataś ca taduktam eva varaṃ vacanaṃ dharmādisamāśrayo 'stu, kimaparamapramāṇopapannāpauruṣeyatvakalpanayā / | Under the circumstances, it is far better to rely upon the word of this Person himself, for the knowledge of Dharma and such matters; what is the use of assuming the Word not proceeding from a Person, the reliability of which Word must always remain doubtful? |
yaccoktam yogiratyakṣasamādhigamyo 'pi dharmādir na bhavatīti, tadapi śe{do}ṣavat, anumā{ne}nayoginaḥ paścāt sādhayiṣyamāṇatvād iti bhāvaḥ // | It has been argued that matters like Dharma are not amenable to the direct meditative Perception of the Mystics. This assertion also is defective; because it is going to be proved later on, by means of Inference, that there can be such perception in the case of Mystics. |
iti śrutiparīkṣā // | who has dispelled this by the light of knowledge. |
KAPITEL SVATA.HPRAAMAA.NYAPARIIK.SAA | pure, free from impurities like animal-slaughter, wrongful sexual acts and so forth. |
on TS 2810 | ‘Seek for a teacher’; |
evam ityādinā bhūyaḥ svatantraśrutiniḥsaṅgatvam eva prakārāntareṇa samarthayate | as explained above. Under the circumstances, it is far better to rely upon the word of this Person himself, for the knowledge of Dharma and such matters; |
evaṃ ca pauruṣeyatve vedānām upapādite / svataḥprāmāṇyam apy eṣāṃ pratikṣiptamayatnataḥ // | Thus then, it being established that the Vedas are the work of a personality, the self-sufficiency of their authority and validity also becomes overthrown without effort. |
TS 2810 | With the following Text, the author proceeds to further support the idea of his doctrine being ‘free from all self-sufficient Revelation’ (declared in the Introductory Texts): [see verse 2811 above] |
[p.745] tathā hi śruteḥ prāmāṇyaṃ yathā syād iti manyamānāḥ sāmānyena sarvapramāṇānāṃ svataḥprāmāṇyamaprāmāṇyaṃ tu parata ity āhur jaiminīyāḥ / | With a view to establish the authority (and reliability) of the Revealed Word, the followers of Jaimini have declared that of all Pramāṇas (Cognitions and Means of Cognition) the validity is self-sufficient, inherent, and its only invalidity is due to other causes, extrinsic. |
parataḥ kila prāmāṇye 'navasthādidoṣaprasaṅgāt pramāṇetaravyavasthocchedaḥ syāt / | They argue that if their validity were extrinsic (due to other causes), there would be an infinite regress; which would strike at the root of all notions of the valid and invalid cognitions. |
tathā hi catvāraḥ pakṣāḥ sambhavanti kadācid ubhe 'pi prāmāṇyāprāmāṇye svata eveti prathamaḥ, kadācid aparata eveti dvitīyaḥ, prāmāṇyaṃ parato 'prāmāṇyaṃ tu svata eveti tṛtīyaḥ, etad viparyayaścaturthaḥ / | On this question, there are four views possible: (1) Sometimes both validity and invalidity are inherent; (2) sometimes both are extrinsic; (3) Validity is extrinsic and Invalidity is inherent; (4) Validity is inherent and Invalidity is extrinsic. (1) The first view is not tenable; |
tatra na tāvad ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, tathā hi ekavyakyādhāraṃ vā tadubhayaṃ syād vyaktibhedena vā / | and there is no other means admitted that could definitely determine the one or the other. Thus any distinction as to one being valid and the other invalid would be impossible. (2) Nor can the second view be right; |
na tāvad ekasyāṃ vyaktau parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇayoḥ prāmāṇyetaradharmayoḥ sambhavaḥ, virodhāt / | If it be argued that the two characters might not be incompatible, as belonging to different Cognitions, even so, as it is not dependent upon anything else, it cannot be determined which character belongs to which cognition.’ |
nāpi vyaktibhedena, niyamakāraṇābhāvānniścayahetusambhavāccāsaṅkīrṇapramāṇāpramāṇavyavasthānābhāvaprasaṅgāt / | nor could it be expected to proceed from what is valid; because it stands on the same footing as the other; if it be expected that validity would come from outside, then there would be an infinite regress. |
tathā hi dvayor api svātantryādidaṃ pramāṇameveti niyamo na syāt / | Thus then, it being established that the Vedas are the work of a personality, the self-sufficiency of their authority and validity also becomes overthrown without effort. |
bādhasāmānyena ca dvayor api tirohitabhedatvād anyasya cāvadhāraṇakāraṇasyānabhyupagamād vibhāgenāparijñānād idaṃ pramāṇamapramāṇam iti vyavasthā na syāt / | because would both Validity and Invalidity belong to the same individual cognition? Or to different ones (Validity to one and Invalidity to another)? It is not possible for two mutually contradictory and exclusive characters as Validity and Invalidity to belong to one and the same individual. Nor can they belong to different individuals; |
nāpi dvitīyaḥ pakṣaḥ, prāgubhayasvabhāvarahitasya jñānasya niḥsvabhāvatvaprasaṅgāt / nahi parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇayoḥ prāmāṇyetarayorabhāve rūpāntaram asya śakyamavadhārayitum ity asaṃśayamasyānupākhyatvam āpadyate / | which would mean that there would be no distinction between Valid and Invalid Cognitions which would not be confused. Because both being equally independent, there could be no certainty as to any particular Cognition being valid only. Because, as regards Annulment also, all difference between the two would become obliterated; and there is no other means admitted that could definitely determine the one or the other. |
svatas tāvad dvayaṃ nāsti virodhātparato na ca / | Thus any distinction as to one being valid and the other invalid would be impossible. (2) Nor can the second view be right; |
niḥsvabhāvatvam evaṃ hi jñānarūpe prasajyate // | as in this case, the Cognition would have to be regarded as featureless (35)... |
vijñānavyaktibhedena bhavec ced aviruddhatā / tathāpy anyānapekṣatve kiṃkva neti nirūpyate // | If it be argued that the two characters might not be incompatible, as belonging to different Cognitions, even so, as it is not dependent upon anything else, it cannot be determined which character belongs to which cognition.’ |
nāpi tṛtīyaḥ pakṣo 'navasthādoṣāt / | (3) Nor can the third view be right; [that Validity is inherent and Invalidity, is extrinsic]; |
tathā hi na tāvat parato 'pramāṇabhūtāt prāmāṇyamāśaṃsanīyam tasya svayam evāpramāṇatvāt / | as this involves an infinite regress. For instance, what is by itself intrinsically invalid, can never be expected to bring about validity; because it is itself invalid; |
nāpi pramāṇabhūtāt, tasyāpi tulyaparyanuyogena parataḥprāmāṇyāśaṃsāyām anavasthāprasaṅgāt / | nor could it be expected to proceed from what is valid; because it stands on the same footing as the other; if it be expected that validity would come from outside, then there would be an infinite regress. |
tataścaikapramāṇavyaktivyavasthāpanāya pramāṇaparamparāmanusarataḥ sakalam eva puruṣāyuṣam upayujyate / | For the purpose of determining the validity of a single Cognition, one would have to follow up a series of such Means, and the entire life of man would become used up. |
tasmād gatyantarāsambhavāt svataḥsarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyam, parato 'prāmāṇyam iti gṛhyatām / | For these reasons, there being no other alternative available, the validity of all Pramāṇas (Cognitions and Means of Cognition) must be regarded as inherent in them, and the invalidity as extrinsic. |
tatra prayogaḥ ye yadbhāvaniyatās te taṃ prati na paramapekṣante, yathākāśamamūrtatvāya, pramāṇabhāvaniyatāś ca vivādāspadībhūtā vijñānādaya iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | This argument may be formulated as follows: When certain things are restricted to a certain thing, they do not need anything else, so far as that thing is concerned, e.g. Ākāśa and Incorporeality; the Pramāṇas in question are restricted to the character of being valid; hence there is apprehension of something contrary to the wider character. |
na cāsyānaikāntikatvam, svato 'sambhavino dharmasya pareṇādhātumaśakyatvād ākāśasyeva mūrttatvaṃ yadāha "nahi svato 'satī śaktiḥ kartumanyena pāryata" iti. | The Reason adduced here is not ‘Inconclusive’; a character which is impossible by itself cannot be thrust upon it by something else; e.g. corporeality cannot be thrust upon Ākāśa. This has been thus asserted ‘The Potency that is non-existent by itself can never be created by anything else.’ [Ślokavārtika Codanā-Sūtra 47]. |
atra svata ityādinā tucchaṃ pratijñārthaṃ sambhāvayaṃstadvicāradvāreṇa dūṣaṇam ārabhate / | With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out objections against the above view (of the Mīmāṃsaka), by showing the insignificant character of his proposition: [see verse 2812 next] |
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