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ane{nye}na cetaseti / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3308 above] |
ane{nye---}nābhiprāyeṇa // kaḥ punar asāvityāha svargetyādi / | ‘With a different motive’ with another intention. Question: “What is that motive?” Answer: [see verse 3309 next] |
svargāpavargasamprāptihetujñostīti gamyate / | What is primarily and directly understood by us is that there is a person who knows the means of attaining heaven and liberation; |
sākṣān na kevalaṃ kintu sarvajñopi pratīyate // | but not this alone; it is also believed that there is a person who also knows all things. |
[p.863] mukhyaṃ hi tāvat svargamokṣasamprāpakahetujñatvasādhanaṃ bhagavato 'smābhiḥ kriyate, yat punaraśeṣārthaparijñātṛtvasādhanam asya tat prāsaṅgikam anyatrāpi bhagavato jñānapravṛtter bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt sākṣād aśeṣārthaparijñānāt sarvajño bhavan na kenacid bhādhyata iti, ato na prekṣāvatāṃ tat pratikṣepo yuktaḥ / | What we are primarily concerned with proving is the fact that the Blessed Lord knows the means of attaining Heaven and Liberation; as for the proving of the fact of His knowing all things, without exception, that is done only incidentally; what we mean is that in matters other than Heaven and Liberation also, the knowledge of the Blessed Lord is not hampered by obstacles, and hence knowing all things, if He becomes Omniscient, there is nothing to prevent it. Hence it is not right for the wise to deny such omniscience; but for those who seek to be sure of the omniscience, it is only right that they should try to secure that certainty. |
kiṃtu ye sarvajñatvādhigamārthinas teṣāṃ tadarthapravṛttir yuktā ceti darśitaṃ bhavati // | Thus then, there being no reasons against, while there is clear reason in support of it, why should dull-witted persons object to the idea of the omniscient person? (3310) |
tataśca bādhakābhāve sādhane sati ca sphuṭe / | Even if there be no proof in support of it, so long as there is no reason definitely against it, the matter should remain in doubt; |
kasmād vipratipadyante sarvajñe jaḍabuddhayaḥ // | on what could this certainty of these people be based? (3311) [verse 3310]: |
syād etat tathābhūtapuruṣasaṃsādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ tathāvidhaṃ nāstītyevaṃmanyamānair asmābhiḥ pratikṣipyante, natu mohād ity āha mābhūd vetyādi / mābhūdvā sādhanaṃ tatra bādhake tvaviniścite / | Thus then, there being no proof against the existence of the Omniscient Person, and clear proof of His existence going to be set forth later on, the definite denial that you make of the Omniscient Person, whose recognition is certain, can be due only to delusion. This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verse 3310 above] The following might be urged “We deny the Omniscient Person because we think that there is no proof in support of the existence of such a Person; and we do not deny Him through delusion”. |
saṃśayaḥ syād ayaṃ tveṣāṃ niścayaḥ kiṃnibandhanaḥ // etaccābhyupagamyocyate, sādhanaṃ tu vakṣyamāṇam astyeva / | [verse 3311]: The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3311 above] What is said here is on granting the position of the Opponent for the sake of argument; in reality, there is definite proof in support, as is going to be shown later on. |
ayam niścaya iti / nāsti sarvajña ityevaṃ mīmāṃsakānām // | ‘This certainty’ i.e. the certainty of the Mīmāṃsakas that “the Omniscient Person does not exist”. |
yaccocyate bhavadbhiḥ codanā hi bhūtaṃ bhavantaṃ bhaviṣyantaṃ sūkṣmaṃ vyavahitam ityevañjātīyakam arthaṃ śaknotyavagamayituṃ nānyatkiñcanendriyam iti, etad api kevalaṃ pratijñāmātramapramāṇakam evādghoṣyate bhaktivādeneti darśayati bhūtādītyādi / | The assertion that “the Veda alone and nothing else is able to provide knowledge of the past, etc. could be true only if the non-existence of the other sources were certain. The following assertion has been made by you Mīmāṃsakas “The Veda can make known such things as the past, the present, the future, the subtle, the hidden and so forth; |
bhūtādibodhane śaktā codanaivāparaṃ natu / | which cannot be done by any other Sense-organ” (Śabara-Bhāṣya 1. |
ityayaṃ niyamo yukto hyanyāsattve viniścite // aparam iti / | This is also a mere assertion without any reason, based upon sheer faith. This is what is shown in the following: [see verse 3312 above] |
sarvajñapratyakṣādi / | ‘Nothing else’ in the shape of Perception by the Omniscient Person and so forth. |
anyāsattva iti / | ‘The non-existence of other sources’; |
anyasya sarvajñasyāsattve viniścite satyevaṃ vaktuṃ yuktaṃ nānyathā, avadhāraṇasya naiṣphalyāt // | if it were quite certain that the other source, in the shape of the Omniscient Person is non-existent, then alone, not otherwise, could it be reasonable to make the above assertion; |
tatra sarvaṃ jagatsūkṣmetyādāvāha pradhānetyādi / | as any such restriction would, under the circumstances, be meaningless. |
pradhānapuruṣārthajñasarvārthajñaprasiddhaye / tacca mānaṃ puraḥ proktaṃ paścād anyacca vakṣyate // | The proof in support of the person knowing primordial matter and the spirit and other things, as also of the person knowing all things, has been already declared before, and later on another proof also is going to be set forth. |
ataḥ sarvajagatsūkṣmabhedajñārthaprasādhane / nāsthāne kliśyate lokaḥ saṃrambhād granthavādayoḥ // | Hence it is not for nothing that people take the trouble of proving the existence of the person knowing the minute details of the whole world, by means of enthusiastic treatises and discussions. |
[p.864] nahyasmābhiḥ sarvajñaviṣayāṃ cintāṃ muktvā sarvajñasādhane prayatnaḥ kiryate / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 3313-3314 above] When we try to prove the existence of the Omniscient Person, we do not give up all considerations regarding that Person Himself; |
kiṃ tarhi pradhānabhūtadharmajñasādhana eva / | in fact our effort is directed towards the proving of the existence of the Person who knows the principal factor of Dharma itself. |
tathā ca pūrvam tenārthāpattilabhyeta dharmajñopagamenetyādi dharmajñasādhane 'rthāpattyākhyaṃ bhavan matenaiva pramāṇam uktam, paścāccānumānākhyaṃ pramāṇam abhidhāsyate, tena nāsthāne lokaḥ kliśyate, kiṃ tarhi sthāna eva // sarvapramātṛsambaddhetyādāvāha sarvetyādi / | Thus on a previous occasion, under Text 3267, we have set forth the proof, in the shape of Presumption, in due accordance with your own view, where we pointed out that ‘your denial of the Omniscient Person is set aside by the acceptance of the knower of Dharma, on the strength of Presumption’; and we are also going to set forth another proof, in the shape of Inference. |
sarvapramātṛsambaddhapratyakṣādyanivāraṇāt / | It is not for nothing that people take all this trouble, in fact, it is for a very right and proper purpose. |
kevalāgamagamyatvaṃ nāpyate puṇyapāpayoḥ // dharmādiviṣayasya sarvapramātṛsambaddhasya pratyakṣāder darśana{radarśana}mātreṇa nivārayitum aśakyatvān na dharmādharmayor āgamamātragamyatvaṃ labhyate // | As perception and other means of cognition regarding the omniscient person cannot be discarded, it does not follow that morality and immorality are cognisable through the reliable word only. The doctrine of the mīmāṃsaka being thus demolished, the attempt that the other party has made to refute the omniscient person has been made through sheer stupidity. |
yaccoktametāvatā cetyādi tatrāha etāvatetyādi / etāvatā ca mīmāṃsāpakṣe 'siddhe 'pi yaḥ punaḥ / sarvajñavāraṇe yatnaḥ so 'tisaukhyā{maurkhyā---}tparaiḥ kṛtaḥ // | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 3142, that “Perception and the other Means of Cognition regarding the Omniscient Person having been discarded, it would follow that Morality and Immorality are cognisable through the reliable Word only”. |
asiddhe 'pīti / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3315 above] |
dharmajñasya siddhatvāt / | ‘Demolished’ By the existence of the Omniscient Person being established. |
parair iti mīmāṃsakaiḥ // | ‘Other party’ the Mīmāṃsakas. |
ye tvavicchinnamūlatvād dharmajñatve 'hate sati / sarvajñāt puruṣānāhur dhīmattā taiḥ prakāśitā // | The ‘person cognisant of dharma’ not being refuted, on account of the root not being cut off, if people have asserted the existence of omniscient persons they have shown their wisdom by this. |
ahata ityakārapraśleṣo draṣṭavyaḥ / tair iti / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under Text 3144, that “The Person cognisant of Dharma having been refuted, on the ground of his very |
bauddhaiḥ // | ‘People’ The Buddhists. |
rasanendriyasambandhān madyāśucirasādayaḥ / vedyeran yadi tasyaiva tadānīṃ nindyatā bhavet // | If the omniscient person had experienced the unclean taste, etc. through the contact of his gestatory organ, then alone could he be regarded as blameworthy. |
bhūtārthabhāvanodbhūtamānasenaiva cetasā / aprāptā eva vedyante ninditā api saṃvṛttau // | As a matter of fact however, things, even those that are deprecated under ‘illusion’, become cognised by him without actual contact, through the mind, whose perceptiveness has been brought about by the impressions of past experiences. |
yadi nāma sākṣān madyarasādisaṃvedanamabhūt tasya tathāpi na dharmajñatvahānir bhavet / nindyātvamāpadyata iti cet, yo rasanādīndriyasaṃsargeṇa tān rasanādīn saṃvedayate sa lokasaṃvṛttyā nindyo bhavet, natu bhagavāṃs tathā saṃvedayate, kiṃ tarhi---, manasā, taccāprāptaviṣayam iti na loke tat kṛtaṃ pratītam / | If the Omniscient Person had direct experience of the said tastes, etc. even then that would not detract from His being the ‘knower of Dharma If it is urged that “He would become blameworthy”, the answer is as follows: The man who experiences the said Taste, etc. through the direct contact of these with the gestatory organ, becomes blameworthy; the Blessed Lord, however, has no such perception; He perceives things only through the Mind, and that also without its coming into contact with the thing; |
nahi nindyatvaṃ paramārthataḥ kasyaci [p.865] dasti, anavasthitatvāt tasya / | As a matter of fact, there is no one who is really blameworthy; because ‘blame’ is not something fixed, it is relative; |
tathā hi śrotriyasya yannindyaṃ na tajjordviṃga{jjuṅgita---}sya, kiṃtu saṃvṛtyā loke madyādayo garhitās tān saṃvedayas tathāpi bhagavato na nincyatvam madyasya manasaiva vedanāt / | for instance, what may be ‘blameworthy’ for the Vedic Scholar, is not so for the low-born; what happens in the world is that, under the spell of Illusion, Wine and such things are considered evil. But even so, if the Blessed Lord perceived these, He would not be ‘blameworthy’; |
yathā rasanendriyasambandhād anyeṣāṃ madyādisaṃvittau duḥkhādyanubhavas tathā manasāpi saṃvedayataḥ prāpnotīti / | because His perception of these is purely mental. The following might be urged “When other people suffer from tasting wine through its contact with the Gestatory Organ, so would He suffer from experiencing it through the Mind”. |
naitad asti / | That is not so. |
rasanādīndriyasambandhenānubhūyamānā rasādaya indriyasyānugrahopaghātaṃkurvanto duḥkhādihetavo bhavanti / | When the Taste, etc. are experienced through the contact of the Sense-organs, they either benefit or injure that organ and hence become sources of pain, etc.; |
te cākuśalādikarmānurūpeṇa viparyastacetasāṃ keṣāñcid eva tathā duḥkhādihetutvena prakhyāyante na sarveṣām / | but they are known to he the source of pain and suffering, not for all men, but only for some men whose mind has become disordered through the influence of their past misdeeds. |
yathāhi pretānāṃ pūyādirūpeṇa salilādi / | For instance, Water becomes Pus for only some dead people, not for all. |
nacaivaṃ {cedaṃ---} bhagavataḥ sarvam asti / | All this, however, is not there in the case of the Blessed Lord. |
tathā hi manasaiva saṃvedanānnendriyopaghātādisambhavaḥ, anāśravapañcavyavahārātmakatvād bhagavato nāpi sāśravakarmādhipatyasambhavaḥ, aviparītānityādirūpeṇa saṃvedanānnāpi viparyastatvam, ata eva bhagavato mānasasyāpi daurmanasyādilakṣaṇasya duḥkhāder asambhavaḥ, tasya mohajatvāt / | Because His experiences being through the Mind, there is no possibility of injury to the Sense-organs; specially because the Lord having all his five-fold activity free from the impurities of the ‘Afflictions’, there is no possibility of his actions being influenced by the Afflictions. Nor is His Mind capable of being disordered, because He cognises all things in their right form and as evanescent. For these reasons, in the case of the Blessed Lord, there is no possibility of even mental pain, in the shape of unhappiness, etc.; specially because all these have their source in delusion. |
etac ca sarvaṃ bāhyārthasambhave sati rūpaskandhāsambhavān na santyevāśucyādayas teṣām mā bhūt tān parikalpyā dūrībhūtāśeṣāśucyādipratibhāsānāṃ darśane pratibāsante yathā timirādidoṣāpagame 'nupahatacakṣuṣāṃ darśane na keśādayaḥ / | For instance, for Idealists, there being no Colour-phase, there can be nothing ‘unclean’ for them in reality; nor can there be any impression due to that; because all this arises from Ideas only. All these therefore do not appear within range of the vision of persons who have realised the Highest Truth and have shaken off all impurities; just as, on being cured of visual disorder, people do not have any illusory cognitions like the ‘Hair-tuft’ and the like. |
yathoktam nanvajñānena bhāsante tasyāśucirasādayaḥ / | This has been thus declared ‘The unclean Taste and other things manifest themselves only through Ignorance; |
asaṃvedās tataḥ siddhā dvitīyaśaśibimbavat // | hence they are imperceptible (for the Wise One); just like the second Moon |
yasya tu viprasya vyāpitayā sakalāśucideśasambaddhā vedadhvanayo vadanodarādivartinaḥ sadaiva sa katham iha loke na nindyo bhavet // | On the other hand, the Brāhmaṇa has resounding within his mouth, the words of the Veda, which, being all-pervading, are in contact with all unclean places; as such, how can he be free from blame? (3318-3319) |
naca vedopavedāṅgetyādāvāha yata evetyādi / yata eva na vedādiproktārthapratipādakam / tāyino dṛśyate vākyaṃ tata eva sa sarvavit // | It is because ho word of tāyin are found to provide knowledge of things mentioned in the Veda, that he is ‘omniscient it is quite possible too that he had knowledge of all false philosophical doctrines also; as he does make the declaration that what is asserted in the Veda regarding the soul and other things is wrong. |
pramādādhītamātmādi vede 'līkaṃ bravīti hi // | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 3320-3321 above] |
yadyathaivāvasthitaṃ vastu sadādirūpeṇa tasya tathaiva jñānāt sarvavidbhavati / | A man becomes ‘omniscient’ by knowing everything exactly as it exists, in its true or other forms; |
naca yathā vede nirdiṣṭā ātmādayo 'rthās te tathaiva santi pramāṇena bādhyamānatvāt / | and things that are spoken of in the Veda do not exist exactly as described there; as they are found to be annulled by proofs. |
tat kathaṃ tathaiva tānupadiśaṃs tattvadarśī bhavet / nacaitacchakyaṃ vaktuṃ mithyātvenāpi te naiva jñātā iti, [p.866] yathā jñātā eva / | How then could man be a ‘knower of truth’ by expounding things exactly as they are taught in the Veda? It cannot be asserted that the Buddha did not know these things at all not even as false; because they were actually known to Him as such. |
tathā hi sarva eva prāṇivadhādayo 'kuśalāḥ karmapathyā durgatihetutvena nirdiṣṭāḥ, tathā | For instance, it has been pointed out by Him that Animal-sacrifice and other evil paths of action lead to damnation; He says ‘There is no such thing as the Soul, all those things that are there are the effects of causes’; |
nāstīha sattva ātmā vā dharmastvete sahetukāḥ ityādinātmādayo 'pyasattvenoktā ityasiddhaṃ vedādivihitapadārthāparijñānaṃ bhagavataḥ // svagrantheṣvanibaddho 'pītyādāvāha advitīyam ityādi / | where He has declared that the Soul and other things are non-existent. Thus it is not true that the Blessed Lord had no knowledge of the things taught in the Veda. The doctrine of ‘no-soul’ has been clearly taught by him for the benefit of his disciples the doctrine which is the unique gateway to the highest good, and the fright of all upholders of wrong doctrines. |
vina{ne---}yebhyo hitāyoktaṃ nairātmyaṃ tena tu sphuṭam // anyatīrthyair anadhigatatvādidvitīyam, teṣāṃ sarveṣām eva vitathātmadṛṣṭyabhiniviṣṭatvāt / | It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under Text 3147, that “If things not mentioned in one’s own books were held to be known to him, then, by merely composing one’s own poems, poets would be omniscient”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3322 above] ‘Unique’. because not understood by other philosophers; |
etac ca sarvaṃ nairātmyaviśeṣaṇam / | All these qualifications apply to the ‘doctrine of No-soul’. |
śivadvāram iti / | ‘Gateway to the Highest Good’; |
nirvāṇapraveśopāyabhūtatvāt / | it is so called because it is the means of entering Nirvāṇa; |
śivam iti nirvāṇam ucyate / | it is Nirvāṇa that is meant by the term ‘śiva’, ‘Highest Good’. |
kudṛṣṭīnām iti / kutsitā ātmādidṛṣṭayo yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / vitathadṛṣṭyabhiniviṣṭabālajanatrāsakaram ity arthaḥ / | ‘Kudṛṣṭīnām’ Those upholding wrong doctrines, regarding the Soul and other things. The Path taught by Buddha is the ‘fright’ inspires fear in those childish people who have their faith fixed in false doctrines. |
yathoktam nāsty ahaṃ na bhaviṣyāmi na me 'sti na bhaviṣyati / iti bālasya saṃtrāsaḥ piṇḍitasya bhayakṣayaḥ // | This has been thus declared ‘The childish man is always beset with such fears as I am not, I may cease to exist, naught is mine, nothing shall be mine; the wise one is without fear |
iti / etena viparītābhiniveśāvasthitais tadadhigamoktum api na śakyate, kimutādhigantum iti darśitaṃ bhavati // | What is meant by this is that men who are obsessed with false doctrines cannot even speak of the True Doctrine, how can they understand it? (3322) |
saṃsāryanucitaṃ jñātaṃ sarvānarthanivartakam / | It is not known to the worldly man; when known, it sets aside all evil; |
tadabhyāsādiyuktānāṃ guṇaratnākaraṃ param // | for those who are devoted to its practice, it is a veritable mine of valuable qualities. |
īdṛk va paramaṃ tattvaṃ jānanti kavayo yadi / pradhānapuruṣārthajñān sarvajñān ko na manyate // | If the poets know this highest truth, then who is there who would not regard them, knowing the primordial matter, the spirit and other things, as omniscient? (3323-3324) |
saṃsāribhiḥ pṛthagjanair anucitamanabhyastam ity arthaḥ / | The following Texts point out that the True Doctrine has never been known before by people at the stage of the common man: [see verses 3323-3324 above] ‘Not known to’ not practised by ‘worldly man’ common people. |
kathaṃ hitāya prabhavati yena tadarthaṃ deśitam ity āha jñātam ityādi / | Question: “In what way does it benefit people that it has been taught by the Lord?” |
jñātaṃ sākṣātkṛtaṃ satkleśajanmādilakṣaṇasyāśeṣānartharāśer nivartakaṃ bhavati / | Answer: ‘When known, etc. etc when it becomes ‘known’ directly and realised, it sets aside the whole lot of evils, such as the Afflictions, Birth and so forth. |
uttarakālam api tadabhyasyamānaṃ rathyādivaiśeṣikaguṇābhinivartakam ityeva paramaṃ puruṣārthopayogitattvaṃ yadi kavayo 'dhigacchanti te 'pi santu sarvajñāḥna hyasmābhirekapuruṣāvadhikam eva sarvajñatvamabhyupeyate, kiṃ tarhiya evaṃ yathoditatattvavedī sa eva sarvavidiṣyate nānyaḥ, na caivaṃ kavīnām asti, tenātiprasaṅgo na bhavati //3323- | Even subsequently, when it is practised, it brings about excellent qualities. If such a truth, leading as it does to the fulfilment of the Highest Good, is known to the Poets, they may very well be ‘omniscient’; we do not for a moment think that omniscience is confined to a single Person; in fact, whoever is cognisant of the said Truth, he alone, no one else, is held by us to be omniscient. Such knowledge, however, does not belong to the Poets; |
idaṃ ca varddhamānāder nairātmyajñānamīdṛśam / | This knowledge of the doctrine of ‘no-soul’ as described does not belong to vardhamāna and others; |
na samastyātmadṛṣṭau hi vinaṣṭāḥ sarvatīrthikāḥ // syād vādākṣaṇikasyā{tvā---}di pratyakṣādiprabo{bā---}dhitam / | in fact, all philosophers have become lost in the doctrine of the ‘soul’, all such doctrines as the ‘syādvāda’ and others involving the notions of things being not-momentary, are discarded by direct perception; |
vahnevāyuktamuktaṃ yaiḥ syuḥ sarvajñāḥ kathaṃ nu te // vāhīkādiprasiddhe 'smin pratyakṣe 'rthe skhalanti ye / kathaṃ sambhāvyate teṣām apratyakṣādhigamaḥ sphuṭaḥ // asarvajñatvam evaṃ tu a{pra}spaṣṭamavagamyate / mithyājñānānuṣaṅgitvād viparītaprakāśanāt // | how then can persons who have asserted' many such unreasonable things be ‘omniscient’? People who tremble over things that are perceptible and known even to the ploughman, how could they ever have any clear knowledge of things that are beyond the senses? Thus the fact of these persons being not-omniscient is clearly understood from their being attached to wrong doctrines and expounding wrong teachings; |
sthāṇau nara iti bhrāntaḥ paripattyā{ttā---} yathā paraḥ / | just in the same way as any other man who perceives the man in the post is said to be mistaken. |
sarvābhiś ca parīkṣābhir vijñeyo hetusiddhitaḥ // samyak sarvapadārthānāṃ tattvajñānāc ca sarvavit / | One is to be recognised as omniscient only when he has been found to satisfy all tests and all reasons, and has been found to have the true knowledge of all things. |
hetāvato na sambodhyā saṃdigdhavyatirekitā // | Thus then our reason should not be regarded as being one whose contrary is open to doubt. |
yathoktaṃ tattvajñānaṃ yadi varddhamānakapilādīnāṃ sambhavet tadā teṣām api sarvajñatvaṃ bhavatu, yathā sarva evāmī sarvadoṣaprasavahetuvitathātmagrahagrāhagṛhītāḥ pratyakṣādipramāṇabādhitākṣaṇikādipadārthānām upadeṣṭāraḥ, tat katham ākumāramatipratītipatham upagateṣvapi padārtheṣu praskhalatām eṣām atīndriyārthadarśanaṃ sambhāvanāpatham avatariṣyati, yenocyate "kapilo neti kā prameti /" tathāhīyamatra pramā sphuṭataramabhidhātuṃ śakyate, ye mithyājñānānuṣaṅgiṇas te sarvavidāṃ na bhavanti, yathā sthāṇau nara iti samupajātavibhramaḥ pumān, mithyājñānānusaṅgiṇaś ca varddhamānādaya iti viruddhavyāptopalabdhiḥ / | The following Texts show that what has been just said disposes of what has been urged by the other Party under Text 3148, to the effect that “There being many Omniscient Persons, imparting mutually contradictory teachings, how can any one be singled out as the One Omniscient Person?” [see verses 3325-3330 above] If the said knowledge of Truth belonged to Vardhamāna, Kapila and others, then they also might be omniscient. As a matter of fact however, all these persons have been held in the clutches of the crocodile of the false doctrine of the ‘Soul’, which is the root of all evil, and have taught that things ate not-momentary and so forth, which are all annulled by Perception and other forms of Cognition; being thus found to be tripping even in regard to things known even to the veriest child, how could their knowledge of supersensuous things ever fall within range of possibility, in view of which it could be asked “what proof is there that Kapila is not omniscient?” [as has been asked by the other party under Text 3149]. Because there is the following proof available which can be clearly stated: People who are attached to false doctrines cannot be omniscient; |
sarvajña{tva}viruiddhenāsarvajñatvena mithyājñānānuṣaṅgitvasya vyāptatvāt / na cāsiddho hetuḥ yato viparītārthaprakāśanam eṣāṃ sarvābhiḥ parīkṣābhiḥpratipāditam / | as ‘attachment to false doctrines’ is pervaded by ‘being non-omniscient’, which is the contradictory of ‘omniscience The Reason here put forward caṇnot be regarded as ‘inadmissible’; because by all sorts of tests it has been shown that all these Teachers have taught false doctrines. |
nacāpi sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttitayānaikāntikatā hetoḥ, yataḥ samyagaśeṣapadārthaparijñātṛtvena sarvajñatvam iṣyate / | Nor can the Reason be said to be ‘inconclusive’, on the ground of its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being doubtful; because omniscience has been held to depend upon the full knowledge of all things without exception; |
naca yatra samyag jñānaṃ tatra tadviruddhasya mithyājñānasya sambhavaḥ // | and a person who possesses True Knowledge can never have any false idea of things at all (3325-3330) |
syād etat yadi nāma viparītārthaprakāśaṇam eṣām, tathāpi mithyājñānānuṣaṅgi [p.868] tvam ato 'vasātuṃ na śakyate, yato 'nyathāpi vyavahārāḥ śakyante kartuṃ vicitrāti{bhi---}sandhitvāt puruṣāṇām, tena hetoḥ saṃdigdhāsiddhatetyetad aśaṅkyāha ābhiprāyikam ityādi / ābhiprāyikameteṣāṃ syād vādādivaco yadi / | If the assertion of these teachers regarding the ‘syādvāda’ and other doctrines be said to have been made with some (other) motive, then (we ask) what is that form of things which they hold to be real and true? (3331) The following might be urged “If these Teachers have taught false doctrines, even so, it cannot be deduced from this that they are addicted to the false notions of things; because it is open to men to act contrary to their convictions, the tendencies of men being peculiarly divergent; consequently, your Reason is ‘doubtful hence inadmissible’.” |
yadi hyanyabhiprāyeṇa tairetat syād vādādipramāṇaviruddham ityu{mapyu---}ktam ityabhidhīyate / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3331 above] If it be said that “it is with some other motive that these Teachers have asserted the doctrines of Syādvāda, etc., which are against all canons of truth”; |
abhidhīyatām, nahyasmābhiḥ svātantryeṇa varddhamānādīnām asarvajñatvaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭam, kiṃtu bhavatā parasparaviruddhamatāvasthitena kapilādiṣu yadi sugataḥ sarvajñas tadā kapilo neti kā prametyuktam, atrāsmābhiḥ pramāṇaṃ bhavan matyā teṣāṃ matabhedam aṅgīkṛtyābhidhīyate, tena nāsiddhatā hetoḥ / | then (our answer is that) let them assert the doctrines; we do not wish to prove that Vardhamāna, etc. are, by themselves, non-omniscient; all that we have done is to put forward the diversity of opinion among these Teachers, as a proof in answer to the question that you, taking your stand upon the mutually contradictory doctrines taught by Kapila and others, have asked “If Buddha is omniscient, what is the proof that Kapila is not so?” Hence our Reason cannot be ‘inadmissible’. |
tathā hi yadyeṣām ābhiprāyikaṃ vaco varṇyate tadā kimeṣāṃ pāramārthikaṃ vasturūpamiṣṭam iti vaktavyam // | Then again, if what has been asserted by them has some other motive behind it, then it behoves you to explain what, according to them, is the real nature of things. |
anātmakṣaṇikatvādi yadyevaṃ sarvadarśinaḥ / | “There is no soul; things are momentary and so forth.” If that is so, these teachers are omniscient; |
sākṣāt samastavastūnāṃ tattvarūpasya darśanāt // santu tepi samastānām aikamatyena saṃsthiteḥ / | because they have directly perceived the true nature of all things. In that case they are all omniscient, holding the same view of things. |
parasparaviruddhārthaṃ nītārthaṃ na hi te jaguḥ // | As for the mutually contradictory teachings, they never expounded any such teachings, they meant something quite different. |
yadi sātmādīni brūyāt tadā matabheda evoktaḥ syād iti nāsiddhatā bhavet / | If this is the answer, then it means that there is no difference of opinion between these Teachers and Buddha; hence our Reason would not be ‘inadmissible |
yadyevam ityādinottaram āha nahyasmābhiḥ śṛṅgagrāhikayāyam asau sarvajña ityevaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ, kiṃtu sāmānyena / yadi kapilādīnāṃ evaṃvidhatattvaparijñānam abhyupagamyate na tarhi bhavatāvaktavyam matabhedaḥ kathaṃ tayor iti, sarveṣām aikamatyena sthitatvāt / | The Author therefore says in his reply ‘If that is so, etc. etc.’ We do not mean to point our finger to any one Person and say that ‘He is omniscient’, we only assert it in a general way that ‘there are omniscient persons’. If it is admitted that Kapila and others also have the said knowledge of truth, then you should not say why is there a difference of opinion between the two”? Because under the circumstances, they would all be of the same opinion. |
yastu parasparaviruddhārthopadeśas teṣāṃ sa neyārthatayā vyavatiṣṭhate / | Then, as regards the mutually contradictory teachings of these Teachers, it will have to be interpreted in some other way; |
nahyaikamatyena sthitāḥ parasparaviruddhaṃ nītārtham tāttvikaṃ rūpaṃ gadantīti yuktam / | for people holding the same opinions cannot expound contradictory teachings; the only right view is that all of them expound only the true nature of things. |
tasmān matabhedamicchatānā{mā---}bhiprāyikaṃ vaco vācyam, eṣāṃ matabhedābhyupagame ca na vaktavyam ko nāmaiko nirūpyatām iti, yataḥ sugata eva yathoktajñānayogitayā sarvajñatvenāvadhāryate nānya iti nirūpitam etat //3332- | Hence whenever one meets with a diversity of opinion, he should understand that its meaning is something quite different. In case they are held to be holders of divergent opinions, there can be no room for the question “who is the one to be selected as omniscient?” (as has been asked by the other party in Text 3148). Because in that case Sugata (Buddha) would be selected as the only person possessing the said knowledge and hence being omniscient, and no other person could be so regarded. |
kiñca kapilādīnāṃ yathoktajñānābhyupagame sugatatvam evāpadyata ityetad darśayann āha pratipāditarūpastyetyādi / | Then again, if Kapila and others are accepted as holding the said opinion regarding things, then they become Buddhas themselves. |
[p.869] | This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verses 3334-3335 next] |
pratipāditarūpasya sarvavastugatasya ca / sākṣāt tattvasya vijñānāt sugatāḥ sarvadarśinaḥ // teṣāṃ caivaṃvidhe jñāne sugatatvaṃ na bhidyate / | The Buddhas are omniscient only because they have the direct knowledge of truth regarding all things, as explained above. If then this same knowledge belongs to the other teachers also, then they also are ‘Buddhas’ and their ‘Buddha-hood’ does not differ from that of the Buddha; |
praśastajñānayogitvād etāvat tasya lakṣaṇam // | because they also possess perfect knowledge, and this is the sole characteristic of the Buddha. |
pratipāditaṃ prasādhitaṃ pramāṇato rūpaṃ svabhāvo yasyānātmādilakṣaṇasyatattvasya tat tathoktam / teṣām iti / | The ‘Truth’ whose character has been explained as consisting in there being no Soul, etc. etc. ‘Teṣām’ of Vardhamāna and others. |
praśastajñānayogitvam / | ‘This’ i.e. possessing perfect knowledge. |
sugatatvasya / | ‘Tasya’ of Buddha-hood. |
yato nairātmyajñānāt praśastaṃ samastajñeyādyāvaraṇagrahaṇaṃ gata iti sugata ucyate // | Because that person is called ‘Sugata’ (Buddha) who has attained the perfect knowledge of there being no Soul, and has got rid of all that obscures the right view of things. |
Subsets and Splits