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ātmātmīyadṛgākārasattvadṛṣṭiḥ pravartate / ahaṃ mameti māne ca kleśo 'śeṣaḥ pravartate // | This notion of the reality of things appears in the form of ‘self’ and ‘things related to the self’, it is only when there are notions of ‘i’ and ‘mine’ that the whole mass of afflictions becomes operative. |
sattvadṛkpratyanīkaṃ ca tannairātmyanidarśanam / | The said perception of ‘soul-less-ness’ is the enemy of this notion of reality; |
abhyāsātsātmyamāyāte tasmin sā vinivartate // tanmūlakleśarāśiś ca hetvabhāvāt pratīyate / | hence when the former becomes duly absorbed and realised, the latter disappears; therefore the entire mass of afflictions due to that notion of reality ceases, on account of the absence of its cause; |
tasminnasati taddhetur na punar jāyate bhavaḥ // | and when that ceases, there is no more birth due to that. |
tadatyantavinirmukter apavargaś ca kīrtyate / advitīyaśivadvāram ato nairātmyadarśanam // | Thus there being absolute liberation from birth, this state is spoken of as the ‘final goal’. Thus the perception of ‘soul-less-ness’ is the door to unrivalled ‘good’. |
sarveṣām api tīrthyānām ahaṅkāranivartanāt / | All other philosophers have held that liberation follows from the cessation of the ‘i-notion’; |
muktiriṣṭātmasattve ca nāhaṅkāro nivartate // | but if there is a ‘soul’, this ‘i-notion’ can never cease; |
śaktakāraṇasadbhāvād viṣayasyāpyadūṣaṇāt / | because its efficient cause would always be there; so the objective of that notion too would not be abrogated. |
taddūṣaṇe tvabhāvena viparyāsaḥ prasajyate // | If it were abrogated, there would be negation of it, which would mean a complete volte-face on their part. |
[p.905] janmaprabandhātyantopaśamo hi sarveṣām eva mokṣa itīṣṭam tasya ca prāptiheturbhagavad vacanam eva janmahetukleśapratipakṣabhūtasya nairātmyadarśanasyātraivopadeśāt nānyatra / | It is accepted by all that Liberation consists in the absolute cessation of the series of Births and Rebirths. But the only means of attaining this consists in the Teachings of the Blessed Lord; as it is only here and nowhere else, that we have the ‘teaching of the doctrine of no-Soul’, which is the sole destroyer of ‘Afflictions’ which are the source of ‘Birth and Rebirth’; |
sarveṣām eva cānyatīrthyānāṃ vitathātmadarśanābhiniviṣṭatvāt / | and all other Philosophers are wedded to the false doctrine of the ‘Soul’. |
ato bhagavad vacanam evābhyudayaniḥśreyaprāptyupāyabhūtatvād dharmalakṣaṇaṃ yuktaṃ nānyat / | Thus it is the word of the Blessed Lord alone which, as being the means of attaining Prosperity and Highest Good, can be the indicator of Dharma; |
tenaitad eva śreyorthibhir āśreyaṃ nānyad iti samudāyārthaḥ / | hence it is this alone that should be depended upon by all who seek their own welfare. Such is the purport of the whole text. |
avayavārthas tūcyate satkāryadarśanodbhūtatvaṃ kleśaughasya kathaṃ siddham iti cedāha ātmātmīyetyādi / | The meaning of the words is now explained: Question: “How do you know that the mass of Afflictions arises from the notion of the real existence of things?” |
etaccātmābhiḥ pūrvam eva vyākhyātam / | Answer: ‘The notion of the reality of things, etc. etc.’ This has been already explained by us before. |
yadi nāma kleśaughaḥ satkāryadarśanodbhūtasthāpi katham asau nairātmyadarśanān nivartata ity āha sattvadṛgityādi / sattvadṛk sattvadarśanam / | Question: “If the mass of Afflictions arises from the notion of the real existence of things, even so, how is it set aside by the perception of ‘Soul-less-ness’?” Answer: ‘The said perception of Soul-less-ness, etc. etc.’ ‘Notion of reality’ i.e. the notion of existence; |
satkāryadṛṣṭir iti yāvat / tasyāḥ pratyanīkam pratipakṣaḥ / | i.e. the idea that things are really existent, of this, the ‘perception of Soul-less-ness’ is the ‘enemy’ opponent. |
etad api pūrvaṃ darśitam eva / | This also has been already explained by us before. |
nairātmyanidarśane / seti / sattvadṛk / | ‘The former’ i.e. the Perception of ‘Soul-less-ness’, ‘the latter’ i.e. the notion of the real existence of things. |
tanmūla iti / | ‘Due to that’ due to the notion of real existence. |
hetvabhāvād iti / sattvadarśanākhyasya hetor abhāvāt / | ‘On account of the absence of its cause’ i.e. on the cessation of its cause in the shape of the notion of real existence. |
tasminniti / kleśarāśau / taddhetur iti / kleśarāśihetuḥ / | ‘When that ceases’ i.e. when the mass of Afflictions disappears. ‘Due to that’ i.e. due to the Afflictions. |
na jāyata iti / | ‘There is no more Birth’; |
nahi kāraṇabhāve kāryasyotpādo yukto nirhetukatvaprasaṅgāt / | when the cause is not there, the effect cannot appear; |
tadatyantavinirmuktiriti / | if it did, it would do so without cause. |
teṣāṃ kleśānāṃ tasya vā punarbhavasyātyantaṃ punar utpattito vimuktis tadatyantavinirmuktiḥ / | ‘Absolute liberation from it’ i.e. from the Afflictions or from Birth, there is absolute liberation, there being no more Birth; |
yathāhuḥ tadatyantavimokṣo 'pavarga iti / | as it has been declared that ‘Final Liberation consists in absolute emancipation from it’. |
nanu cānyamteṣvapi tattvadarśanaṃ niḥśreyasaheturabhyudayahetavaś ca daśa kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ proktāḥ tat kathaṃ nairātmyadarśanām evādvitīyaṃ mokṣādvāramity ucyata ity āha sarveṣām ityādi / | Says the Opponent “Under other systems also the Perception of Truth has been held to be the means of ‘Highest Good’, and the ‘Ten Noble Paths’ also have been laid down as leading to ‘Prosperity’, Why then should the doctrine of Soul-less-ness be the only way to Liberation?” The answer to this is as follows: ‘All other Philosophers etc. etc. |
tatrāhaṅkārodbhavatvāt skandhānāṃ tannivṛttau muktir iti sarveṣām eva mumukṣūṇāmātrāvivādaḥ / | For instance, all ‘thought-phases’ having their source in the ‘I-notion’, there is Liberation on the cessation of this notion; on this point all men seeking for Liberation are agreed. |
sā cāhaṅkāranivṛttir anyatīrthyānāṃ na sambhavati vitathātmadarśanābhiniviṣṭatvāt teṣām ahaṅkārasya cātmadarśanamūlatvāt / | This cessation of the ‘I-notion’, however, is not possible under the other philosophical systems; |
tat katham ayam ātmasattve ātmasattvābhiniveśe sthite satyavikalakāraṇe svaviṣaye cātmanyavidūṣite nivarteta / yathoktam sāhaṅkāre manasi na śamaṃ yāti janmaprabandho nāhaṅkāraścalati hṛdayādātmadṛṣṭau tu styām / | as they are all obsessed with the false notion of ‘Soul’, and this notion of ‘Soul’ is the very root of the said ‘I-notion’, So long as this ‘Soul’ is there obsessing the men, and this, in its perfect state, is the cause of the ‘I-notion’, and its own objective, in the shape of the ‘Soul’ has not been abrogated, how could the said ‘I-notion’ cease? This has been thus declared ‘So long as the Mind is beset with the I-notion, the series of Birth and Rebirth does not cease; and so long as the idea of the Soul is there, the I-notion does not cease; |
anyaḥ śāstā jagati bhavato nāsti nairātmyavādī nānyastasmād upaśamavidhestvanmatādasti mārgaḥ iti / | there is no other Teacher, except Thyself, who teaches the doctrine of no-soul; hence there is no other Path to Peace except the one declared by Thee’. |
tathā hi manodharmā na kaṇṭakādivad utkīlyāpanetavyāḥ / | The reason for this lies in the fact that the properties of the Mind cannot be pulled out like thorns and thrown away; |
kiṃ tarhi yathābhūtaviṣayābhiniveśena te pravṛttās taddhetudūṣaṇāt / | they have arisen from the wrong notions of things, and as such they automatically cease on the cessation of their cause in the shape of the said wrong notions. |
vidūṣayatyevātmānaṃ yogīti cedāha taddūṣaṇetyādi / | It might be argued that “the Yogin does abrogate it”. |
tathā hi hi vidūṣyamāṇo nāstītyevam abhāvakāreṇa dūṣyaḥ anyathā taddūṣaṇavaityarthyaṃ syāt / | The answer to that is ‘If it were abrogated, etc. etc.’ If the ‘Soul’ were abrogated (and repudiated), it could be repudiated only in the words ‘it does not exist’; as otherwise, there would be no point in repudiating it. |
tathā hi yadi sattvenātmānam abhiniveśya duḥkhahetutvena taṃ dūṣayet / tadānarthakam eva dūṣaṇaṃ syāt / | Because if, after having accepted the ‘Soul’, one were to repudiate it as the ‘source of pain’, then such repudiation would he useless; |
tyāgārthaṃ hi taddūṣaṇam / | because the repudiation of a thing is done for the purpose of abandoning it; |
naca svato nityasya svabhāvabhūtasya tyāgaḥ sambhavatītyato 'narthakam eva tadāpadyate / | and no abandoning could be possible of what one regards as his ever-lasting self; hence the said repudiation would be useless. |
nacābhā [p.906] vākāreṇa dūṣyastair ātmā ātmani satyāsatyatvābhiniveśena teṣāṃ viparyāsaprasaṅgāt // | Nor can those other philosophers repudiate the ‘Soul’ as being non-existent; because when they have regarded the Soul as existent, if they regard it as non-existent, this would mean a complete volte-face on their part. |
na yuktaṃ nāhamityevaṃ yadyahaṃ nāma vidyate / | The notion ‘i am not’ cannot be right if the ‘i’ really exists. |
niyamāt tattvavidyāti nirvāṇam iti vā mṛṣā // | or else, it is not true ‘that one who knows the truth must attain nirvāṇa. |
nāham ityevam iti nāham ityevaṃ darśanaṃ na yuktam ity arthaḥ / | This is what is pointed out in the following: [see verse 3495 above] ‘I am not’ This idea that ‘I am not’ cannot be right; |
yadyātmāstītyarthaḥ / | ‘if the I really exists’, i.e. if the Soul exists. |
tasmāt tattvaviruddhavadīyo nirvāṇaṃ yātītyetan mṛṣā / | Hence that your ‘knower of Truth’ attains Nirvāṇa cannot be true; |
yato 'haṅkāravigamān muktiriṣṭā na cātmani viṣayabhūte sthite 'haṅkāranivṛttir yukteti kuto yuktiḥ // | because Liberation has been held to follow from the cessation of the ‘I-notion’, and so long as the ‘Soul’ is there as the object of that notion, there can be no cessation of the ‘I-notion’; how then could there be Liberation? (3495) |
tasmād ityādinopasaṃharati / tasmād anyeṣu tīrtheṣu daśākuśalahānitaḥ / | Thus then, under other systems, there is just a little ‘welfare’ (prosperity) secured through the destruction of the ‘ten sins’; |
apavargasya tu prāptir na manāgapi vidyate / sattvadṛṣṭiviśiṣṭatvāt kleśamūlānapoddhṛteḥ // | the attainment of the highest good there is none in the least: and the reason for this lies in the fact that all these are associated with the notion of the ‘real existence’ (of the soul) and hence the root of the ‘afflictions’ is not removed. |
daśākuśalahānita iti / | The following Texts sum up the Author’s position: [see verses 3496-3497 above] |
prāṇātipātādattādānakāmamithyācāramṛṣāvādapaiśunyapāruṣyāsambhinnapralāpābhivyāpādamithyādṛṣṭayo daśākuśalāḥ / yadvā pareṣām aparitrāṇamadānamaparicaraṇamasatyamapriyavacanamahitamasvādhyāyaḥ aśraddha adayā spṛhā ceti daśākuśalāni paṭhyante / | ‘Through the destruction of the Ten Sins’ These sins are (1) Killing of life, (2) Taking what has not been given, (3) Indulgence in (sexual) desire, (4) Dishonest Behaviour, (5) Lying, (6) Backbiting, (7) Cruelty, (8) Incoherent Talking, (9) Malice or Deceitfulness, and (10) Wrong knowledge, Or they may be the following: (1) Not saving others, (2) Not giving, (3) Not serving, (4) Lying, (5) Harsh words, (6) Injuring others, (7) Neglect of study, (8) Faithlessness, (9) Mercilessness, and (10) Undue Desire. |
tadviparyayāt kuśalāni daśa / teṣām akuśalānāṃ hānis tato viratirdaśakuśalānuṣṭhānam iti yāvat / | The ‘opposites’ of these are the ‘Ten noble Paths’. When these said ‘Ten sins’ are destroyed, there follows Dispassion and thenee the ‘Ten Noble Paths’. |
laghīyasīti viparyāsapūrvakatvāt tasyāḥ kṣiprataraṃ bhraṃśāt / | ‘Just a little’ Inasmuch as it is preceded by the aforesaid ‘volte face’ the man lapses away very quickly. |
kleśamūlaṃ sattvadṛṣṭireva // | The ‘root of the Afflictions’ is the notion of the existence (of the Soul). |
abhyudayahetutvenāpi bhagavad vacanaviśeṣaṃ darśayati daśetyādi / daśa karmayathā{pathāḥ proktāḥ śubhā ye tāyinā punaḥ / samyag dṛṣṭyupagūḍhās te balavanto bhavantyalam // | On the other hand, the ‘ten noble paths’ that have been taught by Tāyin (Buddha) are embedded in true knowledge and hence they are sufficiently powerful. The superiority of the Lord’s Teaching is shown further, even though this also brings about Welfare (Prosperity) [see verse 3498 above] |
balavanta iti / sthirodāraphalatvāt // | ‘Powerful’ as leading to lasting and excellent results. |
sattvadṛṣṭyupagūḍhās tu viparyāsānuṣaṅgataḥ / | Those others are clothed in the notion of the real existence (of the soul) and involve a ‘Volte face’: as such they are not pure; |
aviśuddhās tataḥ śuddhaṃ phalaṃ tebhyo na jāyate // | consequently pure results do not flow from them. |
tadevaṃ dharmatattvasya deśake munisattame / apaśyataḥ svayaṃ dharmam iti kaḥ svasthadhīr vadet // | Thus then, if one does not himself perceive in the great sage the teacher of the essence of dharma, and consequently remains ignorant of dharma, how can he attain peace of mind? (3499-3500) Question: “Why cannot the teachings of others also be regarded as ‘powerful’?” |
pariśuddhād eva hi kāraṇāt pariśuddhaṃ phalaṃ jāyate nāviśuddhāt / | Answer: [see verses 3499-3500 above] Pure results follow only from pure causes, not from impure ones. |
munisattama iti munīnāṃ bāhyaśaikṣyāśaikṣyāṇāṃ madhye sattamaḥ śobhanaḥ munisattamaḥ // | ‘The Great Sage’ i.e. the Highest, Best, among the sages of various grades (?). |
yaccoktam sarvajñatvaṃ ca buddhāder yā ca vedasya nityatā / | The ‘omniscience of Buddha’ and the ‘eternality of the Veda’ have not been declared by any wise man to stand on the same footing; |
tulye jalpanti no vijñā nityatāyā asambhavāt // tasyā hi bādhakaṃ proktaṃ kramākramavirodhataḥ / | and this because the said eternality is impossible. The argument against it has been already pointed out, as consisting in the incompatibility involved in ‘simultaneity’ and ‘successiveness’; |
vijñānādi na tat kāryaṃ kathañcid api yujyate // | by reason of this it cannot bring about any such effects as cognition and the like. |
tāyina iti / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 3501-3502 above] |
bhagavato buddhasya / | ‘Tāyin’ is the Blessed Lord Buddha. |
yadi hi vedasyā{sya---}nityatā sambhavet tadaivaṃ syād vaktum yā ca vedasya nityateti, yāvatā saiva na siddhyet / | If the Veda could be eternal, then alone it could be said that “the omniscience of Buddha and the eternality of the Veda (stand on the same footing)”; as a matter of fact, however, that itself is not possible; |
pūrvaṃ bādhakapramāṇopadarśanāt / | as arguments to the contrary have been already adduced above. |
pratipāditaṃ tadeva ca bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ smārayati kramākramavirodhata iti / etac ca pūrvaṃ vyākhyātam eva // | The Author recalls the same arguments in the words, ‘consisting in the incompatibility, etc. etc.’ What this means has been already explained before. |
yac coktam (TS 3186ab) sarvajño dṛśyate tāvan nedānīm asmadādibhiḥ iti tatrāha dṛśyata ityādi / dṛśyate na ca sarvajña idānīm iti kiṃ {yat---} tvayā / atha sarvair iti proktaṃ vistareṇeha dūṣaṇam // | As regards the argument that the omniscient person is not seen at the present time by you or by all men, this has been already answered in detail. As regards non-perception by you, that, by itself, is ‘fallible’, ‘inconclusive’, as regards non-perception by all other men, that must remain always doubtful. “His existence in the past cannot be presumed in the way in which his non-existence has been presumed” This assertion in regard even to the past cannot be right; |
bhāvatko 'nupalambho hi kevalo vyabhicāravān / | because such denial is impossible. |
sarvānyadṛgnivṛttis tu saṃdigdheti na sādhanam // | It has been argued under Text 3186 that, “The Omniscient Person is not seen by us at the present time, etc. etc.” |
idaṃ cāparam uktaṃ kumārilena " nirākaraṇavacchakyā na cāsīditi kalpanāEEE iti tatrāha nirākaraṇetyādi. | It has been argued further by Kumārila (Ślokavārtika) that “That He existed in the past cannot be presumed in the way in which it is presumed that He did not exist in the past”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3505 above] |
yathā kila nirākaraṇam atīte kāle sarvajñasya śakyate kartuṃ tathāsītsarvajña iti, na kalpanā śakyate kartum, iti tadetad ayuktam atīte 'pi kāle tasya nirākaraṇāyogāt / | The assertion that “The denial can be made to the effect that the Omniscient Person did not exist in the past, in the same way, it cannot be presumed that He did exist in the past”; Such an assertion is most improper; because even in reference to the past, the denial of the said Person is not possible. |
apiśabdād bhavadbhaviṣyatorapi kālayor na śakyam iti darśayati, nahyadarśanamātrād abhāvagatir iti pūrvam uktam // | The term ‘even’ implies that it is not possible in reference to the Present and the Future also. It has been already pointed out that the mere fact that a certain thing is not seen cannot justify the conclusion that it does not exist. |
syān mataṃ yo vyatīto 'dhvā sa śūnyastava{sarva---}darśinā / kālatvāt tadyathākālo vartamānaḥ pratīyate // | The following might be urged “The period that is past was devoid of the omniscient person, because it was a period of time, like the present time which is actually perceived”. |
saṃdigdhavyatirekitvādyuktam etanna sādhanam / | This argument however, is not right, as its contrary is open to doubt; |
vartamānaś ca kālo 'yaṃ tena śūnyo na niścitaḥ // | inasmuch as there can be no certainty regarding the present time being devoid of the omniscient person. |
prayogaḥ yo 'yam atītaḥ kālaḥ sa sarvajñaśūnyaḥ kālatvāt sāmpratakālavat tatra sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇānupadarśanāt sandigdhavyatirekitvam ityato 'naikāntikatā hetoḥ / | The argument of the other party may be thus formulated “The Past must be regarded as devoid of the Omniscient Person, because it is a period of time, like the Present Time”. |
dṛṣṭānto 'pi sandigdhasādhyadharmatvād asiddhaḥ // bhavatu vā dṛṣṭāntasya siddhis tatrāpi na dṛṣṭamātreṇeṣṭasiddhir yukteti darśayann āha hetvityādi / | In this argument, inasmuch as nothing has been adduced to show that the contrary of the Probandum is impossible, there will always be a doubt regarding the existence of such a contrary, and consequently, the Reason would remain ‘Inconclusive The Corroborative Instance also would be ‘Inadmissible’, as the presence of the Probandum would he doubtful. |
hetusāmagryabhāvāc ca bhūto nāma na samprati / | It is quite possible that what existed in the past is not there in the present because the whole set of its causes is not present. |
rāmādivad atīte tu kāle kena na sambhavet // | Why should it not be that such a person existed in the past, like Rāma and others? (3508) |
kaḥ punar atra pratibandho ya idānīṃ nāsti so 'tīte 'pi kāle nābhūd iti / nahi rāmabharatādaya idānīṃ na santītyatīte 'pi kāle nābhūvanniti śakyam anumātum / | What truth can there be in any such premiss as that ‘what does not exist in the Present could not have existed in the Past’, For instance, the mere fact that Rāma, Bharata and others do not exist at the present time cannot justify the inference that they did not exist in the past. |
ato rāmādibhir anaikāntikatā hetoḥ // | Thus, in view of the ease of Rāma and others, the Reason put forward by the other party is ‘Inconclusive’. |
prajñādīnāṃ ca dharmitvaṃ kṛtvā liṅgamudīritam / | ‘Wisdom’ and the rest hate been made the ‘subject’, and then the inferential indicative has been set forth; |
nanā{tannāma} dṛśyate liṅgaṃ naca sattā prasi{sā---}dhyate // | It has been argued under Text 3180, that “no Indicative is recognised as part of the Subject which could lead to His inference”. |
ye cāsamānajātīyetyādinā prajñādīnāṃ dharmitvaṃ vidhāya liṅgam udīritam ato liṅgaṃ nāstītyetad asiddham / | Under Text 3414 above, Wisdom, etc. have been made the ‘subject’ of the Reasoning, and the necessary Inferential Indicative has been asserted; hence it is not right to assert that “no Indicative is recognised”. |
nāpi sattā sādhyate, kiṃ tarhi prajñādīnām atyantotkarṣākhyo dharmaḥ tadeva ca sarvajñatvam ataḥ sattāsādhane 'pi ye doṣās te 'pyatra nāvatarantyeva // | But existence is not what we are proving; all that we are proving is the fact of there being higher stages of the Wisdom, etc.; it is the highest stage of such Wisdom, that constitutes ‘Omniscience’, Consequently the objections that have been urged against the proving of the existence of the Omniscient Person are not applicable at all. |
āgamena tu sarvajño nāsmābhiḥ pratipādyate / | We are not affirming the existence of the omniscient person on the basis of scriptural declarations. |
laiṅge sati hi pūrvokte ko nāmāgamato vadet // | When the inferential reason is available, who would make an assertion on the basis of verbal authority? (3510) |
nahi vastubalapravṛttānumānasambhave sati kaścid icchāmātrānuvidhāyino vacanād vastusiddhimanvicchet / ato na vayamāgamāt sarvajñaṃ sādhayāmaḥ / kiṃ tarhi anumānāt / | So long as Inference on the basis of the capacity of things is available, who would seek to establish the existence of things on the basis of mere verbal assertion which is entirely dependent upon the whim of man? It is for this reason that we are not proving the existence of the Omniscient Person on the basis of scriptural declarations; in fact, we are doing it on the basis of Inference; |
tacca pūrvoktam eva // | and this has been already explained before. |
[p.909] na cāpyetat siddham na cāgamavidhiḥ kaścinnityaḥ sarvajñabodhana iti darśayann āha kintvityādi / | Nor is it true (as asserted by the Opponent) that ‘there is no scriptural declaration affirming the eternal Omniscient Person”; this is what is pointed out in the following: [see verses 3511-3512 above] |
kintu vedapramāṇatvaṃ yadi yuṣmābhir iṣyate / | For instance, there is a particular Vedic Rescensional Text under the name ‘Nimitta’; |
tat kiṃ bhagavato mūḍhaiḥ sarvajñatvaṃ na gamyate // nimittanāmni sarvajño bhagavān munisattamaḥ / | and therein, the Blessed Lord, Śakya-Muni is clearly spoken of as‘omniscient’, How is it then, that you, dull-witted people, while taking your stand upon the Veda, are denying Him? (3511-3512) |
katham asau tatra paṭhyata ityādarśayann āha yo 'sāvityādi / | The following Text points out how He is spoken of iṇ the said Vedic text: [see verses 3513-3514 next] |
yo 'sau ṣaḍdantamātmānam avadātadvipātmakam / svapne pradarśya saṃjāto bodhisattvo guṇodadhiḥ // vighuṣṭaśabdaḥ sarvajñaḥ kṛpātmā sa bhaviṣyati / | [He is described as] one who, having shown himself in a dream as a six-tusked white elephant, was born as one going to be a Bodhisattva, the ocean of fine qualities, his fame proclaimed, omniscient, full of mercy, attaining the state of immortality, pure, the father of the whole world. |
vighuṣṭaśabda iti sakalajagat prakhyātakīrtiḥ / | ‘His fame proclaimed’ i.e his fame well-known to the whole world. |
prāptāmṛtapada iti / prāptasavāsanāśeṣakleśopaśamalakṣaṇanirvāṇapada ity arthaḥ / | ‘Attaining the state of Immortality’ i.e. on reaching the state of Nirvana, which consists in the cessation of all Afflictions along with the Dispositions. |
śuddha iti anāśravadhātumayaḥ / | ‘Pure’ consisting of constituents free from all impurities. |
etāvatā bhagavato 'jñānaprahāṇalakṣaṇā svārthasampat paridīpitā / | This indicates that superiority of the Blessed Lord which is conducive to his own welfare and which consists in the destruction of all Ignorance; |
Subsets and Splits