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āstāṃ tāvad etat yadasādhvī yuktir vedavādimukhasthā naiva śobhata iti naivātra citram kiṃtu sādhvyapyāśrayadoṣeṇa bhavatocyamānā na bhrājate // | This matter may rest here. There is no wonder that the unsound reasoning appearing in the mouth of the Vedic Scholar does not shine; what is strange, however, is that even a sound reason when asserted by you, fails to shine, on account of the defective character of its substratum. |
katham ityatrāha pāvakāvyabhicāritvam ityādi / | Question: ‘How so?’ Answer: [see verses 3378-3379 next] |
pāvakāvyabhicāritvaṃ dhūmasyāpi na śakyate / | He cannot assert even the infallibility of the concomitance between smoke and fire; |
vaktuṃ tena yatu dhūmas tanmate 'nyatra vartate // | because, under his view, smoke exists elsewhere also; |
ekavastusvarūpatvād udanvatyapi vartate / | in fact, being of the one uniform nature of ‘entity’, it exists in the ocean also; |
tatrāpyanalasadbhāve vyatirekaḥ kimāśrayaḥ // | and if fire exists there also, then where would the absence (of the probans) lie? (3378-3379) |
[p.886] dhūmasya hi dahanapratibaddhajanma tathā tadavyabhicāritvamāgopālamatipratītameva tasyāpi tvayā sarvasya jagato vastutvādinā pāramārthikamaikyaṃ varṇayatā dahanābyabhicāritvaṃ na śakyaṃ pratipādayitum vastusvarūpatvenodake 'sya bhavan matena dhūmasya paramārthato vṛtteḥ / | That the birth of Smoke is related to Fire, and that it is invariably concomitant with Fire is known even to the veriest cowherd; and yet you, by describing the whole world as really one and uniform in the shape of ‘Entity’, are unable to say that Smoke is infallible in its concomitance with Fire; because under your view, in the form of ‘Entity’, it is present in water also. |
syād etat avyabhicāritaivetyāha tatrāpītyādi / tatrāpyudanvati tādātmyena yadyanalasvabhāvo 'ṅgīkriyate tadānale sādhye jalādir na vipakṣaḥ syāt / | Answer: ‘If Fire exists, etc. etc.’ If it is admitted that, under the principle of all things being one and the same, the Ocean is of the same nature as Fire, then, in the proving of Fire, Water could not be regarded as that where the Probandam (Fire) is known to be absent; |
tataś ca vipakṣābhāvād dhūmāder liṅgasya kimāśrayo vipakṣād vyatireko bhavet //3378- | and thus there being nothing where the Probandum is absent, on what basis would the Probans, Smoke, be non-existent where the Probandum is absent? (3378-3379) |
tadrūpakāryavijñaptiḥ kiṃ vā tatrāpi no bhavet / vilakṣaṇātmabhāve vā vastubhedo 'stu tattvikaḥ // | Why should not then there be recognition of the form and of the effects of fire in water also? The only other alternative is that the nature of the two things being distinct, the difference among things must be real. |
yadi jaladhau paramārthato dahano 'vasthita iti matam, kimiti tadrūpopalabdhir dāhapākādilakṣaṇakāryanirbhāsā ca vijñaptir na jāyate / | If the view is that Fire is really present in Water, then why is there no recognition of the form of the Fire in Water, or the recognition of its effects, in the shape of Burning, Cooking and the like? |
etac ca vistareṇa syād vādaparīkṣāyāṃ vicāritamityās tāṃ tāvad etat // yaduktam ekena pramāṇenetyādi, tatrāha samastetyādi / | If it is said that some sort of difference is also accepted, then the answer is that ‘the only other, etc. etc.’ This has been discussed in detail, under the chapter on Syādvāda. So it may be allowed to rest here. |
samastavastusambaddhatattvābhyāsabalodgatam / sārvajñaṃ mānasaṃ jñānaṃ mānamekaṃ prakalpyate // | The only evidence that is suggested is that of the mental cognition of omniscience as brought about by the repeated practice of the ‘truth’ relating to all things; |
natu netrādivijñānaṃ tataḥ kimidam ucyate / nūnaṃ sa cakṣuṣā sarvātrasādīn pratipadyate // siddhaṃ ca mānasaṃ jñānaṃ rūpādyanubhavātmakam / | and not the ordinary visual and other cognitions. Under the circumstances, how can it be asserted that the said person should cognise taste, etc. through the eye? As regards mental cognition of things like colour and the rest, it has been accepted, without dispute, even by the other party; |
varṇyate hi smṛtis tena rūpaśabdādigocarā / | in fact, it is on the basis of this mental cognition that the remembrance of colour and other things has been said to be produced. |
svapne ca mānasaṃ jñānaṃ sarvārthānubhavātmakam // | During dreams also, there is mental cognition in the shape of the apprehension of all things. |
tataścāniyatārthena mānasena prakalpite / sarvajñe cakṣuṣā kasmād rasādīn pratipadyate // cākṣuṣeṇaiva tat klṛptāvayaṃ doṣo bhavedapi / | Thus then, the omniscient person being postulated on the basis of mental cognition, the scope of which is not restricted, how could he cognise taste, etc, through the eye? This objection might apply, if he were held to know all things through the eye itself. |
samāsena tu cittena vettyeva ca rasādikam // | As a matter of fact however, he does cognise taste and other things collectively, through the mind. |
yatrāpyatiśayo dṛṣṭaḥ svasvārthānatilaṅghanāt / dūrasūkṣmādidṛṣṭau syān na rūpe śrotravṛttitaḥ // | Even in cases where some superior peculiarity is found (in the cognitions of the omniscient person), in regard to the perception of subtle and remote things, it is all within the scope of the said mind and mental concepts; and it is not due to the functioning of the auditory organ on colour; |
[p.887] ityādikamato 'niṣṭaṃ parair uktaṃ na yo yataḥ / svārthāvilaṅghanenaiva mānase 'tiśayo mataḥ // | all these undesirable contingencies that other people have urged against us are not applicable to us at all; because all the superiority and peculiarity lies in the mental cognition itself, and it does not lie beyond the scope of this cognition. |
yajjātīyaiḥ pramāṇaiś ca yajjātīyārthadarśanam / dṛṣṭaṃ samprati lokasya tathā kālāntare 'pi naḥ // | Thus then for us, the things that were cognised in the past by certain means of cognition are precisely the same that are cognised now by the same means of cognition. |
yadi cakṣurādīndriyadhiyāṃ sarvārthaparijñānam abhyupagataṃ bhavet, tadā bhavedyathoktadoṣaprasaṅgaḥ yāvatā, samastavastugatānityatvādilakṣaṇāśeṣatattvābhyāsaprakarṣaparyantajena manovijñānena sattvārthagocareṇa sphuṭapratibhāsāvisaṃvāditvābhyāṃ pratyakṣatām upagatena yugapad aśeṣavastugrahaṇātsarvavidiṣṭaḥ natu cakṣurādidhiyā / | If it had been held (by us) that the Visual and other Sense -perceptions apprehend all things, then there might have been room for the objection that has been urged. As a matter of fact, however, when we postulate the Omniscient Person we do so on the basis of the fact that at one and the same time He knows all things through Mental Cognition, which apprehends all entities, and which is as good as Perception, on account of its distinctness and its being in agreement with the real state of things, real Mental Cognition having been brought about by the Practice of Meditation upon the Truth relating to the impermanent and other characters of all things; |
naca manojñānaṃ sarvārthagocaratayā na prasiddham iti yuktaṃ vaktum yato bhavatāpi rūpaśabdādiviṣayaṃ smārttaṃ jñānam upavarṇitam / | and we do not hold that He apprehends all things through the Visual or other Sense-perceptions. It cannot be right to assert that “Mental Cognition is not known to apprehend all things”. Because you have yourself explained that there is Remembrance of Colour, Sound and other things; |
tacca manojñānam eva / svapne ca rūpādipratibhāsamatipratītam eveti nāsyāpahnavaḥ śakyakriyaḥ / | and Remembrance is certainly a Mental Cognition Then again, it is a well-known fact that in dreams, there is cognition of Colour and other things; so that the denial of Mental Cognition is impossible. |
tena svārthāvilaṅghanenaivātiśayasyeṣṭatvānnāsmākaṃ kiñcid aniṣṭamāpāditaṃ bhavatā // | Consequently, the peculiarities in the cognition of the Omniscient Person falling well within the scope of Mental Cognition, what you have urged does not affect our position at all. |
viśuddhaṃ vā bhavejjñānaṃ sarvaṃ sarvārthagocaram / | Or, all cognition, when pure, would, as a rule, apprehend all things; |
hetoḥ sambhāvyate kaścit phale 'pyatiśayaḥ kvacit // | though in a certain case, there may be some peculiarity in the resultant of the cognition, due to particular causes. |
nahi sūkṣmaphalā dṛṣṭā āmalakyo marāviti / sarvās tattvena tadrūpā anyatrāpi bhavanti tāḥ // | because the āmalakī growing in the desert has been found to yield a small fruit, it does not necessarily follow that it will always, in other places also, produce fruits of the same small size. |
śṛṇvanti cakṣuṣā sarpā ityeṣāpi śrutis tataḥ / | Similarly, there is the assertion that serpents hear through their eyes. |
sambhāvyārthā vicitrā hi sattvānāṃ karmaśaktayaḥ // | In fact, the capacities of, action belonging to all things are wonderful and anything might be possible for them. |
kāraṇabhedena hi bhāvānāṃ svabhāvabhedapratiniyamān na śakyate kvacid ekadā dṛṣṭasya vastunaḥ sarvatra sarvadā tathā bhāvo niścetum, nahi sūkṣmaphalā āmalakyo maruṣu samupalabdhā ityetāvatā sarvatra deśe satyapi kāraṇabhedasambhave tathātvenāvadhārayituṃ darśanamātreṇa prekṣāvanto yuktāḥ / | The nature of things is found to vary and become restricted under the influence of a variety of causes; it is not right therefore to deduce that a certain thing will always retain the same character that has been, perceived in it once; e.g. on seeing that the Āmalakī fruits growing in deserts are very small in size, no sane man can conclude that in all places, even though there may be diverse causes operating, they would be the same. |
tena cakṣuṣāpi yogābhyāsaviśeṣabalaśalākonmīlitena kaścid api sarvārthān paśyatītyaviruddham // | Hence it is quite possible that even through the Eye, as improved by the practice of Yoga, a man may become able to see all things. Hence there can be nothing incongruous in this possibility. |
yasyādhvatritayasthaṃ hi sarvaṃ vastvavabhāsate / tathā niyatasāmarthyaṃ vaktumitthaṃ sa śobhate // | Such an assertion can sound well only when proceeding from one who has the apprehension of all things at all the three points of time, as restricted in their capacity. |
tathā niyatasāmarthyam iti / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3393 above] |
teneṣṭarūpeṇa niyatasāmarthyaṃ sarvaṃ vastvavabhāsata iti sambandhaḥ // | ‘With their capacities restricted’ construe thus ‘to whom all things appear as restricted in the desired manner’. |
kīdṛśaṃ tadvaktuṃ ity āha yajjātīyair ityādi / | Question: “What is the assertion that sounds well?” Answer: [see verses 3394-3396 next] |
yajjātīyaiḥ pramāṇais tu yajjātīyārthadarśanam / | [Such an assertion as that] “The perception of certain things through certain causes in the past was exactly as it is found at the present time”. |
idānīm api lokasya śaktir jñātuṃ na śakyate / bhavatā jantumātreṇa sarvaśaktyaviniścayāt // | As a matter of fact, even at the present time, it cannot be known what the capacity of people is, by you, who are a mere animal devoid of the definite knowledge of the capacity of all things. |
niḥśeṣasattvaśaktīnāṃ jñāne sarvajñatā bata / | In fact, if you had the knowledge of the capacity of all things, omniscience would indeed be yours! |
nacānumānataḥ siddhir anyathābhāvaśaṅkayā // | nor can it be known by means of inference, as there would always be a suspicion regarding its being otherwise. |
syād etat na vayaṃ pratyakṣato jñātvaivaṃ brūmaḥ tathā kālāntare 'pyabhūd iti, kiṃ tarhi anumānāt / yatpramāṇaṃ yajjātīyārthagrāhi dṛṣṭaṃ tat kālāntare 'pi tathaivābhūt pramāṇatvād iti, tatrāha na cānumānataḥ siddhir iti / | The following might be urged “When we say that this should have been the same in the past, we do not say so on the basis of what we have actually seen, but on the basis of Inference; the inference being in the form ‘The means of cognition that is found to apprehend certain things now must have done the same in the past, because it is a Means of Cognition The answer to this is ‘Nor can it be known by Inference’; |
āmalakyādivaddhetuviśeṣaṇakāryasya viśeṣadarśanāt / | as in the case of the Āmalakī just cited, peculiar effects are found to be brought about by peculiar causes; |
anyathāpi vijātīyārthagrahaṇadvāreṇa pravṛtteḥ sambhāvyamānatvād anaikāntikatā hetoḥ // | hence it might be possible that, through some cause, the Means of Cognition apprehends a different kind of things. Hence the Reason adduced would be ‘Inconclusive’. |
atīndriyārthavijñānayogenāpyupalabhyate / prajñādiguṇayogitvaṃ puṃsāṃ vidyādiśaktitaḥ // asti hīkṣaṇikādyākhyā vidyāyāṃ suvibhāvitā / paracittaparijñānaṃ karotīhaiva janmani // śrutānumitadṛṣṭaṃ ca yanna vastvatra janmani / | It is found that on account of the capacity to perceive supersensuous things also, the presence of intelligence and other qualities is perceived as arising from the force of their learning, etc. for instance, there is the art of ‘īkṣaṇika’ (thought reading?) which, properly practised, brings about, even during the present life, the knowledge of what is passing in another man’s mind: and (with its help) people come to know and describe things past, present and future, that have not been either inferred or heard of during the present life. |
sasaṃvādamabhivyaktamāviṣṭāḥ puruṣā iha / vicitramantranāgendrarakṣoyakṣādiśaktitaḥ // | Similarly, people are distinctly and truly found to be possessed of the capacities of curious incantations, nāgas, demons and spirits of all kinds. |
māvā bhūd dṛṣṭamityādi tathāpyatra na bādhakam / | all this may not be seen, and yet there is no proof for denying it. |
kiñcitpramāṇam astīti tadabhāvo na siddhyati // | Hence it cannot be said that he does not exist, (3397-3401) |
[p.889] natvatīndriyārthadarśanādityasiddham etat, tathā hi īkṣaṇikādividyābalena ḍākinyādīnāṃ paracittajñānaṃ bhūtabhavad bhaviṣyad vastuparijñānaṃ copalabhyata eva / | The assertion made in 3160 to the effect that “it is not on account of the capacity to perceive supersensuous things that some people are found to be superior to others”, is not true. Because through such arts as that of Telepathy, witches and others are found to be able to read the thoughts of others, and also to have the knowledge of past, present and future things. |
ādiśabdena gāndhārīprakṛtīnāṃ grahaṇam / | The term ‘ādi’ ‘others’, is meant to include the Gāndhāri and others. |
vicitrabhūtagrahāc cā{dyā---}veśabalāccātīndriyārthaparijñānadarśanād anyatrāpyapratikṣepaḥ / | People have also been found to have the knowledge of supersensuous things through the obsession of various elemental, planets, etc.; |
mā bhūd vā vyabhicāraviṣayadarśanam / tathāpyaprati{lambha}mātreṇa sarvavido nābhāvo niścetuṃ yuktaḥ / | all which cannot be denied. Granting that there is no supernormal vision anywhere, even so, the mere fact that the Omniscient Person is not seen cannot prove His non-existence. |
tadabhāvaḥ atīndriyārthadṛgabhāvo na siddhyati // | Hence it cannot be true that He the knower of super-sensuous things does not exist. |
prājño 'pi hītyādāvāha uktena cetyādi / | The author of the Veda having been established in the manner above described, you have to admit of the person capable of perceiving supersensuous things. |
uktena ca prakāreṇa vedakāre prasādhite / avaśyābhyupagantavyastvayātīndriyadṛgnaraḥ // | Just as the capacity of the ear and other sense-organs in relation to their objects, becomes improved by special exercise, medication and other means, so would be the case with the mind also. |
ataḥ prājño naraḥ sūkṣmānarthān draṣṭuṃ kṣamo bhavet / sajātīrapyatikrāman parānabhibhavennarān // | It has been argued under Text 3161 that “Even the intelligent man who is capable of perceiving subtle things is superior to other persons, without going beyond the limitations of his own kind”. |
ukteneti a{śru---}tiparīkṣāyām // | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 3402-3403 above] |
atraivopapattimāha yathā svaviṣayā ityādi / yathā svaviṣaye śaktiḥ śrotrādeḥ praviśiṣyate / | ‘In the manner described’ by us, under the chapter on ‘the Revealed Word’. The author states an argument in support of the above: [see verse 3404 above] |
yathā gativiśeṣeṇāñjanādilakṣaṇayogaviśeṣeṇa ca śrotrādeḥ svārthaśaktir viśiṣyate tathā manaso 'pi hetuviśeṣaṇa śaktiḥ praviśiṣyata iti sambhāvyam // | As a matter of fact, the potency of the sense-organs Ear and the rest relating to their objectives, becomes improved by particular exercises and by the application of particular unguents, etc.; and in the same manner it is quite possible that the capacity of the Mind also should become improved by certain special means. |
tathā hi vīkṣyate rūpaṃ gṛdhrair dūratarasthitam / tiraskṛtaṃ nidhānādi tathā siddhāñjanādikaiḥ // | For example, vultures are able to see things lying at a very great distance: and people are enabled to perceive hidden treasures and other things by the use of unguents and collyrium with magical powers. |
yogaviśeṣakṛtamapyāha tiraskṛtam ityādi / | The following Text shows how the capacity of the Ear, etc. is improved by exercise: [see verse 3405 above] |
siddhāñjanādikair iti / vīkṣyata iti sambandhaḥ / | The words ‘People are enabled, etc.’ point out the improvement caused by medication. |
hetau karaṇe vā tṛtīyeyam // | the Instrumental Ending connoting cause or instrumentality. |
evaṃ gativiśeṣeṇa devāder darśanaṃ bhavet / sūkṣmavyavahitādīnāṃ svopapattyānurūpyataḥ // | In the same manner, through special exercises, one would be enabled to see the celestial and other beings, as also things subtle, hidden and so forth, in accordance with his own limitations. |
adhastādeṣāṃ jñānadarśanaṃ pravartate norddhvamityevaṃ yathā [p.890] svamupapattyā ānurūpyeṇa jñānaṃ bhavaccānu{jjātu---} mahārājakāyikādīnāṃ{---} devānāṃ kena vāryate // | “In accordance, etc., etc.” There are such natural limitations as ‘Vision of such and such a person turns downwards, not upwards’ and so forth; and if, in accordance with such well-known limitations, people have the Cognition of the Mahārajikas and other celestial Beings, who can prevent it? (3406) |
yogābhyāsaviśeṣāc ca yogināṃ mānasaṃ tathā / | Through particular practices of Yoga, the mind of the mystics and their cognitions come to be of superior order. |
jñānaṃ prakṛṣṭarūpaṃ syād ityatrāsti na bādhakam // | there can be nothing incongruous in this. |
siddhasādhyateti darśayann āha gatiyogādivaikalya iti / | The following Text shows the superiority acquired by means of Mystic Practices: [see verse 3407 above] |
gatiyogādi vaikalye jñāne tvatiśayo yadi / kṣipyate 'yuktametaddhi hetvabhāvāt phalaṃ nahi // | If the superior powers among men is denied on the ground that the said practices and medication, etc. are impossible, then such denial is entirely superfluous. |
uttarottarataddhetuvaikalye 'tiśayastathā // | This is pointed out in the following: [see verses 3408-3409 above] |
devānām / | ‘Superiority’ among the celestial Beings. |
yaccoktam śrotragamyeṣvityādi tadapyanenaiva pratyuktam adarśanamātreṇa tathāvidhasyātiśayasya pratiṣeddhumaśakyatvādityabhiprāyaḥ // | This same argument sets aside what has been said by the other party under Text 3102, regarding the ‘auditory perception of Sounds, etc. etc.’ What is meant is that mere non-perception of the said superiority cannot justify the denial of it. |
nacaikadeśavijñānāt sarvajñānāstitocyate / yena vedādivijñānāt svargādyadhyakṣatā bhavet // | When the existence of the omniscient person is asserted, it is not on the basis of his knowledge of any one part of things, in view of which the knowledge of the Veda and the allied subjects could make heaven, etc. perceptible to him. |
kiṃtu prajñākṛpādīnām abhyāsād vṛddhidarśanāt / anyo 'pyatiśayas tasmād vardhamānāt pratīyate // | What we find in him is a superior grade of wisdom, mercy and such qualities brought about by constant practice, and from our knowledge of these qualities we deduce our knowledge of his other kinds of superiority also. |
manoguṇatayāpyeṣāṃ kāṣṭhāparyantasambhavaḥ / | And as these are qualities of the mind, there is every possibility of their rising to the highest stage. |
nairghṛṇyavan mahābhyāsānniṣṭhāśeṣārthabodhanāt // | Like the cruelty (of wicked people), the knowledge of all things reaches the highest stage, through constant practice; |
dharmā{arthā---}vabodharūpā hi prajñā lakṣaṇataḥ sthitā / | thus is that wisdom attained which consists in the knowledge of things; |
ekasyāpyaparijñāne sāsamāptaiva vartate // | and it remains incomplete while even a single thing remains unknown. |
nahyasmābhir ekadeśaparijñānamātrād aśeṣapadārthaparijñānamabhyupagamyate, yenābhyadhāyi bhavatā śāstrāntarajñānaṃ tāvanmātreṇa labhyata iti / | We do not accept the view that there is knowledge of all things, on the basis of the knowledge of a single thing, in view of which you have asserted that ‘merely that does not secure the knowledge of other sciences’ (Text 3164). |
kiṃtvābhyāsavaśāt prajñāprakarṣopalambhād anyo 'pyatīndriyaparijñānakṛto viśeṣas tasmād abhyāsād varddhamānāt prakarṣaviśeṣaṃ prāptād bhavatīti sambhāvyate / | What we do hold is that, through constant practice, the highest stages of wisdom are reached; and from that we gather that other kinds of superiority are also brought about by the knowledge of supersensuous things, through the rising grades of that same practice. |
etac ca pūrvaṃ prasādhitaṃ punar api bhūyaḥ pramāṇayati prayogaḥ ye ye manoguṇās te 'bhyāsātiśaye sati sambhavat prakarṣaparyantvṛttayaḥ, yathā [p.891] śrotriyajodiṃga{---}nairghṛṇyam, manoguṇaś ca prajñeti svabhāvahetuḥ / | That this is so has been already proved before; it is further supported, the argument being formulated as follows: all qualities of the Mind reach their highest stage through constant practice, like the cruelty and other qualities of the Vedic Sacrificers (?); and Wisdom is a quality of the Mind; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. |
na naikāntikatā hetoḥ prajñāyāḥ padārthasvabhāvabodhalakṣaṇāyāḥ prakarṣaparyantagamanaṃ nāśeṣārthaparijñānamantareṇa sambhavati / | The Reason adduced here cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’, because Wisdom, which consists in the comprehending of the nature of things, cannot reach its highest stage without the knowledge of all things, Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Inadmissible’ on the ground of its qualification being unknown; |
nāpyaprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatayā hetor asiddhatā, pūrvam abhyāsaviśeṣasambhavasya vistareṇa prasādhitatvāt / | because it has already been proved before in detail that constant practice is what is quite feasible. |
kāṣṭhāśabdaḥ prakarṣaparyāyaḥ // | The word. ‘Kāṣṭhā’ is synonymous with ‘highest stage’. |
ye vā samānajātīyapūrvabījapravṛttayaḥ / te 'tyantavṛddhidharmāṇaḥ saṃskārotkarṣabhedataḥ // | Then again, the grains that originally grew out of the seeds of the same kind, turn out gradually to be vastly superior, through the superior treatment that they receive. |
vīhyādivat sambhavino dayāmatyādayo 'pi ca / yathābhihitadharmāṇaḥ pravṛddhau sarvadarśitā // | And as in the case of the vrīhi and other grains, so in the case of mercy, wisdom and other qualities also, it is quite possible that when these latter, endowed with the said character, reach their higher stages, there results omniscience. |
athavā ye tulyajātīyapūrvabījaprasūtayas te saṃskāraviśeṣe satyatyantavṛddhidharmāṇaḥ sambhavinaḥ, yathā vrīhyādayaḥ, yathoktadharmāṇaś ca dayāprajñādaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | Or, the grains that originally grew out of the same kind of seeds are found, on undergoing special treatment, to become vastly superior; and just as this happens in the case of grains, so it does in the case of the qualities of Mercy, Wisdom, etc. also. So this is a Reason based on the nature of things. |
atrāpi pūrvavad asiddhānaikāntikatā na bhavati / | As before, here also the Reason is not ‘Inconclusive’ or ‘Inadmissible’. |
matiḥ prajñā / | ‘Mali’ wisdom. |
samānajātīyapūrvabījapravṛttaya ity arthaḥ // | ‘Endowed with the said character’ i.e. originally growing out of the same kind of cause. |
ye cāpacayadharmāṇaḥ pratipakṣasya sannidhau / atyantāpacayas teṣāṃ kaladhautamalādivat // | In things that are liable to deterioration in the presence of their opposites, there comes about an utter deterioration, as is pound in the case of the impurities in gold. |
sambhāvyante tathā cāmī kleśajñeyānṛtādayaḥ / yathopadiṣṭadharmāṇas tat prahāṇe 'malā dhiyaḥ // | Afflictions, wrong notions of cognisable things and so forth, are all endowed with the said character (of deteriorating in the presence of their opposites): hence on the destruction of these, cognitions become free from impurities. |
yathoktadharmāṇām eṣāṃ sambhāvyo yadi vā malaḥ / atyantonmūlane dakṣaḥ pratipakṣas tathaiva hi // | If it is possible for these, endowed as they are with the said character, to have impurities, then it is equally possible for their opposite to uproot that impurity. |
athavā ye pratipakṣasannidhāvapacayadharmāṇo dṛṣṭās te pratipakṣātyantavṛddhau satyāṃ sambhavadatyantāpacayadharmāṇaḥ, yathā kanakamalādi, nairātmyādilakṣaṇasaṃmukhībhāve cāpacayadharmāṇo rāgādaya iti svabhāvahetur iti / | Or, things that have been found to deteriorate in the presence of their opposites are liable to utter deterioration when their opposite rises to its highest stage of development; as is found to be the ease with the impurities of gold; Love, Hatred and the rest are found to deteriorate in the presence of the knowledge of ‘Soul-less-ness’; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. |
nāsiddhatā hetoḥ nairātmyajñānena saha kleśāder virodhasya prasādhitatvāt / | The Reason adduced cannot be regarded as ‘Inadmissible’, because it has been proved that the knowledge of ‘Soul-less-ness’ is destructive of Love, etc. |
nāpyanaikāntikatā pratipakṣātyantavṛddhau satyāṃ vipakṣasyāvasthānāsambhavāt / | Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’, because when the opposite of something rises to the highest point, that thing cannot continue to exist. |
anyathā yo 'tyantamunmūlayitum asamarthaḥ sa kathamalpamapyapacayaṃ kuryāt / nahi sphuṭatarasphuratsphuliṅgamālojvalajvalanakalāpāntargatam api vajramapacayamanubhavati kadācit / | Otherwise, if a thing were unable to entirely uproot another thing, how could it bring about even a slight deterioration in this latter? For instance, the diamond, even when lying in the midst of flaming fire, does not undergo any deterioration at all. |
na cāpi vipakṣasyātyantavṛddhyasambhavādanaikāntikatā pūrvaṃ vistareṇātyantavṛddhisambhavasya prasādhitatvāt / | Nor can the Reason be held to be ‘Inconclusive’ on the ground of the impossibility of the opposite rising to the highest stage of development; because it has been already proved in detail, that such high development is quite possible. |
athavā ye pratipakṣasannidhāvapaca [p.892] yadharmāṇas te sambhavad atyantonmūlanādakṣapratipakṣāḥ tadyathā kanakamalādi yathoktadharmāṇaś ca kleśājñeyāvaraṇādaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | Or, those things that are liable to deterioration in the presence of their opposites, are likely to have opposites that are capable of utterly uprooting them, as in the ease of the impurities of gold; the Afflictions and the wrong notions of knowable things are liable to deterioration in the presence of their opposites; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. |
atrāpi pūrvavad asiddhānaikāntikate parihārye / | Here also the charge of ‘Inconclusiveness’ and ‘Inadmissibility’ may be rebutted as in the previous cases. |
ādiśabdena karmāvaraṇādiparigrahaḥ // | ‘Ādi’ includes the ‘wrong notions of action (3416-3418) |
Subsets and Splits