buddhist-nlp/tatpa-cleaned · Datasets at Hugging Face

sanskrit stringlengths 2 508	english stringlengths 2 924 ⌀
prayogaḥ ye niyatapadārthasannidhāne sati niyatajanmānas te sahetukaḥ /	[Here is] the formal argument: Those things whose production is restricted to occasions when certain specific things are present must be regarded as having causes
yathā bhavatsādhanasannidhānabhāvisādhyarthaviṣayaṃ jñānam tathā ca rājīvādayo bhāvā iti svabhāvahetuḥ //	Just as [in the case of] your cognition of the probandum which appears only when the probans is present, so also [in the case of] things like lotus filaments - this is a reason based on essential nature
iti svābhāvikavādaparīkṣā //	Thus ends the examination of the doctrine of [things existing by their] own nature
nāśotpādetyādi śabdabrāhmavādino bruvate	The proponents of the Word-Brahman doctrine speak thus beginning with "destruction and origination"
nāśotpādāsamālīḍhaṃ brahma śabdamayaṃ param /	The supreme Brahman consisting of sound is untouched by destruction and origination
yat tasya pariṇāmo 'yaṃ bhāvagrāmaḥ pratīyate //	This multitude of entities is recognized as its transformation
anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatatvaṃ yadakṣaram /	That which is Brahman, without beginning or end, whose essence is sound, [and which is] imperishable
vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ	From which the world-process evolves in the form of things
tatra ādiḥ utpādaḥ; nidhanam nāśaḥ; tadabhāvād anādinidhanam	Here, "ādi" means origination; "nidhana" means destruction; due to the absence of these [two], [it is] without beginning and end
akṣaram iti	[It is] in the form of the letter-sounds
akārādyakṣarasya nimittatvāt	Because the letters beginning with "a" are the instrumental cause
etenābhidhānarūpeṇa vivarto darśitaḥ / arthabhāvenetyādinā punar abhidheyavivartaḥ	By this, the evolution in the form of words is shown; again, by [the phrase] "in the form of things," the evolution of the denoted objects [is shown]
prakriyeti bhedāḥ	The term "prakriyā" [refers to] the differentiations
brahmeti nāmasaṃkīrtanam	The term "brahman" is a declaration of the name
asyaiva ślokasyārthaṃ nirdiśati nāśotpādāsamālīḍham iti	[The text] indicates the meaning of this very verse [by the phrase] "untouched by destruction and origination"
nāśotpādagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam	The mention of "destruction" and "origination" is illustrative
idamapyatra boddhavyam pūrvāparadeśavibhāgarahitam iti	This also should be understood here: [it is] free from distinctions of prior and posterior space
tathā hi anādinidhanatvaṃ pūrvāparadeśavibhāgarahitatvam api tatra nirdiṣṭam	Thus indeed, being without beginning and end also indicates being free from distinctions of prior and posterior space therein
śabdamayam iti	"[It is] of the essence of Word-Sound"
śabdasvabhāvāt ata eva śabdas tattvam asya śabdatattvaṃ taducyate	"Because of [its] word-nature, therefore Word is its essence, [and] hence it is called 'word-essence'"
śabdo 'syāviparītaṃ rūpam ity arthaḥ	"The meaning is that Word is its inseparable form"
param iti praṇavātmakam	"[The term] 'highest' [means it is] in the form of the praṇava [oṃ]"
praṇavo hi kila sarveṣāṃ śabdānāṃ sarveṣāṃ cārthānāṃ prakṛtiḥ sa ca vedaḥ	"For the praṇava is indeed the source of all words and all meanings, and that is the Veda"
ayaṃ tu varṇapadakrameṇāvasthito vedas tadadhigamopāyas tasya praticchabdakanyāyenāvasthitaḥ	"This Veda, however, existing in the sequence of letters and words, is the means of understanding that [praṇava], being established according to the principle of replication"
taṃ tu paramaṃ brahmaṇamabhyudayaniḥśreyasaphaladharmānugṛhītāntaḥkaraṇaṃ paśyantīti	"They perceive that highest Brahman [when their] inner faculties are blessed by dharma that brings the fruit of prosperity and supreme good"
atra ca pramaṇayanti	"And in this regard they cite authority"
ye yadākārānusyūtās te tan mayā yathā ghaṭaśarāvodañcanādayo mṛdvikārāḥ mṛdākārānugatāḥ padārthā mṛṇamayatvena prasiddhāḥ	"Just as those things which are pervaded by a particular form are 'made of that', like pots, bowls, and water vessels, being modifications of clay [and] following the form of clay, are well-known as being 'made of clay'"
śabdākārānusyūtāś ca sarvabhāvā iti svabhāvahetuḥ yataḥ pratyakṣata eva sarvārthānāṃ śabdākārānugamaḥ siddhaḥ	"And all entities are pervaded by word-form - this is the reason for [their] nature, since the following of word-form by all things is established through direct perception"
tathā hi śabda eva pratyayo 'rtheṣūpajāyamānaḥ śabdollekhānugata evopajāyate /	Thus indeed, when cognition [of objects] arises through words alone, it arises only accompanied by the traces of words.
yathoktam	As has been said
na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte /	There exists no cognition in the world that is devoid of association with words.
anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena vartate //	All knowledge exists as if penetrated by words.
jñānākāranibandhanā ca vastūnāṃ svabhāvaprajñaptiḥ /	And the understanding of the nature of things depends on the form of [their] cognition.
ataḥ siddhameṣāṃ śabdākārānusyūtatvaṃ tatsiddhau ca tanmayatvam api siddhameva tanmātrabhāvitvāt tanmayatvasyeti //	Therefore it is established that these [things] are interwoven with word-forms, and when this is established, their being made of that [i.e., words] is also established, since being made of that means nothing more than having that [word-form] as their essence.
iti sañcakṣate ye 'pi te vācyāḥ kimidaṃ nijam / śabdarūpaṃ parityajya nīlāditvaṃ prapadyate // na vā tatheti yadyādyaḥ pakṣaḥ saṃśrīyate tadā / akṣaratvaviyogaḥ syāt paurastyātmavināśataḥ //	Those who maintain this [view] should be asked: "Does this inherent sound-form abandon [itself] and become blue-ness etc. or not?" If the first position is accepted, then [the sound] would lose its immutability due to the destruction of its prior nature.
athāpyanantaraḥ pakṣas tatra nīlādivedane / aśruter api vispaṣṭaṃ bhavecchabdātmavedanam //	If the second position is accepted, then even deaf people should have a clear perception of the sound-essence when cognizing blue and other [things].
atra kadācicchabdapariṇāmarūpatvād vā jagataḥ śabdamayatvaṃ sādhyatveneṣṭam kadācicchabdādutpatter vā / yathānnamayāḥ prāṇā iti hetau mayaḍvidhānāt /	Here, is the world's being śabdamaya ["made of sound"] intended to be proved either as [the world] sometimes taking the form of sound-modifications, or as [the world] sometimes being produced from sound - just as in [the expression] "prāṇāḥ are annamayāḥ," where the suffix mayaṭ indicates causation?
atra na tāvadādyaḥ pakṣaḥ pariṇāmasyaivānupapatteḥ /	Here, the first position is not [acceptable] because modification itself is impossible.
tathā hi śabdātmakaṃ brahma nīlādirūpatāṃ pratipadyamānaṃ kadācinnijaṃ svābhāvikaṃ śabdarūpaṃ parityajya pratipadyetāparityajya vā	When Brahman, [which is] of the nature of Sound, takes on the form of blue and other [colors], does [it] either abandon or not abandon its own natural Sound-form?
athāparityajyetyanantaraḥ pakṣaḥ tadā nīlādisaṃvedanakāle 'pyaśruter badhirasya śabdaḥ saṃvedanaṃ prāpnoti	If the latter alternative [is accepted], that [it] does not abandon [its form], then even a deaf person would have to perceive sound at the time of perceiving blue and other [colors]
nīlādisaṃvedanavat tadavyatirekāt	Because [sound perception] would be non-different from the perception of blue and other [colors]
prayogaḥ yadyadavyatiriktaṃ tat tasmin saṃvedyamāne saṃvedyate yathā nīlādisaṃvedanāvasthāyāṃ tasyaiva nīlāder ātmā nīlādavyatiriktaś ca śabda iti svabhāvahetuḥ	The formal argument [is]: Whatever is non-different [from something], when that [something] is perceived, [it] too is perceived—just as when blue and other [colors] are being perceived, the essence of that very blue [is perceived]; and sound is non-different from blue—this is a reason based on essential nature
anyathā bhinnayogakṣematvāt tatsvabhāvatvam eva prasidhyedityetad atra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam	Otherwise, since [their] conditions of subsistence would be different, [their] having the same essential nature would not be established—this is the counter-argument here
etad eva vistareṇa pratipādayann āha yenetyādi	[The author], explaining this very [point] in detail, states [the verse] beginning with "yena"
yena śabdamayaṃ sarvaṃ mukhyavṛttyā vyavasthitam	Because according to [you], everything exists primarily as consisting of sound
śabdarūpāparityāgaṃ pariṇāmānidhānataḥ	[And] due to [your claim of] non-abandonment of the sound-form, [there can be] no transformation
yena yasmāt bhavaddhirmukhyatā eva śabdasvabhāvaṃ jagaditi varṇyate	Here "yena" means "because," since you describe the world as being primarily of the nature of sound
kasmādityāha śabdarūpāparityāga iti	[The author] states "śabdarūpāparityāga" [to explain] why [this is so]
yadi nāma mukhyataḥ śabdamayamavasthitaṃ tataḥ kimityāha agauṇe cetyādi	[If one asks] "What if [the world] remains primarily of the essence of sound?" [the author] responds with [the verse beginning with] "agauṇe ca"
agauṇe caivam ekatve nīlādīnāṃ vyavasthite / tatsaṃvedanavelāyāṃ kathaṃ nāstyasya vedanam	When the identity of blue and other [things] with [sound] is established as non-figurative, why is there no cognition of it [sound] at the time of their cognition?
ekatve nīlādīnām iti	[This refers to] the identity of blue and other [things]
śabdena saheti śeṣaḥ	[The complete phrase is] "with sound" [which is to be supplied]
tatsaṃvedanavelāyām iti / teṣāṃ nīlādīnāṃ saṃvedanāvasthāyām	"At the time of their cognition" means at the time when blue and other [things] are being cognized
kathaṃ nāstyasya vedanam iti / tasyāpi nīlādisvabhāvavad upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvādyuktam eva saṃvedanam ityabhiprāyaḥ	"Why is there no cognition of it?" means that since it [sound] also fulfills the conditions of perceptibility like blue and other [things], its cognition should certainly occur
asyāvittau hi nīlāder api na syāt pravedanam	If there were no cognition of it [sound], then there could not be cognition of blue and other [things] either
aikātmyādbhinnadharmatve bhedo 'tyantaṃ prasajyate	If they had different properties despite [their] unity of essence, absolute difference would follow
athāsya vedanaṃ neṣyate tadā nīlāder api śabdasvarūpavadasaṃvedanaprasaṅgaḥ	If the cognition of it [sound] is not accepted, then there would follow the unwanted consequence of non-cognition of blue and other [things] as well, just as [there is non-cognition] of the nature of sound
aikātmyāt śabdena saha nīlādīnām ekasvabhāvatvādity arthaḥ	Because of [their] unity of essence - meaning that blue and other [things] have the same nature as sound
anyathā nīlādīnāṃ śabdena saha bhinnadharmatve 'bhyupagamyamāne 'tyantabhedo 'ṅgīkartavyaḥ	Otherwise, if blue and other [things] are accepted as having different properties from sound, absolute difference would have to be accepted
kasmād ity āha	Why? He explains [thus]:
viruddhadharmasaṅgo hi bahūnāṃ bhedalakṣaṇam /	Indeed, the presence of mutually incompatible properties is the mark of difference among many [things];
nānyathā vyaktibhedānāṃ kalpito 'pi bhavedasau //	otherwise, even an assumed difference among distinct individuals could not exist.
na hyekasyaikadaikapratipattrapekṣayā grahaṇam agrahaṇaṃ ca yuktam /	For it is not possible for one [and the same] thing to be both perceived and not perceived simultaneously with reference to one perceiver;
ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt /	because [if it were], its unity would be destroyed.
anyathā hi yadi viruddhadharmādhyāse 'pyekatvaṃ syāt tadā ghaṭādīnāṃ yaḥ kalpita iṣṭo vyaktibhedaḥ so 'pi na bhavet /	For if otherwise unity were possible even when incompatible properties are superimposed, then even that accepted assumed difference among distinct things like jars would not exist.
na kevalaṃ brahmaṇaḥ svarūpabhedo nāstītyapiśabdaḥ /	The word 'api' [even] indicates that it is not only in Brahman's own nature that there is no difference;
yatas tasya svātmani vyavasthitasya nāsti bhedo vikāraviṣayatvādasyeti siddhāntaḥ /	because it is an established conclusion that for Brahman, which abides in its own self, there is no difference, as difference belongs [only] to the realm of modification.
tathā hi na ghaṭādyātmanā tasyānādinidhanatvam iṣyate /	Thus indeed, Its [Brahman's] beginninglessness and endlessness is not accepted in the form of jars and such things;
paramātmanā ghaṭādayo hi dṛśyamānodayavyayāḥ paricchinnadeśāścopalabhyantaiti /	for jars and such things, unlike the Supreme Self, are perceived as having visible origin and destruction and as being limited in space.
ayaṃ cāśruteḥ spaṣṭaṃ śabdasaṃvedanaṃ syād iti yaḥ prasaṅga uktaḥ sa yadi brahmaṇo rūpamupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptamiṣyate tadā draṣṭavyaḥ /	[That] objection which was raised [above] that a deaf person would clearly perceive śabda – this should be considered [valid] only if the form of brahman is accepted as fulfilling the conditions of perceptibility.
kiṃ tu nīlādīnām api tādrūpyāt tatsvarūpavadagrahaṇaprasaṅga ityayaṃ doṣo vācyaḥ /	But [in that case] this objection should be raised: due to [their] having the same nature [as śabda], blue and other [qualities] would also not be grasped, like its [śabda's] own nature.
tataścāyaṃ niyamo nopapadyate / udayavyayavatīmevārthamātrāmaparadarśanāḥ pratiyantīti /	And consequently, this rule would not be established: "Ordinary people perceive only those objects which are subject to origination and destruction."
syād etadyathā bhavatāṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ nīlādyavyatiriktaṃ nīlādisaṃvedane 'pina saṃvedyate tadvacchabdarūpam iti /	[One] might argue thus: "Just as according to you [Buddhists], momentariness, though not different from blue etc., is not perceived when blue etc. are perceived, similarly [it could be] with the form of śabda."
tadetad asamyak /	This [argument] is not correct.
na hi nīlādisaṃvedane kṣaṇikatvaṃ na saṃvedyate /	For it is not [true] that momentariness is not perceived when blue etc. are perceived.
kiṃ tu gṛhītam api nirvikalpena cetasā bhrāntinimittena guṇāntarasamāropānna viniścīyata ity ucyate /	Rather, it is said that although [momentariness] is grasped by non-conceptual consciousness, it is not determined due to the superimposition of other qualities through illusion.
tenānubhavāpekṣayā tadgṛhītam eva niścayajñānāpekṣayā tvagṛhītam iti jñānabhedenaikasya gṛhītatvaṃ agṛhītatvaṃ cāviruddham eva /	Therefore, with respect to experience it is indeed grasped, but with respect to determinate cognition it is not grasped – thus due to the difference in [types of] cognition, being grasped and not being grasped of one [thing] is not at all contradictory.
na caivaṃ bhavatāṃ pakṣe śabdasya grahaṇāgrahaṇe yuktaṃ /	And such grasping and non-grasping of śabda is not possible in your position.
sarvajñānānāṃ savikalpakatābhyupagamāt / ekenaivajñānena sarvātmanā tasya niścitatvāt /	Because [you] accept that all cognitions are determinate, and because it [śabda] would be completely determined by a single cognition.
agṛhītasvabhāvāntarānupapatteḥ /	[In that case] there would be no other aspect [of the object] that would remain unapprehended.
yathoktam niścayaḥ / yan na niścīyate rūpaṃ tat teṣāṃ viṣayaḥ katham iti /	As has been stated [regarding] determination: "How can that form which is not determined be their object?"
atha kiñcidavikalpam api jñānamabhyupagamyate / na tarhi vaktavyam na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte /	If some non-conceptual cognition is admitted [by you], then [you] should not assert that "there exists no cognition in the world which is independent of words."
kiñca kṣaṇikatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ pramāṇāntarataḥ siddheranubhūtam api na niścīyata iti vyapadiśyate /	Moreover, the momentariness of entities, though established through other means of valid cognition and [actually] experienced, is [still] said to be not determined.
śabdātmatā tu bhāvānāṃ kutaḥ siddhā yena sāpyevaṃ vyavasthāpyate //	But how is the sound-essence of entities established, such that it too could be posited in this way?
pratibhāvaṃ ca yadyekaḥ śabdātmā bhinna iṣyate / sarveṣām ekadeśatvamekākārā ca vidhavet //	And if the one sound-essence is accepted as different for each entity, then all [things] would [have to] occupy the same space and would possess one single form.
sa hi śabdātmā pariṇāmaṃ gacchan pratipadārthaṃ bhedaṃ vā pratipadyate na vā /	For does that sound-essence, when undergoing modification, become different for each object or not?
tatra yadi na bhinna iti pakṣas tadā sarveṣāṃ nīlādīnām ekadeśatvaṃ prāpnoti /	If the position is that it does not become different, then all things like blue etc. would [have to] occupy the same space.
ekadeśatvamityupalakṣaṇam /	This "occupying the same space" is [mentioned merely] as an indication [of other absurdities].
kālapariṇāmavyāpārāvasthāviśeṣādyapi grāhyam /	Time, modifications, functions, specific conditions, etc. should also be understood [as being included].
ekākārā ca vit pratibhāsaḥ bhavet prāpnoti /	And the cognition [and its] appearance would necessarily be of one form.
sarveṣāṃ nīlādīnām ekaśabdarūpāvyatirekāt //	Because all things like blue etc. would be non-different from the single form of sound.
prativyakti tu bhede 'sya brahmānekaṃ prasajyate / vibhinnānekabhāvātmarūpatvād vyaktibhedavat //	If [brahman] differs with each individual [thing], then brahman becomes many, because [it would have] a form consisting of diverse multiple entities, just as [in the case of] the diversity of individuals.
atha prativyakti bhedo 'sya śabdātmano 'ṅgīkriyate /	If the differentiation of this Sound-essence with each individual is accepted [by you],
vibhinnānekabhāvātmarūpatvāt vibhinno 'nekabhāvātmānekapadārthasvabhāvo rūpaṃ svabhāvo yasyeti vigrahaḥ tadbhāvastatvam /	because [it would have] a form consisting of diverse multiple entities - meaning one whose inherent nature consists of multiple diverse entities and multiple objects - [that is] its essential nature;
ekaṃ ca paramabrahmeṣyate /	and yet the supreme brahman is claimed to be one.
ato 'bhyupetabādhāpratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ //	Therefore [your] assertion contradicts [your] own accepted premise.
nityaśabdamayatve ca bhāvānām api nityatā /	And if things consisted of eternal sound, the entities would also be eternal;
tadyaugapadyataḥ siddheḥ pariṇāmo na saṅgataḥ //	[and] due to [their] being established simultaneously with that [sound], modification is not possible.
nityaśabdamayatve nityaśabdasvabhāvatve; jagataḥ śabdaḥ svarūpaṃ cedbhāvānām api nityatvaṃ prāpnoti /	If [things] consisted of eternal sound - that is, if [they] had the nature of eternal sound, if sound constitutes the very essence of the world - then the entities too would necessarily be eternal;
tataś ca sarvakālaṃ bhāvānāṃ śabdena saha yaugapadyataḥ siddhe siddhatvāt pariṇāmātmā na prāpnoti taditi tasmād ityarthe teṣāṃ vā nīlādīnāṃ yaugapadyaṃ tadyaugapadyam iti vigrahaḥ //	And consequently, since the entities would be established simultaneously with sound at all times, due to [their] being [already] established, they cannot have the nature of modifications - here 'tat' means 'therefore' - or the simultaneity refers to the simultaneity of those [entities] like blue etc.

prayogaḥ ye niyatapadārthasannidhāne sati niyatajanmānas te sahetukaḥ /

[Here is] the formal argument: Those things whose production is restricted to occasions when certain specific things are present must be regarded as having causes

yathā bhavatsādhanasannidhānabhāvisādhyarthaviṣayaṃ jñānam tathā ca rājīvādayo bhāvā iti svabhāvahetuḥ //

Just as [in the case of] your cognition of the probandum which appears only when the probans is present, so also [in the case of] things like lotus filaments - this is a reason based on essential nature

iti svābhāvikavādaparīkṣā //

Thus ends the examination of the doctrine of [things existing by their] own nature

nāśotpādetyādi śabdabrāhmavādino bruvate

The proponents of the Word-Brahman doctrine speak thus beginning with "destruction and origination"

nāśotpādāsamālīḍhaṃ brahma śabdamayaṃ param /

The supreme Brahman consisting of sound is untouched by destruction and origination

yat tasya pariṇāmo 'yaṃ bhāvagrāmaḥ pratīyate //

This multitude of entities is recognized as its transformation

anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatatvaṃ yadakṣaram /

That which is Brahman, without beginning or end, whose essence is sound, [and which is] imperishable

vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ

From which the world-process evolves in the form of things

tatra ādiḥ utpādaḥ; nidhanam nāśaḥ; tadabhāvād anādinidhanam

Here, "ādi" means origination; "nidhana" means destruction; due to the absence of these [two], [it is] without beginning and end

akṣaram iti

[It is] in the form of the letter-sounds

akārādyakṣarasya nimittatvāt

Because the letters beginning with "a" are the instrumental cause

etenābhidhānarūpeṇa vivarto darśitaḥ / arthabhāvenetyādinā punar abhidheyavivartaḥ

By this, the evolution in the form of words is shown; again, by [the phrase] "in the form of things," the evolution of the denoted objects [is shown]

prakriyeti bhedāḥ

The term "prakriyā" [refers to] the differentiations

brahmeti nāmasaṃkīrtanam

The term "brahman" is a declaration of the name

asyaiva ślokasyārthaṃ nirdiśati nāśotpādāsamālīḍham iti

[The text] indicates the meaning of this very verse [by the phrase] "untouched by destruction and origination"

nāśotpādagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam

The mention of "destruction" and "origination" is illustrative

idamapyatra boddhavyam pūrvāparadeśavibhāgarahitam iti

This also should be understood here: [it is] free from distinctions of prior and posterior space

tathā hi anādinidhanatvaṃ pūrvāparadeśavibhāgarahitatvam api tatra nirdiṣṭam

Thus indeed, being without beginning and end also indicates being free from distinctions of prior and posterior space therein

śabdamayam iti

"[It is] of the essence of Word-Sound"

śabdasvabhāvāt ata eva śabdas tattvam asya śabdatattvaṃ taducyate

"Because of [its] word-nature, therefore Word is its essence, [and] hence it is called 'word-essence'"

śabdo 'syāviparītaṃ rūpam ity arthaḥ

"The meaning is that Word is its inseparable form"

param iti praṇavātmakam

"[The term] 'highest' [means it is] in the form of the praṇava [oṃ]"

praṇavo hi kila sarveṣāṃ śabdānāṃ sarveṣāṃ cārthānāṃ prakṛtiḥ sa ca vedaḥ

"For the praṇava is indeed the source of all words and all meanings, and that is the Veda"

ayaṃ tu varṇapadakrameṇāvasthito vedas tadadhigamopāyas tasya praticchabdakanyāyenāvasthitaḥ

"This Veda, however, existing in the sequence of letters and words, is the means of understanding that [praṇava], being established according to the principle of replication"

taṃ tu paramaṃ brahmaṇamabhyudayaniḥśreyasaphaladharmānugṛhītāntaḥkaraṇaṃ paśyantīti

"They perceive that highest Brahman [when their] inner faculties are blessed by dharma that brings the fruit of prosperity and supreme good"

atra ca pramaṇayanti

"And in this regard they cite authority"

ye yadākārānusyūtās te tan mayā yathā ghaṭaśarāvodañcanādayo mṛdvikārāḥ mṛdākārānugatāḥ padārthā mṛṇamayatvena prasiddhāḥ

"Just as those things which are pervaded by a particular form are 'made of that', like pots, bowls, and water vessels, being modifications of clay [and] following the form of clay, are well-known as being 'made of clay'"

śabdākārānusyūtāś ca sarvabhāvā iti svabhāvahetuḥ yataḥ pratyakṣata eva sarvārthānāṃ śabdākārānugamaḥ siddhaḥ

"And all entities are pervaded by word-form - this is the reason for [their] nature, since the following of word-form by all things is established through direct perception"

tathā hi śabda eva pratyayo 'rtheṣūpajāyamānaḥ śabdollekhānugata evopajāyate /

Thus indeed, when cognition [of objects] arises through words alone, it arises only accompanied by the traces of words.

yathoktam

As has been said

na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte /

There exists no cognition in the world that is devoid of association with words.

anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena vartate //

All knowledge exists as if penetrated by words.

jñānākāranibandhanā ca vastūnāṃ svabhāvaprajñaptiḥ /

And the understanding of the nature of things depends on the form of [their] cognition.

ataḥ siddhameṣāṃ śabdākārānusyūtatvaṃ tatsiddhau ca tanmayatvam api siddhameva tanmātrabhāvitvāt tanmayatvasyeti //

Therefore it is established that these [things] are interwoven with word-forms, and when this is established, their being made of that [i.e., words] is also established, since being made of that means nothing more than having that [word-form] as their essence.

iti sañcakṣate ye 'pi te vācyāḥ kimidaṃ nijam / śabdarūpaṃ parityajya nīlāditvaṃ prapadyate // na vā tatheti yadyādyaḥ pakṣaḥ saṃśrīyate tadā / akṣaratvaviyogaḥ syāt paurastyātmavināśataḥ //

Those who maintain this [view] should be asked: "Does this inherent sound-form abandon [itself] and become blue-ness etc. or not?" If the first position is accepted, then [the sound] would lose its immutability due to the destruction of its prior nature.

athāpyanantaraḥ pakṣas tatra nīlādivedane / aśruter api vispaṣṭaṃ bhavecchabdātmavedanam //

If the second position is accepted, then even deaf people should have a clear perception of the sound-essence when cognizing blue and other [things].

atra kadācicchabdapariṇāmarūpatvād vā jagataḥ śabdamayatvaṃ sādhyatveneṣṭam kadācicchabdādutpatter vā / yathānnamayāḥ prāṇā iti hetau mayaḍvidhānāt /

Here, is the world's being śabdamaya ["made of sound"] intended to be proved either as [the world] sometimes taking the form of sound-modifications, or as [the world] sometimes being produced from sound - just as in [the expression] "prāṇāḥ are annamayāḥ," where the suffix mayaṭ indicates causation?

atra na tāvadādyaḥ pakṣaḥ pariṇāmasyaivānupapatteḥ /

Here, the first position is not [acceptable] because modification itself is impossible.

tathā hi śabdātmakaṃ brahma nīlādirūpatāṃ pratipadyamānaṃ kadācinnijaṃ svābhāvikaṃ śabdarūpaṃ parityajya pratipadyetāparityajya vā

When Brahman, [which is] of the nature of Sound, takes on the form of blue and other [colors], does [it] either abandon or not abandon its own natural Sound-form?

athāparityajyetyanantaraḥ pakṣaḥ tadā nīlādisaṃvedanakāle 'pyaśruter badhirasya śabdaḥ saṃvedanaṃ prāpnoti

If the latter alternative [is accepted], that [it] does not abandon [its form], then even a deaf person would have to perceive sound at the time of perceiving blue and other [colors]

nīlādisaṃvedanavat tadavyatirekāt

Because [sound perception] would be non-different from the perception of blue and other [colors]

prayogaḥ yadyadavyatiriktaṃ tat tasmin saṃvedyamāne saṃvedyate yathā nīlādisaṃvedanāvasthāyāṃ tasyaiva nīlāder ātmā nīlādavyatiriktaś ca śabda iti svabhāvahetuḥ

The formal argument [is]: Whatever is non-different [from something], when that [something] is perceived, [it] too is perceived—just as when blue and other [colors] are being perceived, the essence of that very blue [is perceived]; and sound is non-different from blue—this is a reason based on essential nature

anyathā bhinnayogakṣematvāt tatsvabhāvatvam eva prasidhyedityetad atra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam

Otherwise, since [their] conditions of subsistence would be different, [their] having the same essential nature would not be established—this is the counter-argument here

etad eva vistareṇa pratipādayann āha yenetyādi

[The author], explaining this very [point] in detail, states [the verse] beginning with "yena"

yena śabdamayaṃ sarvaṃ mukhyavṛttyā vyavasthitam

Because according to [you], everything exists primarily as consisting of sound

śabdarūpāparityāgaṃ pariṇāmānidhānataḥ

[And] due to [your claim of] non-abandonment of the sound-form, [there can be] no transformation

yena yasmāt bhavaddhirmukhyatā eva śabdasvabhāvaṃ jagaditi varṇyate

Here "yena" means "because," since you describe the world as being primarily of the nature of sound

kasmādityāha śabdarūpāparityāga iti

[The author] states "śabdarūpāparityāga" [to explain] why [this is so]

yadi nāma mukhyataḥ śabdamayamavasthitaṃ tataḥ kimityāha agauṇe cetyādi

[If one asks] "What if [the world] remains primarily of the essence of sound?" [the author] responds with [the verse beginning with] "agauṇe ca"

agauṇe caivam ekatve nīlādīnāṃ vyavasthite / tatsaṃvedanavelāyāṃ kathaṃ nāstyasya vedanam

When the identity of blue and other [things] with [sound] is established as non-figurative, why is there no cognition of it [sound] at the time of their cognition?

ekatve nīlādīnām iti

[This refers to] the identity of blue and other [things]

śabdena saheti śeṣaḥ

[The complete phrase is] "with sound" [which is to be supplied]

tatsaṃvedanavelāyām iti / teṣāṃ nīlādīnāṃ saṃvedanāvasthāyām

"At the time of their cognition" means at the time when blue and other [things] are being cognized

kathaṃ nāstyasya vedanam iti / tasyāpi nīlādisvabhāvavad upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvādyuktam eva saṃvedanam ityabhiprāyaḥ

"Why is there no cognition of it?" means that since it [sound] also fulfills the conditions of perceptibility like blue and other [things], its cognition should certainly occur

asyāvittau hi nīlāder api na syāt pravedanam

If there were no cognition of it [sound], then there could not be cognition of blue and other [things] either

aikātmyādbhinnadharmatve bhedo 'tyantaṃ prasajyate

If they had different properties despite [their] unity of essence, absolute difference would follow

athāsya vedanaṃ neṣyate tadā nīlāder api śabdasvarūpavadasaṃvedanaprasaṅgaḥ

If the cognition of it [sound] is not accepted, then there would follow the unwanted consequence of non-cognition of blue and other [things] as well, just as [there is non-cognition] of the nature of sound

aikātmyāt śabdena saha nīlādīnām ekasvabhāvatvādity arthaḥ

Because of [their] unity of essence - meaning that blue and other [things] have the same nature as sound

anyathā nīlādīnāṃ śabdena saha bhinnadharmatve 'bhyupagamyamāne 'tyantabhedo 'ṅgīkartavyaḥ

Otherwise, if blue and other [things] are accepted as having different properties from sound, absolute difference would have to be accepted

kasmād ity āha

Why? He explains [thus]:

viruddhadharmasaṅgo hi bahūnāṃ bhedalakṣaṇam /

Indeed, the presence of mutually incompatible properties is the mark of difference among many [things];

nānyathā vyaktibhedānāṃ kalpito 'pi bhavedasau //

otherwise, even an assumed difference among distinct individuals could not exist.

na hyekasyaikadaikapratipattrapekṣayā grahaṇam agrahaṇaṃ ca yuktam /

For it is not possible for one [and the same] thing to be both perceived and not perceived simultaneously with reference to one perceiver;

ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt /

because [if it were], its unity would be destroyed.

anyathā hi yadi viruddhadharmādhyāse 'pyekatvaṃ syāt tadā ghaṭādīnāṃ yaḥ kalpita iṣṭo vyaktibhedaḥ so 'pi na bhavet /

For if otherwise unity were possible even when incompatible properties are superimposed, then even that accepted assumed difference among distinct things like jars would not exist.

na kevalaṃ brahmaṇaḥ svarūpabhedo nāstītyapiśabdaḥ /

The word 'api' [even] indicates that it is not only in Brahman's own nature that there is no difference;

yatas tasya svātmani vyavasthitasya nāsti bhedo vikāraviṣayatvādasyeti siddhāntaḥ /

because it is an established conclusion that for Brahman, which abides in its own self, there is no difference, as difference belongs [only] to the realm of modification.

tathā hi na ghaṭādyātmanā tasyānādinidhanatvam iṣyate /

Thus indeed, Its [Brahman's] beginninglessness and endlessness is not accepted in the form of jars and such things;

paramātmanā ghaṭādayo hi dṛśyamānodayavyayāḥ paricchinnadeśāścopalabhyantaiti /

for jars and such things, unlike the Supreme Self, are perceived as having visible origin and destruction and as being limited in space.

ayaṃ cāśruteḥ spaṣṭaṃ śabdasaṃvedanaṃ syād iti yaḥ prasaṅga uktaḥ sa yadi brahmaṇo rūpamupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptamiṣyate tadā draṣṭavyaḥ /

[That] objection which was raised [above] that a deaf person would clearly perceive śabda – this should be considered [valid] only if the form of brahman is accepted as fulfilling the conditions of perceptibility.

kiṃ tu nīlādīnām api tādrūpyāt tatsvarūpavadagrahaṇaprasaṅga ityayaṃ doṣo vācyaḥ /

But [in that case] this objection should be raised: due to [their] having the same nature [as śabda], blue and other [qualities] would also not be grasped, like its [śabda's] own nature.

tataścāyaṃ niyamo nopapadyate / udayavyayavatīmevārthamātrāmaparadarśanāḥ pratiyantīti /

And consequently, this rule would not be established: "Ordinary people perceive only those objects which are subject to origination and destruction."

syād etadyathā bhavatāṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ nīlādyavyatiriktaṃ nīlādisaṃvedane 'pina saṃvedyate tadvacchabdarūpam iti /

[One] might argue thus: "Just as according to you [Buddhists], momentariness, though not different from blue etc., is not perceived when blue etc. are perceived, similarly [it could be] with the form of śabda."

tadetad asamyak /

This [argument] is not correct.

na hi nīlādisaṃvedane kṣaṇikatvaṃ na saṃvedyate /

For it is not [true] that momentariness is not perceived when blue etc. are perceived.

kiṃ tu gṛhītam api nirvikalpena cetasā bhrāntinimittena guṇāntarasamāropānna viniścīyata ity ucyate /

Rather, it is said that although [momentariness] is grasped by non-conceptual consciousness, it is not determined due to the superimposition of other qualities through illusion.

tenānubhavāpekṣayā tadgṛhītam eva niścayajñānāpekṣayā tvagṛhītam iti jñānabhedenaikasya gṛhītatvaṃ agṛhītatvaṃ cāviruddham eva /

Therefore, with respect to experience it is indeed grasped, but with respect to determinate cognition it is not grasped – thus due to the difference in [types of] cognition, being grasped and not being grasped of one [thing] is not at all contradictory.

na caivaṃ bhavatāṃ pakṣe śabdasya grahaṇāgrahaṇe yuktaṃ /

And such grasping and non-grasping of śabda is not possible in your position.

sarvajñānānāṃ savikalpakatābhyupagamāt / ekenaivajñānena sarvātmanā tasya niścitatvāt /

Because [you] accept that all cognitions are determinate, and because it [śabda] would be completely determined by a single cognition.

agṛhītasvabhāvāntarānupapatteḥ /

[In that case] there would be no other aspect [of the object] that would remain unapprehended.

yathoktam niścayaḥ / yan na niścīyate rūpaṃ tat teṣāṃ viṣayaḥ katham iti /

As has been stated [regarding] determination: "How can that form which is not determined be their object?"

atha kiñcidavikalpam api jñānamabhyupagamyate / na tarhi vaktavyam na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte /

If some non-conceptual cognition is admitted [by you], then [you] should not assert that "there exists no cognition in the world which is independent of words."

kiñca kṣaṇikatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ pramāṇāntarataḥ siddheranubhūtam api na niścīyata iti vyapadiśyate /

Moreover, the momentariness of entities, though established through other means of valid cognition and [actually] experienced, is [still] said to be not determined.

śabdātmatā tu bhāvānāṃ kutaḥ siddhā yena sāpyevaṃ vyavasthāpyate //

But how is the sound-essence of entities established, such that it too could be posited in this way?

pratibhāvaṃ ca yadyekaḥ śabdātmā bhinna iṣyate / sarveṣām ekadeśatvamekākārā ca vidhavet //

And if the one sound-essence is accepted as different for each entity, then all [things] would [have to] occupy the same space and would possess one single form.

sa hi śabdātmā pariṇāmaṃ gacchan pratipadārthaṃ bhedaṃ vā pratipadyate na vā /

For does that sound-essence, when undergoing modification, become different for each object or not?

tatra yadi na bhinna iti pakṣas tadā sarveṣāṃ nīlādīnām ekadeśatvaṃ prāpnoti /

If the position is that it does not become different, then all things like blue etc. would [have to] occupy the same space.

ekadeśatvamityupalakṣaṇam /

This "occupying the same space" is [mentioned merely] as an indication [of other absurdities].

kālapariṇāmavyāpārāvasthāviśeṣādyapi grāhyam /

Time, modifications, functions, specific conditions, etc. should also be understood [as being included].

ekākārā ca vit pratibhāsaḥ bhavet prāpnoti /

And the cognition [and its] appearance would necessarily be of one form.

sarveṣāṃ nīlādīnām ekaśabdarūpāvyatirekāt //

Because all things like blue etc. would be non-different from the single form of sound.

prativyakti tu bhede 'sya brahmānekaṃ prasajyate / vibhinnānekabhāvātmarūpatvād vyaktibhedavat //

If [brahman] differs with each individual [thing], then brahman becomes many, because [it would have] a form consisting of diverse multiple entities, just as [in the case of] the diversity of individuals.

atha prativyakti bhedo 'sya śabdātmano 'ṅgīkriyate /

If the differentiation of this Sound-essence with each individual is accepted [by you],

vibhinnānekabhāvātmarūpatvāt vibhinno 'nekabhāvātmānekapadārthasvabhāvo rūpaṃ svabhāvo yasyeti vigrahaḥ tadbhāvastatvam /

because [it would have] a form consisting of diverse multiple entities - meaning one whose inherent nature consists of multiple diverse entities and multiple objects - [that is] its essential nature;

ekaṃ ca paramabrahmeṣyate /

and yet the supreme brahman is claimed to be one.

ato 'bhyupetabādhāpratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ //

Therefore [your] assertion contradicts [your] own accepted premise.

nityaśabdamayatve ca bhāvānām api nityatā /

And if things consisted of eternal sound, the entities would also be eternal;

tadyaugapadyataḥ siddheḥ pariṇāmo na saṅgataḥ //

[and] due to [their] being established simultaneously with that [sound], modification is not possible.

nityaśabdamayatve nityaśabdasvabhāvatve; jagataḥ śabdaḥ svarūpaṃ cedbhāvānām api nityatvaṃ prāpnoti /

If [things] consisted of eternal sound - that is, if [they] had the nature of eternal sound, if sound constitutes the very essence of the world - then the entities too would necessarily be eternal;

tataś ca sarvakālaṃ bhāvānāṃ śabdena saha yaugapadyataḥ siddhe siddhatvāt pariṇāmātmā na prāpnoti taditi tasmād ityarthe teṣāṃ vā nīlādīnāṃ yaugapadyaṃ tadyaugapadyam iti vigrahaḥ //

And consequently, since the entities would be established simultaneously with sound at all times, due to [their] being [already] established, they cannot have the nature of modifications - here 'tat' means 'therefore' - or the simultaneity refers to the simultaneity of those [entities] like blue etc.