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atraivopapattim āha anyathetyādi / | This is pointed out in the following: [see verses 3116-3117 above] |
yadi pāṭhasya tulyatvaṃ bhavet tadā kvacideśādau pāṭhaṃ prati puṃsāṃ vimatiḥ saṃśayo na prāpnoti // iṣyate ca jagatsarvam ityādāvāha jagat sadedṛśyam ityādi / | The argument in support of the preceding assertion is stated in the words ‘If it were not so, etc. etc.’ If the verbal text had remained the same, then there could be no difference of opinion doubt among persons, regarding it, by reason of the divergence of place, time, etc. |
jagatsadedṛśaṃ ceti na pramāṇam ihāpi vaḥ / | You have no proof for the notion that the world has always been as it is now. |
na yuktādṛṣṭimātreṇa saṃvartasyāpi nāstitā // | The existence of the ‘saṃvarta’ (dissolution) also cannot be denied simply because it is not seen. |
īdṛśam eva sarvadā jagadityatra na kiñcit sādhakaṃ pramāṇam asti / | It has been asserted (by Kumārila) under Texts 2275 and 3114 that “the world has never been known to be unlike what it is now and that no Universal Dissolution can be admitted”. |
yac ca smṛtikārair ucyate | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3118 above] |
"āsīd idam tamobhūtam aprajñātam alakṣaṇam / apravartyam avijñeyaṃ suṣuptam iva sarvataḥ //" | the Smṛti-writers also have declared that ‘This world was a mass of darkness, unknown and undiscernible, unthinkable, unknowable, as if asleep all round,’ (Manu, Chapter I); |
iti tadetad asya dvividhasyāpi saṃvartasya na kiñcid bādhakaṃ pramāṇam asti, yena sarvadā jagadīdṛśam eva siddhyet / | where we have the mention of two kinds of ‘Saṃvarta’, ‘Dissolution’; and there is no proof to the effect that there is no such Dissolution, on the strength of which the world could always remain as it is now. |
nacādarśanamātreṇa vastūnāṃ nāstitā siddhyati, satyapi vastuni kvacid adarśanāt, vastvabhāvena darśanamātrasya vyāptyasiddheḥ // | Merely because a certain thing is not seen, it does not follow that it does not exist; because it often happens that a thing, even though existent, is not seen; specially as it is not known that there is invariable concomitance between ‘non-existence’ and ‘non-perception’. |
svataḥprāmāṇyapakṣe tu niścayaṃ kurute svataḥ / vedaḥ svārthasvarūpe ca tan na mohādisambhavaḥ // | Under the view that the validity of cognitions is inherent in them, certainty of conviction must be regarded as brought about by the Veda by itself, in regard to its own form (text); hence there can be no possibility of delusion in respect to that. |
ataścājñānasaṃdehaviparyāsāpade sthite / nopadeśamapekṣeta dvijapoto 'pi kaścana // | Thus, there being no room for ignorance, or doubt, or misconception, even the infant of the Brāhmaṇa should not require any teaching. |
yathācājñātamūlasya na vināśo 'pi sambhavī / ko vā vināśo nityasya bhaved vajrātiśāyinaḥ // | Just as there is no possibility of the destruction of the thing whose root (cause) is unknown, how could there be any destruction (mutilation) of what is eternal and superior even to the diamond (in its indestructibility)? If it be said that “there may be destruction in the shape of perversion of the manifestation”, then the answer is that the possibility of such manifestation of what is eternal has been already rejected. |
[p.811] | so that there can be no delusion regarding it; |
abhivyaktyanyathātvaṃ cen nitye sā nanvapākṛtā / | and as it is eternal, there is no likelihood of its essential nature being altered; |
ato rakṣām api prājṇyā niṣphalām asya kurvate // | Under the circumstances, all the attempt that has been made by Vedic Scholars to preserve the text of the Veda has been superfluous. |
dvijapotaḥ brāhmaṇaśiśuḥ / | ‘Infant of a Brāhmaṇa’ a Brāhmaṇa-child. |
evaṃ tāvat svataḥprāmāṇyād vināśo 'sya na sambhavatīti pratipāditam / | Thus far it has been shown that the destruction (or mutilation) of the Veda is not possible, if it is self-sufficient in its validity. |
idānīṃ nityatvādapi na sambhavatītyetad darśayituṃ pṛcchati ko vetyādi / | The author now proceeds to show that it is not possible, on account of its eternality also; to this end, he puts the question ‘How could there be, etc. etc.?’ |
abhivyaktyanyathātvaṃ ced iti / vināśa iti sambandhaḥ / | ‘If it is urged, etc. etc.’ this is to be construed with ‘destruction’ of the preceding sentence. |
abhivyaktiḥ / asyeti vedasya // | ‘Sā’ manifestation. ‘Asya’ of the Veda. |
atīndriyārthadṛktasmād vidhūtāntasmaścayaḥ / vedārthapravibhāgajñaḥ kartā cābhyupagamyatām // iti svataḥprāmāṇyavādaparīkṣā // | For these reasons please accept the view that there has been an author of the Veda, one who is capable of seeing things beyond the senses, who has shaken off the entire mass of darkness and ignorance, and who is conversant with the meaning of the Veda and its divisions. |
KAPITEL ATIINDRIYADAR.CIPURU.SAPARIIK.SAA | The following Text sums up the whole section: [see verse 3123 above] |
antastamaḥ kliṣṭākliṣṭam ajñānam, tasya cayaḥ saṃhatiḥ, sa vidhūto yena sa tathoktaḥ / | ‘Darkness’ i.e. Ignorance, ‘afflicted’ as well as ‘unafflicted’ [vide Yogasūtra ‘Vṛttayaḥ-kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ’]; the ‘mass’ of this Ignorance has been shaken off by him; |
pravibhāgajñaḥ vyākhyāto / | ‘conversant with its divisions’ i.e. the right expounder. |
vedasyeti śeṣaḥ / | ‘Author’ i.e. of the Veda. |
tadevaṃ pratijñātārthasya sarvathā pramāṇabādhitatvam, hetoś ca tadbhāvabhāvitvād ityetasyānaikāntikatvaṃ sādhitam / sapakṣasiddhyarthaṃ ca pramāṇaṃ yaḥ saṃdehaparyāsaviṣayair ityādinā pradarśitam iti kṣepārthaḥ / | Thus it has been established that the Proposition (of the Mīmāṃsaka) is found to be entirely annulled by Means of Valid Cognition, his Reason, in the shape of ‘being present when the other is present’, is Inconclusive, the proof for the Reason (adduced by the Buddhist) being present where the Probandum is present has been already indicated above, under Text 2939. |
yat tu pakṣacatuṣṭayamupanyasya pakṣatraye doṣābhidhānaṃ kṛtam, tatrāpi na kācid bauddhasya kṛ{kṣa---}tiḥ, nahi bauddhair eṣāṃ caturṇām ekatamo 'pi pakṣo 'bhīṣṭo 'niyamapakṣasyeṣṭatvāt / | As regards the four alternatives set forth (by the Mīmāṃsaka) under the commentary on Text 2811, f(l) Both validity and invalidity are inherent in cognitions, (2) Both are extraneous at times, (3) Validity is inherent and Invalidity is extraneous, and (4) Validity is extraneous and Invalidity is inherent], and the objections urged against three of them, they do not affect the Buddhists at all. Because they do not accept any of these alternatives, their view being that there can be no hard and fast rule in the matter; |
tathā hi ubhayamapyetat kiñcit svataḥ kiñciparata iti pūrvamupavarṇitam / ata eva pakṣacatuṣṭayopanyāso 'pyayuktaḥ / | as it has been already explained that both these, Validity and Invalidity, may be sometimes inherent and sometimes extraneous, Hence it was not right to put forward the said four alternatives only; |
pañcamasyāpyaniyamapakṣasya sambhavāt / | as a fifth alternative was also possible that there can be no hard and fast rule applying to all cases. |
apare tvanyathā pratijñārthaṃ varṇayanti bodhātmakatvaṃ nāma prāmāṇyam, tac ca jñānānāṃ svābhāvikam eva, na guṇakṛtaṃ, guṇābhāve 'pi viparyayajñāne bodhātmakatvasambhavāt / | Other people have offered an entirely different explanation of the Proposition (regarding the self-validity of Cognitions)“Validity consists in being of the nature Consciousness; hence it must be natural (inherent) in ail cognitions, it cannot be due to the presence of any excellences; |
ataḥ svataḥprāmāṇyamity ucyate / guṇais tu doṣanirākaraṇam eva kriyata ityatas tannirghātāya prāmāṇyaṃ guṇānapekṣate nātmapratilambhāyeti / | as even in the absence of excellences, when there is wrong cognition, it is quite possible that there should be the ‘essence of cognition It is for this reason and in this sense that Cognition is spoken of as ‘self-valid’, All that the excellences do is to remove the defects; hence for the removal of defects, the validity of the cognition needs the excellences; |
tadetad asamyak / | The above view cannot be right. |
yato na bodhātmakatvam eva prāmāṇyaṃ yuktam / | Because it is not correct to say that validity consists in being of the nature of Consciousness; |
viparyayajñāne 'pi sambhavāt / | as in that case there would be validity in wrong cognitions also. |
bodhaviśeṣaḥ prāmāṭam iti cet, na tarhi vaktavyam tac ca jñānāṃ svābhāvikam eva na guṇakṛtam, guṇābhāve 'pi viparyayajñāne sadbhāvād iti / | If it be held that “Validity is a particular form of Cognition itself”, then it should not be said that “Validity is natural and inherent in cognitions, and not brought about by excellences; because oven in the absence of excellences, when there is wrong cognition, it is quite possible that there should be validity” (as asserted above). |
tathā hi yadi bodhaviśeṣaḥ prāmāṇyamiṣṭaṃ syāt tadā tasyaiva guṇakṛtatve vyabhicāropadarśanaṃ yuktaṃ nānyasya / naca vipa [p.812] ryayajñāne 'pi sadbhāvādityanena bodhaviśeṣasya guṇakṛtatve vyabhicāro darśitaḥ / kiṃ tarhi bodhasāmānyasya / | Because if Validity were held to be a particular form of Cognition, then alone could there be any justification for the pointing out of the falsity of the premiss that the same validity is due to the presence of excellences, not of anything else. As a matter of fact, however, when it has been asserted that “it is present also in wrong cognition’, the falsity pointed out is not in the premiss that ‘the particular form, of Cognition is due to the presence of excellences’, but in regard to Cognition in general; |
naca pareṇa bodhasāmānyaṃ guṇakṛtam iṣyate / | and the other party does not hold that cognition in general is brought about by excellences; |
naca tasya guṇakṛtatve vyabhicāraḥ śakyate pratipādayitum / | and it is not possible to point out falsity in the premiss that ‘a particular cognition is brought about by excellences’. |
nacāpyasmābhir guṇakṛtatvena parataḥprāmāṇyamiṣṭaṃ, yatas tanniṣedhena bhavadbhiḥ svato vyavasthāpyate / kiṃ tarhi anubhūto 'pyasau bodhaviśeṣaḥ kvacid bhrāntinimittasadbhāvādyathānubhavaṃ naniścayam utpādayatīti / | Then again, we also do not hold the extraneous validity to be due to excellences; by denying which yon are seeking to prove inherent, validity. What we hold is that a particular cognition, even though apprehended, might be due to a mistake, and as such it cannot bring about the certainty of conviction in accordance with the said apprehension; |
atas tanniścayotpatteḥ parata iti vyavasthāpyate / | hence it is concluded that validity, being due to the appearance of the said conviction, must be extraneous. |
kiṃ cāprāmāṇye 'pi śakyam evaṃ kalpayitum / | Further, the same may be said in regard to Invalidity also; |
bodhātmakatvaṃ nāmāprāmāṇyam, tac ca jñānanāṃ svābhāvikaṃ na doṣakṛtam, doṣābhāve 'pi samyagjñāne sambhavād ityataḥ svato 'prāmāṇyamucyate, doṣais tu guṇanirākaraṇam eva kriyata ityatas tannirākaraṇāyāprāmāṇyaṃ doṣānapekṣate nātmapratilambhāyeti / | and this is natural and inherent in cognitions, and not due to defects; because it is possible even when there is no defect, as in the case of Right Cognition; that is why Invalidity is said to be inherent; and all that the defects do is to set aside the Excellences; hence it is for the setting aside of the excellences, that the Invalidity needs the defects, not for the bringing about of the Invalidity itself. |
tasmād yatkiñcid etat / | Thus there is nothing in the explanation put forward above by some people. |
uveyakastvāha{---} na bodhātmakatvaṃ nāma jñānānāṃ prāmāṇyam, kiṃ tarhi---, arthāvisaṃvāditvam / | Ubeyaka, on the other hand, has declared as follows: “The validity of cognitions consists, not in their being of the nature of Consciousness, but in being in conformity with the real state of things; |
tathā hi satyapi bodhātmakatve yatrārthāvisaṃvāditvaṃ nāsti tatrāprāmāṇyam, yathā śuktikāyāṃ rajatajñānasya / | because, in a ease where there is Consciousness, if there is no conformity with the real state of things, the cognition is invalid; e.g. the cognition of silver in regard to the piece of shell; and conversely, even when there is no Consciousness, if there is conformity with real state of things, the cognition is valid; |
vināpi bodha{bodhātma---}katvaṃ yatrārthāvisaṃvāditvam asti tatra prāmāṇyaṃ yathāgnau dhūmasya, tasmād anvayavyatirekābhyām avisaṃvāditvam eva prāmāṇyaṃ siddham / | e.g. the cognition of smoke in Fire, Hence from this positive and negative concomitance, it follows that Validity consists in being in conformity with the real state of things”. “The cognition of this conformity proceeds from that same cause which brings about the original cognition itself, not from any other circumstantial conditions; |
tac ca jñānam atmīyād eva hetor upajāyate / | it is in this sense that the validity of cognitions is spoken of as inherent in themselves; |
svaśabdasyātmīyavacanatvāt / svataḥ ātmīyāddhetor ity arthaḥ / | the term ‘sva’ (in the word ‘svataḥ’) stands for ‘svakīya’, ‘what belongs to oneself’; |
nahi svato 'satī śaktir ityādinā paścād arddhena sāmagryantarād bhāvaniṣedhe heturuktaḥ / | so that the word ‘svataḥ’ means ‘due to its own cause The second half of the passage ‘the capacity which is not present in the thing itself cannot be produced in it by something else’, only serves to point out the reason for denying the idea of its being brought about by other circumstances; |
nahi svato 'satī kartum anyena vijñānasāmagryantarātiriktena śakyata ity arthaḥ / | the thing itself cannot be brought about by anything else, i.e. by anything else besides the causes bringing about the Cognition itself’,” |
syād etat vijñānahetave 'pi pramāṇāpramānasādhāraṇāḥ tat kathaṃ vijñānahetumātrapratibaddhaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ syāt, tasmāt sāmagryantarajanyam eva prāmāṇyaṃ natu jñānahetumātrajanyam / tac ca sāmagryantaraṃ guṇasahitam eva, indriyādiguṇāścāsya kāraṇam iti / | As a matter of fact, the causes of cognitions are common to valid as well as invalid cognitions; how then could validity be invariably concomitant with the mere character of ‘being the cause of cognitions’? From this it is clear that validity is due to other circumstantial causes, not merely to the cause of the cognition itself, This ‘other circumstantial cause’ must be one that is accompanied by excellences; so that the cause of validity would consist also in the excellences of the Sense-organs and other Instruments of Cognition. |
śābde cāptapraṇītatvam eva kāraṇaguṇatvena vyavahārānniścitam / vede ca ta{dasa}dbhāvād aprāmāṇyaṃ prasaktam iti / naiṣa doṣaḥ / | In the ease of Verbal Cognition the excellence of this other cause, as ascertained from actual experience, consists in ‘being composed (spoken) by a trustworthy person’, So that there being no such composer (or Speaker) in the ease of the Veda, it would have to be regarded as invalid. |
sāmagryantarajanyatvāsiddhatvāt / | because it cannot be proved that validity is due to other circumstantial causes. |
nahi vidhimukhena guṇānāṃ prāmāṇyākhyakāryotpattau vyāpāraḥ pratītaḥ sambhavati / | It is not possible for us to recognise any positive functioning of the Excellences towards the bringing about of the effect in the shape of validity; |
indriyādisvarūpam eva hyanyanirapekṣamarthāvisaṃvādijñānotpādakam / | what produces the idea of the cognition being in conformity with the real state of things is the cause in the shape of the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition themselves, independently of anything else. |
añjanādīnāṃ tu doṣāpagame vyāpāro na guṇādhāne / | As regards the function of the ointment (applied to the Eyes to remove defective vision), that tends only towards the removal of defects, and not to the producing of excellences”. |
athāpi syād indriyādisvarūpamaprāmāṇye 'pyastīti sarvatra prāmāṇyotpattiprasaṅgo 'vikalakāraṇatvāt / | It might be argued that The Sense-organs and the other Means of Cognition are there in the case of the invalid cognition also; so that under the above view, validity should be produced in all cases; |
naitad asti / doṣasamavadhāne tu sāmagryantarād vilakṣaṇakāryotpattir bhaviṣyati / | “This is not so,” says Ubeyaka “because after the defects have been cured, other causes would become operative towards the bringing about of particular effects”. |
syād etat viparyayaḥ kasmān na vijñā [p.813] yate indriyādisvarūpam evānyanirapekṣaṃ vyabhicārijñānotpādakaṃ, guṇasamavadhāne tu sāmagryantaram arthāvisaṃvādijñānotpādakam iti / | The following might be urged: Why is not the contrary of this accepted that the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition bring about wrong cognitions, independently of other things, and that on the cure of the excellences, other circumstantial causes become operative towards bringing about the right cognition in conformity with the real state of things? |
satyam evam etat, anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ tu vijñānotpādakam eva trairūpyamanumānādau prāmāṇyotpādakaṃ dṛṣṭam iti pratyakṣe 'pi ca sambhavāt tadevotpādakaṃ kalpyate / | this is so; but through positive and negative concomitance, it has been found in the case of Inference, that what brings about the validity is that same ‘presence of three factors’ which brings about the cognition itself; and hence it is assumed that in the case of Perception also, the validity would be produced by the same cause that produces the cognition. |
viparyayajñānarūpaṃ tu kāryamindriyādisvarūpādanutpadyamānaṃ sāmagryantaraṃ kalpayatītyanavadyam iti / | As regards the wrong cognition, on the other hand, it is an effect that is not found to be produced by the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition, and hence it leads to the assumption that it must be due to other circumstantial causes, Thus there can be no objection to our explanation of validity”. |
tadetat sarvaṃ nānavadyam / | [The Author’s answer to the a,bove view of Ubeyaka] All this is certainly not free from objections. |
tathā hi yattāvad uktam arthāvisaṃvāditvam eva jñānasya prāmāṇyaṃ taccātmīyād eva hetos tasyopajāyata iti atra siddhasādhyatā, yata iṣyata evāsmābhiḥ pramāṇam avisaṃvādivijñānam iti vacanād arthāvisaṃvāditvaṃ jñānasya prāmāṇyam, kintu jñānam iti viśeṣeṇopādānād brūyād dhūmāder ajñānasvabhāvasya mukhyataḥ prāmāṇyaṃ neṣṭam ityarthāvisaṃvāditvamātraṃ prāmāṇyam asiddham / | For instance, it has been asserted that “the validity of cognitions consists in its being in conformity with the real state of things; and that it proceeds from the cause of the cognition itself”, This is superfluous, futile; because we also admit that ‘that cognition alone is valid which is in conformity with the real nature of things’, which clearly means that Validity consists in being in conformity with the real state of things. But the ‘cognition’ is specially mentioned as qualifying ‘validity’; validity is not regarded as belonging directly to the Smoke and such other means of cognition, which are themselves not of the nature of ‘cognition’; |
jñānasyaiva heyopādeyavastuni pravṛttau prādhānyāt / | Specially because it is Cognition alone which is primarily operative towards things to be abandoned or acquired. |
tathā hi satyapyavinābhāvini dhūmādau na tāvat puruṣasyārthe pravṛttir bhavati yāvad vijñānotpādo na bhavati, tasmāt pravṛttau jñānasyāvyavahitaṃ kārakatvam iti tadeva pramāṇam / | For instance, even though the Smoke, which is invariably concomitant with Fire, is there, the Agent does not have recourse to activity towards the securing of the Fire, until the cognition of the Smoke comes about; which shows that it is the cognition that is the direct and immediate prompting agent towards the man’s activity. This has been thus declared ‘The Cognition must be valid, because that is the primary cause of activity towards things to be abandoned or obtained’. |
pravṛttes tatpradhānatvāddheyopādeyavastuni" iti, yaccāvisaṃvāditvaṃ jñānasyārthaprāpaṇaśaktilakṣaṇaṃ tattvarthaprāpaṇam eva, pratibandhādisambhavāt / | As regards the character of ‘being in conformity with the real state of things’, which belongs to the Cognitions, and which is there in the form of the capacity to lead up to the thing cognised, this consists in this same getting at the thing; as it is only in regard to this that Invariable Concomitance is possible; |
śaktiś ca padārthānām ātmabhūtaiveti kas tasyā arthāntarādutpattimicchedyena sā niṣidhyeta / nahi tanniṣpattāvaniṣpanno dharmastatsvabhāvo yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt / | and the capacity of things forms their very nature or essence; hence who could ever think of securing it from other things, in view of which it would have to be specially denied? Because when the thing itself has been produced, it cannot be that its property and nature have not been produced. |
sā ca pramāṇasyātmabhūtāpi satī bhrāntikāraṇasadbhāvadanadhigatatatkāryair avamātuṃ na pāryata iti parato 'rthakriyājñānākhyāt kāryaṃ niścīyate / | This validity then, though being the very essence of the cognitions, cannot be recognised until the effects of the cognition have been brought about, because of the presence of causes likely to lead to wrong cognitions. Hence the effect is ascertained from extraneous causes such as the cognition of effective action. |
ato niścayāpekṣayā parataḥprāmāṇyam ity ucyate notpattyapekṣayā / | Hence when the validity is said to be extraneous; it is in reference to the said certainty regarding it, not in reference to its being produced. |
tena kāraṇāntarād utpādapratiṣedhavaiyarthyaṃ vivādābhāvāt / | Consequently, there can be no useful purpose served by the denial of the production of the validity by other causes; |
niścayastu śaktīnāṃ parato bhavadbhir apīṣyata eva / yathoktam "śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ kāryārthāpattisādhanāḥ" iti / yaś ca "nahi svato 'satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena pāryata" ityeṣa sāmagryantarād bhāvaniṣedhāya hetur upavarṇyate 'sāvapramāṇe 'pi samāna iti tadapi svata eva prasajyeta / | As regards the certainty, however, regarding the capacity of things, you also hold that it is brought about by extraneous causes, This has been declared thus (by Kumārila himself) “The capacities of things are proved through Presumption based upon the fact that certain effects cannot be explained otherwise” [Ślo-Vā., p, 341]. As regards the argument that “the capacity that does not belong to a thing by itself cannot be produced by anything else”, which has been put forward in support of the denial of the idea of the validity being due to other circumstantial causes, that is equally applicable to Invalidity also; |
navā sa hetur vyabhicārāt / yaccoktam / | Hence the Reason adduced is no Reason at all; |
nahi vidhimukhena guṇānām aprāmāṇyotpattau vyāpāraḥ pratītaḥ sambhavatīti, etad apyanvayavacanam unmīlitārthaṃ na jñāyate / | as it is false and inconclusive. It has been argued that “Excellences are never recognised as operating positively towards the bringing about of Invalidity”. |
ko 'yaṃ vidhimukhena vyāpāro nāmeti / | It cannot be understood what the clear meaning of this affirmation is. |
yadi tāvad idaṃ cedaṃ kariṣyāmīti kāryotpādāya buddhipūrvā pravṛttiḥ, sānendriyādiṣvapi sambhavati / | What is the meaning of this ‘positive operation’? If it means intentional activity towards the producing of a certain effect, following upon the determination that ‘I shall do this’, then such activity cannot be possible for the Sense-organs. |
nahi bhāvānāṃ prekṣāpūrvakāritāsti, sarvabhāvānāṃ kṣaṇikatvena samīhāvyāpārayor asambhavāt / | Nor is it possible for things to act intelligently and intentionally; because all things being momentary, effort and activity are impossible; |
tataścendriyāder api vidhimukhena vyāpārasambhavāt kāraṇatvaṃ na syāt / | consequently, for the Sense-organs also, no positive activity is possible; and hence they can never serve as Causes. |
athendriyādi vināpi kriyākhyavyāpārasamā [p.814] veśaṃ sattāmātreṇa kāryotpattau vyāpriyata iti kāraṇam iṣyate, tadetad guṇeṣvapi samānam / | If it be argued that “even without any operation in the form of activity, the Sense-organs operate, by their mere presence, towards the production of effects; and as such are held to be Causes”, then the answer is that this can be said, with equal reason, in regard to Excellences also. |
nahi sarvakāraṇānāṃ kāryotpattau niyataḥ svasattāsannidhānavyatirekeṇānyovyāpāraḥ pratītaḥ sambhavati / | In the producing of the effects, all Causes are not always found to have an activity apart from their mere presence, The following might be urged “When the Excellences are present, the Defects disappear, and thence comes about validity; |
atha guṇasannidhāne doṣanivṛttau satyāṃ prāmāṇyamupajāyata iti doṣanivṛttyā vyavahṛtatvāt sākṣād vidhimukhena guṇānāṃ vyāpāro na sambhavatītyucyate, tadetad doṣeṣvapi samānam / | so that, as they act through the disappearance of the defects, it is said that there can be no positive operation possible for the Excellences”. |
tathā hi doṣasannidhāne 'pi guṇanivṛttau satyāmaprāmāṇyamupajāyata iti doṣāṇām api vidhimukhenāprāmāṇyotpattau vyāpāro na syāt / | The same, however, may be said regarding the Defects also; for instance, when the Defects are present, the "Excellences disappear and thence there comes about, invalidity; hence towards the bringing about of Invalidity also, the Defects would have no positive operation. |
tataścāprāmānyam api svataḥ prasajyeta, aviśeṣāt / | Thus Invalidity also would be inherent, there being no difference between the two cases. |
nahi doṣā guṇān nirākṛtya sākṣād aprāmāṇye vyāpriyamāṇāḥ samālakṣyante / | As a matter of fact, Defects are never found to set aside Excellences and operate directly towards the bringing about of Invalidity. |
tasmāt tadbhāvābhāvānuvidhānavyatirekeṇa nānyaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ sambhavatīti doṣavad guṇānām api kāraṇatvaṃ samānam / | Hence there can be no causal relation apart from the condition that the presence and absence of one thing is concomitant with the presence and absence of the other. Such causal relation is equally possible for Defects as well as Excellences. |
yaccoktam indriyādirūpam evānyanirapekṣam arthāvisaṃvādijñānotpādakam iti, tadapyayuktam / | It has been argued that “The form of the Sense-organ and other Means of Cognition, independently of anything else, serves to bring about cognitions in conformity with the real state of things”. |
avikalakāraṇatvena sarvajñānānāṃ prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt / | because, all cognitions would, in this case, be valid, as their efficient cause would be always present; |
bodharūpatāvat / | specially as they would be of the nature of Consciousness. |
yathā bodharūpatā jñānānāṃ samanantarapratyayapratibaddhā satī doṣādisamavadhāne 'pyavikalakāraṇatayā sarvatra jñāne bhavati tathārthāvisaṃvāditvam api syāt / | The character of being of the nature of Consciousness, as present in cognitions, is inseparably related to the preceding cognition; so that even when there are defects, their efficient cause and the said character would be there in the case of all cognitions the character of being in conformity with the real state of things would also, in the same way, be there in all cognitions. |
syād etat doṣair aprāmāṇyasyotpāde sāmānyam avikalakāraṇamapi nopajāyate, prāmāṇyetarayorekatra jñāne viruddhayor ayogāt, bodharūpatā tu niṣpratidvandvā sarvatra bhavatyeveti / | The following might be urged “In the case of Defects bringing about Invalidity, the efficient cause would not be there in all cases; because Validity and its opposite, being mutually exclusive, could never be present in the same cognition. The character of being of the essence of Consciousness, however, can be present in all cases, without any opposition”. |
yadyevaṃ na tarhīndriya{sva}rūpam evānyanirapekṣaṃ kāraṇaṃ siddhyati, satyapi tasminnavikale prāmāṇyākhyakāryānutpatteḥ / | If that is so, then the Sense-organ by itself, independently of everything else, cannot turn out to be the cause; because, even when the Sense-organ is there in its efficient condition, its effect, in the shape of Validity, does not come about. |
nahyanyanirapekṣasya kadācid ajanakatvaṃ yuktam / nāpi yadyasmin satyapi na bhavati tat tanmātrakāraṇaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | What is independent of everything else can never fail to be productive of its effect; and when between two things, one does not come about even when the other is there, the former cannot be regarded as having the latter as its only cause; |
kiñcedaṃ tāvac ca bhavānvaktum arhati yadyavikalakāraṇaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ kimitidoṣasannidhāne 'pi notpadyata iti / svaviruddhakāraṇasya doṣasya sannihitatvād iti cet / aprāmāṇye 'pi tulyam / | Then again, you have got to explain this If Validity has its efficient cause present in its perfect condition, why is it that it does not come about, even when the Defects are there? If the answer is that “it does not come about on account of the presence of the Defect, which is a cause operating against the Validity”, then, the same may be said regarding Invalidity also; |
tasyāpi tadānīṃ svaviruddhakāraṇam indriyādisannihitam ityutpattir mābhūt / | it does not come about at the time on account of the presence of the Sense-organ, etc. which are the cause operating against the Invalidity. |
kiṃ ca yadi nāma viruddhakāraṇād doṣād bibhyataḥ prāmāṇyasyānutpattum icchā syāt, svakāraṇaṃ tvapratihatasāmarthyaṃ sattādānīṃ kimiti tadupekṣeta / evaṃ hi tenātmano 'pratihataśaktitā prakaṭitā syād yadi svakāryamutpattumanicchadapi haṭhādutpādayet / | Further, even if the Validity were unwilling to come about because it is afraid of the Defect which operates against it, how could its own cause which is present there in its efficient condition, ignore the effect? In fact, the untrammelled potency of the cause would be manifested only if it forced the effect to come about, even though unwilling. |
doṣair upahataśaktitvād indriyaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ na janayet, vijñānam api naiva janayed asamārthyāt / | If the idea is that the Sense-organ would not bring about Validity, when its potency would be obstructed by the presence of Defects, then, being impotent, it could not bring about the Cognition either. |
anyathā vijñānahetumātrajanyaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ na siddhyet, tadutpattāvapyanutpatteḥ / | Otherwise it would not be true that “Validity is brought about by the cause of the Cognition itself”; as it would not come about even when the Cognition has come about. |
yo hi yadutpattāvapi niyamena notpadyate nāsau tena sahaikakāraṇaḥ, yathā kodravāṅkurotpattāvapyanutpadyamānaḥ śālyaṅkuraḥ / | If between two things, one is not produced even when the other has been produced, then both cannot be regarded as necessarily having the same cause; as for instance, when the paddy-sprout is not produced on the production of the Kodrava -sprout; |
notpadyate ca vijñānotpattāvapi prāmāṇyaṃ niyameneti vyāpakānupalambhaḥ / | and it has been found that even when the Cognition has been produced, its Validity is not always produced; |
[p.815] nāpi tatsvbhāvamakhaṇḍayannātmabhūtāṃ śaktiṃ kaścid upahantuṃ śaknuyāt / | Then again, when a Potency forms the very essence of a thing, nothing can obstruct it, without destroying the nature of that thing. |
tataś caivam api śakyate paṭhitum "svataḥ sarvopalabdhīnāṃ prāmāṇyam iti gṛhyatām / | Thus then it may be possible to assert as follows ‘Please accept the view that there is validity of all Apprehensions, because the Potency which is inherent in a thing cannot be destroyed by anything else’ [a parody of Kumārila’s assertion]. |
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