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tena śaktes tatsvabhāvāvyatiriktāyās tatsvabhāvavat kartumaśakyatvāt / | Because the capacity being nothing apart from its very nature, cannot, like this nature, be brought about by any such cause. |
arthāntaratve 'pi sambandhasiddheriti bahudhā carcitam etat / | Even if there were some such cause, any relationship to it would be impossible. This has been discussed several times. |
tasmād atīndriyārthaparijñānasya nityavacanāśrayatvam anumānabādhitatvād ayuktam // | Thus then, the idea of the Cognition of supersensuous things being due to the ‘Eternal Word’, being rejected by Inference, cannot be accepted. |
svargayāgādayas tasmāt svato jñātvā prakāśitāḥ / | From this it follows that things like heaven, sacrifice and the like have been spoken of by the person who knew them by himself. |
vedakāras tavāpyasti tādṛśo 'tīndriyārthadṛk // | In fact, under your view also the author of the Veda would be such a person capable of perceiving supersensuous things; |
pradhānapuruṣārthajñaḥ sarvadharmajña eva vā / | or a person who knows all about primordial matter, spirit and other things; or one who knows of all things. |
tasyānupagame na syād vedaprāmāṇyamanyathā // tenārthāpattilabdhena dharmajñopagamena tu / | In fact, if such an author were not It has been argued that “The Perceiver of Dharma cannot exist, because the only means of Cognition by which his existence can be envisaged is ‘Non-apprehension’ (Negation).” |
svata iti / | In answer to this, the. |
svātantryeṇa / | ‘By Himself’ independently of all else; |
vedānapekṣeṇa jñānenetyarthaḥ / | i.e. independently of the knowledge provided by the Veda. |
tādṛśa iti / yādṛśo bhavadbhiḥ pratikṣipyate / | ‘Such a Person’ i.e. the like of whom yon are denying. |
vedaprāmāṇyābhyupagamasāmarthyalabdhena / | ‘Brought about by Presumption’; i.e. by the force of the doctrine that the Veda is reliable. |
ata evābhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtavigrahatvam apyasiddham, arthāpattyā viṣayīkṛtatvāt // | It is on this ground that the opponent’s Reason ‘because He is envisaged by Negation’ becomes Inadmissible; because He is actually envisaged by Presumption. |
yac ca sarvaśabdasya prakṛtārtho{rthā---pekṣitvaṃ bahudhā vikalpya dūṣaṇam uktam tannāvataratyeva / | it has been asserted by the Opponent that “the term ‘all’ is used in reference to the context”, and on this several alternatives have been put forward and many objections urged (against the idea of the All-knowing, Omniscient, Person). |
asya pakṣasyānabhyupagamāt / | because we do not admit of any such idea. |
nahyasmābhir dharmādivyatiriktavivakṣitāśeṣārthābhijñatayā sarvajño 'bhyupagamyate yena tatra dūṣaṇam āsajyeta / | When we postulate the Omniscient Person, we do not mean that He knows all possible things, even those other than Dharma. And the objections urged would be applicable to only such an idea. |
kiṃ tarhi yasya sakalakleśajñeyāvaraṇamalavyapagatena cetasā sakalam eva dharmādikaṃ jñeyamavabhāsate sa sarvajño 'bhīṣṭaḥ / | In fact, the ‘Omniscient Person’ postulated by us is one whose mind has become freed from all aberrations and afflictions, obstacles to knowledge and impurities, by virtue of which Dharma and other things all become revealed to his consciousness. |
tatra ca bhavatā na kiñcid bādhakaṃ pramāṇabhyadhāyi / | Against such a view you have not put forward a single argument. |
yaccoktam ekasyaiva śarīrasya yāvantaḥ paramāṇavaḥ ityādi tatkevalaṃ pratijñāmātram apramāṇakam uktam / | Again, it has been argued by the Opponent under Text 3137 that “In one body alone, there are so many atoms, etc. etc. and who can know all these? etc. etc.” This is a mere assertion, made without any proof; |
naca pratijñāmātrād upapattiśūnyād arthasiddhiḥ sambhavati / | and nothing can be proved by a mere assertion without reasons in support of it. |
sarvasya sarvārthasiddhiprasaṅgād ityetat sarvamāgūryāha kiñcetyādi / | Because in this way, all things would be established for all men. With a view to all this, the Author makes the following statement: [see verses 3268-3269 above] |
akāraṇam iti na vidyate kāraṇam upapattis trirūpaliṅgākhyānaṃ yasya tat tathoktam / | ‘Without any basis’ that in support of which the three-factored Probans is not available. |
kleśajñeyāvaraṇamalaviviktatvān nirmalaṃ māratīrthikaparihāṇa{---}samīraṇākampyatvād akampyaṃ yadeva jñānaṃ tadeva dīpaḥ / | The knowledge is ‘clear’, free from impurities, and aberrations obstructing the vision of things to be known it is ‘unflinching’, not shaken by the gusts of passion, etc. The knowledge is spoken of as ‘light’, because it illumines things; |
prakāśasāmyāt / | become ‘manifested’ made known. |
sāpekṣatve 'pi gamakatvāt samāsaḥ / | The irregular compounding is done on the strength of implication. |
atroktaṃ na bādhakam iti / pramāṇam iti śeṣaḥ / na kevalaṃ noktam, nāpyatra / | ‘No reason has been adduced, etc, etc.’ i.e. any proof to the contrary. It is not only that no proof has been adduced; in fact, there can be no proof to the contrary. |
tathā hi na tāvat pratyakṣaṃ bādhakam, tasyātadviṣayatvāt / | because He is not amenable to that Means of Cognition. |
yadeva hi vsatu pratyakṣeṇa yathā viṣayīkriyate tatra pratyakṣaprasiddhe viparīto dharmo 'bhyupagamyamānaḥ pratyakṣeṇa bādhyate / | It is only when a thing is amenable to Perception that, if it is cognised as something contrary to its well-known form, such cognition is annulled by Perception; |
yathā śabde dharmiṇi aśrāvaṇatvaṃ śrāvaṇatvena / | e.g. when Sound is cognised as inaudible, this Cognition is annulled by the perception of audibility. |
na tu yatra pratyakṣasyāpravṛttiḥ / | There can be no such annulment in a case where Perception is not applicable at all. |
naca parasantānavartini cetāṃsi sarvāṇi pratyakṣato 'sarvajñena viṣayīkriyante kenacit / | As a matter of fact, the Cognitions appearing in the ‘Chain’ of other people are never amenable to perception by one who is not omniscient; |
yena tatra sarvajñatvaṃ pratijñāyamānaṃ pratyakṣeṇa bādhyeta / | and it could be only if such were the case, that the assertion of Omniscience could be annulled by Perception. |
sarveṣām evārvāgdarśitvāt / | And the reason for this inapplicability of Perception lies in the fact that all men are possessed of limited powers of vision. |
viṣayīkaraṇe vā sa eva sarvajña ityapratikṣepaḥ / | If such Cognitions were amenable to Perception by any one, that person himself would be omniscient; |
syād etat na vayaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pravartamānamabhāvaṃ sādhayatīti brūmaḥ / | The following might be urged “We do not mean that it is by being applied to the Omniscient Person that Perception proves His non-existence, but as being inapplicable to it. |
tathā hi yatra vastuni pratyakṣasya nivṛttis tasyābhāve 'vasīyate, yathā śaśaviṣāṇasya / yatra pravṛttis tasya bhāvaḥ, yathā {a}syādeḥ / | That is, when Perception is not applicable to a certain thing, it proves the non-existence of that thing; e.g. in the case of the ‘Hare’s Horns In a case where Perception does apply, the thing perceived does exist; as in the case of things like the Sword. |
na ca sarvajñaviṣayaṃ kadācit pratyakṣaṃ pravṛttam ityatas tannivṛttes tadabhāvo 'vasīyata iti / | As regards the Omniscient Person, Perception has never been found to be applicable; hence, from this inapplicability of Perception it is inferred that the Person does not exist”. |
tadetad asambaddham / | This is entirely irrelevant. |
nahi pravṛtta{pratyakṣa---}nivṛtter yo bhavati niścayaḥ sa pratyakṣād bhavati / | Because the conclusion that- is deduced from the inapplicability of Perception cannot be said to have been brought about by Perception; |
abhāvābhāvayor ekatravirodhāt / | because presence (applicability) and absence (non-applicability) cannot co-exist in the same thing. |
naca pratyakṣanivṛttir vastu{stva---}bhāvena vyāptā, yenāsauvastvabhāvas tato niścīyate / satyapi vastuni vyavahitādau pratyakṣasya nivṛttidarśanāt / | Further, the inapplicability of Perception is not invariably concomitant with non-existence of the thing concerned; and it is only if it were so that the non-existence could be inferred from inapplicability of Perception; |
syād etat na pratyakṣanivṛtteḥ sakāśād abhāvaniścaya iti brūmaḥ / kiṃ tarhi nivṛttaṃ pratyakṣamabhāvaṃ sādhayatīti / tadetacchabdānyatvaṃ kevalaṃ bhavatocyate / | because even when a thing is there, Perception is found to be inapplicable, if the thing is hidden or remote, etc. The following might be urged “We do not say that the inapplicability of Perception proves non-existence; all that we mean is that when the Perception is inoperative, it proves the non-existence”. |
natvarthabhedaḥ / | This is a mere change in. |
na ca śabdānyatvamātrād arthānyatvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | the wording of your statement; there is no difference in the meaning; mere change of words cannot alter facts; |
tathā hi nivṛttir vastusattāniṣedha ucyate / nivṛttaśabdenāpi paramārthataḥ sa evābhidhīyate / | Because ‘cessation’, or ‘not-operating’ of a thing means the denial or negation of existence; the same meaning is also expressed by the word ‘become inoperative’, ‘ceased’; |
kevalam eko bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇa tanmātrajijñāsāyāṃ tamāha aparastvapratikṣepeṇeti viśeṣaḥ / | the only difference is that while one (cessation) denies other things and expresses the one thing meant, the other (‘ceased’) expresses the same thing without denying other things. |
paramārthatas tu dvābhyām asattvam eva vastunaḥ pratipādyate / | In reality, both terms express the ‘non-existence’ of the thing concerned. What again is non-existent cannot be a cause; |
navāsato hetubhāvaḥ sambhavī sarvasāmarthyavirahalakṣaṇatvāt tasya / | and nonexistence is characterised by the absence of all potencies. |
tasmād yasya yadutpādakaṃ prakāśakaṃ vā tat tasyotpādane prakāśane ca sannihitasattākam eva bhavati natu nivṛttasvabhāvaṃ yathā bījāṅkurasya dīpo vā rūpasya / | It is for this reason that when one thing is productive or illuminative of another, it is so productive or illuminative only when its existence is there, not when its existence has ceased; e.g. the Seed which is productive of the sprout, and the Lamp which is illuminative of colour; |
nahi tau nivṛttāvaṅkuraghaṭarūpādyutpādanaprakāśane samarthau bhavataḥ / | and when these two (Seed and Lamp) have ceased, they are not able to do the producing or the illuminating. |
api ca nivṛttaṃ pratyakṣamabhāvaṃ sādhayatīti ko 'trārtho 'bhimataḥ / yadi tāvad vartamānādadhvano nivṛttam ityarthas tadā sāmarthyād atītānāgatāvasthām ityevam uktaṃ syāt / | Further, what is the meaning of the statement that “Perception, having ceased, proves non-existence”? If the meaning is that Perception has ceased, disappeared, from the ‘present’ state, then it would imply that it is there in the ‘past’ and ‘future’ states; |
nacātītānāgatavastu vidyata iti pūrvaṃ pratipāditam / | and it has been already proved that the ‘past’ and the ‘future’ thing does not exist at all; |
tat katham asato vyāpāraḥ siddhyet / atha vartamānam api sadyadyatra viṣaye notpadyate tat tato nivṛttamity ucyate / | how then could there be any operation of what is non-existent? If, secondly, the meaning of the statement is that though existing at the present time, it does not come about (appear) in connection with a certain thing, and it is in this sense that Perception is said to have ‘ceased’ (become inapplicable), even so, this cannot prove the non-existence of the thing in question; |
evam api nāto vastvabhāvasiddhirvya [p.849] bhicārāt / | as the premiss voṇld be wrong and fallible; |
nahi cakṣur vijñānaṃ gandharasādiviṣaye notpadyata ityetāvatā tatas tadabhāvaḥ siddhyet / | as the mere fact that Visual Perception does not appear in connection with Odour, Taste, etc. cannot prove that these latter do not exist. |
tasmān na pratyakṣataḥ kasyacid abhāvasiddhiḥ / | Thus Perception cannot prove the nonexistence of anything. |
yadyevaṃ katham anupalambhākhyāt pratyakṣāt ghaṭādyabhāvasiddhiḥ pradeśāntare bhavadbhir varṇyate / | [Bays the Opponent] “If that is so, then how is it that, on the basis of Perception, in the form of Non-apprehension, you declare, in another place, the non-existence of the Jar?” |
naitad asti / | This is not so. |
nahi tatrābhāvaviṣayīkaraṇāt pratyakṣam abhāvaṃ sādhayatītyucyate / kiṃ tarhi ekajñānasaṃsargayogyayor arthayor anyatarasyaiva yā siddhiḥ sāparasyābhāvasiddhir iti kṛtvā / yatas tayoḥ sator naikarūpaniyatā pratipattiḥ sambhavati / | What is said there is, not that Perception proves nonexistence of the thing because the thing is envisaged by Non-apprehension, but that, when two things are capable of figuring in the same Cognition, if only one appears there, it means the non-appearance (non-existence) of the other. And the reason for this lies in the fact that both cannot be cognised in one and the same form, on the ground that the capability is equally present in both. |
na caivaṃ sarvajñatvasya kenacit saddharmamekajñānasaṃsargitā niścitā, yasyakevalasyopalambhāt tadabhāvaṃ vyavasyāmaḥ / | In the case in question however, we have never definitely cognised the fact of Omniscience figuring in the same Cognition as anything else; the presence of which latter could lead us to deduce the non-existence of Omniscience; |
tasya sarvadaivātyantaparokṣatvāt / | because this latter is always absolutely imperceptible. |
evaṃ tāvat pratyakṣaṃ sarvavido{na}bādhakaṃ sambhavati / | Thus it is clear that Perception cannot annul the notion of the Omniscient Person. |
nāpyanumānaṃ sarvajñābhāvaṃ sādhayati / | (B) Nor can Inference prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. |
tasya vidhiviṣayatvābhyupagamāt / yato 'bhāvam eva pramāṇam abhāvaviṣayam upavarṇyate nānyat / | Because it is held that Inference always envisages affirmation; as is clear from the fact that it is only Non-apprehension that has been regarded as envisaging negation. |
ata evārthāpattyādīnāṃ trayāṇām api bā{nasā---}dhakatvam / | For this same reason, the other three Means of Cognition, Presumption (Analogy and Word) cannot prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. |
athāpi syāt nāsmābhiḥ prasajyarūpeṇa sarvajñābhāvaḥ prasādhyate, kiṃ tarhi sarvanarān pakṣīkṛtya paryudāsavṛttyā teṣvasarvajñatvaṃ sādhyate, tenānumānādīnāṃ vyāpāro bhavatyeveti / | The following might be urged “When we assert that there is no Omniscient Person, we are not asserting an absolute negation; ail that we are asserting is the Relative Negation, Negation of omniscience, in relation to all men; so that there is certainly room for the operation of Inference and other Means of Cognition » |
bhavatvevam, tathāpyanumānaṃ tāvan na sambhavati, sarvanareṣvasarvajñatvāvyabhicāriliṅgāpraisiddheḥ / | It may be so; but even so, Inference is not possible; because there is no Indicative (Probans) known to be present in all men, which is invariably concomitant with Omniscience. |
yadapi ca prameyatvavaktṛtvādikam uktaṃ tadapi vyabhicārīti paścāt pratipādayiṣyate / | Such character as ‘being know able’, ‘being a Teacher’ and so forth, which have been put forward, all these are Inconclusive, as we are going to show later on. |
nāpyarthāpattirasarvajñaṃ sādhayati / | Nor again is Presumption able to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. |
satyapi vā pramāṇāntaratve nārthāpattis tāvad asarvajñasādhane paryāptā yato dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho 'nyathā nopapadyate ityadṛṣṭaparikalpanārthāpattiḥ / | Secondly, even if there are other Means of Cognition, Presumption is not capable of proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because Presumption is based upon the idea that a certain well known fact seen or heard of, is not explicable otherwise than on the basis of the unseen factor which is thus presumed; |
nacāsarvajñatvamantareṇa sarvanareṣu kaścid artho dṛṣṭādir nopapadyate, yatastadarthāpattyā kalpyeta / | and as a matter of fact, there is no well-known fact seen or heard of among men, which is not explicable except on the basis of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person, which, therefore, should be presumed. |
nāpyupamānaṃ kṣamaṃ, tathā hi smaryamāṇam eva vastu purovartipadārthasadṛśyopādhi sādṛśyamātraṃ vā purovartinā smaryamāṇavastugatam upamānena pratīyate / | Nor is Analogy able to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. What is cognised by means of Analogy is, either the remembered thing having for its adjunct the similarity of the thing before the eyes, or mere similarity of the thing before the eyes, to the Remembered Thing. |
yathānubhūtagodarśanasya puṃso 'raṇyagatasya gavayadarśanāt pūrvānubhūte gavi tat sādharmyajñānam / | For example, when a man who has had the perception of the Cow goes to the forest, and sees the Qavaya there, he perceives in this latter, the similarity to the Cow. |
yathoktam "tasmādyatsmaryate tat syāt sādṛśyena viśeṣitam / prameyamupamānasya sādṛśyaṃ vā tadanvitam // | This has been thus declared ‘Thus what is remembered and perceived as similar, forms the object of Analogy, or the Similarity itself’ (Ślokavārtika Upamāna, 37). |
tasmāt smaryamāṇa eva dharmī upamānasya viṣayaḥ, anubhūtam eva ca vastu smaraṇena viṣayīkriyate, nānyat / | Thus the object that is remembered forms the object of Analogical Cognition; and what is remembered is only what has been apprehended before, not anything else; |
naca sarvavarasantānavartini cetāṃsi kenacit sarvavidānubhūtāni, yataḥ smaraṇena viṣayīkriyeran / | and there is no Omniscient Person who has apprehended the Cognitions occurring in the ‘Chain’ of all men; hence these could not be remembered by any one. |
nacānubhūyamānasya vastunaḥ sarvanarair asarvajñatvasādhāraṇadharmaniścayo 'sti, yadvaśād asarvajñatvaṃ sarvanareṣūpamīyeta / | Nor is there anything apprehended by all men which is definitely known as possessing properties in common with non-omniscience, on the basis of which the non-omniscient character of all men could be cognised through Analogy. |
yadapi sattvādikaṃ kvacid asarvajñatvaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tadapi nāsarvajñatvasādhāraṇaṃ siddham / | As regards the quality of ‘existence’ etc. which has been found in the non-Omniscient Person, those also have not been found to be in common with non-omniscience. |
sarvajñasyāpi [p.850] sattvādyavirodhāt / | Besause the quality of ‘existence’ is not incompatible with the Omniscient Person also. |
nahi gave sattvādidharmadarśanād ghaṭādīnām api gavayasādṛśyanupamīyate / | Further, the perception of ‘existence’ in the Gavaya does not lead to the Analogical Cognition of the Jar being similar to the Gavaya. |
bhavatu nāma sarvanarāṇāṃ sattvādinā sādharmyamasarvajñatvaṃ tu na siddhyati / | Ail men may be alike on the ground of being existent; but that does not prove their non-omniscience. |
etenaiva tat pratyuktam, yaduktam narān dṛṣṭetyādi / | This also refutes the argument that has been set forth by the other party under the Text 3215. |
nāpi śabdākhyaṃ pramāṇaṃ sarvavido bādhakam asti / | Nor again can Word, as the Means of Cognition, set aside the existence of the Omniscient Person. |
yattāvat pauruṣeyaṃ tadapramāṇam eva svayaṃ mīmāṃsakair atīndriyārthaviṣaye 'bhyupagamyate, yaccāpauruṣeyaṃ tadapyapramāṇam iti niveditam / | As regards the Word emanating from human beings, that is regarded by the Mīmāṃsaka as itself unreliable in matters beyond the senses. And as regards the Word not emanating from human beings, that cannot be reliable, as we have shown above. |
nacāpi kiñcid vaidikaṃ vacanaṃ sarvanarāsarvajñatvapratyāyakam upalabhyate / | Nor is there any Vedic assertion found to the effect that all men are non-omniscient. |
naca tatrānupadeśād arthāntarābhāvaḥ siddhyati, sarvavastūnāṃ śāstropadeśe 'nadhikṛtatvāt / | Nor can the mere fact of something not being mentioned in the Veda establish the non-existence of that thing; because all things are not meant to be spoken of in the scriptures. |
anyathā hi bhavan mātṛvivāhādīnām apyabhāvaprasaṅgaḥ syāt, tatrāpāṭhāt / | Otherwise, there would be non-existence of the marriage of your mother and such things, as these are not mentioned in the Veda. |
nacaikadeśaṃ kvacit pāṭhādarśanāt sarvatrāpāṭhaniścayo yuktaḥ, anekaśākhāśatāntarhitaśravaṇād anyatrāpi pāṭhasya sambhāvyamānatvāt / | Nor again can it be right to deduce that a certain thing is not mentioned in the Veda, at all from the fact of its not being mentioned in a certain text. Because there being many ‘Rescensional Texts’ of the Veda, it is always probable that the thing may be mentioned somewhere in them. |
śākhāntare sphuṭataram eva sarvajñaḥ paṭhyata iti paścāt pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ / | And we are going to show later on that a certain Vedic Text does speak of the Omniscient Person. |
nāpyabhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtatvāt sarvavido 'sattvasiddhiḥ / tathā hi yadi pramāṇanivṛttimātraṃ prasajya lakṣaṇam abhāvapramāṇaṃ varṇyate tadā nāsau kasyacit pratipattir nāpi pratipattihetur iti na tena viṣayīkaraṇaṃ yuktam avastutvāt / | The non-existence of the Omniscient Person cannot be proved by the argument that He forms the objective of the Means of Cognition called ‘Negation’ (Non-apprehension). Because if this ‘Negation’ as a means of Cognition is described as consisting in the absolute negation of Cognition, then, it cannot form either the Cognition, or the Means of Cognition, of anything at all; and hence the Omniscient Person could not be envisaged by it; as it is a non-entity; |
ato nāsau pramāṇam / | and hence cannot be a Means of Cognition (or Cognition). |
atha paryudāsāvṛttyā pramāṇākhyād bhāvād anyo bhāva evābhipretaḥ evam api pramāṇād vyāvṛttyātmatayā na prāmāṇyaṃ siddhyet / | If, on the other hand, ‘Negation’, is held to be of the nature of Relative Negation standing for the negation of the entity in the shape of the Means of Cognition, even so, as it would be of the nature of the negation of the ‘Means of Cognition’, it could not be reliable at all. |
nahi brāhmaṇādanyo brāhmaṇa eva yuktaḥ / | One who is a non-Brāhmaṇa cannot be a Brāhmaṇa. |
syād etat na sarvapramāṇavyāvṛtto 'sau varṇyate / kiṃ tarhi vivakṣitapramāṇapañcakavyatirekeṇānyaḥ pratyayaviśeṣa eva / | The following might be urged Negation, as a Means of Cognition, is not described by us as consisting in the exclusion of all Means of Cognition; it is described as a particular form of Cognition, only different from the five other Means of Cognition |
yadyevaṃ kimākāro 'sāvīti vācyam / | If that is so, then it behoves you to explain in what form it appears. |
yasmāt pramāṇapañcakāgocaras tasmād asua sarvajño nāstītyevam ākāra iti cet / | “It appears in this form inasmuch as the Omniscient Person is not cognisable by any one of the five Means of Cognition, He does not exist.” |
yadyevam ākāro na tarhi pramāṇam vyabhicārāt / | If it is in this form, then it is not a ‘Means (or form) of valid Cognition’; |
nahi pramāṇapañcakasyā{sva---}svabhāvākāraṇabhūtasya nivṛttāvapratibaddhaṃ sarvajñādivastu nivartate, yenāyaṃ pratyayaḥ satyavamarśnuvīta / | as it is Inconclusive, False, Because the inapplicability of the jive Means of Cognition cannot set aside the entity in the shape of the Omniscient Person, which is not invariably concomitant with the said inapplicability; |
tasmān na kiñcid bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ sarva{jñ}syāstīti bhāvaḥ // | Thus it is established that there is no Proof that sets aside the possibility of the existence of the Omniscient Person. |
syād etat anupralambho yo yuṃṣābhir upavarṇito 'numānatvena sa eva sarvajñasya bādhako bhaviṣyati, kimatrāsmākam anyena pramāṇeneti / | The following might be urged “That same Non-apprehension which you have described as a form of Inference, will be the proof against the existence of the Omniscient Person; what need have we to seek for another proof?” |
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