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[p.835] yathā mantreṣvarthavādanirdeśo bhavati tathetihāsādiṣvapi brahmādeḥ sarvajñatvamarthavādād boddhavyam /
Just as, in regard to Vedic Mantras there are Commendatory Declarations, so in the Itihāsa and Purāṇa, the assertion of the omniscience of Brahmā and other Beings, should be taken as Commendatory Declarations.
anyārtho hi śabdo 'nyamarthaṃ vadatīti kṛtvārthavāda ucyate /
When a set of words directly expressing one thing is taken as expressing something else, it is called ‘arthavāda’, ‘Figurative or Commendatory Declaration’.
athavā prakṛteṣu dharmārthakāmamokṣeṣu jñānasyāpratighatvād asya brahmāder jñānārtha 'pratighatā nirdiṣṭhā /
Or the meaning may be that the knowledge of Brahmā is untrammelled so far as the things spoken of in the Itihāsa and Purāṇa are concerned, such as Duty, Property, Pleasure and Liberation;
natu sarvārtheṣvapratighātāt //
and it does not refer to the knowledge of all things.
na hyapratighatāmātrāt sarvagocaratocyate /
“Being untrammelled does hot mean that it envisages all things;
svārtheṣvapyapratighātād bhavatyapratighaṃ hi tat //
it may be called ‘untrammelled’ when it is so only in relation to its own particular object.” (3202)
etacca phaladajñānaṃ yāvaddharmā{di}gocaram /
“That is so because it is only the cognition of dharma, etc. that is fruitful;
natu vṛkṣādibhir jñātaiḥ sarvaiḥ kiñcit prayojanam //
no useful purpose is served by the cognition of such ordinary things as the tree and the like.
yāvad aupayikajñānaṃ nacaitat pratihanyate /
Question: If the knowledge of Brahmā relating to other things were ‘trammelled’ (obstructed), then how could it be called ‘untrammelled’?
tenāpratighavijñānavyapadeśo 'sya labhyate //
If that is so, then so far as the particular object of a Cognition is concerned, the Cognition of all men is ‘untrammelled’;
etadācaṣṭe puruṣārthopayogiṣu dharmādiṣu tasyaiva brahmaṇo jñānamapratighaṃ pravartate nānyeṣām ityetad viśeṣakhyāpanāya brahmāder eva svārthāpratighatvād apratighāti jñānam uktaṃ nānyeṣām /
[verses 3203-3204]: This is the explanation given: As regards Dharma and other matters useful for man, it is the knowledge of Brahmā alone that is untrammelled, not of others. That is the reason why the knowledge of Brahmā alone not others, has been called ‘untrammelled’, by reason of its not being obstructed in relation to its own objective.
aupayike puruṣārthopayogini dharmādau jñānam aupayikajñānam /
‘Aupayika-jñāna’ The knowledge of such useful matters as Dharma and the rest.
yāvad iti /
‘Yāvat’ whole.
aupayikajñānaviśeṣaṇaṃ caitat //
This qualifies ‘jñānam’, ‘knowledge (3203-3204)
yadveti pakṣāntaram āha
The following Text offers another explanation: [see verse 3205 next]
yadvātmanyeva tajjñānaṃ dhyānābhyāsapravartitam /
“Or, the knowledge spoken of may be that of his own ‘self’ brought about by the practice of meditation;
tasyaivāpratighātena jñānāpratighatocyate //
as such knowledge would never be obstructed, it is spoken of as ‘untrammelled’.” (3205)
ātmanīti /
‘Self’ Spirit.
tasyaiveti / ātmaviṣayasya jñānasya //
‘Tasya’ the knowledge of that same self.
nanu ceśvarasya jñānādayo daśāvyayā guṇāḥ paṭhyante, tat katham asāvavyajñānayogāt sarvajño na bhavatītyāha jñānam ityādi / jñānaṃ vairāgyamaiśvaryam iti yo 'pi daśāvyayaḥ / śaṃkaraḥ śrūyate so 'pi jñānavānātmavittayā //
“When Śaṅkara is spoken of as equipped with ‘ten imperishable qualities’ in the shape of knowledge, dispassion, supreme power and so forth, he also is ‘possessed of knowledge’ only in the sense of knowing his own self.” (3206) Question: In connection with God, we read of ‘ten imperishable qualities’, in the shape of knowledge and the rest; and if He is equipped with these imperishable qualities, why cannot He be regarded as omniscient?
[p.836] jñānam tattvāvabodhaḥ, vairāgyam viṣayavaimukhyam, aiśvaryam aṣṭavidham aṇimā laghimā mahimā prāptiḥ prākāmyam īśitvaṃ vaśitvaṃ yatrakāmāvasāyitā ceti, ete daśa jñānādayo 'vyayā anuyāyino yasyāsau daśāvyayaḥ /
‘Knowledge’ recognition of truth; ‘Dispassion’ detachment from objects; ‘Supreme Power’ of eight kinds, ‘Smallness’, ‘Lightness’, ‘Greatness’, ‘Attainment’, ‘Capacity for Enjoyment’, ‘Power’, ‘Control’, ‘Freedom of Movement’; these ten qualities belong to God, in their imperishable form.
tatrāṇimā yadaṇuśarīro bhūtvā sukhaṃ lokaṃ sañcarati sarvabhūtair adṛśyaḥ /
‘Smallness’ is that quality by virtue of which having assumed a subtle body, one becomes capable of going to happy regions, being unseen by people.
laghimā yo laghutvād vāyuvad vicarati /
‘Lightness’ by virtue of which one moves about like Air.
mahimā yatpūjitaḥ sarvalokeṣu vandito 'rcitaś ca mahadbhyo 'pi mahattamo bhavati /
‘Greatness’ by virtue of which one is respected among all men, honoured and worshipped as the greatest of the great.
prāptiḥ yadyanmanasā cintayati tat tat prāpnoti / prākāmyam yat pracurakāmo bhavati viṣayān bhoktuṃ śaknotītyarthaḥ /
‘Attainment’ by virtue of which one gets whatever he thinks of. ‘Capacity for Enjoyment’ by virtue of which one, when having strong desires, is capable of satisfying them and enjoying things.
īśitvam yat trailokyasya prabhur bhavati /
‘Power’ by virtue of which one becomes the master of the Three Regions.
vaśitvam yadbhūtāni sthāvarajaṅgamāni vaśaṃ nayati, tasyendraś ca bhavati /
‘Control’ by virtue of which one brings under his control all beings moveable and immoveable, and becomes master of them.
yatrakāmāvasāyitā yat brāhmaprājāpatyadaivagāndharvayākṣya rākṣasyapaitrapaiśāceṣu mānuṣyeṣu tair yagyonyeṣu ca sthānāntareṣu yatra yatra kāmayate tatra tatrāvasati /
‘Freedom of Movement’ by virtue of which one is able to live in all regions, of Brahmā, of Prajāpati, of Devas, of Gandharvas, of Yakṣas, of Rākṣasas, of Pitṛs, of Piśācas, of human beings, of lower animals and other places.
ātmavittayeti / ātmaviditayā sa jñānavān na tu niravaśeṣapadārthaparijñānavat tayetyarthaḥ //
‘Only in the sense of His knowing His own self’. It is on account of knowing His own self that He is ‘equipped with knowledge’, not because He knows all things.
etad eva hi tajjñānaṃ yadviśuddhātmadarśanam /
“His knowledge consists only in the direct perception of his pure self;
aśuddhe tannimitte ca yat tadajñānam ucyate //
when the source of that knowledge is not pure, the knowledge itself is called ‘ignorance’.” (3207)
viśuddhaścāsāvātmā, ceti tathoktaḥ tasya darśanam iti samāsaḥ /
Question: How is it that, though knowing only a part of things, Śaṅkara alone and no one else is spoken of as ‘equipped with knowledge’?
tannimitta iti /
Answer: [see verse 3207 above]
tasya śuddhātmadarśanasya nimittaṃ tannimittam, kiṃ tat ---, ātmaiva /
‘Pure’ qualifies the ‘Self’; the perception of this. ‘Its basis’ the basis of the perception of the pure self. What is that basis? The Self itself.
tasmin śuddhe tannimitte ātmani sati yadātmadarśanamaviśuddhaṃ pravartate tadajñānam ucyate, kutsitatvāt //
When this Self is not-pure, then the ‘perception of the Self’ that appears is called ‘no knowledge’, ‘Ignorance’; because it is of a low order.
athāpi vedadehatvād brahmaviṣṇumaheśvarāḥ / sarvajñānamayād vedāt sarvajñā mānuṣasya kim //
“It may be that Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara are embodiments of the Veda, and as the Veda consists in the knowledge of all things, these are omniscient;
kvaca buddhādayo martyāḥ kvaca devottamatrayam / yena tat sparddhayā te 'pi sarvajñā iti mohadṛk //
but how could that apply to man? Where, on one side are the mortal men, Buddha and the rest, and where on the other, are the said three superior deities? Hence the idea that the former, in rivalry to the latter, are also omniscient, is sheer delusion”.
ātmībhūtavedatvād vedadehā ucyante /
As the Veda forms their very self, they are called ‘embodiments of the Veda’.
sarvapadārthajñānakāraṇatvāt sarvajñānamayo vedaḥ /
The Veda ‘consists in the knowledge of all things’ because it is the Means of obtaining the knowledge of all things.
[p.837] etad uktaṃ bhavati nahi brahmādīnāṃ svātantryeṇa dharmādiṣu jñānapratighaṃ pravartate /
What is meant is as follows: In the case of Brahmā, etc. also, the ‘untrammelled knowledge’ of Dharma, etc. does not come about independently;
kiṃ tarhi vedadvāreṇa /
it comes only through the Veda.
na caivaṃ buddhādīnāṃ bhavadbhir iṣyate / teṣāṃ svayaṃ tu {svāyatta---} jñānatvāt /
This however you do not admit in the case of Buddha, etc., whose knowledge is held to be dependent upon themselves.
kiñca brahmādīnāṃ dhyānābhyāsād viśuddhajñānasambhavo yujyata eva teṣāṃ devatvena sarvajanotkṛṣṭatvāt /
Further, in the case of Brahmā, etc. it is only possible that there should be pure knowledge through the Practice of Meditation; because being Deities, they are superior to all Persons;
vede paṭhitatvāc ca /
and also because they are named in the Veda.
manuṣyasya tu na kadācid īdṛśaṃ sāmarthaṃ sambhāvyaṃ tasya tadviparītatvāt /
In the case of a human being, on the other hand, there is no possibility of any such capacity; as his character is quite the reverse.
tasmān manuṣyā api sarvajñā iti mohadṛk /
Hence the idea that human beings also are omniscient is sheer delusion;
mohadarśanametad bhavatām //
i.e. this is mere deluded fancy on your part.
nitye 'pi cāgame vede brahmāditrayakīrtanam /
“There is mention of the three deities, Brahmā, etc., in the Veda, which is eternal;
tannityatvāc ca vedānāṃ nityatvaṃ na vihanyate //
and yet the eternality of the Vedas does not become impaired;
tannityatvādi teṣāṃ brahmādīnāṃ nityatvāt //
‘Tannityatvāt’ on account of the eternality of Brahmā and the other Deities.
te hītyādinā etad eva spaṣṭīkaroti
The same idea is further clarified in the following: [see verses 3211-3212 next]
te hi nityair guṇair nityaṃ karmabhiś ca samanvitāḥ /
“They are equipped with eternal qualities and eternal functions;
nityavedābhidhāyitvasambhavān na virodhinaḥ //
hence there is no incongruity in these being mentioned in the eternal Veda.
anityasya tu buddhāder na nityāgamagamyatā /
On the other hand, Buddha, etc. are perishable beings, hence it is not possible for them to be mentioned in the eternal scripture.
nityatve cāgamsyeṣṭe vṛthā sarvajñakalpanā //
And when the scripture is held to be eternal, the assuming of the omniscient person is entirely futile.” (3211-3212)
na nityāgamagamyateti śabdārthasambandhasyānityatvaprasaṅgāt /
‘To be mentioned in the eternal scripture’ Because, if they were so capable, the relationship between the Word and its meaning would have to be regarded as ephemera;
nityasya cāgamaya parair anabhyupagamāt /
not-eternal; because the other party does not admit of an eternal scripture;
abhyupagame vā sarvajñakalpanāyā vaiyarthyaprasaṅgāt //
and because, if they did admit of it, the postulating of the Omniscient Person would be entirely futile.
etadeva darśayati sarvajñajñāpanāt tasyeti /
The same idea is further explained: [see verses 3213-3214 next]
sarvajñajñānapanāt tasya varaṃ dharmāvabodhanam / vedabodhitasarvajñajñānād dharmāt tirohitāt // atirohitadharmādijñānam eva viśeṣyate /
“Rather than admit the idea of the scripture indicating the omniscient person, it is far better to accept the idea that it indicates dharma. Because the clear knowledge of dharma (directly from the Veda) is superior to the unclear knowledge derived indirectly through the knowledge of the omniscient person mentioned in the Veda.
evam āgamagamyatvaṃ na sarvajñasya labhyate //
Thus it cannot be maintained that the omniscient person is spoken of in the scriptures.” (3213-3214)
nityasyāgamasya sarvajñajñāpanāt sakāśād varaṃ dharmāvabodhanameveṣṭam /
Rather than entertain the idea that the Eternal Scripture mentions the Omniscient Person, it is better to accept the idea that Dharma is taught by that Scripture.
kathaṃ tadvaram ity āha [p.838] ---vedabodhitetyādi /
Question: In what way is it better?
vedāśrayeṇa hi dharmajñānaṃ bhavadatirohitaṃ bhavati ā{anyathā---}lokasthiteraviśeṣeṇa sarveṣām eva sambhavāt / tirohitas tu vedabodhitasarvajñajñāto dharmas tasya nirvāṇaṃ{ga}tasyāprakaṭatvāt /
Answer; ‘Because the clear knowledge, etc. etc.’ The knowledge of Dharma derived from the Veda is clear and direct; because the light emanating therefrom is equally available for ail things. On the other hand, the Dharma learnt through the knowledge of the Omniscient Person mentioned in the Scripture is indirect and indistinct;
anirvāṇāvasthāyām apyanicchayā tadupadeśābhāvāt /
because the said Person has retired into Nirvāṇa and cannot be clearly perceptible.
upadeśe 'pi sarvatra sarvadā sarveṣāṃ śravaṇābhāvāt //
Even if He did impart teachings, these could not be heard by all men at all times and places, (3213-3214)
sarvajñasadṛśaḥ kaścid yadi dṛśyeta samprati / tadā gamyeta sarvajñasadbhāva upamābalāt //
“If any person similar to the omniscient person were seen at the present time, then alone could the existence of the omniscient person be cognised on the strength of analogy.” (3215)
upamānaṃ hi sādṛśyatadupādhiviṣayatvāt sadṛśapadārthagrahaṇānantarīyakamasannikṛṣṭārthagocaram, yathā gavayagrahaṇadvāreṇa goḥ smaraṇam, naca sarvajñasadṛśaḥ kaścit pratītaḥ sambhavatītyataḥ sadṛśapadārthagrahaṇābhāvān na pravartate /
The following Text shows that the Omniscient Person cannot be vouched for by ‘Analogy’: [see verse 3215 above] Analogy, as a Means of Cognition based upon similarity and its adjuncts, envisages the far off things, and is invariably concomitant with the Cognition of a similar thing; for example, there is remembrance of the Cow through the perception of the Gavaya;
prayogaḥ yasya sadṛśagrahaṇaṃ nāsti, na sa upamānagamyaḥ, yathā vandhyāsutaḥ, nāsti ca sadṛśagrahaṇaṃ sarvajñasyeti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ // kiñca upamānān na kevalaṃ sarvajñādhigamo 'sambhavī, api tu sarveṣām eva puṃsām upamānād asarvajñatvam eva yuktaṃ pratyetum ityādarśayati narān ityādi /
it is not possible for any one to perceive at the present time any person similar to the Omniscient Person; hence, on account of the similar thing not being perceptible, Analogy cannot be operative in the case in question. This argument may be formulated as follows: When any object similar to an object is not perceptible, the latter cannot be amenable to Analogy, e.g, the Son of the Barren Woman; any person similar to the Omniscient Person is not perceptible;
narān dṛṣṭvā svasarvajñān sarvānevādhunātanān / sādṛśyasyopamānena śeṣāsarvajñaniścayaḥ //
“Finding that all men of the present time are not omniscient, the certainty is derived from analogy based upon this similarity, that all other men (of the past and the future) could not be omniscient.” (3216)
nacāpyarthāpattyā sarvajñaḥ siddhyatītyetat pratipipādayiṣuḥ paramataṃ tāvad āśaṅkate upadeśo hītyādi / upadeśo hi buddhāder dharmādharmādigocaraḥ /
“Some one may accept the omniscient person on the following grounds: (a) ‘the teachings of Buddha relating to dharma and adharma cannot be explained, if there be no omniscient person; thus from presumption, one can admit the omniscient person, even though it has been shown that perception and the other means of cognition are not capable of affording the knowledge of the said person’.” (3217-3218)
anyathā nopapadyeta sarvajño yadi no bhavet // pratyakṣādau niṣiddhe 'pi sarvajñapratipādake /
Further, it is not only that the knowledge of the Omniscient Person cannot be derived from Analogy; on the contrary, it would be right for all men to deduce, from Analogy, the fact that there can be no Omniscient Person.
arthāpattyaiva sarvajñām itthaṃ yaḥ pratipadyate //
This is what is shown in the following [see verse 3216 above]
yo 'yaṃ buddhāder dharmādyupadeśaḥ so 'nyathā nopapadyate, yadi dharmādayas tena sākṣān na viditā bhaveyuḥ, tasmād yadyapi pratyakṣādi sarvajñapratipādakaṃ niṣiddham, tathāpyarthāpattyā sarvadarśī pumān siddha ityevaṃ yaḥ pratipadyate so 'yuktaṃ pratipadyate, vakṣyamāṇānnyāyād iti bhāvaḥ //
In order to show that the Omniscient Person cannot be known through Presumption, the Vaidika puts forward the view of the other party: [see verses 3217-3218 above]
[p.839]
[verses 3217-3218]:
yadvā sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ pravṛttam iha sādhanam /
If any one holds this view, then he understands things wrongly. This is what is meant.
sarvajñasyocyate 'nyatra jñānapūrvatvadarśanāt // yaḥ kaścid upadeśo hi sa sarvo jñānapūrvakaḥ /
“‘(b) or, this argument in support of the existence of the omniscient person may be stated in the form of the following inference of the sāmānyatodṛṣṭa kind (difference from the universal to the particular): in every other case teaching is found to be preceded by the knowledge of the thing taught, and wherever there is teaching, it is always preceded by the knowledge of the subject taught;
yathābhayādiśaktīnām upadeśas tathāvidhaḥ //
as in the case of the potencies of harītakī and such things;
dharmādharmopadeśo 'yam upadeśaś ca tat kṛtaḥ /
the teaching of dharma and a dharma, has been given by Buddha;
tadīyajñānapūrvatvaṃ tasmād asyānumīyate //
hence it is inferred that the teaching must have been preceded by a knowledge of those matters.” (3219-3221)
sāmānyato dṛṣṭamityanena viśeṣato dṛṣṭasyāsambhavam āha yayor eva hi liṅgaliṅginoḥ pratyakṣeṇa sambandho dṛṣṭaḥ sa eva liṅgī tenaiva liṅgena kālāntare saṃśayavyavacchedāya yadānumīyate, tadā viśeṣato dṛṣṭam anumānam ucyate /
The special mention of the ‘Sāmanyatodṛṣṭa’ Inference (from the Universal Premiss) implies the impossibility of the Particular Premiss; as a matter of fact, it is only when the relation between the particular Probans and the particular Subject has been perceived, that, at a later time, the same Probans is made to yield an Inference that sets aside all doubts on the point; and it is this Inference that is called ‘Viśeṣatodṛṣṭa’ (based on a particular Premiss).
naca sarvajñena saha dharmādyupadeśasya kvacit sambandho gṛhīta ityataḥ sāmānyato dṛṣṭam evaitat /
As a matter of fact, no relationship has been perceived between the Omniscient Person and the Teaching of Dharma, etc.; hence this can be an instance of Inference from a Universal Premiss only.
tathā hi sāmānyenopadeśasyānyatra svasantāne jñānapūrvakatvaṃ dṛṣṭam, ato yathā devadattasya gatipūrvakāṃ deśāntaraprāptimupalabhyādityasya deśāntaraprāptyā gatir anumīyate, evaṃ buddhāder api bhagavato dharmādyupadeśāt tajjñānam anumāsyate /
For instance, it has been found as a universal truth that in any one ‘chain’, the Teaching is always preceded by knowledge; hence just as in the case of Devadatta, it having been found that his change of place is preceded by movement, so in the case of the sun, the change of place leads to the inference of its movement; in the same manner, from the fact that Buddha imparted teachings relating to Dharma, it is inferred that He possessed the knowledge of Dharma.
prayogaḥ yaḥ kaścid upadeśaḥ sa vaktṛjñānapūrvakaḥ, yathā harītakyādiśaktyupadeśaḥ, upadeśaścāyaṃ buddhādīnāṃ dharmādyupadeśa iti svabhāvahetuḥ //
The argument may be formulated as follows: Every Teaching is preceded by the Teacher’s knowledge of what is taught; e.g. the teachings relating to the potencies of the Harītakī; Buddha’s teaching of Dharma is Teaching; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.
atrottaram āha anyathāpītyādi /
The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to the above is as follows: [see verses 3222-3223 next]
anyathāpyupannatvān nārthāpattir iyaṃ kṣamā /
“As the fact is capable of another explanation, the presumption (put forward) has no efficacy (in proving the existence of the omniscient person).
ata evānumāpyeṣā na sādhvī vyavatiṣṭhate //
For the same reason, the inference that has been put forward is not valid.
upadeśo hi buddhāder anyathāpyupapadyate / svapnādidṛṣṭa{ṣṭaṃ---}vyāmohā{t} vedādvādi{ccāvi---}tatha{thaṃ---} śrutāt //
for instance, the fact of Buddha and others having taught dharma, etc. can be explained in another way For instance, as being due to dreams, or to delusion, or to the Veda itself, or to wrong teaching.” (3222-3223)
anyathāpi hi vyāmohādinopadeśasya sambhavād ubhayor apyanumānārthāpattyor anaikāntikatvam /
Teaching by people may be due to delusion and other causes also hence both, the Presumption and the Inference cited, are Inconclusive.
katham anyathāpi sambhavatītyāha svapnādītyādi /
Question: How can it be otherwise explained?
yathoktaṃ śābare bhāṣye upadeśo hi vyāmohād api bhavati, asati vyāmohe vedādapi bhavatīti /
Answer: ‘To dreams, etc. etc.’ as declared in Śabara’s Bhāṣya (I. 2.) ‘Teaching proceeds from delusion also; and when there is no Delusion it proceeds from the Veda also’.
tatra vyāmohād bhavan dṛṣṭo yathā svapnopalabdhasyārthasya, vedādṛṣṭo yathā manvādīnām //
Teaching proceeding from Delusion is found in cases where things dreamt of are taught; and that proceeding from the Veda is found in the case of the teachings of Manu and others.
ye hi tāvad avedajñās teṣāṃ vedād asambhavaḥ /
“Those who are ignorant of the Veda cannot have their teaching based upon the Veda;
upadeśakṛto, yastair vyāmohādeva kevalāt //
it can proceed from delusion only.
loke duṣṭopadeṣṭṛṇāmupadeśaḥ pravartate //
in the world the teachings that are propounded by wicked teachers are not based upon the Veda;
atadāśrayād iti /
they proceed either from delusion or for the purpose of duping the disciples.” (3224-3225)
avedāśrayāt //
for the purpose of deceiving people.
katham idamavagatam na vedāśrayo 'sāvupadeśa ity āha yadyasāvityādi /
This is pointed out in the following [see verses 3224-3225 above] ‘Atadāśrayāt’ not based on the Veda.
yadyasau vedamūlaḥ syād vedavādibhya eva tu / upadeśaṃ prayaccheyur yathā manvādayas tathā // yatas tu mūrkhaśūdrebhyaḥ kṛtaṃ tair upadeśanam /
“If the teaching of Buddha had been based upon the Veda, it would have been imparted to only such persons as were Vedic scholars, just like the teachings of Manu and others, as a matter of fact, however, Buddha’s teachings are found to have been imparted to ignorant persons and Śūdras;
jñāyate tena duṣṭaṃ tat sāṃvṛtaṃ kūṭakarmavat //
hence it must be defective and illusory, like the making of counterfeit coins.” (3226-3227) Question;