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prayogaḥ ye niyatapadārthasannidhāne sati niyatajanmānas te sahetukaḥ / | [Here is] the formal argument: Those things whose production is restricted to occasions when certain specific things are present must be regarded as having causes |
yathā bhavatsādhanasannidhānabhāvisādhyarthaviṣayaṃ jñānam tathā ca rājīvādayo bhāvā iti svabhāvahetuḥ // | Just as [in the case of] your cognition of the probandum which appears only when the probans is present, so also [in the case of] things like lotus filaments - this is a reason based on essential nature |
iti svābhāvikavādaparīkṣā // | Thus ends the examination of the doctrine of [things existing by their] own nature |
nāśotpādetyādi śabdabrāhmavādino bruvate | The proponents of the Word-Brahman doctrine speak thus beginning with "destruction and origination" |
nāśotpādāsamālīḍhaṃ brahma śabdamayaṃ param / | The supreme Brahman consisting of sound is untouched by destruction and origination |
yat tasya pariṇāmo 'yaṃ bhāvagrāmaḥ pratīyate // | This multitude of entities is recognized as its transformation |
anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatatvaṃ yadakṣaram / | That which is Brahman, without beginning or end, whose essence is sound, [and which is] imperishable |
vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ | From which the world-process evolves in the form of things |
tatra ādiḥ utpādaḥ; nidhanam nāśaḥ; tadabhāvād anādinidhanam | Here, "ādi" means origination; "nidhana" means destruction; due to the absence of these [two], [it is] without beginning and end |
akṣaram iti | [It is] in the form of the letter-sounds |
akārādyakṣarasya nimittatvāt | Because the letters beginning with "a" are the instrumental cause |
etenābhidhānarūpeṇa vivarto darśitaḥ / arthabhāvenetyādinā punar abhidheyavivartaḥ | By this, the evolution in the form of words is shown; again, by [the phrase] "in the form of things," the evolution of the denoted objects [is shown] |
prakriyeti bhedāḥ | The term "prakriyā" [refers to] the differentiations |
brahmeti nāmasaṃkīrtanam | The term "brahman" is a declaration of the name |
asyaiva ślokasyārthaṃ nirdiśati nāśotpādāsamālīḍham iti | [The text] indicates the meaning of this very verse [by the phrase] "untouched by destruction and origination" |
nāśotpādagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam | The mention of "destruction" and "origination" is illustrative |
idamapyatra boddhavyam pūrvāparadeśavibhāgarahitam iti | This also should be understood here: [it is] free from distinctions of prior and posterior space |
tathā hi anādinidhanatvaṃ pūrvāparadeśavibhāgarahitatvam api tatra nirdiṣṭam | Thus indeed, being without beginning and end also indicates being free from distinctions of prior and posterior space therein |
śabdamayam iti | "[It is] of the essence of Word-Sound" |
śabdasvabhāvāt ata eva śabdas tattvam asya śabdatattvaṃ taducyate | "Because of [its] word-nature, therefore Word is its essence, [and] hence it is called 'word-essence'" |
śabdo 'syāviparītaṃ rūpam ity arthaḥ | "The meaning is that Word is its inseparable form" |
param iti praṇavātmakam | "[The term] 'highest' [means it is] in the form of the praṇava [oṃ]" |
praṇavo hi kila sarveṣāṃ śabdānāṃ sarveṣāṃ cārthānāṃ prakṛtiḥ sa ca vedaḥ | "For the praṇava is indeed the source of all words and all meanings, and that is the Veda" |
ayaṃ tu varṇapadakrameṇāvasthito vedas tadadhigamopāyas tasya praticchabdakanyāyenāvasthitaḥ | "This Veda, however, existing in the sequence of letters and words, is the means of understanding that [praṇava], being established according to the principle of replication" |
taṃ tu paramaṃ brahmaṇamabhyudayaniḥśreyasaphaladharmānugṛhītāntaḥkaraṇaṃ paśyantīti | "They perceive that highest Brahman [when their] inner faculties are blessed by dharma that brings the fruit of prosperity and supreme good" |
atra ca pramaṇayanti | "And in this regard they cite authority" |
ye yadākārānusyūtās te tan mayā yathā ghaṭaśarāvodañcanādayo mṛdvikārāḥ mṛdākārānugatāḥ padārthā mṛṇamayatvena prasiddhāḥ | "Just as those things which are pervaded by a particular form are 'made of that', like pots, bowls, and water vessels, being modifications of clay [and] following the form of clay, are well-known as being 'made of clay'" |
śabdākārānusyūtāś ca sarvabhāvā iti svabhāvahetuḥ yataḥ pratyakṣata eva sarvārthānāṃ śabdākārānugamaḥ siddhaḥ | "And all entities are pervaded by word-form - this is the reason for [their] nature, since the following of word-form by all things is established through direct perception" |
tathā hi śabda eva pratyayo 'rtheṣūpajāyamānaḥ śabdollekhānugata evopajāyate / | Thus indeed, when cognition [of objects] arises through words alone, it arises only accompanied by the traces of words. |
yathoktam | As has been said |
na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte / | There exists no cognition in the world that is devoid of association with words. |
anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena vartate // | All knowledge exists as if penetrated by words. |
jñānākāranibandhanā ca vastūnāṃ svabhāvaprajñaptiḥ / | And the understanding of the nature of things depends on the form of [their] cognition. |
ataḥ siddhameṣāṃ śabdākārānusyūtatvaṃ tatsiddhau ca tanmayatvam api siddhameva tanmātrabhāvitvāt tanmayatvasyeti // | Therefore it is established that these [things] are interwoven with word-forms, and when this is established, their being made of that [i.e., words] is also established, since being made of that means nothing more than having that [word-form] as their essence. |
iti sañcakṣate ye 'pi te vācyāḥ kimidaṃ nijam / śabdarūpaṃ parityajya nīlāditvaṃ prapadyate // na vā tatheti yadyādyaḥ pakṣaḥ saṃśrīyate tadā / akṣaratvaviyogaḥ syāt paurastyātmavināśataḥ // | Those who maintain this [view] should be asked: "Does this inherent sound-form abandon [itself] and become blue-ness etc. or not?" If the first position is accepted, then [the sound] would lose its immutability due to the destruction of its prior nature. |
athāpyanantaraḥ pakṣas tatra nīlādivedane / aśruter api vispaṣṭaṃ bhavecchabdātmavedanam // | If the second position is accepted, then even deaf people should have a clear perception of the sound-essence when cognizing blue and other [things]. |
atra kadācicchabdapariṇāmarūpatvād vā jagataḥ śabdamayatvaṃ sādhyatveneṣṭam kadācicchabdādutpatter vā / yathānnamayāḥ prāṇā iti hetau mayaḍvidhānāt / | Here, is the world's being śabdamaya ["made of sound"] intended to be proved either as [the world] sometimes taking the form of sound-modifications, or as [the world] sometimes being produced from sound - just as in [the expression] "prāṇāḥ are annamayāḥ," where the suffix mayaṭ indicates causation? |
atra na tāvadādyaḥ pakṣaḥ pariṇāmasyaivānupapatteḥ / | Here, the first position is not [acceptable] because modification itself is impossible. |
tathā hi śabdātmakaṃ brahma nīlādirūpatāṃ pratipadyamānaṃ kadācinnijaṃ svābhāvikaṃ śabdarūpaṃ parityajya pratipadyetāparityajya vā | When Brahman, [which is] of the nature of Sound, takes on the form of blue and other [colors], does [it] either abandon or not abandon its own natural Sound-form? |
athāparityajyetyanantaraḥ pakṣaḥ tadā nīlādisaṃvedanakāle 'pyaśruter badhirasya śabdaḥ saṃvedanaṃ prāpnoti | If the latter alternative [is accepted], that [it] does not abandon [its form], then even a deaf person would have to perceive sound at the time of perceiving blue and other [colors] |
nīlādisaṃvedanavat tadavyatirekāt | Because [sound perception] would be non-different from the perception of blue and other [colors] |
prayogaḥ yadyadavyatiriktaṃ tat tasmin saṃvedyamāne saṃvedyate yathā nīlādisaṃvedanāvasthāyāṃ tasyaiva nīlāder ātmā nīlādavyatiriktaś ca śabda iti svabhāvahetuḥ | The formal argument [is]: Whatever is non-different [from something], when that [something] is perceived, [it] too is perceived—just as when blue and other [colors] are being perceived, the essence of that very blue [is perceived]; and sound is non-different from blue—this is a reason based on essential nature |
anyathā bhinnayogakṣematvāt tatsvabhāvatvam eva prasidhyedityetad atra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam | Otherwise, since [their] conditions of subsistence would be different, [their] having the same essential nature would not be established—this is the counter-argument here |
etad eva vistareṇa pratipādayann āha yenetyādi | [The author], explaining this very [point] in detail, states [the verse] beginning with "yena" |
yena śabdamayaṃ sarvaṃ mukhyavṛttyā vyavasthitam | Because according to [you], everything exists primarily as consisting of sound |
śabdarūpāparityāgaṃ pariṇāmānidhānataḥ | [And] due to [your claim of] non-abandonment of the sound-form, [there can be] no transformation |
yena yasmāt bhavaddhirmukhyatā eva śabdasvabhāvaṃ jagaditi varṇyate | Here "yena" means "because," since you describe the world as being primarily of the nature of sound |
kasmādityāha śabdarūpāparityāga iti | [The author] states "śabdarūpāparityāga" [to explain] why [this is so] |
yadi nāma mukhyataḥ śabdamayamavasthitaṃ tataḥ kimityāha agauṇe cetyādi | [If one asks] "What if [the world] remains primarily of the essence of sound?" [the author] responds with [the verse beginning with] "agauṇe ca" |
agauṇe caivam ekatve nīlādīnāṃ vyavasthite / tatsaṃvedanavelāyāṃ kathaṃ nāstyasya vedanam | When the identity of blue and other [things] with [sound] is established as non-figurative, why is there no cognition of it [sound] at the time of their cognition? |
ekatve nīlādīnām iti | [This refers to] the identity of blue and other [things] |
śabdena saheti śeṣaḥ | [The complete phrase is] "with sound" [which is to be supplied] |
tatsaṃvedanavelāyām iti / teṣāṃ nīlādīnāṃ saṃvedanāvasthāyām | "At the time of their cognition" means at the time when blue and other [things] are being cognized |
kathaṃ nāstyasya vedanam iti / tasyāpi nīlādisvabhāvavad upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvādyuktam eva saṃvedanam ityabhiprāyaḥ | "Why is there no cognition of it?" means that since it [sound] also fulfills the conditions of perceptibility like blue and other [things], its cognition should certainly occur |
asyāvittau hi nīlāder api na syāt pravedanam | If there were no cognition of it [sound], then there could not be cognition of blue and other [things] either |
aikātmyādbhinnadharmatve bhedo 'tyantaṃ prasajyate | If they had different properties despite [their] unity of essence, absolute difference would follow |
athāsya vedanaṃ neṣyate tadā nīlāder api śabdasvarūpavadasaṃvedanaprasaṅgaḥ | If the cognition of it [sound] is not accepted, then there would follow the unwanted consequence of non-cognition of blue and other [things] as well, just as [there is non-cognition] of the nature of sound |
aikātmyāt śabdena saha nīlādīnām ekasvabhāvatvādity arthaḥ | Because of [their] unity of essence - meaning that blue and other [things] have the same nature as sound |
anyathā nīlādīnāṃ śabdena saha bhinnadharmatve 'bhyupagamyamāne 'tyantabhedo 'ṅgīkartavyaḥ | Otherwise, if blue and other [things] are accepted as having different properties from sound, absolute difference would have to be accepted |
kasmād ity āha | Why? He explains [thus]: |
viruddhadharmasaṅgo hi bahūnāṃ bhedalakṣaṇam / | Indeed, the presence of mutually incompatible properties is the mark of difference among many [things]; |
nānyathā vyaktibhedānāṃ kalpito 'pi bhavedasau // | otherwise, even an assumed difference among distinct individuals could not exist. |
na hyekasyaikadaikapratipattrapekṣayā grahaṇam agrahaṇaṃ ca yuktam / | For it is not possible for one [and the same] thing to be both perceived and not perceived simultaneously with reference to one perceiver; |
ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt / | because [if it were], its unity would be destroyed. |
anyathā hi yadi viruddhadharmādhyāse 'pyekatvaṃ syāt tadā ghaṭādīnāṃ yaḥ kalpita iṣṭo vyaktibhedaḥ so 'pi na bhavet / | For if otherwise unity were possible even when incompatible properties are superimposed, then even that accepted assumed difference among distinct things like jars would not exist. |
na kevalaṃ brahmaṇaḥ svarūpabhedo nāstītyapiśabdaḥ / | The word 'api' [even] indicates that it is not only in Brahman's own nature that there is no difference; |
yatas tasya svātmani vyavasthitasya nāsti bhedo vikāraviṣayatvādasyeti siddhāntaḥ / | because it is an established conclusion that for Brahman, which abides in its own self, there is no difference, as difference belongs [only] to the realm of modification. |
tathā hi na ghaṭādyātmanā tasyānādinidhanatvam iṣyate / | Thus indeed, Its [Brahman's] beginninglessness and endlessness is not accepted in the form of jars and such things; |
paramātmanā ghaṭādayo hi dṛśyamānodayavyayāḥ paricchinnadeśāścopalabhyantaiti / | for jars and such things, unlike the Supreme Self, are perceived as having visible origin and destruction and as being limited in space. |
ayaṃ cāśruteḥ spaṣṭaṃ śabdasaṃvedanaṃ syād iti yaḥ prasaṅga uktaḥ sa yadi brahmaṇo rūpamupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptamiṣyate tadā draṣṭavyaḥ / | [That] objection which was raised [above] that a deaf person would clearly perceive śabda – this should be considered [valid] only if the form of brahman is accepted as fulfilling the conditions of perceptibility. |
kiṃ tu nīlādīnām api tādrūpyāt tatsvarūpavadagrahaṇaprasaṅga ityayaṃ doṣo vācyaḥ / | But [in that case] this objection should be raised: due to [their] having the same nature [as śabda], blue and other [qualities] would also not be grasped, like its [śabda's] own nature. |
tataścāyaṃ niyamo nopapadyate / udayavyayavatīmevārthamātrāmaparadarśanāḥ pratiyantīti / | And consequently, this rule would not be established: "Ordinary people perceive only those objects which are subject to origination and destruction." |
syād etadyathā bhavatāṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ nīlādyavyatiriktaṃ nīlādisaṃvedane 'pina saṃvedyate tadvacchabdarūpam iti / | [One] might argue thus: "Just as according to you [Buddhists], momentariness, though not different from blue etc., is not perceived when blue etc. are perceived, similarly [it could be] with the form of śabda." |
tadetad asamyak / | This [argument] is not correct. |
na hi nīlādisaṃvedane kṣaṇikatvaṃ na saṃvedyate / | For it is not [true] that momentariness is not perceived when blue etc. are perceived. |
kiṃ tu gṛhītam api nirvikalpena cetasā bhrāntinimittena guṇāntarasamāropānna viniścīyata ity ucyate / | Rather, it is said that although [momentariness] is grasped by non-conceptual consciousness, it is not determined due to the superimposition of other qualities through illusion. |
tenānubhavāpekṣayā tadgṛhītam eva niścayajñānāpekṣayā tvagṛhītam iti jñānabhedenaikasya gṛhītatvaṃ agṛhītatvaṃ cāviruddham eva / | Therefore, with respect to experience it is indeed grasped, but with respect to determinate cognition it is not grasped – thus due to the difference in [types of] cognition, being grasped and not being grasped of one [thing] is not at all contradictory. |
na caivaṃ bhavatāṃ pakṣe śabdasya grahaṇāgrahaṇe yuktaṃ / | And such grasping and non-grasping of śabda is not possible in your position. |
sarvajñānānāṃ savikalpakatābhyupagamāt / ekenaivajñānena sarvātmanā tasya niścitatvāt / | Because [you] accept that all cognitions are determinate, and because it [śabda] would be completely determined by a single cognition. |
agṛhītasvabhāvāntarānupapatteḥ / | [In that case] there would be no other aspect [of the object] that would remain unapprehended. |
yathoktam niścayaḥ / yan na niścīyate rūpaṃ tat teṣāṃ viṣayaḥ katham iti / | As has been stated [regarding] determination: "How can that form which is not determined be their object?" |
atha kiñcidavikalpam api jñānamabhyupagamyate / na tarhi vaktavyam na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte / | If some non-conceptual cognition is admitted [by you], then [you] should not assert that "there exists no cognition in the world which is independent of words." |
kiñca kṣaṇikatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ pramāṇāntarataḥ siddheranubhūtam api na niścīyata iti vyapadiśyate / | Moreover, the momentariness of entities, though established through other means of valid cognition and [actually] experienced, is [still] said to be not determined. |
śabdātmatā tu bhāvānāṃ kutaḥ siddhā yena sāpyevaṃ vyavasthāpyate // | But how is the sound-essence of entities established, such that it too could be posited in this way? |
pratibhāvaṃ ca yadyekaḥ śabdātmā bhinna iṣyate / sarveṣām ekadeśatvamekākārā ca vidhavet // | And if the one sound-essence is accepted as different for each entity, then all [things] would [have to] occupy the same space and would possess one single form. |
sa hi śabdātmā pariṇāmaṃ gacchan pratipadārthaṃ bhedaṃ vā pratipadyate na vā / | For does that sound-essence, when undergoing modification, become different for each object or not? |
tatra yadi na bhinna iti pakṣas tadā sarveṣāṃ nīlādīnām ekadeśatvaṃ prāpnoti / | If the position is that it does not become different, then all things like blue etc. would [have to] occupy the same space. |
ekadeśatvamityupalakṣaṇam / | This "occupying the same space" is [mentioned merely] as an indication [of other absurdities]. |
kālapariṇāmavyāpārāvasthāviśeṣādyapi grāhyam / | Time, modifications, functions, specific conditions, etc. should also be understood [as being included]. |
ekākārā ca vit pratibhāsaḥ bhavet prāpnoti / | And the cognition [and its] appearance would necessarily be of one form. |
sarveṣāṃ nīlādīnām ekaśabdarūpāvyatirekāt // | Because all things like blue etc. would be non-different from the single form of sound. |
prativyakti tu bhede 'sya brahmānekaṃ prasajyate / vibhinnānekabhāvātmarūpatvād vyaktibhedavat // | If [brahman] differs with each individual [thing], then brahman becomes many, because [it would have] a form consisting of diverse multiple entities, just as [in the case of] the diversity of individuals. |
atha prativyakti bhedo 'sya śabdātmano 'ṅgīkriyate / | If the differentiation of this Sound-essence with each individual is accepted [by you], |
vibhinnānekabhāvātmarūpatvāt vibhinno 'nekabhāvātmānekapadārthasvabhāvo rūpaṃ svabhāvo yasyeti vigrahaḥ tadbhāvastatvam / | because [it would have] a form consisting of diverse multiple entities - meaning one whose inherent nature consists of multiple diverse entities and multiple objects - [that is] its essential nature; |
ekaṃ ca paramabrahmeṣyate / | and yet the supreme brahman is claimed to be one. |
ato 'bhyupetabādhāpratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ // | Therefore [your] assertion contradicts [your] own accepted premise. |
nityaśabdamayatve ca bhāvānām api nityatā / | And if things consisted of eternal sound, the entities would also be eternal; |
tadyaugapadyataḥ siddheḥ pariṇāmo na saṅgataḥ // | [and] due to [their] being established simultaneously with that [sound], modification is not possible. |
nityaśabdamayatve nityaśabdasvabhāvatve; jagataḥ śabdaḥ svarūpaṃ cedbhāvānām api nityatvaṃ prāpnoti / | If [things] consisted of eternal sound - that is, if [they] had the nature of eternal sound, if sound constitutes the very essence of the world - then the entities too would necessarily be eternal; |
tataś ca sarvakālaṃ bhāvānāṃ śabdena saha yaugapadyataḥ siddhe siddhatvāt pariṇāmātmā na prāpnoti taditi tasmād ityarthe teṣāṃ vā nīlādīnāṃ yaugapadyaṃ tadyaugapadyam iti vigrahaḥ // | And consequently, since the entities would be established simultaneously with sound at all times, due to [their] being [already] established, they cannot have the nature of modifications - here 'tat' means 'therefore' - or the simultaneity refers to the simultaneity of those [entities] like blue etc. |
Subsets and Splits