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na hi yathoktaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭo dharmī prasiddho 'sti prativādinaḥ tasmān na śāstraprasiddho dharmī kartavyaḥ | For the opponent does not acknowledge [the existence of] any subject possessing the aforementioned qualifications; therefore, the subject should not be one that is established only in [your own] philosophical system. |
itīśvaraparīkṣā | Thus ends the examination of [the doctrine of] God. |
prakṛtīśvarayor eva hetutvapratiṣedhanāt | Due to the refutation of both prakṛti and īśvara being [individually] the cause [of the world], |
pratyekaṃ sahitaṃ kartṛ nobhayaṃ janminām idam | Neither separately nor jointly can these two be the maker of created things. |
tatra kecit sāṅkhyā āhuḥ na pradhānādeva kevalādamī kāryabhedāḥ pravartante tasyācetanatvāt | In this context, some Sāṃkhyas declare: "These various effects do not proceed from pradhāna alone, because it is non-conscious; |
na hyacetano 'dhiṣṭhāyakamantareṇa svakāryamārabhamāṇo dṛṣṭaḥ | for no non-conscious [entity] has ever been observed to undertake its effects without a controller; |
na ca puruṣo 'dhiṣṭhāyako yuktas tasya tadānīm ajñatvāt | and puruṣa cannot reasonably be the controller, because at that time [he] is unconscious; |
tathā hi buddhyadhyavasitamevārthaṃ puruṣaścetayate | for puruṣa is conscious only of objects [already] determined by buddhi; |
buddhisaṃsargāc ca pūrvamasāvajña eva na jātu kañcidarthaṃ vijānāti | and prior to contact with buddhi, he is entirely unconscious and never cognizes any object; |
na cāvijñātamarthaṃ śaktaḥ kaścid kartumiti nāsau kartā | and since no one is capable of making something [they have] not cognized, he cannot be the maker." |
tasmād īśvara eva pradhānāpekṣaḥ kāryabhedānāṃ kartā na kevalaḥ / | From this it follows that God [Īśvara] is the maker of diverse effects not by himself alone, but [only] with the help of Primordial Matter [Pradhāna]. |
na hi devadattādiḥ kevalaḥ putraṃ janayati nāpi kevalaḥ kulālo ghaṭaṃ karotīti / | For neither does Devadatta alone beget a son, nor does a potter alone make a jar. |
tad etad api pratyekaṃ prakṛtīśvarayor hetutvaniṣedhāt sahitam api nedam īśvarapradhānākhyamubhayaṃ janminām kartṛ janakam iti siddham // | Since the causality of both Prakṛti and Īśvara has been refuted individually, it is established that even these two together—known as Īśvara and Pradhāna—cannot be the maker [or] producer of things that are born. |
nanu yadi nāma pratyekam anayoḥ kartṛtvaṃ niṣiddham tathāpi sahitayor aniṣiddham eva na hi kevalānāṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ cakṣur jñānotpattiṃ prati sāmarthyābhāve sahitānām api na bhavatītyāśaṅkyāha sāhityam ityādi / | [One might] object: "Even if the agency of these two [has been] refuted individually, their joint agency remains unrefuted; just as in the case of the eye and other sense organs, though they lack the capacity individually to produce visual cognition, this does not [mean] they cannot do so jointly." |
sāhityaṃ sahakāritvād etayoḥ kalpite ca yat / tat syādatiśayādhānādekārthakriyayāpi vā // | As for their conjectured 'association' based on cooperation, this would have to be either through the production of some excellence [in each other] or through performing a single purpose. |
na yuktā kalpanādyasya nirvikāratayā tayoḥ / | The first assumption is not reasonable, because both are unchangeable. |
na dvitīyasya kāryāṇāṃ yaugapadyaprasaṅgataḥ // | Nor [is] the second [acceptable], because it would lead to the unwanted consequence of effects occurring simultaneously. |
sāhityaṃ nāma sahakāritvaṃ tac ca dvividham parasparātiśayādhānādvā syād ekārthakāritvād vā / | What is called 'association' means cooperation, and this is of two kinds: either through producing excellence in each other or through accomplishing a single purpose. |
tatra na tāvad ādyasyātiśayādhānalakṣaṇasya sahakāritvasya kalpanā yuktākasmāt / | Of these, the assumption of the first kind of cooperation, characterized by producing excellence [in each other], is not reasonable. |
tayor īśvarapradhānayor nityatvena nirvikāratvāt / | [This is not possible] because both Īśvara and Pradhāna are eternal and hence unchangeable. |
nāpi dvitīyasya kalpanā yukteti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ / | Nor is the assumption of the second [kind of] association suitable - this is how [these words] are to be construed with the previous [statement]. |
kasmāt / kāryāṇāṃ yaugapadyānaprasaṅgāt / | Why? Because [it] would lead to the unwanted consequence of all effects [arising] simultaneously. |
avikalāpratihatasāmarthyasyeśvarapradhānākhyakāraṇasya sadā sannihitatvenāvikalakāraṇāt / | Because the cause named 'Īśvara-Pradhāna', whose power is undiminished and unobstructed, being always present [would constitute] an undiminished cause. |
atra ca pūrvavad yadavikalakāraṇam ityādi prasaṅgasādhanaṃ vācyam / | And here, as before, the demonstration through unwanted consequence beginning with "that which is an undiminished cause" should be stated. |
athocyate pradhānasya trirūpatvaṃ vyavasthitam / | Now [the opponent] says: "It is established that Pradhāna has three forms; |
tatrāyaṃ rajasā yuktaḥ sargaheturmaheśvaraḥ / | there, this Maheśvara, when united with rajas, becomes the cause of creation; |
udbhūtavṛttisattvaṃ tu yadā saṃśrayate punaḥ / tadā sarvasya lokasya sthiter yāti nimittatām / | when again he resorts to sattva whose operation has become manifest, then he becomes the instrumental cause for the maintenance of the entire world; |
udbhūtaśaktirūpeṇa tamasā yujyate yadā / | when he unites with tamas in the form of manifested power, |
rajaḥsatvādirūpādi tadevaṃ sahakāriṇaḥ / | thus rajas, sattva and the other forms are [his] auxiliaries; |
krameṇaivāsya vartante kāryāṇāṃ nākramastataḥ / | these operate for him only in sequence; therefore there is no non-sequence of effects; |
yadyapi kāraṇadvayametannityasannihitam / | although these two causes are eternally present [together]." |
tathāpi krameṇaivāmī kāryabhedāḥ pravartiṣyante yata īśvarasya pradhānagatāstrayo guṇāḥ satvādayaḥ sahakāriṇaḥ teṣāṃ ca kramavṛttitvāt tatkāryeṣvapi kramo bhavati / | Even though these [two causes] are constantly present together, the various effects will proceed only successively, because the three guṇas residing in Pradhāna—sattva and the others—are [God's] auxiliaries; and since these [guṇas] function successively, there must also be succession in their effects. |
tathā hi yadodbhūtavṛttinā rajasā yukto bhavati maheśvaras tadā sargahetuḥ prajānāṃ bhavati prasavakāryatvād rajasaḥ / | Thus when Maheśvara becomes connected with rajas in its manifest function, then He becomes the cause of creation of beings, because rajas has the function of producing. |
yadā tu sattvaṃ samudbhūtavṛtti saṃśrayate tadā lokānāṃ sthitikāraṇaṃ bhavati satvasya sthitihetutvāt / | When, however, He resorts to sattva in its manifest function, then He becomes the cause of maintenance of the worlds, because sattva is conducive to preservation. |
yadā tu tamasodbhūtaśaktinā samāyukto bhavati tadā pralayaṃ nāśaṃ sarvajagataḥ karoti tamasaḥ pratyayahetutvāt | And when He becomes connected with tamas in its manifest power, then He brings about the dissolution [and] destruction of the entire world, because tamas is conducive to dissolution. |
rajojuṣe janmani sattvavṛttaye sthitau prajānāṃ pralaye tamaḥspṛśe / ajāya sarvasthitināśatastriṇe trayīmayāya triguṇātmane namaḥ // iti / | "Obeisance to Him who resorts to rajas in creation, to sattva in maintenance, to tamas in dissolution; who is unborn, who controls creation, maintenance and destruction; who consists of the three Vedas [and] who is the essence of the three guṇas!" |
kilaśabdo 'sambhavanāyām // | The word kila [is used] to indicate impossibility. |
ihocyata ityādinā pratividhatte / | [The author] responds with the words "ihocyate" etc. |
ihocyate tayor ekakriyākāle samasti kim / tadanyakāryaniṣpattisāmarthyaṃ yadi vā na tat // | Here it is said: When the two are performing one action, is there the capacity to accomplish other actions, or is there not? |
yadyasti sargakāle 'pi dvayamapyaparaṃ bhavet / | If there is, then even at the time of creation, the other two [actions] would also occur. |
evam anyasya sadbhāve dvayamanyatprasajyate // | Thus when any one [action] exists, the other two would necessarily follow. |
tayor iti / prakṛtirīśarayoḥ / | [The expression] "of the two" [refers to] Prakṛti and Īśvara. |
ekakriyākāla iti / | [This means] at the time of one action. |
sargasthitipralayānām anyatamasyaikasya kriyākāle tadaparakāryadvayotpādanasāmarthyaṃ kimastyuta nāstīti vikalpadvayam / | At the time when one among the three acts of creation [sarga], maintenance [sthiti], and dissolution [pralaya] is being performed, is there or is there not the capacity to produce the other two effects? These are the two alternatives. |
tatra yadyasti tadā sargakāleṣvavikalakāraṇatvād aparaṃ kāryadvayaṃ sthitipralayātmakaṃ bhaved utpādavat / | If [such a capacity] exists, then at the times of creation, due to the cause being unimpeded, the other two effects consisting of maintenance and dissolution should occur, just like creation [occurs]. |
evaṃ sthitikāle 'pyutpādavināśau prāpnutaḥ / pralayakāle ca sthityutpādau syātām / | Similarly, at the time of maintenance, creation and destruction would occur, and at the time of dissolution, maintenance and creation would occur. |
na caivaṃ yuktam / | And this is certainly not reasonable. |
na hi parasparaparihāreṇāvasthitānām ekatra dharmiṇyekadā sadbhāvo yuktaḥ //101- | For it is not possible that [states] which exist by mutually excluding each other should exist simultaneously in one substrate. |
syād etat tadekakāryotpādakāle tayoḥ prakṛtīśvarayor aparakāryadvayotpādanāya rūpāntaraṃ na sannihitamiti tena tadānīṃ tayor na prasaṅga ity āha na hītyādi / na hi tatpararūpeṇa punar anyasya kārakam / svarūpaṃ ca tadevāsya tatkriyāviratiḥ kutaḥ // | [One might object:] "At the time when those two, Prakṛti and Īśvara, are producing one effect, another form [of theirs] for producing the other two effects is not present, therefore at that time those two [effects] do not follow" - thus [the opponent] speaks beginning with "na hi." For it [the cause] is not the producer of something else through another form, and since its essential nature remains the same, how could there be a cessation of that activity? |
taditi / | [The word] "tat" [refers to what was mentioned above]. |
prakṛtīśvarākhyaṃ kāraṇam anyasyeti / pāścāttyasya kāryadvayasya / | [The phrase] "of something else" [refers to] the cause called Prakṛti and Īśvara, [and refers to] the two subsequent effects. |
na pararūpeṇa kiṃ tarhi/ | [It is] not through another form, but rather what? |
svarūpeṇaiva kāraṇam iti bhāvaḥ // | [It is] a cause through its very own nature - this is the meaning. |
syādedyadyapi tatpararūpeṇa na kāraṇaṃ tathāpyekakāryotpādakāle pariśiṣṭakāryadvayotpattaye sāmarthyamasya nāsti / | "Though it does not serve as the Cause in any other form, yet at the time when it is producing one effect, its capacity for producing the remaining two effects is not present." |
tena kāryadvayasya tadānīm anutpāda ity āha tatsāmarthyetyādi / | "That is why the two [other] effects do not appear at that time," thus [the opponent] speaks, [and the answer is given] beginning with "that capacity." |
anyadā śaktiśūnyatvād viyadambhoruhādivat // anyadeti / | "At another time, due to [its] being devoid of potency, like space, lotuses, etc." [The phrase] "at another time" [is explained thus]. |
syād etadyadyapi pradhāne sarvā śaktiḥ sannihitā tathāpi yodbhūtavṛttir bhavati / saiva kāraṇatāṃ pratipadyate nānyā tena yaugapadyaṃ kāryāṇāṃ na bhaviṣyatītyāha utkaṭam ityādi / | "Even though all potency is present in pradhāna, yet only that [potency] which has become manifest becomes operative. That alone attains causality, not another. Therefore there will be no simultaneity of effects," thus [the opponent] speaks, beginning with "manifested." |
utkaṭaṃ śaktirūpaṃ ca yadi tanmātrakāraṇam / | "If the manifested form of potency has that alone as its cause..." |
sarvadā tadbhaveddhetor nityarūpasya sannidheḥ // idaṃ hi sarvā{tvā---}dīnām utkaṭaṃ rūpaṃ na tāvannityaṃ yuktaṃ vaktum kādācitkatvāt / | "...then it would exist always, due to the proximity of the eternal cause." Indeed, this manifested form of sattva and other [guṇas] cannot reasonably be called eternal, because it occurs only occasionally. |
tataścāsya bhāvaḥ kadacit prakṛtīśvarādeva kāraṇādanyato vā hetoḥ svatantro vā syād iti trayo vikalpāḥ / | Therefore, regarding the occurrence of this [manifested form], there are three alternatives: it could be either from prakṛti and īśvara as the cause, or from some other cause, or [it could be] independent. |
tatra prathame pakṣe tadutkaṭaṃ rūpaṃ sarvadā bhavet prakṛtīśvarākhyasya hetor nityarūpatvena sadā sannihitatvāt // | In the first alternative, that manifested form would always exist, because the cause known as prakṛti and īśvara, being eternal in nature, is always present. |
dvitīye 'pi pakṣe prāha na cāparam ityādi / na cāparamparir iṣṭamato naivānyato 'pi tat / | Regarding the second alternative, [the text] states beginning with "and not another": "And another [cause] is not accepted, therefore it cannot be from another source." |
nāpi svatantram evedaṃ kādācitkatvasambhavāt // na hi prakṛtīśvaravyatiriktam aparaṃ kāraṇam iṣṭam yenānyatas tadudbhavet / | "Nor is this indeed independent, due to [its] occasional occurrence." For no cause other than prakṛti and īśvara is accepted, by which it could arise from another source. |
nāpi tṛtīyaḥ pakṣo yukta ity āha nāpītyādi // | And the third alternative is not reasonable either, thus [the text] states beginning with "nor." |
atha svātantrye sati kādācitkatvasya ko virodha ity āha svata ityādi / svato bhāve hyahetutvaṃ svakriyāyā virodhataḥ / apekṣayā hi bhāvānāṃ kādācitkatvasambhavaḥ // | [The opponent] asks: "If there is independence, what contradiction is there with occasional occurrence?" [The answer is given] starting with svataḥ: "Indeed, if there is self-existence, [there would be] causelessness, due to the contradiction of self-action. For occasional occurrence of entities [is possible only] through dependence." |
svataḥ svabhāvāt bhāve janmani sati ahetukatvaṃ niyamato bhavet / | If production [would occur] from itself, from [its] own nature, then necessarily it would be causeless. |
nanu svabhāvādutpadyamānaḥ katham ahetuko bhavati yāvatā svabhāva eva tasya hetuḥ pratīyata ity āha svakriyāyā virodhata iti svasmin svarūpe kriyāyā hetubhāvasya virodhāt / | [One might ask:] "How can something produced from [its] own nature be causeless, when its own nature itself is perceived as its cause?" [The answer] states that due to contradiction of self-action, because causal action in/upon one's own essence is contradictory. |
syād etad bhavatvahetukatvam tathāpi kimiti kādācitkatvaṃ na yujyata ity āha apekṣayā hītyādi / | One might say: "Let it be causeless; why still would occasional occurrence not be possible?" [The answer] states [the verse beginning with] "through dependence..." |
svabhāvāntarāyattavṛttayo hi bhāvāḥ kādācitkā yuktāḥ / | Indeed, entities whose existence depends on other natures are reasonably occasional [in their occurrence]. |
parabhāvābhāvapratibaddhatvāt teṣāṃ sadasattayoḥ / | Because their existence and non-existence are bound to the presence and absence of other entities. |
ye punar aparāyattavṛttayasteṣām apekṣaṇīyasya kasyacid abhāvāt kimiti kadācidbhaveyuḥ // | But those whose existence does not depend [on others], due to the absence of anything they would need to depend on, why should they occur only occasionally? |
tathā hi na hyabhāvasya svātmani vyāpṛtir matā / | For indeed, absence is not considered to have any operation upon itself. |
niṣpannasyātmano 'pyasyāmavasthāyāṃ prasiddhitaḥ // | And in this condition, [this applies] also to an established self, as is well-known. |
ātmānaṃ hi janayansvabhāvo niṣpanno vā na vā / na tāvanniṣpannaḥ / | For when [its own] nature produces itself, is it established or not? It cannot be established. |
tasyāmavasthāyāmātmano 'pi niṣpannarūpāvyatirekitvena prasiddher niṣpannatvāt svabhāvavat / | Because in that state, since [its] own form is established as non-different [from itself], [its] establishment is like [its] inherent nature. |
tataś ca janyāsambhavāt kutrāsau bhāvo vyāpriyeta // | And hence, since there is nothing to be produced, where could that entity operate? |
nāpyaniṣpanna iti darśayati aniṣpannetyādi / | [The text] shows that [it] cannot be unestablished either, [starting with] "aniṣpanna" etc. |
aniṣpannātmatatvastu naiva vyāpriyate kvacit / | But if [its] own essential nature is unestablished, it cannot operate anywhere at all, |
sarvaśaktiviyuktatvād ākāśakamalādivat // | Because [it is] devoid of all power, like a sky-lotus and similar [non-existent things]. |
ity ubhayaparīksā // | This is the examination of both [alternatives]. |
na svātmabhūte nāpi parabhūta ity arthaḥ / | The meaning is that [it] can operate neither on what is itself nor on what is other. |
sati vyāpāre niṣpannātmatatva eva syāt / | If there were operation, [it] would have an established essential nature, |
etāvanmātralakṣaṇatvān niṣpannasyeti bhāvaḥ // | Because an established [entity] has just this much as [its] characteristic – this is the idea. |
sarvetyādi / | [Beginning with the word] "sarva" etc. |
svabhāvavādibhis te hi nāhuḥ svamapi kāraṇam // | Those who uphold [the doctrine of] svabhāva do not declare even the thing itself to be its own cause. |
svabhāvavādas tu yady apy ādiśabdenāhatyanopāttaḥ / tathāpi svabhāvavādina{ṃ---}topādānāt sūcita eva / | Although the doctrine of svabhāva has not been directly stated [in the texts] with the word "ādi", nevertheless it is implied through the mentioning of the proponents of svabhāva. |
tatra ye svata eva bhāvā jāyanta iti varṇayanti / te svakriyāyā virodhata ityādinā nirastāḥ sāmprataṃ svabhāvavādino nirasyante / | Those who assert that things arise from themselves have been refuted by [the argument about] the contradiction in self-action and so forth; now the proponents of svabhāva are being refuted. |
ta evam āhur na svato nāpi parato bhāvānāṃ janma kiṃ tarhi sarvahetunirāśaṃsam svaparakāraṇanirapekṣam ity arthaḥ / | They say thus: "The origination of things occurs neither from themselves nor from others; rather, [it occurs] independent of all causes, that is, without dependence on either self-causation or external causation." |
nanu ye svata eva bhāvā bhavantīti varṇayanti tebhya eṣāṃ ko bheda ity āha ---te hītyādi / | [One might ask]: "What is the difference between these [svabhāvavādins] and those who maintain that things arise from themselves?" The answer begins with "te hi" ["they indeed"]. |
te svabhāvavādinaḥ svamiti / svarūpam / | "They" [refers to] the proponents of svabhāva; "svam" [means] its own nature. |
apiśabdāt pararūpam api / pūrvakās tu svabhāvaṃ kāraṇamicchanti ete tamapi necchantīti bhedaḥ // | Due to the word "api" [it includes] the nature of others as well; the difference is that while the previous [theorists] accept svabhāva as a cause, these [svabhāvavādins] do not accept even that as a cause. |
atra ca yuktiṃ varṇayanti yad upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ sad anupalabhyamānasattākam, tat prekṣāvatām asadvyavahāraviṣayaḥ, yathā śaśaviṣāṇam. | Here they present the argument that whatever exists but is not perceived despite being perceptible should be treated as non-existent by rational people, like a hare's horn. |
anupalabhyamānasattākaṃ ca bhāvānāṃ kāraṇam iti svabhāvānupalabdhiḥ / | And [they argue that] the cause of things is something whose existence is not perceived - this is the non-perception of svabhāva. |
na cāyam asiddho hetur ity ādarśayann āha rājīvetyādi / | And showing that this reason is not unestablished, [the author] states beginning with "rājīva" ["lotus"]. |
rājīvakesarādīnāṃ vaicitryakaḥ karoti hi / mayūracandrakādir vā vicitraḥ kena nirmitaḥ // | Who makes the diversity of the lotus and its filaments [and other parts]? By whom have the variegated [patterns] of the peacock's moon[-shaped spots] and such things been created? |
rājīvam padmam tasya kesarādaya iti vigrahaḥ / | 'Rājīva' means lotus; [and] its 'kesarādayaḥ' [means] its filaments and other [parts] - such is the analysis of the compound. |
ādigrahaṇānnāladalakarṇikādīnāṃ kaṇṭakataikṣṇyādīnāṃ ca grahaṇam / | By the word 'ādi' [in the compound] are included the stalk, petals, pericarp and other parts, as well as the sharpness of thorns and such things. |
vaicitryam iti / | [As for the word] 'vaicitrya' [it means] diversity. |
saṃsthānavarṇakārkaśyādibhedam / kaḥ karotīti / naiva kaścit / īśvarādeḥ kāraṇasyānupalabhyamānatvād iti bhāvaḥ // | [It refers to] the differences in shape, color, hardness and such things. [When asked] "Who makes [it]?", [the answer is] indeed no one, since no cause such as God or the like is perceived - such is the meaning. |
syād etat yadi nāma bāhyānāṃ bhāvānāṃ kāraṇānupalabdher ahetutvaṃ siddham ādhyātmikānāṃ tu kathaṃ siddham ity āha yathaivetyādi / | This might be objected: "Even if the causelessness of external things is proven due to non-perception of [their] cause, how is it proven for internal things?" - [to this] he says "yathaiva" etc. |
Subsets and Splits