sanskrit
stringlengths 2
508
| english
stringlengths 2
924
⌀ |
|---|---|
na viruddhena dharmeṇa vyāptir hetoḥ prakalpate // | [For] there cannot be pervasion of a reason through a contradictory property. |
sarvatra yathokte sādhane sādhyena vā hetor vyāptis tasyā anumānavirodho vakṣyamāṇaḥ / | In every one of the arguments put forward [by the Theist], the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum that has been cited is contrary to inference, as will be explained later. |
atha pratijñāyāḥ kasmād anumānavirodho nodbhāvyate / | [Question:] "Why is this contrariness to inference not urged against the conclusion [of the Theist]?" |
yadi pratijñā sādhanāṅgaṃ syāt tadā taddoṣodbhāvanaṃ syāt yāvatā sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vāsau na sādhyasiddher aṅgabhāvaṃ pratipadyate tataś ca sādhanadoṣābhidhāne prastute yatpratijñādodbhāvanaṃ tadadoṣodbhāvanaṃ vādino nigrahasthānaṃ syāt tasmān na sādhanaprayogeṣu pratijñādoṣo vācyaḥ / | [Answer:] It would be so urged if the conclusion formed part of the proof. However, as a matter of fact, the conclusion does not form part of proving the probandum, either directly or indirectly. Hence when the task at hand is pointing out defects in the proof, if one were to point out defects in the conclusion, that would constitute the clincher of "pointing out what is not a defect" for the disputant. Therefore, defects in the conclusion should not be pointed out in connection with the presentation of proofs. |
yatra tu kvacit pratijñāvirodha udbhāvyate tatra tanmukhena vyāptereva tadvighaṭanaṃ kriyata iti grahītavyam / | Where in some cases a contradiction in the conclusion is pointed out, it should be understood that this is done only as a means of demolishing the invariable concomitance itself. |
yadvā sādhanaprayogādanyatra taddraṣṭavyam / | Or such [pointing out of contradictions] should be considered [appropriate] only in contexts other than the presentation of proofs. |
atha vyāptikāle 'pi katham anumānavirodho bhavatītyāha na viruddhenetyādi / | [Question:] "Even at the time when the invariable concomitance is put forward, how can there be contrariness to inference?" [The text] responds with "not with what is contradictory" etc. |
viruddheneti / | "Contradictory" means that which is opposed to all means of valid cognition [and is thus] false. |
pramāṇavyāhatena tasyāsambhavād eva na yuktā vyāptiḥ na hyasatā vyāptiravakalpyata iti yāvatā // | Because such a [contradictory thing] is impossible due to being opposed to valid means of cognition, an invariable concomitance with it is not possible - for there can certainly be no invariable concomitance with what does not exist. |
neśvaro janmitāṃ heturutpattivikalatvataḥ / gaganāmbhojavatsarvamanyathā yugapad bhavet // | God cannot be the cause of created things because [He] is devoid of origination, like a sky-lotus; otherwise, everything would come into existence simultaneously. |
yadutpattvikalaṃ na tatkasyacit kāraṇam yathā gaganāmbhojam utpattivikalaśceśvara iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | That which is devoid of origination cannot be the cause of anything - like a sky-lotus; [and] God is devoid of origination - thus [this constitutes] the perception of what contradicts the pervader. |
prasaṅgasādhanaṃ cedam tenāśrayāsiddhatā na codanīyā / | And this is a prasaṅga-type argument; therefore the objection of "unproven substratum" cannot be raised against it. |
sarvam anyathā yugapad bhaved iti / | [If this were not so,] all things would come into existence simultaneously. |
apratibaddhasāmarthyakāraṇatvād ekakālābhimatakāryagrāmavatsarvaṃ yugapadbhaved ity arthaḥ / | What is meant is that, because [there would be] a cause whose efficiency is never obstructed, everything would come into existence simultaneously, just like those groups of effects which are accepted [to arise] at one time. |
etadatrabādhakaṃ pramāṇam athavārthakathanamātrametat / | This is either a refuting proof here, or merely a restatement of the meaning. |
evaṃ tu prasaṅgasādhanaṃ kartavyam / | However, the reductio ad absurdum should be performed thus: |
yadavikalakāraṇaṃ tadbhavatyeva / | Whatever has an unimpaired cause must necessarily come into existence. |
yathāntyāvasthāprāptāyāṃ sāmagryāmavikalakāraṇo bhavannaṅkuraḥ / | Just as a sprout, having an unimpaired cause, comes into existence when the totality [of causes] has reached its final state. |
avikalakāraṇaṃ ca sarvamīśvarahetukaṃ jagaditi yugapadbhavet / | And since the entire world has God as its cause [and this cause is] unimpaired, it would [all] come into existence simultaneously. |
syād etat neśvara eva kevalaṃ kāraṇam api tu dharmādisahakārikāraṇāntaramapekṣya keroti nimittakāraṇatvādīśvarasya tena dharmādeḥ kāraṇāntarasya vaikalyādavikalakāraṇatvam asiddham iti / | One might argue thus: "God is not the sole cause, but rather He acts depending on other auxiliary causes such as dharma and so forth, since God is [only] the efficient cause; therefore, due to the deficiency of other causes such as dharma, the existence of an unimpaired cause is not established." |
tadetad asamyak / | This [argument] is incorrect. |
yadi hi tasya sahakāribhiḥ kaścid upakāribhiḥ kaścid upakāraḥ kartavyo bhavet tadā tasya sahakāriṇi vyapekṣā yāvatā nityatvāt parairanādheyātiśayasya na kiñcit tasya sahakāribhyaḥ prāptavyam astīti kimiti tāṃstathābhūtananupakāriṇaḥ sahakāriṇo 'pekṣeta / | For if there were some assistance that had to be rendered to Him by auxiliaries, then alone would He have dependence on auxiliaries; [but] since He is eternal and no excellence can be added to Him by others, there is nothing that He needs to obtain from auxiliaries - so why would He depend on such auxiliaries that are of no help? |
kiṃ ca ye 'pi te sahakāriṇaste 'pi sarva eveśvarasyāyattajanmatayā nityaṃ samavahatā eveti katham asiddhatā hetoḥ / | Moreover, even those auxiliaries, since they all have their origin dependent on God, would always be present [with Him], so how could there be non-establishment of the reason? |
n cānaikāntikatā avikalakāraṇatvahāniprasaṅgāt avikalakāraṇasyāpyanutpattau sarvadaivānutpattiprasaṅgo 'viśeṣāt / | And [the reason] is not inconclusive, because [if it were,] there would follow the loss of [the concept of] unimpaired causation; if even an unimpaired cause would not arise, there would follow the eternal non-arising of anything whatsoever, due to there being no distinction. |
udyotakaratvāha yadyapi nityamīśvarākhyaṃ kāraṇam avikalaṃ bhāvānāṃ saṃnihitaṃ / tathāpi na yugapad utpattirīśvarasya buddhipūrvakāritvāt / | Uddyotakara says: "Although the cause named Īśvara [God] is eternal, complete and ever-present for [all] beings, yet [their] production is not simultaneous because Īśvara acts with prior deliberation." |
yadīśvarasattāmātreṇaivābuddhipūrvaṃ bhāvānām utpādakaḥ syāt tadā syād etaccodyam / | "If Īśvara were to produce beings by his mere presence alone, without prior deliberation, then this objection would apply." |
yadā tu buddhipūrvakaṃ karoti tadā na doṣaḥ tasya sveddhayā kāryeṣu pravṛtteḥ / | "But when he acts with prior deliberation, then there is no fault, because he engages in [producing] effects according to his own will." |
ato 'naikāntikataiva hetor iti / | "Therefore the reason [given by the opponent] is inconclusive." |
tadetad ayuktam / | This is not correct. |
na hi kāryāṇāṃ kāraṇasyecchābhāvābhāvāpekṣayā pravṛttinivṛttī bhavataḥ yenāpratibaddhasāmarthye 'pīśvarākhye kāraṇe sadā sannihite tadīyecchābhāvān na pravartanta iti syāt / | For the activity and cessation of effects do not depend on the presence or absence of the cause's will, such that [effects] would not arise due to the absence of his will even when the cause named Īśvara, with unimpeded power, is always present. |
kāraṇagatasāmarthyabhāvābhāvānuvidhāyino bhāvāḥ / | [Rather,] entities follow [only] the presence and absence of the cause's inherent capability. |
tathā hi icchāvato 'pi kartur asamarthān notpadyante samarthāc ca bījāderanicchāvato 'pi samutpadyante / | For instance, even from a willing agent lacking capability [effects] do not arise, while from a capable [cause] like a seed, even though lacking will, [effects] do arise. |
tatra yadīśvarākhyaṃ kāraṇaṃ kāryotpādakālavad apratihataśakti sadaivāvasthitam bhāvās tatkimiti tadīyāmanupakāriṇīṃ tāmicchāmapekṣante yenotpādakālavadyugapatta utpadyeran / | If then the cause named Īśvara always exists with unimpeded power just as [he does] at the time of producing effects, why should entities depend on his will, which serves no purpose? Due to which they should arise simultaneously, just as [they do] at the time of production. |
evaṃ hi tairavikalakāraṇatvam ātmano darśitaṃ bhavet yadi yugapad bhaveyuḥ / | For only thus could his status as an unimpeded cause be demonstrated by them [i.e., the effects], if they were to arise simultaneously. |
na cāpīśvarasya parai anupakāryasya kācid apekṣāsti yenecchāmapekṣeta / | Nor can God, who cannot be helped by others, have any need [for anything], on account of which He would depend on [His] will. |
api ca buddhivyatirekeṇa nānyecchāsti buddhiśceśvarasya bhavadbhir nityaikarūpābhīṣṭā tataś ca buddhipūrvakāritve 'pīśvarasya kimiti bhāvānāṃ yugad utpādo na bhavati / | Moreover, without Intelligence there can be no desire for anything else, and God's Intelligence is accepted by you [opponents] to be eternally uniform; therefore, even if God acts with prior Intelligence, why do things not arise simultaneously? |
īśvaravattadbuddher api sadā sannihitatvāt / | Because His Intelligence, like God [Himself], is always present. |
athāpyanityā tasya buddhiraṅgīkriyate tathāpīśvarasattāmātrabhāvitvāttasyā īśvaravat sadābhāva eveti sa eva doṣaḥ / | Even if His Intelligence is accepted to be non-eternal, nevertheless, since it exists merely by virtue of God's existence, it must, like God [Himself], exist eternally - thus the same fault [remains]. |
tasmād buddhimatvād iti viśeṣaṇamakiñcitkarameveti nānaikāntikatā hetoḥ / | Therefore, the qualification "because of [His] possessing Intelligence" proves to be entirely futile; hence the reason is not inconclusive. |
na cāpi viruddhatā sapakṣe bhāvāt na caivaṃ bhavati tasmād viparyayaḥ / | Nor is there contradiction, because [the reason] exists in similar cases [sapakṣa]; thus there is no reversal [of the argument]. |
prayogaḥ yadyadā na bhavati na tat tadānīm avikalakāraṇam yathā kuśūlasthitabījāvasthāyām anutpadyamāno 'ṅkuraḥ / | The formal argument is: Whatever does not arise at a particular time does not have an unimpeded cause at that time - like a sprout that does not arise while the seed remains in the granary. |
na bhavati caikapadārthotpādakāle sarvaṃ viśvam iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ / | And the entire universe does not arise at the time when a single thing arises - this is the non-perception of the pervader. |
na ca siddhasadhyatā īśvarasya kāraṇatve sati vikalakāraṇatvānupapatteḥ prasādhitatvāt / | Nor is this proving what is [already] proven, since it has been established that if God were the cause, it would be impossible for [Him to be] an impeded cause. |
ye vā krameṇa jāyante te naiveśvarahetukāḥ / | Things that arise in succession are certainly not caused by God. |
yathoktasādhanodbhūtā jaḍānāṃ pratyayā iva / | [They are] like the cognitions of insentient things arising from the aforementioned means of proof. |
teṣām api tadudbhūtau viphalā sādhanābhidhā / | If those [notions] also are produced by Īśvara, then the adducing of proofs [in support of them] would be useless |
nityatvād acikitsyasya naiva sā sahakāriṇī // | Due to [His] eternality and since He would be beyond remedy, that [adducing of proofs] could never be a contributing factor |
yathoktebhyaḥ svārambhakāvayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭatvādibhyaḥ sādhanebhya udbhūtā iṣṭasādhyadharmiviṣayā jaḍānāmīśvarakāraṇābhiniveśināṃ pratyayāḥ niścayā ivetyarthaḥ / | The notions, i.e., the definite conclusions, which arise from the aforementioned proofs such as "being characterized by a peculiar arrangement of constituent parts" and so forth, concerning the subject possessing the property to be proved, [arise] in the minds of foolish persons who are fixated on [proving] Īśvara as the cause |
nanu yathoktadoṣaduṣṭatvānnaitebhya iṣṭe sādhye pratyayāḥ samutpadyanta iti na dṛṣṭāntadharmisiddhiḥ / | [Objection:] "Since [these proofs] are vitiated by the aforementioned faults, no conclusive notions regarding what is desired to be proved could arise from them, and therefore there is no establishment of the subject of the corroborative instance" |
satyametat / | This is true |
ata eva jaḍānām ityuktam / | That is precisely why [the text] says "of foolish persons" |
jaḍānāṃ hi sādhanāvivekākṣamatayā sādhanābhāsebhyo 'pi teṣāṃ pratyayāḥsamutpadyanta eva / | For due to their inability to discriminate [valid] proofs, foolish persons' notions arise even from fallacious proofs |
nanvevam api sādhyavikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ teṣām api jaḍapratyayānām īśvarasya nimittakāraṇatveneṣṭatvādityata āha teṣām apītyādi / | [Objection:] "Even so, the corroborative instance would lack the property to be proved, since these notions of foolish persons are also accepted as having Īśvara as their efficient cause." To this [the author] responds with "If these also" etc. |
teṣām api jaḍapratyayānām tadudbhūtāv iti / | If these notions of foolish persons also are produced by Īśvara |
īśvarādudbhūtāviṣyamāṇāyām viphalā sādhanābhidhā sādhanābhidhānaṃ vyarthaṃ syāt / | If they are to be produced from Īśvara, then the statement of proofs, i.e., the presenting of reasons, would be pointless |
īśvarādeva teṣām utpatter iti bhāvaḥ / | Because [in that case] their origination would be from Īśvara alone - this is the meaning |
nanu sādhanābhidhāṃ sahakāriṇīmapekṣya teṣām īśvaro janako bhaviṣyati na kevalas tenāsau viphalā na bhaviṣyatītyata āha nityatvād ityādi / | [One might object:] "God would be the producer of these [notions] depending on the statement of proofs as an auxiliary cause, not [operating] alone; therefore this [statement] would not be useless." [To this he] responds [with the words] "Because of [His] eternality" etc. |
yadyasau sādhanābhidhā tasyeśvarasyāsamarthaṃ svabhāvamapanīya samarthamādadhīta tadā syāt sā tasya sahakāriṇī yāvatā nityatvādīśvaro 'nutpādyānivartyasvabhāvatayā na kenacitkiñcitsanīyata iti na sādhanābhidhā tasyāsau sahakāriṇī yuktā //88- | If that statement of proofs were to remove God's inefficient nature and establish [an] efficient [one], then it could be His auxiliary cause; but since God, due to [His] eternality, has a nature that cannot be produced or removed, He cannot be assisted by anything whatsoever; therefore that statement of proofs cannot reasonably be His auxiliary cause. |
api ca yathā paridṛṣṭasāmarthyasādhanādikāraṇavyatirekeṇāparidṛṣṭasāmarthyasyāpīśvarasya kāraṇabhāve kalpyamāne 'tiprasaṅgo bhavatāṃ prāpnoti yatas tamapīśvaraṃ parikalpyāparamapi ḍeṭkaṣakādikaṃ kalpanīyam eva viśeṣābhāvād iti darśayann āha yeṣv ityādi / | Moreover, when you postulate a causal nature for God, whose efficacy is not perceived, distinct from causes like means [of knowledge] whose efficacy is perceived, you incur an infinite regress, because even after assuming such a God, you would have to assume something else like a Ḍheṭkaṣaka too, due to [there being] no distinction [between them]. Showing this, he says "In which cases" etc. |
ye tu satsu bhavaddṛṣṭamasatsu na kadācana / tasyānyahetutāklṛptāvanavasthā kathaṃ na te // | When something is seen by you to exist when [certain things] exist and never when they don't exist, how would you not [encounter] an infinite regress in assuming another cause for that? |
bhavaddṛṣṭaṃ yadityupaskāraḥ / | The word "yat" is to be supplied after "bhavaddṛṣṭam." |
anyahetutāklṛptāviti / | [The phrase] "in assuming another cause" [means]: |
yathā paridṛṣṭasāmarthyebhyo hetubhyo 'nyo hetustadbhāvo 'nyahetutā tasyāḥ klṛptiḥ kalpaneti vigrahaḥ // | [This] is analyzed [as follows]: "another cause" means a cause other than those causes whose efficacy has been perceived; "assuming that" means postulating it. |
yaduktaṃ sarvakartṛtvasiddhau cetyādi tatrāha kartṛtvetyādi / kartṛtvapratiṣedhāc ca sarvajñatvaṃ nirākṛtaṃ / boddhavyaṃ tadbalenaiva sarvajñatvopapādanāt // | Regarding what was said beginning with "When [His] universal creatorship is established," he states [the verse] beginning with "creatorship": And from the refutation of [His] creatorship, [His] omniscience should be understood to be refuted, since [His] omniscience was established solely on the strength of that. |
sarvakartṛtvabalenāsau sarvajño bhavadbhir iṣyate tena tannirākaraṇāt sarvajñatvam api tasyāyatnato nirākṛtam eva // | He is considered omniscient by you only on the strength of [His] universal creatorship; therefore, through the refutation of that, His omniscience too is automatically refuted. |
yathoktadoṣaduṣṭāni mābhūvan sādhanāni vā / | [Even if] your proofs might not be affected by the defects mentioned above... |
tathāpi karturnaikatvaṃ vyabhicāropadarśanāt // | And yet the creator cannot be one, because [instances of] deviation [from this thesis] have been shown. |
ekakartur asiddhau ca sarvajñatvaṃ kimāśrayam / | And when the oneness of the creator is not established, what could [possibly] be the substrate of omniscience? |
yathoktā doṣā anumānavirodhaparyantāḥ. | The defects [that were] stated [extend] up to the contradiction with inference. |
ayam atra samudāyārthaḥ yady api tanugiriprabhṛtīnām ebhyaḥ sādhanebhyo buddhimān kartā siddhyati, tathāpy asau ya evaikasya hetuḥ, sa evānyasyāpīti na niścita eveti prati kāryaṃ bhinnasyāpi kartuḥ sambhāvyamānatvāt saudhāheścaikasyāpi bahubhiḥ karaṇekṣaṇādato naikaḥ kartā pratipādayituṃ śakyate yāvaccaikaḥ kartā na siddhas tāvat kutaḥ sarvajñatvasiddhir iti / | This is the overall meaning here: Although from these proofs an intelligent creator of [things] such as bodies, mountains and so forth may be established, nevertheless it is not at all certain that the one who is the cause of one [thing] is indeed the cause of another, because for each effect a different creator is possible, since even one mansion is observed to be made by many [people]. Therefore, it is not possible to establish [the existence of] one creator. And as long as one creator is not established, how can omniscience be established? |
atra praśastamatir ekakartṛtvasiddhaye pramāṇayati ekādhiṣṭhānā brahmādayaḥ piśācāntāḥ parasparātiśayavṛttitvāt iha yeṣāṃ parasparātiśayavṛttitvaṃ teṣām ekāyattatā dṛṣṭā yatheha loke gṛhyagrāmanagaradeśādhipatīnām ekasmin sārvabhaume narapatau tathā ca bhujagarakṣoyakṣaprabhṛtīnāṃ parasparātiśayavṛttitvam tena manyāmahe teṣām apyekasminnīśvare pāratantryam iti / | Here Praśastamati proves [the existence of] a single creator [thus]: "All [beings] from Brahmā down to the Piśācas must have a single controller, because they exist in mutual hierarchical gradation. Here [in the world], wherever there is mutual hierarchical gradation, dependence on one [superior being] is observed - just as the rulers of households, villages, cities and regions [are dependent] on one universal emperor. And serpents, Rakṣas, Yakṣas and others exist in mutual hierarchical gradation. Therefore we conclude that they too are dependent on one Īśvara." |
tatra yadyeta īśvarākhyenādhiṣṭhitā ityayam arthaḥ sādhayitumiṣṭas tadānaikāntikatā / | If what is intended to be proved here is that these [beings] are controlled by [one being] called Īśvara, then [the reason] is inconclusive. |
viparyaye bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt / | Because there is no valid cognition preventing the opposite [conclusion]. |
pratibandhāsiddheḥ / | Because [their] necessary connection is not established. |
dṛṣṭāntasya ca sādhyavikalatā / | And the example lacks what is to be proved. |
athādhiṣṭhāyakamātreṇa sādhiṣṭhāneti sādhyate tadā siddhasādhyatā yata iṣyata evāsmābhir bhagavatā sambuddhena sakalalokacūḍāmaṇinā sarvam eva jagatkāruṇyavaśādadhiṣṭhitaṃ / | If what is to be proved is merely that they have a controller, then [this] proves what is [already] established, since we too accept that the Blessed One, the Perfectly Enlightened One, the crest-jewel of all worlds, controls the entire world through [his] compassion. |
yatprabhāvādadyābyabhyudayaniḥśreyasasampadamāsādayanti sādhavaḥ / | Through whose power even today [all] virtuous people attain prosperity and the highest good. |
idaṃ cāparaṃ tenaiva sādhanam uktam / | And this further proof has been stated by him [Praśastamati]. |
saptabhuvanānyekabuddhinirmitāni ekavastvantargatatvāt / ekāvasathāntargatāpavarakavat / | The seven worlds must have been created by a single intelligence because they are contained within a single entity, like rooms contained within a single house. |
yathaikāvasathāntargatānām apavarakāṇāṃ sūtradhāraikabuddhinirmitattvaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tathaikkasminneva bhuvate 'ntargatāni saptabhuvanāni / | Just as rooms contained within a single house are seen to be created by the intelligence of a single architect, so too the seven worlds are contained within a single universe. |
tasmāt teṣām apyekabuddhinirmitatvaṃ niścīyate / | Therefore it is concluded that these [worlds] too must be created by a single intelligence. |
yadbuddhinirmitāni caitāni sa bhagavān maheśvaraḥ sakalabhuvanaikasūtradhāra iti / | And that [being] by whose intelligence these [worlds] were created is the blessed Maheśvara, the sole architect of all worlds. |
tadatra hetur asiddhaḥ naikaṃ bhuvanamāvasathādi vāsti vyavahāralāghavārthaṃ bahuṣviyaṃ saṃjñā kṛtā / | Here the reason is unproven; there exists no single universe or house; this designation has been applied to many [things] merely for ease of practical dealings. |
ata eva dṛṣṭānte 'pi sādhanavikalaḥ / | For this very reason, the example too lacks the proving property. |
ekasaudhāntargatānām apavarakādīnām anekasūtradhāraghaṭitatvadarśanāccanaikāntiko hetuḥ / | And because rooms and such within a single mansion are seen to be constructed by multiple architects, the reason is inconclusive. |
evam anyeṣvapi sādhaneṣu yathayogaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vācyam // | In this way, objections should be stated as appropriate to other proofs as well. |
yaccoktaṃ vimaterāspadaṃ vastvityādi / | As for what was stated about "an object being the basis of disagreement" and so forth. |
tatrāha tatsiddhau sādhanam ityādi / | Regarding this, [the opponent] states "[let us examine] the proof for establishing that" etc. |
tatsiddhau sādhanaṃ proktaṃ jaimanīyeṣu rājate // | The proof for establishing that [omniscience] shines forth [only] among the followers of Jaimini. |
itīśvaraparīkshā // | Thus ends the examination of [the doctrine of] God. |
yadi sāmānyenāsti kaścit sarvajña iti sādhyate tadā nāsmāt pratīdaṃ bhavataṃ sādhanaṃ rājate / | If [you] seek to prove that "there exists some omniscient being in general", then this proof of yours does not shine forth against us. |
siddhasādhyatādoṣāt / | Due to the fallacy of proving what is [already] established. |
kiṃtu ye sarvajñāpavādino jaiminīyās teṣveva śobhate / | However, it shines forth only against those followers of Jaimini who deny [the existence of] an omniscient being. |
atreśvarākhyaḥ sarvajñaḥ sādhyate tadā pratibandhasiddher hetor anaikāntikatā dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalateti / | If here [you] seek to prove [the existence of] an omniscient being called God, then due to the impossibility of [establishing] the invariable concomitance, the reason is inconclusive and the example lacks the probandum. |
ato nāsmāt prati sādhanametad rājata iti bhāvaḥ / | Therefore this proof does not shine forth against us - such is the meaning. |
yaccāpi vicitrodayetyādi dharmiviśeṣaṇamupāttaṃ tasya na kaścid upayogo 'sti / | And although [you] have employed qualifications of the subject such as "having various manifestations" etc., there is no use for that. |
kevalaṃ paravyāmohanāya svaprakriyāghoṣaṇam idaṃ kriyate bhavadbhiḥ / | This is merely a proclamation of your own doctrine done by you for the purpose of deluding others. |
tathā hi vinā dharmyādiviśeṣaṇenaivaṃvidhena yadi sādhanamasiddhatādidoṣarahitaṃ tadā bhavatyevābhimatasādhyasiddhiḥ | For instance, if the probans is free from the defects of being 'unproven' and the like even without such qualifying epithets for the subject, then that alone suffices for proving the desired conclusion. |
athāsiddhatādidoṣaduṣṭaṃ sādhanam tadaivaṃvidhaviśeṣaṇopādāne 'pi na sādhyasiddhirastīti sarvathā vyarthameva viśeṣaṇam | If, on the other hand, the reason is defective due to being 'unproven' and the like, then even with the introduction of such qualifying epithets, the desired conclusion cannot be established; hence in every way the qualification is entirely useless. |
kiñcāśrayāsiddho hetuḥ | Moreover, the probans [itself] is one whose very substratum is 'unproven'; |
Subsets and Splits