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brahmādīnāṃ ca vedena sambandho nāsti kaścana /
There can be no connection between Brahmā (and others) and the Veda;
bhedānnityatayāpekṣāviyogāc ca tadanyavat //
(a) because there is difference between them, (b) because both are regarded as eternal, and (c) because there is no mutual dependence; just as in the case of any other thing.
tataś ca vedadehatvaṃ brahmādīnām asaṅgatam / sarvajñānamayatvaṃ ca vedasyārthāviniścayāt //
Thus it is absurd to talk of Brahmā, etc. being ‘embodiments of the veda’. Equally absurd it is to speak of the Veda as ‘consisting of all knowledge’; for the simple reason that the meaning of the Veda cannot be ascertained.
svātantryeṇa ca sambuddhaḥ sarvajña upapāditaḥ /
It has been explained that (for us) the omniscient person is recognised independently by himself;
na punar vedadehatvād brahmādiriva kalpyate //
and he is not assumed on the ground of Brahmā and others being ‘embodiments of the Veda’.
sambandhe sati brahmādīnāṃ vedadehatvaṃ bhavet naca vedena sārddhaṃ brahmādeḥ sambandho 'sti /
If Brahmā and others had any connection with the Veda, then alone could they he regarded as the ‘Embodiment of the Veda’; as a matter of fact, there can be no connection between these and the Veda.
tathā hi tādātmyatadutpattilakṣaṇo dvividha eva sambandho bhāvānām iti pratipāditam tatra bhedātmyatadutpattilakṣaṇo dvividha eva sambandho bhāvānāmiti pratipāditam, tatra bhedābhyupagamānna tādātmyasambndhḥ /
Because there can be only two kinds of connection or relationship among things (1) that of identity and (2) that of cause and effect, as has been explained before; as the two Brahmā and Veda are held to be different, the relation between them cannot be that of Identity.
nāpi tadutpattiḥ, dvayorapi nityatvenānupakāryatayā parasparamapekśāyā abhāvāt /
Nor can it be the relation of Cause and Effect; because both are regarded as eternal, and as such cannot derive any benefit from one another, as neither could be in need of the other.
sarvajñānamayatvaṃ ca vedasyeti /
‘The idea of the Veda consisting of all knowledge’ this has to be construed with ‘is absurd’ of the previous sentence.
kasmātarthāniścayāt /
“Why is it absurd?”
viniścite hyarthevedasya sarvajñānamayatvaṃ kalpayituṃ yuktaṃ, sa ca bhavanmatyā na sambhavatītyāveditametat / naca bhavadbhirivāsmābhirvedadvāreṇa sarvajño 'bhyupagamyate /
Because ‘the meaning of the Veda cannot be ascertained’; if the meaning of the Veda were ascertained, then alone could it be assumed that it consists of all knowledge. This ascertainment however cannot be got at through any Cognition, as has been pointed out already. Nor again do we accept the Omniscient Person on the strength of the Veda, as you do.
kiṃ tarhi svayambhujñānatvāt svayameva bhagavānsarvajña iti pratipāditametat //
In fact, the Cognition of the Lord is self-born, and hence He is omniscient, by Himself; as we have already explained before.
yaccoktam kvaca buddhādayo martyā iti / tatra martyatvaṃ bhagavato 'siddham iti darśayann āha pañcetyādi / pañcagatyātmasaṃsārabahir bhāvān na martyatā /
Being beyond the ‘metempsychic cycle’ consisting of the ‘five states’, the Buddhas are not held by us to be ‘mortal’, what has been regarded as their ‘birth’ is only the creation of themselves by themselves (3550) The answer to this is that the ‘mortality’ of the Lord has not been proved.
buddhānām iṣyate 'smābhir nirmāṇaṃ tat tathāmatam //
This is what is pointed out in the following [see verse 3550 above]
[p.916] narakapretatiryagdevamanuṣyabhedena pañcagatyāmakaḥ, saṃsāraḥ tadbahirbhūtāś ca bhagavanta ityasiddhaṃ martyatvameṣām /
‘Hell’, ‘Regions of the Dead’, ‘Regions of Beasts’, ‘Region of Celestials’ and ‘the Human Regions’ are the ‘five states’ that make up the ‘Metempsychic Cycle’; the Blessed Lords all lie beyond this five-fold Cycle; so that their ‘mortality’ cannot be admitted.
kathaṃ tarhi śuddhodanādikulotpattir eṣāṃ śrūyata ity āha nirmāṇaṃ tat tathāmatam iti //
Question: “How is it then they are heard of as having been born in the family of Śuddhodana and others?” Answer: ‘What has been regarded, etc. etc.’ (3550)
etad evāgamena saṃspandayann āha akaniṣṭhe ityādi /
The following Text supports this same idea by scriptures: [see verse 3551 next]
akaniṣṭhe pure ramye śuddhāvāsavivarjite /
‘It is in the delightful city of Akaniṣṭha, free from the habitation of unclean beings, that the Buddhas become awakened;
buddhyante tatra sambuddhā nirmitastviha budhyate //
and what is awakened here (in this world) is only their own creation’.
akaniṣṭhā nāma devā{śā---}steṣām ekadeśe śuddhāvāsakāyikā nāma devāḥ /
‘Akaniṣṭha’ is the name of a certain region; ‘free from the habitation of unclean Beings’ ‘Aśuddhāvāsakāyika’ are celestial beings;
atra hi āryā eva śuddhā āvasanti teṣām upari māheśvarabhavanaṃ nāma sthānam /
here only such people dwell who are noble and pure; on the top of this rests the Māheśvara-Bhavana (the Palace of the Supreme Lord);
tatra caramabhāvikā eva daśabhūmipratiṣṭhitā bodhisattvā utpadyante /
it is in this Palace that there appear the Bodhisattvas who have passed through the ‘ten stages’ and reached the highest;
iha tu tadādhipatyena tathā nirmāṇamupalabhya ityāgamaḥ //
Such is the assertion met with in the scriptures.
nāsmākam idaṃ siddham iti cedāha svātantryeṇetyādi /
It might be argued by the Opponent that “We do not admit of what has been asserted here”.
svātantryeṇa tu martyatvaṃ tvayā niścīyate katham / parakīyāgamadvārān na tasyaivam avasthiteḥ //
The answer to that is as follows: [see verses 3552-3553 next] How too do you ascertain, independently, the said ‘mortality’? Certainly not on the basis of the ‘scripture’ of other people;
naca tat sparḍhayāsmābhis te sarvajñā itīṣyate /
Nor do we postulate our ‘omniscient persons’ as rivals to the ‘omniscient persons’ postulated by others;
ākāśakusumaiḥ ko hi sparddhāṃ satyeṣu kalpayet //
who could ever conceive of any rivalry between real entities and ‘sky-flowers’? (3552-3553)
yadi hi svātantryeṇa martyatvaṃ bhavatopādīyate tadā sandigdhāsiddhatā / nahi bhagavato martyatvaprasādhakaṃ kiñcidbhavataḥ pramāṇam asti yena svātantryeṇa martyatvaṃ siddhaṃ bhavet tasmāt parakīyāgamadvāreṇa tvayā martyatvaṃ vaktavyam /
If you hold to the ‘mortality’ independently, then your Reason is doubtful hence Inadmissible’, In fact, you have no proof in support of the idea of the Blessed Lord being mortal, by virtue of which the said mortality could be regarded as independently ascertained. Hence the ‘mortality’ has to be asserted by you on the basis of the scripture of the other party;
sa ca parasyāgama evam yathoktarūpaṃ sthita ityasiddhameṣāṃ martyatvam //
and what the scripture of the other party has to say on the point has just been shown. Thus the ‘mortality’ of the Blessed Lords remains ‘unproven’, (3552-3553)
katham ākāśakusumaprakhyatvam eṣāṃ siddham ity āha sarvaśaktiviyogenetyādi /
Question: “How is it known that these other Omniscient Persons are like sky-flowers?” Answer: [see verse 3554 next]
sarvaśaktiviyogena nīrūpatvaṃ hi sādhitam /
It has been proved by us that any eternal beings, being devoid of all capacity, must be formless.
nityānāṃ tena no santi pareṣṭāstryambakādayaḥ //
Hence it follows that the ‘three-eyed deity’ and other such beings, who are held by others to be omniscient, do not exist at all.
pareṇa hi śaṅkarādayo nityatveneṣṭāḥ /
The other party holds Śaṅkara and others to be Eternal Beings;
nityānaṃ ca kramākramābhyāmarthakriyāvirodhāt sarvasāmarthyarahitatvaṃ prasādhitam / sarvasāmarthyavirahalakṣaṇaṃ cāsattvam iti pareṣṭāstryambakādayo nityā na santyevetyākāśakusumaprakhyātvam eṣāṃ siddham eva /
and it has been proved by us that eternal entities cannot have any capacity at all; as any effective action on their part, either successively or simultaneously would be incompatible; ‘being devoid of all capacity’ again is what characterises non-existence; hence it follows that Śiva and other eternal beings posited by the other party are non-existent.
tryambakaḥ śaṅkaraḥ //
‘Tryambaka’, ‘Three-Eyed Deity’, is Śaṅkara, Śiva.
[p.917] kiñca teṣāṃ viparyastaṃ jñānamātmādidarśanāt /
Then again, the knowledge of those persons is all wrong, because it involves notions of the ‘soul’ and such other things.
buddhānāṃ tvaviparyastaṃ vistareṇopapāditam //
The knowledge of the Buddhas, on the other hand, is not wrong; as has been explained in detail.
tat sparddhā kriyate taistu na dūrāntarabhāvataḥ /
There is therefore no comparison made between these two sets, on the ground of greater or less proximity;
ko hi taimirikaiḥ sparddhā kuryāt svasthekṣaṇe nare //
who could institute any comparison between the blind and the man with perfect eyes? (3555-3556)
subodham //3555-
This is easily understood.
yaccoktam nitye 'pi cāgame veda iti tatrāha guṇakarmetyādi / guṇakarmeśvarādīnāṃ vedānāṃ cāpahastitā /
In fact, the eternality of all such things as quality, action, god, as also of the Vedas, has been totally rejected. Consequently we do not admit of any eternal ‘scripture’.
nitytātaś ca nāsmābhir nitya āgama iṣyate //
and the eternality of these does not militate against the eternality of the Vedas”.
sarvavastuvyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya prasādhanān na kasyacin nityatvam astīti sarvam etad asaṅgatam uktam //
By establishing the ‘Perpetual Flux’ as affecting all things, it has been proved that nothing can be eternal. Hence all this (about eternality) is wholly irrelevant. We do not hold that the existence of the omniscient person is proved by analogy;
yaccoktam sarvajñasadṛśam ityādi tatrāha upamānenetyādi /
and what is desired to be proved in the present context is the existence of the all-knowing person;
upamānena sarvajñasattāsiddhir na ceṣyate / tasyāpramāṇatāprokteḥ sattāsiddhis tato na ca // prasiddhāyāṃ hi sattāyāṃ sādṛśyaṃ gamyate tataḥ /
As a matter of fact, no reliability attaches to Analogy, as a means of cognition, by virtue of which the Buddhist could seek to prove the existence of the Omniscient Person by its means. Even if Analogy were reliable, it would be of no use in the proving of the said existence.
a / tathā hi prasiddhe dharmiṇi gavādau gavayādisādharmyamātraṃ tena sādhyate /
Because all that Analogy proves, for instance, is merely the similarity of the Gavaya in the well-known object, Cow;
naca sarvajño dharmī prasiddhas tasyaiva bhavan matena sādhyatvāt /
in the case in question, however, the Omniscient Person is not a well-known object, as, according to you, He is still to be proved;
tena bhavan matyā sarvajñasattāyāṃ sādhyatvena prastutāyām upamānasya prasaṅgābhāvāt tat pratiṣedho 'narthakaḥ prāptyabhāvāt /
consequently when, under your view, the Existence of the Omniscient Person is put up as what is to be proved, there can be no room for Analogy; so that, there being no possibility of its applying to the case in question, your denial of it is entirely futile;
prāptipūrvakatvāt pratiṣedhasyeti bhāvaḥ /
as it is only what is regarded as possible that is denied.
narān dṛṣṭvā tvasarvajñānityādāvāha narā dṛṣṭāstvasarvajñā ityādi / yadi hi sarva eva narā dṛṣṭā bhavatā tadā sarvajñaniṣedhe svavacanavyāghātaḥ /
It has been argued under Text 3216, that “Having found that all men of the present day are not-omniscient, it is definitely concluded, through Analogy, that all men are not-omniscient”. The answer to this is that ‘If all men, etc. etc.’ If all men have been seen by you, then your denial of the Omniscient Person involves self-contradiction.
tathā hi dūravyahitāśeṣanaradarśanābhyupagamād anyasantānasambandhijñānaśaktiniścayābhyupagamāc cātmani sarvajñatvaṃ [p.918] sphuṭataramevābhyupetaṃ syāt, deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭārthadarśanābhyupagamāt /
Because, when you admit that you yourself see all men, far and near, and also that you have definite knowledge of the cognitive capacity of the ‘chain’ of other men, you clearly attribute Omniscience to yourself; because your said admission would imply your perception of all things far removed in time, place and nature;
nahyasarvajñasyaivaṃ parijñānaṃ sambhavet /
as such perception can never belong to one who is not omniscient.
tat pratiṣedhāya ca sādhanopādānāt tadeva pratiṣidhyata iti svavacanavyāghātaḥ yathā mātā me vandhyeti //
And yet in denying such Omniscience, you are putting forward arguments, and are actually denying it; so that there is self-contradiction on your part; just like the assertion ‘your mother is barren’, (3558-3561)
asiddhatā ca hetor iti darśayann āha puraḥsthite 'pītyādi /
The following Text points out that the Person also that is adduced by the other party is ‘Inadmissible’, ‘Unproven’: [see verses 3562-3564 next]
puraḥsthite 'pi puṃsi syāt kathaṃ tava viniścayaḥ / nāyaṃ sarvajñaḥ ityevambhāve 'tīndriyavidbhavān //
Even if the person were standing before you, how could you have the certainty that ‘he is not omniscient’? if you had this knowledge, you would be cognisant of things beyond the senses!
ātmāsarvajñatādṛṣṭau śeṣāsarvajñaniścaye / atiprasaṅgo 'jādyādeḥ sarvajñama{jñasyā---}pi niścayāt //
If you deduce the fact of all persons being not-omniscient from seeing that you yourself are not so, then, there would be this incongruity that (your) Brahmā and other deities would deduce the omniscience of all persons from their own omniscience.
bādhādṛṣṭer nacet sarvadharmaniścaya iṣyate / bādhāśaṅkā nanūkte 'pi bādhādṛṣṭer na bhidyate // tathā hi puro 'vasthite puṃsi śarīramātradarśanān nāyaṃ sarvajña ityevam asarvavidā niścetumaśakyam kimuta deśakālavyavasthite puṃsi /
If it be urged that “there is conviction regarding the presence of such qualities in all men only when we do not perceive anything to the contrary”, then our answer is that in regard to the matter under consideration, the mere suspicion to the contrary has the same effect as the actual perception of that contrary. That is, even when the man is standing before one, one sees only his body, and if the observer is himself not-omniscient, he cannot know that the man before him is not-omniscient.
bhāva iti nāyaṃ sarvajña ityevaṃ niścayasya /
‘Bhāve’ i.e. if there were the certainty that the man is not-omniscient.
atha mā bhūd asiddhatā hetor ityātmāsarvajñatayā śeṣāsarvajñaniścayo 'bhyupagamyate tadātiprasaṅgād anaikāntikatetyādarśayann āha ātmāsarvajñatādṛṣṭāv ityādi / ātmanyasarvajñatāyā dṛṣṭir iti vigrahaḥ /
If, in order to save the Reason from being ‘Inadmissible’, the conviction regarding all men being not-omniscient be taken as deduced from one’s own non-omniscience; then there would be incongruities and the Reason would become ‘Inconclusive’, This is what is pointed out by the words ‘If you deduce, etc. etc.’ The compound ‘ātmāsarvajñatādṛṣṭau’ is to be expounded as ‘dṛṣṭau’ from the perception ‘asarvajñatāyāḥ of non-omniscience ‘ātmani’, in yourself.
syād etat sarvadharmasādhanaṃ kriyamāṇaṃ dṛṣṭena prajñādibhedena bādhyata ityatas tasya sādhanaṃ kriyate /
The following might be urged “In the ease of the proving of the presence of a certain quality in all men, the idea is rendered impossible by the perception of the diversity of wisdom, etc. among men;
tattvasarvajñatvaṃ sādhyamānaṃ kenacid bādhyata ityato 'tiprasaṅgo na bhaviṣyatīti /
in the case of non-omniscience, however, the idea is not rendered impossible by anything; hence there could be no such incongruity as has been indicated”.
tadetad asamyak /
This is not right.
yathaiva dṛṣṭabādhaṃ sādhyaṃ hetur na sādhayati tathā śaṅkyamānabādham apītyato bādhāśaṅkā bādhādṛṣṭer na bhidyate tenāsarvajñatvasādhanam api mābhūd āśaṅkyamānabādhatvāt //
Just as a Reason cannot prove that of which the contrary has been perceived, similarly it cannot also prove that of which the contrary is suspected; and in this respect, the suspicion of the contrary does not differ from the perception of the contrary. Consequently, there can be no proving of non-omniscience, because its contrary is open to suspicion.
yaccoktam upadeśe hi buddhāder anyathāpyupapadyata ity āha svargetyādi /
It has been argued, under Text 3217, that “the teaching of Buddha and others is capable of another explanation also, etc. etc.”.
anyathopapannatvam upadeśasyāsiddham /
It cannot bo admitted that the Teaching is capable of another explanation.
nahi svargāpavargamārgasya niravadya upadeśo vyāmohāt sambhavati niravadyatvaṃ ca bhagavad vacanasya sarvābhiḥ parīkṣābhiḥ prasādhitam /
Because the flawless exposition of the Path to Heaven and Final Liberation cannot have its source in Delusion; and that the Teaching of the Blessed Lord is flawless has been proved by all the investigations and tests herein made.
jaḍād iti kumārilāt /
‘Fool’ i.e. Kumārila.
sa eva yadi paraṃ manyata ity arthaḥ //
He is a fool if he entertains the idea referred to.
[p.919]
(3566)
dṛṣṭepyabhyudayaṃ cittadoṣaśāntiṃ parāṃ tathā /
It has been argued, under Text 3225, that “The teaching of Buddha, etc. might have been for the purpose of deluding their disciples, etc, etc.”.
dṛṣṭa iti /
‘Dṛṣṭe’ during the present life.
abhyudayam nityārogyaiśvaryādilakṣaṇam /
‘Prosperity’ in the shape of lasting health, vigour and so forth;
avāpnuvatām iti sambandhaḥ /
these ‘they have attained’ such is the construction.
doṣaśāntiṃ ceti / rāgādidoṣopaśamam /
‘Alleviation of all afflictions of the Mind’ i.e. the cessation of Love, Hatred and other defects.
tataḥ mantradhyānasamayābhyupadeśāt tatkṛtādyathāvihitānuṣṭhānād āpnuvatāṃ śiṣyāṇāṃ paraṃ vyāmohanaṃ kṛtam ityatiśayoktiriyam /
‘Through it’ Through the proper following of the Teachings of the Lord, regarding Mantras, Meditations, etc. ‘A great delusion has been brought about’ This is figurative;
yadīdṛśaṃ vyāmohaṃ bhavān manyeta tadā bhavāneva vyāmūḍhaḥ syād avyāmoham evaṃ vyāmoham iti gṛhṇan //
the sense is if you regard this as ‘delusion’, then it is you yourself who are deluded, inasmuch as you regard what is not delusion, as delusion.
vedamūlaṃ ca naivedaṃ buddhānām upadeśanam /
The teaching of the Buddhas is certainly not based upon the Veda;
niṣkalaṅgaṃ hi tat proktaṃ sakalaṅkaṃ śrutau punaḥ //
because it has been described as ‘flawless’, while the Veda is full of flaws.
nahi niṣkalaṅgam upadeśanaṃ sakalaṅgamūlaṃ yuktam //
[see verse 3567 above] It cannot be possible for the flawless Teaching to be based upon what is full of flaws.
svārthasaṃsiddhaye teṣām upadeśo na tādṛśaḥ /
The said teaching of the Buddhas is not for any selfish purpose;
ārambhaḥ sakalastveṣa parārthaṃ kartumīdṛśaḥ //
in fact, the whole effort was made for the benefit of others.
tasmājjagaddhitādhānadīkṣitāḥ karuṇātmakāḥ / anibandhanabandhutvād āhuḥ sarveṣu tat padam //
Thus it was that the all-merciful Buddhas taught that path to all men, having made up their minds to bring about the welfare of the world, and thus being the disinterested well-wishers of all beings.
padam iti sarvaguṇasampat pratiṣṭhārthenābhyudayaniḥśreyasamārgaḥ padamucyate //
‘Padam’ this is the name given to that Path to Prosperity and Highest Good which consists in the cultivation of all good qualities.
ye hi lobhabhayadveṣamātsaryādivaśīkṛtāḥ / prādeśekī bhavet teṣāṃ deśanā niḥkṛpātmanām //
Those teachers who were under the influence of greed, fear, hatred, jealousy, etc. and were devoid of mercy, it is the teaching of such persons which could be partial and local.
karuṇāparatantrās tu spaṣṭatattvanidarśinaḥ / sarvāpavādaniḥśaṅkāścakruḥ sarvatra deśanām //
Those teachers, on the other hand, who were led by mercy alone, who had a clear perception of the truth, who had no fear of any contradiction, imparted their teachings to all.
yathāyathā ca maurkhyādidoṣadṛṣṭo bhavejjanaḥ / tathātathaiva nāthānāṃ dayā teṣu pravartate //
As a man, through ignorance, goes on being affected by defects, so there grows in the lords, mercy towards him. They do not desire to establish any such connection with men as that of vivāha (marriage) or āvāha (home-coming of the bride) and so forth;
[p.920]
[verse 3570]:
naivāvāhavivāhādisambandho vāñchitā hi taiḥ / upakārastu kartavyaḥ sādhugītam idaṃ tataḥ //
The following text shows that it is in the case of Manu and other teachers, who imparted the teaching to Vedic scholars alone, that it is possible for the teachings to have been propounded for the purpose of deluding those people: [see verse 3570 above]
ūḍhāyā yoṣitaḥ bhartṛgṛhāgamanamāvāhaḥ //
[verses 3571-3573] ‘Āvāha’ is the coming of the Bride to the house of the Bridegroom.
kiṃ tadgītam ity āha vidyetyādi /
Question; “What has been so well sung of?” Answer;
śuni caiva śvapāke ca paṇḍitāḥ samadarśinaḥ //
[see verse 3574 above] Hundreds of times has the ‘genus’ (universal) been rejected;
api ca bhavataiva mūrkhaśūdrebhya ityatiprakaṭamuccairasadbhūtajātimadoddhatena cetasā bruvatā sphuṭataramātmana eva prakaṭitam iha vidvajjanasadasi mahāmaurkhyam / tathā hi kadācid brāhmaṇatvākhyaṃ sāmānyaṃ nāma vastvantaramastītyevam upakalpayantas tatrabhavanto viprā garvārbuddhamudvahanti /
If, by reason of their connection with the particular (Brāhmaṇa) caste, they had been superior to others, in the matter of possessing the said qualifications, then alone could they be admitted to be really superior, not if they merely belonged to the Brāhmaṇa caste, but in actual life were like fowlers, and others. In fact, by having openly and arrogantly used the expression “to illiterate Śūdras”, through pride of caste, you have yourself shown your own great illiteracy and stupidity.
brāhmaṇapitṛkṛtāṃ cātmano brāhmaṇīgarbhaprasūtimālambya / tatra prathame pakṣe kevalamākāśakuśeśayamaṇḍanam etadbhavatām iti darśayati śataśa ityādi / śataśaḥ pratiṣiddhāyāṃ jātau jātimadaś ca kim / tadanyātiśayāsiddhau viśiṣṭā sā ca kiṃ matā //
For instance, (1) do you put forward the assumption that there is a distinct genus of the name of ‘Brāhmaṇa’ and thereupon you, Brāhmaṇas carry on your backs a million loads of superiority? Or (2) is it on the basis of your superiority in the matter of having had all your Birth and other Sacraments duly performed? Or (3) on the basis of your having been born of a Brāhmaṇa Mother and Brāhmaṇa Father? If it is the first, then this ornament of yours is only like that caused by the ‘sky-lotus’, This is what is pointed out in the following;
vaśitvādiguṇādhārāḥ prakṣīṇāśeṣakalmaṣāḥ /
[see verses 3575-3577 above]
sarve 'pyatrāviśeṣeṇa tadyoge ca vijātayaḥ // bhaveyur yadi siddhyanti viśiṣṭās tat samāśrayāḥ /
We grant that there is such a ‘caste’; even so, your pride would be justified if there were some superiority perceptible in you, due to that caste.
vaiśiṣṭyamanyathā naiva lubdhakadvijajātivat //
As a matter of fact, however, we do not perceive any such superiority in you.
tebhyo brāhmaṇebhyo 'nyas tadanyaḥ śūdrādistasmādaśayastasyāsiddhir iti vigrahaḥ /
This is what is pointed out by the words ‘specially when no superiority, etc. etc.’ ‘others’ i.e. people other than Brāhmaṇas, i.e. the Śūdra, etc.
tathā hi śūdrādibhyo na prajñāmedhādibhir viṇmūtramāṃsaśoṇitādibhiś ca viprāṇāmatiśayam upalabhāmahe tat katham atiśayāsiddhau satyāṃ sā tadādhārā jātir viśiṣyate / yena bhavatā jātivādāvalepoddhatenaivam abhidhīyate vedavādibhya eva taṃ prayaccheyur yathā manvādaya iti /
That is to say, in the Brāhmaṇa, we do not find any superiority over the Śūdra, etc. in regard to their Intelligence, Memory, etc., or to their Blood, Urine, etc.; thus no superiority being perceptible, how could the caste be regarded as superior on the basis of that superiority’, by virtue of which, through arrogance born of your caste-pride, you assert that ‘they should have imparted it to the Vedic scholars alone not to Śūdras’? In ease, by belonging to the Brāhmaṇa-caste, you were, by your very nature, superior persons, endowed with such powers as self-control, fulfilment of wish, Mercy and so forth, and had all evils removed from you, then you would certainly be superior beings;
yadi tu brāhmaṇajātisamāśrayeṇa bhavantaḥ prakṛtyaiva vaśitveśitvaprākāmyakaruṇādiguṇagaṇādhārāḥ prahīṇāśeṣaduritā bhaveyus tadā bhaved bhavatāṃ vaiśiṣṭyamanyathā lubdhakakaivartacarmakārādibrāhmaṇasyeva satyapi brāhmaṇajātiyoge katham iva vaiśiṣṭyaṃ siddhyet //3575 //
whence then is this pride due to ‘caste’ (genus)? specially when no superiority over others is perceived in it, why should it be regarded as superior? In fact, men belonging to other castes also are found, on the presence of particular qualities, to be the receptacle of qualities of self-control and free from all impurities. If, by reason of their connection with the particular (Brāhmaṇa) caste, they had been superior to others, in the matter of possessing the said qualifications, then alone could they be admitted to be really superior, not if they merely belonged to the Brāhmaṇa caste, but in actual life were like fowlers, and others.
[p.921] dvitīye 'pi pakṣe doṣamāha jātakarmādaya ityādi /
The following Text points out the objections to the second alternative (the superiority of the Brāhmaṇa in the proper performance of his sacraments);