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athāpi syād ajñatvā yadṛcchayāpyupadeśasambhavād anaikāntikatetyāha ajñātasyetyādi / | hence our present argument is not ‘futile’. It might be argued that “Teachings can be imparted at random, without knowing the things taught; so that your Reason is ‘Inconclusive’.” |
śrutānumānabhinneva sākṣājjñānena nirmalam / munitārkṣyādivijñānaṃ na cet tad gaditaṃ katham // | The answer to this is ‘Mere random teaching, etc. etc.’ It is not possible that anyone, without knowledge, should go on talking, and that too against all forms of Right Cognition. |
kiñca yadetan mantrādīnāṃ viṣāpanayanādisāmarthyamatyantaparokṣaṃ tadyadi buddhādibhiḥ sākṣān na viditaṃ tat kathaṃ tair bhāṣitam iti vaktavyam // | Further, the knowledge of Incantations and other things as possessing the capacity to remove the effects of Poison, etc., things that are entirely beyond the reach of the senses, if these things were not directly known to Buddha and others, how is it that they have spoken of them? This needs to be explained. |
anumānato jñātvā bhāṣitam iti cedāha na cānumānata ityādi / | “It may be that they have spoken of these things after having come to know them through Inference.” |
nahyaviditalakṣaṇasambandhaṃ vastvanumānaviṣayaḥ naca tenātyantaparokṣeṇa vastunā saha kasyacilliṅgasya sambandhaḥ śakyate niścetum // | Nothing can form the object of Inference of which the relationship to the Indicative has not been recognised; and it is not possible to have any definite notion of the relationship of any Inferential Indicative to a thing which is entirely beyond perception. |
deśanaivamparaiveyaṃ nānyahetūpakalpanā / hetvantarakṛtāyāṃ hi vṛttau tannāma śaṅkyate // | It might be said that “His knowledge has been derived from the assertions of another person”, But that cannot be right, as the case of this latter also would be open to the same objections. |
tathā vidrumasamprāpter yuktā yādṛcchikī sthitiḥ // | For instance, the following consideration arises here also: How did the other person know it? There can be no teaching, without knowledge; |
parataḥ śrutvā proktam iti cen na tasyāpi tulyaparyanuyogāt / | if he learnt it from another person; and so on, there would be an infinite regress; |
tathā hi tathāpyayaṃ vicāro 'vatarati tenāpi pareṇa kathaṃ jñātam nahyajñātvā tathopadeśaḥ sambhavet tenāpyanyato jñātam iti cet evaṃ tarhyanavasthā syāt tataścandhaparamparāyāṃ satyāṃ sarveṣām anabhijñatvān na samyagupadeśaḥ syāt / | thus there being a case of the blind following the blind, all would have to be regarded as ignorant, and no teaching would be right and sound. |
yathoktam naivañjātīyakeṣvartheṣu puruṣavacanaṃ prāmāṇyamupaiti andhānām iva vacanaṃ rūpaviśeṣeṣviti / | This has bèen thus declared. ‘In regard to such matters (as Dharma), the assertion of man cannot be reliable, as it would be like the assertion of the blind regarding colour.’ |
syād etad avisaṃvāditvaṃ ghuṇā [p.899] kṣaravadyādṛcchikam api sambhāvyata ityāśaṅkyāha na yadṛcchetyādi / | The answer to this is that ‘Nor can, etc. etc.’ The compound is to be expounded as that of which accidental conformity is the character. |
anyārthasamīhayā pravṛttasyārthāntarasaṃvādo yādṛcchikaḥ sambhāvyate / | It is only when the effort made for one thing leads one to another thing that the conformity to this latter may be accidental; |
yathā nadīdeśopasarpaṇābhiprāyeṇa pravṛttasya vṛkṣamūlopasarpaṇam / | e.g. when a man is going along in search of the river-side, if he comes by the shade of the tree. |
nacātrānyārthābhiprāyeṇa pravṛttiḥ sambhavati tathā hi dharmaṃ vo bhikṣavo deśayiṣyāmītyevaṃ pratijñāya pravṛtter dharmādyupadeśaparaiveyaṃ deśanā nānyārthaparetyavasīyate / | In the case in question, however, the Teaching has not been imparted with any other motive; as the Blessed Lord has clearly introduced His teaching with the words ‘O Bhikṣus, I shall now teach you Dharma’, and then proceeded to expound His Teachings regarding Dharma and other matters; so that it is clear that His teaching has not proceeded with any other motive. |
vāhinī nadī / | ‘Vāhinī’ is River; |
vidrumo vṛkṣaḥ / pravālaṃ vā // | ‘Vidruma’ is Tree, or Coral. |
mohād apyupadeśasambhavād anaikāntikateti cedāha vikṣiptacetasām ityādi / | It might be argued that “it is possible that the Teaching might have proceeded from Delusion; and hence the Reason put forward is Inconclusive”. |
niyatānukramaṃ hīdaṃ prakṛṣṭaṃ phalasādhakam // | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3458 above] |
nahi niyatānupūrvīkaṃ pūrvāparāvyāhataṃ puruṣārthasādhakaṃ vākyaṃ vikṣiptacetobhir analpaṃ bhāṣituṃ śakyam / | Demented persons with disordered minds cannot make any such long assertions as appear in well-ordered sequence, as a connected whole accomplishing the purposes of man. |
tasmāt siddhaṃ kenacit sākṣād dharmādayo vijñātā iti // | Thus it becomes established that there has been some one who possessed the direct knowledge of Dharma and allied matters. |
syād etat yadi nāma sāmānyena siddham tathāpi sugate dharmajñatvaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭam tat te kathaṃ siddhyatītyāśaṅkya bhagavati dharmajñatvaṃ sādhayann āha yo 'śrutānumitamityādi / | The following might be urged “It might have been established in a general way; but even so, what you wished to prove was the fact that Buddha had the knowledge of Dharma; how is that proved”? In answer to this, the Author proceeds to show that the Blessed Lord did possess the knowledge of Dharma: [see verses 3459-3461 above] |
pratyakṣadṛṣṭanīrādir yathānyaḥ pratipādakaḥ / aśrutānumitaṃ satyaṃ tat parasvārthamuktavān // atīndriyaṃ parājñātasāmarthyaṃ pariniścayāt / | The argument may be thus formulated: One who, intent upon the Truth, teaches the truth regarding unheard of and un-inferred things, he must be regarded as being directly cognisant of the real essence of those things, e.g. the man who, having actually seen water, points it out to others; |
prayogaḥ yastatparo 'śrutānumitasatyārthopadeśī {sa} sākṣād vividitatadarthatattvaḥ, yathā pratyakṣajñātasalilādis tadupadeṣṭā, tathā ca bhagavāniti svabhāvahetuḥ / | the Blessed Lord has actually taught such Truths; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. |
satyatvādeḥ prasādhitatvānnāsiddhatā hetoḥ / nāpyanaikāntikateti pratipāditam etat / | The truthfulness of the Teachings having been already established, the Reason cannot be said to be ‘Inadmissible’, Nor is it ‘Inconclusive’ as has been shown already. |
sarveṣāṃ ca hetūnāṃ sapakṣe sattvān na viruddhateti mantavyam / | And as all our Reasons are present wherever the Probandum is present, the Reason cannot be regarded as ‘Contradictory’. |
parājñātasāmarthyam iti / parair ajñātaṃ sāmarthyaṃ yasya mudrādes tat tathoktam // yaduktam tasmād atiśayajñānair ityādi, tatrāha tasmād ityādi / | ‘Parājñāta, etc.’ The Gesture, etc. whose potency is not known to other people. It has been argued by the other party, under Text 3169, that “Even when the superiority of knowledge proceeds very far, it can comprehend only a little more than others, it can never comprehend things beyond the senses”. |
[p.900] ekāpavarakasthatyetyādāvāha eketyādi / ekāpavarakasthasya pratyakṣaṃ yat pravartate / | It has been argued under Text 3170, that “While the man is seated in a hut, the Sense-perception that he has has its range restricted within that hut, etc. etc.” |
ityetat sarvasattvasthasāmarthyānubhave sati / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 3463-3464 above] |
niścetuṃ bhavato yuktamanyathā kiṃnibandhanam // | When you made this statement you made it entirely on the basis of that assertion itself; |
etat pratijñāmātrapramāṇakam evoktaṃ bhagava{bhava---}tā, nahyarvāg darśinām anupalambhamātreṇa sarvapuṃsāmatīndriyārthajñānāśaktir niścetuṃ pāryate // syād etat nānupalambhamātreṇāsmābhir aśaktiniścayaḥ kriyate / | for people of limited vision, mere non-apprehension cannot justify any certainty regarding the incapacity of all men to cognise super-sensuous things. The following might be urged “When we declare the incapacity of men to cognise supersensuous things, we do not do so on the basis of mere non-apprehension; |
kiṃ tarhi puruṣatvādibhyo hetubhyaḥ / | in fact, we do it on the basis of inference from such reasons as ‘being human’ and so forth. |
tathā hi sarva eva puruṣā dūravyavasthitādiparārthaparijñānāsamarthāḥ puruṣatvavastutvajñeyatvādibhyo yathāhamiti atrāha ātmodāharaṇenetyādi / | For instance, all men are incapable of perceiving things remote, concealed, etc., because they are human, because they are entities, because they are cognisable, like myself”. The answer to this is as follows; |
ātmodāharaṇenānyasāmarthyābhāvaniścaye / | [see verses 3465-3466 above] |
niścaya ityetasya kāryaṃ ityetena sāmānādhikaraṇyam / | ‘Niścaye’, ‘deduce’, is to be construed with ‘Kārye’, ‘in regard to a certain effect’. |
atrānaikāntikatā hetūnām atiprasaṅgāt / | The Reasons cited are all ‘Inconclusive’; |
tathā hi idam api śakyaṃ vaktum sarva eva puruṣā jaḍabuddhayaḥ puruṣatvādibhyo yathā bhavāniti / | as leading to absurdities, Because in this same manner, it may asserted as follows; ‘All men are stupid, because they are human, etc. etc., like yourself’, And yet there can be no such deduction. |
na caivaṃ bhavati / nahyekatra puruṣe 'dṛṣṭasya dharmasya sarvatrābhāvaḥ śakyo 'vasātum puruṣāṇāṃ viśeṣadarśanāt // | Because Dharma is not found in one man, it cannot be deduced that it cannot be found in any man; because men are found to be differently circumstanced. |
naikatra pariniṣṭhāsti jñānasya puruṣe kvacit / | As a matter of fact, there is no limit to the knowledge of man. |
itīdam api vāṅmātramahetukam udāhṛtam // | Hence the statement in question is a mere assertion made without any reason. |
athavātmasamānpuruṣānabhisandhāya ṛtuparṇena bhāṣitam tenāvirodhād ajñāpakam etad ityādarśayann āha svasamānityādi / | Or, it may be that the statement made by ṛtuparṇa was with reference to common dull-witted persons like himself, whose minds have not been purified. In support of the possibility of there being an omniscient person, we have already stated the proof in detail; |
adhikṛtya tathā vākyamṛtuparṇena kīrtitam // | which indicates its probability. In fact, it is only when this probability is there, that there can be such an assertion to the contrary (made by the mīmāṃsaka) as that “it is by means of the Veda alone that dharma can be known”. |
[p.901] | [verse 3467]: |
pramāṇaṃ vistareṇoktaṃ sarvajñasya ca sambhave / bādhakaṃ ca pratikṣiptaṃ tasya pūrvaṃ paroditam // | As regards Ṛtuparṇa’s assertion, quoted under Texts 3172-3173 to the effect that “All men do not know all things, etc. etc.”, that also is a mere assertion made without reasons. |
tathā hi bādhakedṛṣṭe sādhake cāprakāśite / | This is what is pointed out in the following [see verse 3467 above] |
saṃśayo jāyate tena yāti sambhāvanām asau // tasmin sambhāvyamāne ca niyamastena siddhyati / | in that case, there being no incompatibility between this view and our doctrine of the Omniscient Person, it has no bearing on the present discussion. |
vedenaiva svatantreṇa dharmo lakṣyata ityayam // | This is what is pointed out in the following [see verses 3468-3472 above] |
svenātmanā samāstulyāḥ svasamāḥ // | [verses 3468-3472]: ‘Svasamān’ People like similar to himself. |
anāgate na dṛṣṭam ityādāvāha anāgate cetyādi / anāgate ca vijñeye pratyakṣasya tathā bhavet / sāmarthyaṃ yoginām uktaṃ tantraikālyaparīkṣaṇe // | Even in regard to future things, the capacity of perception would be applicable, in the case of mystics, as has been pointed out in the chapter on ‘the three points of time’. It has been argued, under Text 3174, that “The capacity of Perception has never been found applicable to the future, etc. etc.”. |
tantraikālyaparīkṣaṇa iti / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3473 above] |
tatra hyevam uktam sarva eva hi bhāvāḥ sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vā kāryakāraṇatāṃ gatāḥ tatra vartamānam eva vastvatītasya sākṣāt pāramaparyeṇa vā kāryabhūtam anāgatasya tu kāraṇabhūtam / | ‘As has been pointed out in the chapter, etc. etc.’ This is what has been said under that chapter: All things, directly or indirectly, bear to each other the relation of cause and effect; the Present thing is always, directly or indirectly, the effect of the Past, and the cause of the Future thing. |
"pāramparyeṇa sākṣād vā kāryakāraṇatāṃ gatam / yadrūpaṃ vartamānasya tadvijānanti yoginaḥ // anugacchanti paścāc ca vikalpānugatātmabhiḥ / śuddhalaukikavijñānais tattvato viṣayair api // | What the Mystics do is to apprehend all things by direct Perception, and thereby determine the Past and the Future entity also, on the basis of the ‘chain of entities’, past and future, which are related as cause and effect respectively, by means of conceptions that are object-less and hence not entirely in conformity with reality, or purely worldly, which follow on the wake of the said Perception. |
samāśritya pravartante 'tītānāgatadeśanāḥ // % vv. | This is what has been declared in Texts 1853-1855 under the chapter on the ‘Three points of Time’ [For translation see, in loco, above]. |
etac ca sautrāntikānāṃ neṣṭaṃ sarvatra bhagavataḥ sākṣād darśitvābhyupagamād ityataḥ sautrāntikadṛṣṭābhīṣṭamatamādarśayann āha yadi vetyādi / | The above is not accepted by the Sautrāntika (section of Buddhists), who hold that the Blessed Lord has the direct perception of all things. Hence the Author sets forth the view of the Sautrāntika in the following [see verse 3474 next] |
yadi vā yogasāmarthyād bhūtājātanibhaṃ sphuṭam / liṅgāgamanirāśaṃsaṃ mānasaṃ yogināṃ bhavet // | Or, through the powers of Yoga, the mental perception of mystics would clearly envisage the past and the future also, independently of inference and the word. |
yathāhi satyasvapnadarśino jñānamaviṣayam api paramārthato liṅgāgamānapekṣaṃ cāśraya [p.902] viśeṣavaśād utpadyamānam avisaṃvādi bhavati tathā yogināṃ yogabalena yathaiva tadabhūd bhaviṣyati vātītamanāgataṃ vastu tathaiva sphuṭapratibhāsaṃ liṅgāgamānapekṣaṃ jāyate / | When one has a true dream, even though the cognition is object-less, yet it is there, independently of Inference and Word, appearing through the peculiar nature of its substratum, and it is in conformity with the real state of things. In the same manner, in the case of mystics, through the powers of Meditation and Communion, the Past and the Future thing becomes clearly perceptible, independently of Inference and Word. |
tac ca pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam iṣyate // | This Perception is held to be a valid proof (of omniscience). |
svātmāvabhāsasaṃvittes tatsvalakṣaṇagocaram / | As apprehending its own manifestation, it envisages a specific individuality; |
spaṣṭāvabhāsasaṃvedāt tacca pratyakṣamiṣyate // | and as envisaging a clear and distinct manifestation, it is held to be perception. |
tasmād atīndriyārthānāṃ sākṣād draṣṭaiva vidyate / | The following might be urged “Perception has been held to envisage the Specific Individuality of things; |
nityasya vacaso 'sattvāt tena kaścin na paśyati // | there is no Specific Individuality that is Past or Future; |
yadyapyatītādi vastu svalakṣaṇato nāsti, tathāpyātmasaṃvedanāt svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvena śāstre nirdiṣṭamityavirodhaḥ / | Though it is true that there is no Specific Individuality that is Past or Future, yet, inasmuch as the cognition apprehends itself, it has been declared in the scriptures to be envisaging the Specific Individuality; |
tacca sphuṭapratibhāsatayā prakalpanāpoḍhaṃ tathāvidhavastvavisaṃvādāccābhrāntam ityataḥ pratyakṣalakṣaṇopetatvāt pratyakṣam iti siddham // etad akṣamamāṇo ya ityādāvāha atīndriyārthavijñānam ityādi / | And as this cognition is clear and distinct, and is free from conceptual content, and is in conformity with the real state of things, it fulfills all the conditions of ‘Perception’, and hence it becomes established that it is Perception (3475-3476) Not accepting this view (that the Lord has the direct Perception of all things), the Author asserts the following, in answer to what the other party has asserted under Text 3175 to the effect that “He alone sees things who sees them through the eternal Word”. |
atīndriyārthavijñānaṃ pūrvoktādanumānataḥ / muneḥ sumatayaḥ prāhur nānyatastvagamāt kṛtāt // | [see verse 3477 next] The wise men have declared that the knowledge of the sage of supersensuous things proceeds from the inference stated before, not from any revealed word. |
pūrvoktādanumānāt siddhamāgamanirapekṣaṃ bhāvanābalaniṣpannamarthasākṣātkāri yadatīndriyārthavijñānaṃ tan muner bhagavataḥ sudhiyaḥ saugatāḥ prāhur nānyasmāt kṛtakādāgamādityataḥ tadanabhyupagamād adūṣaṇam eva // | The wise men i.e. the Buddhists have declared that the knowledge of supersensuous things, belonging to the Blessed Lord, which directly envisages all things, is brought about by the force of his meditations, through the aforementioned Inference, independently of the Revealed Word; and that it does not proceed from any scriptures compiled by men. Hence as this view is not accepted by us, the objection does not affect us. |
kartṛkritrimavākyānām ucyate na tvanāditā / prāmāṇyasiddhaye yasmāt sāpramāṇe 'pi vartate // | Beginninglessness is not asserted in regard to the composer or to the utterances emanating from him, for the purpose of proving their validity; |
tathā hi nāstikādīnāṃ tathā tadvacasām api / vedānāṃ ca pravaktṛṇāṃ nānāditve 'pi mānatā // | because beginninglessness belongs to the invalid (wrong) cognition also; for instance, the unbelievers and their words, as also the Vedas and their expounders, are not valid and reliable, even though they may be beginningless. |
nahyanāditāsmābhiḥ prāmāṇyasiddhaye sādhanatvenocyate / | It has been argued, under Text 3178, that “the beginninglessness that is asserted in regard to the composer and the utterances emanating from him is itself based upon two invalid notions, etc. etc.”. |
tathā{syā---}vipakṣe 'pi vṛtter anaikāntikatvāt / ato 'dhyāropya dūṣaṇaṃ bhavatābhihitam // | When we assert Beginninglessness, it is not as a reason for reliability;.because such a reason, as present in the absence of the Probandum also, would be ‘Inconclusive’, Hence, the objection that you have urged has been urged by imputing to us a view that is not held by us. |
kiñca bhavatām eva vedaprāmāṇyasiddhaye vedapravakt---ṇāṃ vedānāṃ cānāditvaṃ sādhanaṃ bruvatāṃ sarvam etad dūṣaṇaṃ sphuṭataramavataratīti darśayann āha vaktṛkṛtrimavākyānām ityādi / | In fact, the beginninglessness of the expounders and of the eternal sentences that is asserted by you for the purpose of proving their reliability, is denied by us as a sheer counterblast. Then again, it is you yourselves who assert the beginninglessness of the Vedas and their Expounders as a reason for the reliabilty of the Veda; so that all the objections that you have urged are clearly applicable to you. |
[p.903] | This is what is pointed out in the following [see verse 3480 above] |
vaktāraścākṛtrimavākyāni ceti dvandvaḥ / tatra vaktāro vedānāṃ vyākhyātāraḥ // | The compound is to be expounded as ‘The expounders’ and ‘the eternal sentences’, ‘Expounder’ stands for those who expound the meaning of the Vedas. |
kathaṃ niṣiddhyanta ity āha vaktāra ityādi / | Question: “How is the Beginninglessness denied?” Answer: [see verse 3481 next] |
vaktāraḥ kartṛbhis tulyās tadapekṣā ca mānatā / | The expounders stand on the same footing as the composers; |
vedānāṃ tatkṛtākhyānād arthapratyayajanmataḥ // tadapekṣeti / vaktrapekṣā / | and dependent upon them is the reliability of the Vedas; because the knowledge of the meaning of the Vedas is derived from the explanations provided by the said expounders. |
katham ity āha tatkṛtākhyānād iti / | ‘Dependent upon them’ i.e. upon the Expounders. “How so?” |
tair vaktṛbhiḥ kṛtād vyākhyānād arthapratītyutpatteḥ kāraṇāt tadapekṣā mānatā vedānām // | Because the knowledge of the meaning of the Vedas is derived from the explanations provided by those Expounders, therefore the validity and reliability of the Vedas are dependent upon those persons. |
tataś ca ko doṣa ity āha ata ityādi / | Question: “What is the harm if that is so?” Answer: [see verse 3482 next] |
ato na vedavākyānāṃ pāratantryātpramāṇatā / | In this way, the Vedic sentences, being dependent upon other things, cannot be reliable. |
apaśyatāṃ svayaṃ dharmaṃ vakt---ṇām api naiva sā // | As regards the expounders, as they do not themselves perceive dharma, these also can never be reliable. |
tadīdṛśāṃ pravakt---ṇāṃ kalpyamānāpyanāditā / aprāmāṇyapadasthatvān nāstikāder na bhidyate // | Of such expounders, even though beginninglessness may be postulated, it would be in a position that is not reliable; and hence it would not be different in character from the beginninglessness of the unbelievers and others. |
tadajñānaviśeṣatvāt sarvaṃ yātyatra tulyatām / | Thus there being no difference discernible, all this comes to be on the same footing; |
na mānatvāpramāṇatve syātām evamanādinī // | so that neither reliability nor unreliability would be beginningless. |
naiveti / pramāṇateti sambandhaḥ / | ‘Can never be reliable’ That is Reliability can never be theirs. |
yadā caivaṃ vedavākyānāṃ pāratantryāt pramāṇatā nāsti tat pravakt---ṇāñca sarveṣām andhaparamparāvaddharmamapaśyatām aprāmāṇyam ato yat pareṇoktam "pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve syātām evamanādinī" iti, tadayuktam ityādarśayann āha na mānatvāpramāṇatve syātām evam anādinī iti / | When, in this way, the Vedic Sentences themselves, being dependent upon other things, cannot be reliable, their Expounders would be like a group of blind people, having no knowledge of dharma; and as such these also would be unreliable. Thus what has been asserted by the other party, to the effect, that “Reliability (Validity) and Unreliability (Invalidity) would thus be beginningless”, cannot be right. This is what is pointed out by the words ‘Na māmtvāpramāṇatve, etc. etc.’ Only if the reliability of the Expounders and the Veda had been established, could the said Reliability be beginningless; |
siddhe hi vaktrakṛtrimavākyānāṃ prāmāṇye pramāṇatvasyānāditvaṃ syāt yāvatā na siddham ityayuktaṃ dvayor anāditvam iti bhāvaḥ // | as a matter of fact, however, that itself has not been established; hence it is not right to assert that both these are beginningless. |
kiñca yadetad asmābhir vedatadadhyāyināṃ buddhatadvākyaiḥ saha tulyatvamāpāditaṃ tat spardhayaiva na punar bhagavatāṃ tadvākyānāṃ caitais tulyatvam asti api tu viśeṣo mahān iti darśayann āha yadvetyādi / yadvāstyeva viśeṣo 'yaṃ munau tadvacaneṣu ca / | In fact, there is this difference between the sage and those words, that he perceived the dharma himself and expounded them through mercy. Then again, when we asserted that the Vedas and their expounders stand on the same footing as Buddha and His Teachings, it was merely as a counterblast; as a matter of fact, there can be no equality between the Blessed Lord and His Teachings on the one hand and the Vedas and their expounders on the other; there is really a great difference between them. |
tathā hi prasādhitam etat / | This is what is pointed out in the following [see verse 3485 next] |
yathā bhagavān sākṣād dharmaṃ dṛṣṭavānnirdiṣṭavāṃśceti / | It has been already proved that the Blessed Lord had the direct perception of Dharma and taught it. |
ato 'paśyatāṃ svayaṃ dharmam ityetad asiddham iti bhāvaḥ // | Hence what the opponent has asserted (under Text 3179) regarding the unreliability of one who has never himself perceived Dharma, is ‘inadmissible’. |
[p.904] syād etat dharmamuktavān sa ityetad eva kathaṃ siddham ity āha yato 'bhyudayetyādi / | The following might be urged “How is it known that the Lord Himself expounded the Dharma?” The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3486 above] |
yato niṣpattir iti sambandhaḥ / | ‘The Highest Good’ ‘follows from which’ such is the construction. |
tatrābhyudayaḥ sukhaṃ mokṣo niḥśreyasam / | ‘Prosperity’ is Happiness, and ‘Highest Good’ is Final Liberation. |
sa dharma ucyate tādṛg iti / yato 'bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharma iti vacanāt // | ‘This is what is described as Dharma’ as is clear from the assertion (in the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra) that ‘Dharma is that from which follows the fulfilment of Prosperity and the Highest Good’. |
bhavatu nāmābhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhihetur dharmaḥ asya tu sugatavacanasya kathaṃ taddhetutvaṃ siddham yenāsya dharmajñatvaṃ bhaved ity āha taduktetyādi / | [Says the Opponent] “It may be that Dharma is the means of accomplishing Prosperity and the Highest Good; but how is the Word of Buddha the means of knowing Dharma, by virtue of which He should be recognised as ‘cognisant with Dharma’?” |
taduktamantrayogādiniyamād vidhivatkṛtāt / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3487 above] |
tena bhāgavatoktaścāsau mantrayogādiniyamaśceti vigrahaḥ / | The compound is to be expounded as ‘The rules relating to Incantations and Communion’ which ‘have been laid down by the Blessed Lord’. |
yogaḥ samādhiḥ / | The term ‘yoga’ stands for Communion. |
ādiśabdena mudrāmaṇḍalādiparigrahaḥ / | ‘And such things’ is meant to include Gestures, Magic Circles and so forth. |
dṛṣṭadharmo 'pīti / asminneva janmani na kevalaṃ paraloka ityapiśabdena darśayati // | ‘Even perceptible qualities’ i.e. during the present life itself, and not only in the other regions, after death. |
evam abhyudayahetutvam upadarśya niḥśreyasahetutvaṃ darśayann āha samastetyādi / samastadharmanairātmyadarśanāt tat prakāśitāt / | This is what is indicated by the word ‘even’. From the realisation of the doctrine of the ‘soul-less-ness of all things’ as taught by him, follows the cessation of the whole mass of afflictions due to the notion of things having such existence. |
Subsets and Splits