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parārthasampadaṃ dīpayann āha sarvalokapiteti / | the phrase, ‘The Father of all’ indicates that superiority which is conducive to the welfare of others. |
pitā śāstā / | ‘Father’, Teacher and Controller, of the world; |
sarvasya jagato jñānatrayasugatipratiṣṭāpanāt // | because He establishes the Three forms of Right Knowledge. |
athetyādinā parasyottaram āśaṅkate / | The following Texts anticipate and answer the rejoinder of the other party, to the above: [see verses 3515-3516 next] |
atha śākhāntaraṃ nedaṃ vedāntargatamiṣyate / tadatra na nimittaṃ vo dveṣaṃ muktvāvadhāryate // | If this rescensional text just mentioned is not accepted as such, then, for that, we can discover no reason except sheer hostility on your part. |
svarādayaś ca te dharmāḥ prasiddhāḥ śrutibhāvinaḥ / kartumatrāpi śakyāste narecchāmātrasambhavāt // | Because accentuation and other properties that belong to the Vedic text are all possible in regard to this text also: specially as these properties are dependent upon the mere whim of men. |
idam iti nimittākhyaṃ śākhāntaram / | ‘This’ i.e. the Rescensional Text named ‘Nimitta’. |
tadatretyādinā pratividhatte // nanvityādinā parasyottaramāṅkate / | The second line beginning with ‘Then, for that, etc. etc.’ states the answer to the Opponent’s position. The following text sets forth the Opponent’s rejoinder; |
[p.910] | [see verse 3517 next] |
nanu naivaṃ pa{tatpa---}ro nityaḥ śakyo labdhumihāgamaḥ / nityaścedarthavādatvaṃ tatpare syād anityatā // | “As a matter of fact, no scriptural text to this effect can be found; but if such an assertion were eternal, then it could be only commendatory; and if it really spoke of a person, then it would be not-eternal.” (3517) |
evaṃ pa{etatpa---}ra iti / sarvajñapratipādanaparaḥ / | ‘To this effect’ i.e. speaking of the Omniscient Person. |
kathaṃ na śakyo labdhumityāha nityaścetyādi / | Question: “Why cannot it be found?” |
yadyasau sarvajñapratipādanapara āgamo nityaḥ syāt tadā niyamenārthavādatvam anyārthatvam asya draṣṭavyam / | Answer: ‘If it is eternal, etc. etc.’ If the scriptural text speaking of the Omniscient Person is eternal, then it must be purely commendatory, so that it must be taken as really having an entirely different meaning. |
athārthavādatvaṃ tasya neṣyate tadā niyamād anityatvam asyāpadyeta // | If it is not held to be merely commendatory, then it must be non-eternal. |
kasmāt punar nityatve satyarthavādatvamāpadyata ity āha āgamasya cetyādi / āgamasya ca nityatve si{ddhe ta}tkalpanā vṛthā / | Question: Why should it be commendatory, if eternal? Answer: [see verse 3518 next] |
tat kalpaneti sarvajñakalpanā / | ‘Tatkalpanā’ assumption of the Omniscient Person. |
kimiti vṛthetyāha yata ityādi / tata iti nityādāgamāt // | Question: Why is it futile? Answer: ‘As people, etc.’ ‘Tataḥ’ from the Eternal Scripture itself. |
kintvetasya prasiddhasya prāmāṇyopagame sati / | The author’s answer to the above argument of the other party is as follows: [see verses 3519-3520 next] |
yadyapyayamṛgādivedaḥ / svarūpato 'tiprasiddhaḥ tathāpyasya nityatvam asiddham / | Though the Ṛgveda and the rest are well-known as Veda, yet it is not well known that they are eternal. |
katham ity āha yaditi / | “How so?” ‘Because, etc. etc.’; |
yasmād arthe / | ‘yat’ stands for ‘yasma’, ‘because’; |
yat prayatnānantarajñānaṃ kramajñānaphalaṃ vā tadanityaṃ yathā ghaṭādi tathā ca veda iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | the Cognition after effort, or the successive Cognition, is all not-eternal; just like the Jar and other things; so also is the Veda; hence it is a Reason based upon the nature of things. |
asya ca śrutiparīkṣāyām asiddhatādi vistareṇa nirastam iti nātrābhidhīyate / | The charges of ‘Inadmissibility’, etc. against this Reason have been fully refuted under the chapter on the ‘Revealed Word’, hence it is not done over again here. |
etasyeti vedasya // | ‘Etasya’ of the well-known Veda. |
anyathāśrutyanuktatvaṃ saṃdigdhaṃ tasya te bhavet // | “But the fact of the other Rescensional Text (put forward) cannot be admitted” says the Opponent. |
anyatheti yadyavedatvamasya na jñāpyate tadā yattvayā śrutau vede anuktatvaṃ tasya sarvajñasyoktaṃ tat sandigdhāsiddhaṃ bhavet // | ‘Otherwise’ i.e. if you do not establish the fact that it is not Veda; in that case, what you have asserted regarding the Omniscient Person being not mentioned in the ‘Veda’, becomes open to doubt and hence ‘Inadmissible’ (as Reason). |
yaccoktaṃ tat pare syād anityatetyatrāha nityatvaṃ cāstvityādi / | “if the Text in question refers to the Person, then it is not-eternal”, The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3522 above] |
[p.911] kasmād iti pṛṣṭaḥ sanpara āha nāśyarthasaṅgater iti / nāśinārthena saṅgateḥ sambandhāt kāraṇād anityatvaṃ prāpnoti // yadyevam ityādinā naikāntikatvam udbhāvayati / | On being asked ‘Why should it become not-eternal?’ the Opponent replies ‘Because it would, etc. etc.’ i.e. because it would be associated with-related to something that is perishable, evanescent. The following text points out the ‘Inconclusiveness’ of the Opponent’s answer: [see verse 3523 next] |
ājyam ghṛtam / | ‘Ājya’ is Clarified Butter; |
nīvāro vrīhiviśeṣaḥ / | Nīvāra is a particular kind of Corn; |
cāmīkarajaṭaḥ agniḥ / | Cāmīkarajāta’ is Fire. |
teneti vedena // | ‘Tena’ by the Veda. |
jātirityādinā parasyottaramāśaṅkate | The following texts anticipate and answer the Opponent’s rejoinder: [see verses 3524-3525 next] |
tanmātravacane vāco nacājyādau matir bhavet // tasyāpi vacane vāco nityatā kiṃ na hīyate / | [The other Party says] “In the case of the Clarified Butter and other things, there is the Universal which is expressed by the word; so that there could be no incongruity”. |
tadetad asamyak / | This cannot be right; |
sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ jāter vistareṇa nirākṛtatvāt / | because under the chapter on the ‘Universal’, the Universal has been rejected in detail. |
bhavatu vā jātis tathāpyājyādiśabdājjātimātrābhidhāyino vyaktau pratyayo na prāpnoti / | Granting that the Universal is there; even so, as the word ‘Clarified Butter’ would express the Universal only, it could not bring about the notion of the Individual; |
tataś ca vyaktisādhyārthino jātyabhidhānamanarthakam eva syāt / | and in that case, the denoting of the Universal would be useless, so far as that man is concerned who seeks to do some act that could be accomplished only through the Individual. |
nāntarīyakatayā vyaktiḥ pratīyata iti cet na / | “The Individual is cognised because it is unseparable from the Universal”. That cannot be; |
pratītiviprakarṣābhāvāt / | because, as a matter of fact, there is no such remoteness in the Cognition. |
nahi śabdādanantaraṃ jātau prathamataram upajāyate matiḥ paścānnāntarīyakatayā vyaktipratītiḥ / kiṃ tarhi avyavadhānenaivārthakriyākāripadārthādhyavasāyo loke śabdād udeti / | That is to say, it does not so happen that when the word is uttered, the Cognition that comes about first is that of the Universal, and then later on, follows the Cognition of the Individual as inseparable from that Universal. What actually happens in ordinary experience is that the Cognition of the usefully effective thing (which is the individual) follows from the word immediately (directly); |
tat pratipipādayiṣayaiva ca śabdaṃ prayuṅkte / | in fact, people use the word for the purpose of speaking of that useful thing itself. |
ato na yuktaṃ vaktuṃ na vyaktipratyayaḥ śabdād iti / | Hence it cannot be right to say that “the Cognition of the Individual does not follow from the word directly”. |
yadi ca jātim eva śabdo 'bhidadhīta na vyaktim / tathā balīvardadohacodanāvadasambandhābhidhāyitvam avagamya prekṣāvannaiva vyaktau śabdāt pravarteta / | If the word denoted the Universal only, and not the Individual, then a sane man would not be prompted to activity by the Word which denotes something not connected with that activity, and such a word would be like the Injunction of milking the Bull! |
atha mābhūd eṣa doṣaprasaṅga iti tasyābhivyaktirūpasyābhidhānam aṅgīkriyate tadā nityatāhānirvedasya kathaṃ na prasajyate / | If, in order to avoid this contingency, it is admitted that there is denotation of the thing in its individual aspect also, then how would the Veda escape from the contingency of losing its etemality? |
kiñca bhavatu nāma mukhyato jātyabhidhānaṃ śabdānāṃ nāntarīyakaṃ tadvyaktyabhidhānam tathāpi sarvasya parasyāpyāgamasya nityatā na virodhinīti darśayati sarvejñe 'pītyādi / | Further, it may be that primarily the words denote Universals; |
ekasminnapi hi sarvajñe 'vasthābhedaparikalpitanānātvena jātiśabdavācyatvam upapadyate kiṃ punar aparimitānādisarvajñaparamparāsu // [p.912] kiñca yadi nāma nimittākhyaṃ śākhāntaraṃ vedatvena nāṅgīkriyate bhavadbhis tathāpi śrutyanuktatvaṃ sandigdhaṃ bhavatyanenaiveti darśayann āha tadā cetyādi / | Even so, however, there would be nothing incongruous in the Scripture speaking of the Omniscient Person being eternal. This is what the Author points out in the words ‘Then too, in regard, etc. etc.’ That is to say, even when the Omniscient Person is one only, a multiplicity might be assumed on the basis of varying states; and thereby it would be possible for Him to be spoken by means of a word denotative of the Universal; what to say then when there is an immeasurable line of Omniscient Persons? (3524-3525) |
tadā ca vedavākyānāṃ svātantryeṇārthaniścayaḥ / | As regards the words of the Veda, as they are self-sufficient, their meaning could not be ascertained from the Veda itself; |
vedāt svataḥ parasmāc ca mohādivivaśātmanaḥ // | nor from the learner by himself, or from some other person, who might be under the influence of delusion and other disabilities. |
tenāgnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma iti śruteḥ / jinaḥ sarvajña ityevaṃ nārtha ityatra kā pramā // | Under the circumstances, how could there be any certainty regarding the assertion that ‘what is meant by the Vedic words agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ is not that Jina is omniscient? (3526-3527) |
vedavākyānāṃ hi nityatayā svātantrye sati na tato vedārthaniścayo jāyate nahyayaṃ vedaḥ ayaṃ mamārtho nānya ityevaṃ virauti / | The words of the Veda, on account of their eternality, must be self-sufficient, independent; hence what these words mean cannot be ascertained from the Veda itself; because the Veda nowhere says ‘My meaning is this not that’; |
nāpi pratipattuḥ svataḥ svātmanaḥ parasmād vā vyākhyāturarthaniścayo bhavati sarveṣām eva bhavan matyā mohādibhir viplutatvāt / | nor could it be ascertained from the learner by himself; or from some other person, in the shape of an expounder; because all these men, according to you, might be under the influence of Delusion and other disabilities. |
tenāgnihotrādivākyād bhagavān sarvajña ityayam apyarthaḥ sambhāvyata eva / | Under the circumstances, it is quite possible to take the words relating to the Agnihotra as meaning that ‘the Blessed Lord is omniscient’, |
ko prameti naiva kācit // | ‘Any certainty, etc. etc.’ i.e. no certainty at all. |
svargāpavargamātrasya vispaṣṭamupadeśataḥ / pradhānārthaparijñānāt sarvajña iti gamyate // | That one is ‘omniscient’ is understood only from the clear teaching that he imparts regarding heaven and the highest good: Because that bears testimony to his knowledge of the most important matters. |
samudrasikatāsaṅkhyāvijñānaṃ kvopayujyate / tasyāsmākam ato 'nyārthajñānasaṃvedanena kim // | Of what use is the knowledge of the number of sands of the seas? What then have we got to do with his knowledge of other things? (3528-3529) |
yaccoktam ---{gauṇatvenaiva vaktavyaṃ iti, tatrāha} gauṇatvenetyādi / | It has been argued under Text 3195, that “It is not possible to comprehend all the things cognised by all men”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3528-3529 above] |
gauṇatvenaiva vaktavyaḥ so 'pi mantrārthavādavit / ityayaṃ niyamaḥ siddhyet sarvajñe tu nirākṛte // | That the descriptions should be understood in the figurative sense, like the mantra and Arthavāda texts, would be right only after the actual existence of the omniscient person had been rejected. |
pūrvoktabādhakāyoge sādhite tu savistaram / | while, on the contrary, his existence has been actually proved in great detail. |
yadi hi pramāṇena sarvajño nirastaḥ syāt tadānyathānupapattyā gauṇārthatvam asya niyataṃ syāt nānyathā mukhyārthatvasyāpi sambhāvyamānatvāt / | If the existence of the Omniscient Person had been rejected by proofs, then no other explanation being possible, the assertions in question might be taken in their figurative sense; not otherwise, if the primary meaning were in any way possible. |
naca nityasya vacaso 'rthavādatvaṃ yuktam anyābhiprāyadeśanā hyarthavādaḥ na cābhiprāyarahite vacasi vivakṣāmantareṇa sā yuktā // | It cannot be right to regard the eternal Word to be mere Arthavāda; because an assertion is taken as an Arthavāda only when some other meaning is intended; in a case therefore where there is no such intention, there being no speaker desiring to make the assertion, that condition cannot be fulfilled. |
yadvā prakṛtadharmādijñānādityādāvāha dharmādītyādi / | In case the ‘untrammelled’ nature of his knowledge is regarded as true, in reference to such things as dharma and the like, then clearly the Buddhists have won their case. |
[p.913] | [verse 3532]: |
dharmādigocarajñānamātrāpratighatā yadi / saphalā varṇyate vyaktaṃ tadā buddhair jitaṃ jagat // | It has been further argued, under the same Text 3200, that “the ‘untrammelled knowledge’ spoken of may be taken as referring to certain particular things only, not to all things”. |
kathaṃ jitam ity āha yasmād ityādi / yasmād abhyudaye mokṣe sahaitaiḥ sādhitaṃ puraḥ / | The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 3532 above] Question: “How have the Buddhists won their case?” Answer: [see verse 3533 above] [verse 3533]: |
pūrvaṃ hi bhagavato niḥśreyasajñānamapratighaṃ prasādhitamityato bhagavata evāvaiṇikamasādhāraṇaṃ dharmādijñānam iti svavācaiva sarvajño nā{a---}bhyupetaḥ syāt // | It has been proved before that the Lord’s knowledge of the Highest Good is ‘untrammelled’. Hence it must, be known to all men, down to the veriest piper, that He possesses the knowledge of Dharma and allied matters; so that, by his own words, the opponent admits the “Omniscience’ of the Lord, (after admitting His knowledge of Dharma and such matters). |
yaccoktam yadvātmanyeva vijñānam iti, tatrāpi bhagavatyeva tathāvidhajñānasambhavān na kiñcid aniṣṭamāpāditam ityādarśayann āha yaccātmanyevetyādi / | It has been argued under Text 3205, that “The knowledge spoken of may be that of his own self”. But even so, as such knowledge is possible for the Lord Himself, what has been urged is nothing undesirable for us. |
tasyāpyapratighātitvaṃ teṣāṃ pūrvaṃ prasādhitam // | This is what is pointed out in the following [see verse 3534 above] |
tasyāpīti / ātmajñānasya / | ‘This also’ i.e. the knowledge of self. |
buddhānāṃ bhagavatām / | ‘Tesām’ of the revered Buddhas. |
pūrvam iti / | ‘Already’ Under Text 3434. |
etad eva hi tajjñānaṃ yadviśuddhātmadarśanam / āgantukamalopetacittamātratvavedanāt // | That alone is knowledge of self which consists in the perception of the pure self, as therein the only cognition is that of pure consciousness freed from all adventitious impurities. |
avedyavedakākārā buddhiḥ pūrvaṃ prasādhitā / | It has been shown before that all cognition is in the form devoid of the apprehender and apprehended; |
dvayopaplavaśūnyā ca sā sambuddhaiḥ prakāśitā // | it is free from the two aberrations. This is the cognition or knowledge that has been expounded by the Buddhas. |
saṃsārānucitajñānās tena siddhā mahādhiyaḥ / yadādhipatyabhāvinyo bhāsante 'dyāpi deśanāḥ // | That is what proves these to have been possessed of vast wisdom and of knowledge not conducive to birth and rebirth and it is the teachings inculcated under the guidance of these persons that are luminous to the present day. |
pūrvam iti bahirarthaparīkṣāyām / | Answer: [see verses 3536-3537 above] ‘Before’ Under the chapter (23) on the ‘External World’. |
saṃsārānucitamananukūlaṃ jñānaṃ yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ // kāḥ punas tāstadādhipatyabhāvinyo deśanāḥ śūyanta ity āha prakṛtyā bhāsvara ityādi / | ‘Saṃsāra, etc.’ i.e. whose knowledge is not conducive to Births and Rebirths. Question: “What are those Teachings that were promulgated under Their guidance?” |
[p.914] | Answer: [see verses 3538-3540 next] |
dvayanairātmyabodhe ca stryādisaṅkalpabhāvinaḥ / rāgadveṣādayo doṣāḥ saṃkṣīyante 'prayatnataḥ // | In regard to the luminous consciousness, not marred by the two forms, who could entertain any wrong notions, if his mind is not deluded by the two forms? As soon as there is recognition of the ‘soul-less-ness’ of both, all those defects of love, hate and the like which have their source in the thoughts of women and such things, disappear without effort. |
idaṃ tatparamaṃ tattvaṃ tattvavādī jagāda yat / sarvasampatpradaṃ caiva keśavāder agocaraḥ // | This is the highest truth which the ‘expounder of unity’ propounded, which brings all kinds of prosperity, far beyond the reach’ of Keśava and others. |
dvayākārāvimūḍhātmeti prahīṇagrāhyagrāhakābhiniveśaḥ / | ‘If his mind is not deluded, etc.’ i.e. who has got rid of all obsession of the apprehender and the apprehended. |
dvayanairātmyabodha iti pudgaladharmanairātmyabodhe / yadvā dvayaṃ grāhyaṃ grāhakaṃ ca tasya nairātmyaṃ naiḥsvābhāvyam iti vigrahaḥ / | ‘As soon as there is recognition, etc. etc.’ i.e. the recognition of the fact that the (1) Body and (2) All other things are without soul; or it may mean the recognition of the ‘nairātmya’ unreality ‘of both’ i.e. of the apprehended as well as the Apprehender. |
keśavāder agocara iti keśavo hariḥ ādiśabdeneśvarādiparigrahaḥ // | ‘Far beyond the reach of, etc. etc.’ ‘Keśava’ stands for Hari (Viṣṇu). ‘And others’ includes ‘Īśvara' and the rest. |
atha keśavāder api viśuddhamātmadarśanaṃ kasmānneṣyata ity āha jñāyate hītyādi / | Question: “Why is not the self-Cognition of Keśava and others also regarded as pure?” Answer: [see verses 3541-3543 next] |
jñāyate hi sthirātmānyaiḥ śuddhasphaṭikasannibhaḥ / | Other people recognise the ‘soul’ as something permanent, resembling the pure rock-crystal; |
sa ca teṣāṃ viparyāso nityātmapratiṣedhanāt // | this idea of these people is clearly wrong, as the existence of the permanent ‘soul’ has been rejected. |
ātmagrāhi ca vijñānamātmano yadi jāyate / tataḥ sarvātmavijñānaṃ yugapat samprasajyate // | If the cognition envisaging the soul proceeds from one’s own soul, then there should be the cognition of all souls at one and the same time. |
atha tasmān na jāyeta nityaṃ vābhyupagamyate / tadā tadviṣayaṃ na syāt puruṣāntaracittavat // | If it does not proceed from one’s own soul, or if it is regarded as eternal, then it could not envisage the soul at all: being, in this respect like the cognitions of other persons. |
anyair iti keśavādibhiḥ / | ‘Other people’ Keśava and others. |
ātmaparīkṣāyām ātmano nirastatvāt tadviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ viparyastatvād aviśuddham / | Under the Chapter on the ‘Soul’, the existence of the Soul has been rejected: any Cognition of it must be wrong and hence impure. |
kiñca yadetannityātmaviṣayaṃ teṣāṃ jñānam upavarṇyate tat kiṃ tata ātmano jāyate āhosvinneti pakṣadvayam tatra prathame pakṣe yugapad aśeṣaṃ tadviṣayaṃ jñānamavikalakāraṇatayā jāyeta atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tatrāpi tannityaṃ vā syād anityaṃ vā / | Further, the knowledge of these people relating to the eternal Soul that is spoken of, does this knowledge or Cognition proceed from the person’s own Soul or not? These are the only two alternatives possible. In the former case, all his Cognitions should appear simultaneously, as their efficient cause would be there. In the latter case, is the Cognition eternal or not-eternal? In both cases, that Soul would only be a replica of his own Soul, and hence, like the Cognition of other people, it could not envisage that Soul. |
yaccoktam etad eva hi tajjñānaṃ yadviśuddhātmadarśanam iti tatrāha grāhyetyādi / | His knowledge does not consist in the direct perception of his pure self; |
grāhyalakṣaṇavaidhuryād vistareṇa ca sādhitāt / | because that is devoid of the characteristics of the ‘cognisable’, as has been proved in detail. |
naitad eva hi tajjñānaṃ yadi śuddhātmadarśanam // | If the soul (self) is held to be of the nature of cognition (consciousness), there can be no apprehension of it as such; |
athāpi jñānarūpatvam ātmano 'bhyupagamyate / dṛśyadarśananānātvabhāvānnaivam api grahaḥ // | because of the difference between the ‘seen’ and the ‘seeing’, if then the said cognition is held to be self-illumined, then it comes to be ‘self-cognition’, and as such it would mean that the cognition is amenable to direct perception. |
svayamprakāśarūpatvaṃ tajjñānasyeṣyate yadi / svasaṃvittis tadā prāptā pratyakṣā ca matir bhavet // | It has been argued under Text 3207, that “His knowledge consists in the direct perception of His pure Self, and when the source of that knowledge is not pure, the knowledge itself is called Ignorance”. |
[p.915] yadi tāvad ātmā jaḍarūpo 'bhyupagamyate tadā tadviṣayaṃ jñānamaviśuddham eva prakṛtyā sarvajñānānāṃ grāhyagrāhyakavaidhuryasya bahir arthaparīkṣāyāṃ prasādhitatvāt / | If the Soul is held to be unconscious in its essence, then the Cognition that apprehends it must be regarded as impure; as it has been proved under the chapter on the ‘External World’ that by their very nature, all Cognitions are devoid of the apprehended and the apprehended |
atha cidrūpa ātmeti pakṣas tadāpi dṛśyadarśanayor abhedād grāhyagrāhakabhāvānupapattes tadviṣayaṃ jñānam iti na syāt bhede hi viṣayaviṣayiṇor viṣayaviṣayibhāvaḥ syāt / | If, on the other hand, the Soul is held to be of the nature of Consciousness itself, then there would be non-difference between what is seen (cognised, i.e. the soul) and the seeing (Cognition, Consciousness); so that they could not be related to each other as the apprehended and the apprehender; which would mean that the Cognition could not be regarded as apprehending the Soul. |
atha pradīpavat prakāśatayātmaviṣayatvamasyābhyupagamyate tadā svasaṃvitter anabhimatāyāḥ prasaṅgaḥ syāt jñānasya cāpratyakṣatvam iṣṭaṃ vyāhanyeta / | Because it is only when there is some difference between the subject and the object that they can bear to each other the relation of the apprehender and the apprehended. If, lastly, the idea is that, being luminous, like the lamp, the Cognition apprehends and envisages itself, then there would be ‘self-Cognition’, which you do not admit; and it would set aside your idea that Cognition cannot be perceived. |
taddarśayati pratyakṣā ca matir bhaved iti // | This is what is shown by the words It would mean that Cognition is amenable to direct Perception’. |
Subsets and Splits