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tathābhūtasya cārthakriyākāriṇaḥ svabhāvasyāvasthitināmakaraṇe na nāstivivādaḥ
And if such a nature that is capable of producing effects is termed a "condition," we have no dispute about that.
asmākaṃ tu vitathābhiniveśavāsanaivāvidyā sā ca vāsanā śaktir ucyate
But for us [Buddhists], avidyā is simply the disposition towards false attachment, and that disposition is called a faculty.
śaktiś ca kāraṇātmakajñānātmabhūtaiva iti
And this śakti is only of the essence of cognition [which is] in the form of a cause.
tena pūrvapūrvataḥ kāraṇabhūtādavidyātmano jñānād uttarottarakāryajñānasya vitathākārābhiniveśina utpatter avidyāvaśāt tathākhyātir yuktā
Due to [the influence of] avidyā, each preceding cognition, which is of the nature of ignorance and serves as a cause, gives rise to a succeeding effect-cognition which has within itself the traces of wrongful attachment; thus false cognition is logically established.
tasyāścāvidyāyā yogābhyāsādasamarthataratamakṣaṇotpādakrameṇa vyapagamāt pariśuddhajñānasantānodayādapavargaprāptir ityato bandhamokṣavyavasthā yuktimatī
Through yogic practice, this avidyā is removed by the process of generating moments of its gradually increasing inefficiency, [and] from the arising of a series of pure cognitions liberation is attained; thus the system of bondage and liberation is logically established.
natvevaṃ bhavatāṃ sambhavati nityaikarūpatvād brahmaṇo 'vasthādvayāsambhavāt
This is not possible according to your [view], since brahman, being eternal and of one form, cannot have two states.
ekatvāc ca tasya brahmaṇa ekasya muktau sarveṣāṃ muktiprasaṅgaḥ ekasyāmuktausarveṣām uktiprasaṅgaścānivāryaḥ
And because that brahman is one, the liberation of one [person] would inevitably result in the liberation of all, and the non-liberation of one would inevitably result in the non-liberation of all.
na cāpyayogitvāvasthāyām ātmajyotīrūpatve 'sya kiñcit pramāṇam asti
Nor is there any proof for its being of the nature of the light of the self during the non-yogic state.
prasādhakaṃ jñānaṃ hi prakāśātmatayā svasaṃvedanaprasiddham
For proving cognition is well-known through self-awareness as being of the nature of light.
na tvevaṃ śabdātmā sarvatra pratyayātmani saṃvedyata iti nirdiṣṭam etat
But the sound-self is not cognized thus in all cognitions, as has been pointed out [before].
athāyogyavasthāyām ātmajyotiṣṭvam asya nāṅgīkriyate evam api prāgavidyamānaṃ tadātmajyotiṣṭvamatyaktapūrvarūpasya brahmaṇaḥ paścādyogyavasthāyāṃ kutaḥ sambhūtam iti vācyam
If it is not accepted that it has the nature of the light of the self during the non-yogic state, then it must be explained how this nature of being the light of the self, which did not exist before, could arise later during the yogic state in brahman [which has] not abandoned its previous form.
tasmān mithyāpravādo 'yaṃ śabdabrahmavādo bhavatām ityalaṃ bahunā
Therefore this doctrine of śabda-brahman of yours is false speculation - enough of [saying] more.
pradhānapariṇāmena samaṃ ca brahmadarśanam
And this view of brahman is similar to [the view of] the evolution of pradhāna.
taddūṣaṇānusāreṇa boddhavyam iha dūṣaṇam
The refutation here should be understood according to the refutation of that [view].
iti śabdhabrahmaparīksā //
[This is the] end of the examination of [the doctrine of] śabdabrahman.
tatraiva dūṣaṇaṃ vācyam
The refutation of that [doctrine] should be stated [as follows].
na śabdajanyaṃ tatkāryaṃ sattāto hetuvittivat /
The effect [i.e., the world] cannot be produced from sound, because it exists, just like the cognition of a cause.
ato nābhimato hetur asādhyatvātparātmavat // ityādi //
Therefore, what is intended [to be] the cause cannot be the cause, because it cannot be established [as such], like another self, and so forth.
iti śabdabrahmaparīkṣā //
[This is the] end of the examination of [the doctrine of] śabdabrahman.
anye tvīśasadharmāṇaṃ puruṣaṃ lokakāraṇam / kalpayanti durākhyātasiddhāntānugabuddhayaḥ //
Others, however, whose minds follow an ill-expounded doctrine, postulate [that] puruṣa, who has qualities similar to [those of] the Lord, [is] the cause of the world.
samastavastupralaye 'pyaluptajñānaśaktimān /
[This puruṣa] possesses knowledge and power that remain undiminished even during the dissolution of all things.
ūrṇānābha ivāṃśūnāṃ sa hetuḥ kila janminām //
He is, they say, the cause of [all] born beings, just as the spider [is the cause] of [its] threads.
ta evamāhuḥ puruṣa ekaikaḥ sakalalokasthitisargapralayahetuḥ prayalepyaluptajñānātiśayaśaktir iti /
They speak thus: "The single puruṣa alone is the cause of the creation, sustenance, and dissolution of the entire world, [and] possesses supreme knowledge and power that remain undiminished even during dissolution."
ūrṇanābha ivāṃśūnāṃ candrakānta ivāmbhasām / prarohāṇām iva plakṣaḥ sa hetuḥ sarvajanminām //
Just as the spider [is the cause] of [its] threads, the moon-stone of water, and the banyan tree of [its] shoots, so is he the cause of all born beings.
tathā "puruṣa evaitat sarvaṃ yadbhūtaṃ yac ca bhāvyam" iti
And thus [it is said]: "The puruṣa alone is all this – both what has been and what is to be."
īśadharmāṇām īśvaratulyadharmāṇām dvayor api viśvasargasthitipralayanimittatvāt
[This is] because both [God and Spirit] possess divine qualities equal to God's qualities, being the efficient cause of the universe's creation, maintenance and dissolution.
etāvāṃstu viśeṣaḥ īśvaravyatiriktamanyadapyātmādikaṃ samavāyyādikāraṇamīśvarakāraṇakair iṣyate / puruṣavādibhis tu puruṣa eva kāraṇam viśvasargasthitipralayanimittabhāvas tu dvayor api samānaḥ
The only difference is that the proponents of God's causality accept other things besides God, such as the soul, as inherent and other types of causes, while the proponents of Spirit maintain Spirit alone as the cause; however, the nature of being the efficient cause of creation, maintenance and dissolution is common to both.
dūrākhyātasiddhāntānugabuddhaya iti / durākhyātasiddhāntānugā buddhir yeṣām iti vigrahaḥ
[They are those] whose minds follow an ill-expounded doctrine – this compound means "those whose minds follow a poorly explained doctrine."
ūrṇanābho markaṭakaḥ
Ūrṇanābha [means] spider.
asyāpītyādinā dūṣaṇam ārabhate īśvaravad iti
With [the words] "of this also" etc., [the author] begins the refutation [by comparing it] to [the case of] God.
asyāpīśvaravatsarvaṃ vacanīyaṃ niṣedhanam
All refutation must be stated for this [Spirit] also, just as [it was] for God.
kimarthaṃ ca karotyeva vyāpāramimamīdṛśam
And for what purpose does [the Spirit] perform this kind of activity?
ṣaṣṭhyantād vatiḥ
The suffix vati [comes] after [a word] ending in the sixth case.
atrāpyevaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vācyam
Here also the refutation should be stated thus.
puruṣo janmināṃ hetur notpattivikalatvataḥ / gaganāmbhojavatsargamanyathā yugapad bhavet //
[The] puruṣa cannot be the cause of [all] born things, because [he is] devoid of birth, like a sky-lotus; otherwise creation would occur simultaneously.
ityādi
and so forth
yadi ceśvarasiddhaye yathā paraiḥ sādhanānyuktāni / tathaiva puruṣasiddhaye puruṣavadbhir upādīyante / tadā tadvadevāsiddhatādidoṣo vācyaḥ /
If the same arguments that are put forward by others to prove [the existence of] Īśvara are employed by the proponents of puruṣa to prove [the existence of] puruṣa, then the same fallacies of being unproven and so forth must be stated [against them].
anyad api dūṣaṇaprakāram āha kimarthaṃ cetyādi /
[He] states another kind of refutation beginning with "for what purpose" and so forth.
prekṣāpūrvakāripravṛtteḥ prayojanavattayā vyāptatvādayaḥ kimartham ayaṃ puruṣo jagadracanāvyāpāramīdṛśaṃ karotīti vaktavyam //
Since the activity of purposeful agents is invariably connected with [having] a purpose, it must be explained for what purpose this puruṣa performs such an activity as the creation of the world.
yadyanyena prayuktatvān na syād asya svatantratā /
If [he acts] because of being impelled by another, then his independence would not exist.
athānukampayā kuryād ekāntasukhitaṃ jagat //
If [he] were to act out of compassion, [he] would make the world completely happy.
ādhidāridryaśokādivividhāyāsapīḍitam / janaṃ tu sṛjatas tasya kānukampā pratīyate //
When he creates people afflicted by various troubles such as anxiety, poverty, sorrow and so forth, what compassion of his can be perceived?
yadyanyeneśvarādinā prayukto 'nicchannapi karoti tadāsya yatsvātantryam abhyupagataṃ taddhīyeta /
If impelled by another such as Īśvara [he] acts even though unwilling, then whatever independence was attributed to him would be lost.
atha kṛpayā parānugrahārthaṃ karoti tadā nārakādiduḥkhitamatvanirmāṇaṃ nakuryād ekāntasukhitam eva kuryāt //
If [he] acts out of compassion for the sake of helping others, then [he] would not create the state of suffering in hells and so forth, [but] would make [everything] completely happy.
sṛṣṭeḥ prāganukampānām asattve nopapadyate / anukampāpi yadyotāddhātāyaṃ parikalpyate //
Since prior to creation there could be no objects of compassion, even that compassion through which this ordainer is postulated cannot exist.
yasyā anukampāyā vaśādayaṃ dhātā sraṣṭā kalpyeta //
[It is] through the force of which compassion that this ordainer [and] creator is postulated.
na cāyaṃ pralayaṃ kuryāt sadābhyudayayoginām /
And he should not bring about the dissolution of those who are always destined for prosperity.
tadadṛṣṭavyapekṣāyāṃ svātantryamavahīyate //
If [there is] dependence on that unseen [force], [his] independence diminishes.
yadi cāyam anukampayā kurute tadā yadeva manuṣyāḥ sadābhyudayayoginas teṣāṃ kimiti pralayaṃ karoti /
If he creates through compassion, then why does he bring about the dissolution of those very humans who are always destined for prosperity?
ye duḥkhitasantataya āpāyikāḥ sattvās teṣām eva kāmaṃ karotu pralayam iti bhāvaḥ /
The meaning is that he should rather bring about the dissolution of only those beings who are continuously miserable [and] destined for evil states.
athāpi syāt teṣām anukampyānāṃ yadadṛṣṭaṃ dharmādharmalakṣaṇaṃ tadapekṣya sukhaduḥkhasamanvitaṃ lokaṃ karoti /
Even if it might be [argued] that he creates a world endowed with pleasure and pain in dependence upon the unseen [force] characterized by merit and demerit of those objects of compassion.
evaṃ hi svātantryamabhyupagataṃ hīyate /
For thus the accepted independence would be diminished.
na cāpi samarthyasya kācidapekṣā /
And one who has capability has no dependence whatsoever.
asāmarthye vāpekṣyādeva lokasyotpattes tatkāraṇatvam asya hīyate //
Or if [there is] incapability, then since the world would arise from that very thing which is depended upon, his being the cause would be diminished.
pīḍāhetumadṛṣṭaṃ ca kimarthaṃ sa vyapekṣate /
And why should he depend upon that unseen [force] which is the cause of suffering?
upekṣaiva punas tatra dayāyoge 'sya yujyate //
Rather, since he is connected with mercy, indifference towards that [unseen force] would be appropriate for him.
bhavatu nāma tasyādṛṣṭāpekṣā /
Let it be granted that he [i.e., Īśvara] is dependent upon the adṛṣṭa ["unseen force"].
tathāpi yadadṛṣṭaṃ dharamādharmātmakaṃ pīḍāhetus tadapekṣā kṛpālor naḥ yuktā kintvavadhīraṇam eva tatra tasya kṛpāparatantratayā yuktaṃ kartum /
Nevertheless, it is not proper for [one who is] merciful to be dependent upon such adṛṣṭa, which consists of merit and demerit [and] is the cause of suffering; rather, being subject to compassion, it would be proper for him to completely disregard it.
na hi kṛpālavaḥ paraduḥkhahetumevānvicchanti teṣāṃ paraduḥkhaviyogecchayaiva pravṛtteḥ //
For compassionate ones do not seek causes of others' suffering, since their activity [proceeds] solely from the desire to remove others' suffering.
krīḍārthā tasya vṛttiścet krīḍāyāṃ na prabhur bhavet / vicitrakrīḍanopāyavyapekṣātaḥ śiśur yathā //
If his activity is for the purpose of play, he would not be master of [that] play, due to dependence on various means of play, just like a child.
atha nānukampayā karoti / kiṃ tarhikrīḍārtham / etad apyasamyak /
Now if [it is said that] "He acts not out of compassion but for the purpose of play" - this too is incorrect.
evaṃ krīḍotpāde svātantryam asya na syāt sargasthitipralayātmakasya vicitrakrīḍanopāyasyāpekṣaṇāt //
Thus he would lack independence in producing play, due to dependence on various means of play consisting of creation, maintenance and dissolution.
tat sarvaṃ yugapat kuryād yadi tatkṛtiśaktimān //
If he had the power to create these [means], he would create all of them simultaneously.
krameṇāpi na śaktaḥ syān no cedādau sa śaktimān /
And if he did not possess power at the beginning, he would not be able [to create them] sequentially either.
nāvibhaktasya yujyete śaktyaśaktī hi vastunaḥ //
For power and powerlessness are not compatible in an indivisible entity.
kiṃ ca ye te vicitrāḥ krīḍanopāyāḥ tatkāraṇe yadi śaktirasyāsti tadā yugapadeva kuryāt /
Moreover, if he has the power to create those various means of play, then he should create [them] all simultaneously.
athādau tasya na śaktis tadā krameṇāpi na kuryāt
If [God] does not have that power in the beginning, then [he] could not create [things] subsequently, one by one either
aśaktāvasthāyā aviśiṣṭatvāt
Because the state of powerlessness remains unchanged
na hyekasyaikatra vastuni śaktatvamaśaktatvaṃ ca paramparaviruddhaṃ dharmadvayaṃyuktam
It is not possible for one and the same entity to have both power and powerlessness regarding one and the same object, [as] these two properties are mutually contradictory
kimarthaṃ ca vyāpāramīdṛśamārabhata ityādi sarvo vikalpa īśvare 'pi sādhāraṇaḥ
All the arguments previously raised against [the doctrine of] God, such as "why does [he] undertake such activity," apply equally [here]
tena yadāha praśastamatiḥ parānugrahārtham īśvaraḥ pravartate
Thus [is refuted] what Praśastamati says: "God acts for the purpose of helping others"
yathā kṛtārthaḥ kaścinmunirātmahitāhitaprāptiparihārārthāsambhave 'pi parahitārthamupadeśaṃ karoti / tatheśvaropyātmīyāmaiśvaryavibhūtiṃ vikhyāpya prāṇino 'grahīṣyan pravartata iti
Just as some accomplished sage, although [he] has no need to obtain what is beneficial or avoid what is harmful for himself, gives instruction for others' benefit, similarly God too, having made known the majesty of his own sovereignty, proceeds to act desiring to help living beings
atha vā śaktisvābhāvyāt yathā kālasya vasantādīnāṃ paryāyeṇābhivyaktau sthāvarajaṅgamavikārotpattiḥ svabhāvataḥ / tatheśvarasyāpyavirbhāvānugrahasaṃhāraśaktīnāṃ paryāyeṇābhivyaktau prāṇinām utpattisthitipralayahetukatvam iti
Or, just as due to Time's natural power, when spring and other [seasons] manifest in succession, mobile and immobile beings arise by their own nature, similarly for God too, when [his] powers of manifestation, maintenance and dissolution manifest in succession, [he] becomes the cause of beings' origination, continuation and dissolution
tadapyanenaiva prativihitam
This [argument] too is refuted by this very [reasoning previously given]
tathā hi parānugrahārthaṃ pravartata ityatredam eva pratividhānam / anugrahaḥ paraḥ kuryād ekāntasukhitaṃ jagadityādi
For instance, regarding the statement "[God] acts for others' benefit," this is the counter-argument: if [it were] supreme beneficence, [he] would make the world completely happy, etc.
śaktisvābhāvyād ity atrāpīdam eva dūṣaṇam
And regarding the statement "it is due to the nature of [his] powers," this is the refutation
sargasthityupasaṃhārānyugapad vyaktaśaktikaḥ
[If he were] one whose powers are [fully] manifest, [he would bring about] creation, maintenance and dissolution simultaneously
na vyaktarīśo 'yaṃ krameṇāpy upapadyata /
If [God's] powers are not manifested, creation and [its successive phases] cannot occur even in sequence.
vyaktaśaktirato 'nyāścodbhāvo hyekaḥ kathaṃ bhavet //
And if [a being] with manifested powers were different [from him], how could there be a single spiritual entity?
kālasyāpoi vasantādyabhivyaktau paryāyeṇa pravṛttāvayam eva doṣaḥ /
This same defect applies to [the theory of] Time operating in sequence for the manifestation of spring and other [seasons].
śītoṣṇānvayabhedabhājas tu bhāvā eva hi pratikṣaṇavināśinaḥ kāla ityetat paścāt pratipādayiṣyate //
[The fact that] Time is nothing but things themselves, which are subject to sequential variations of heat and cold [and are] momentarily perishing, will be explained later.
atha svabhāvato vṛttirityādinodyotakaramatamāśaṅkate /
Next, [the author] considers Uddyotakara's view beginning with "functioning occurs by [his] nature."
atha svabhāvato vṛttiḥ sargādāvasya varṇyate /
If it is stated that his functioning at the beginning of creation [occurs] by [his] nature,
pāvakādeḥ prakṛtyaiva yathā dāhādikarmaṇi //
just as fire and such [elements function] by their very nature in burning and other actions,
yadyevam akhilā bhāvā bhaveyur yugapattataḥ /
then all things would come into existence simultaneously,
tadutpādanasāmarthyayogikāraṇasannidheḥ //
due to the presence of the cause endowed with the capacity to produce them.
sa hyāha nahi bhagavataḥ krīḍārthā pravṛttiḥ /
For he [Uddyotakara] says: "The Lord's activity is not for the purpose of play,
api tu yathā pṛthivyādīnāṃ mahābhūtānāṃ svabhāva eva sa tādṛśo yatsvakāryeṣu pravṛttiḥ tatheśvarasyāpīti /
but rather, just as the nature of the great elements like earth and others is such that they operate towards their own effects, so too is it with the Lord."
tadetad ayuktam /
This is not correct,
evaṃ hi sarvabhāvānāṃ tadvyāpāramātrabhāvināṃ samarthāvikalakāraṇasannidhānādyugapadevotpādaḥ syāt /
because in this way, all things, being dependent solely on that [Being's] activity, would arise simultaneously due to the presence of the complete and perfect cause.
na cāpi buddhimattvaṃ viśeṣakaṃ yuktam iti pūrvamevāsmābhiḥ pratipāditam
The qualification of "intelligence" [in the Cause] is not appropriate, as we have already explained [under the section on God].
svahetubalasambhūtā niyatā eva śaktayaḥ / asarvakālabhāvinyo jvalanādiṣu vastuṣu
In [the case of] things like fire and such, their powers are produced by the force of their own causes, are indeed restricted, and do not operate at all times.
anyathā yaugapadyena sarvaṃ kāryaṃ samudbhavet / teṣām api na cedeṣa niyamo 'bhyupagamyate
Otherwise, if this restriction were not accepted for them also, all effects would arise simultaneously.
teṣām iti
[The word] "teṣām" [refers to] them [i.e., fire and such things].
pāvakādīnām / na kevalamīśvarasyetyapiśabdaḥ / eṣa niyama iti / svahetubalasambhavakṛtaḥ
[It refers to] fire and such things. The word "api" [indicates that this applies] not only to God. "This restriction" means the restriction caused by the force of their own causes.
prakṛtyaivāṃśuhetutvamūrṇanābhe 'pi neṣyate
Even in the case of the spider, we do not accept that the causation of threads is due to its very nature.
prāṇibhakṣaṇalāmpaṭyāllālājālaṃ karoti yat
It produces the web of saliva due to its eager desire to devour living creatures.
ūrṇanābho 'pi na svabhāvataḥ pravartate
The spider also does not act from its own nature.
kiṃ tarhi prāṇibhakṣaṇalāmpaṭyātkādācitkāt pratiniyatahetusambhūtādityabhiprāyaḥ
Rather, [it acts] from its occasional eager desire to devour living creatures, which arises from specific causes - this is the intended meaning.
na hyasau nityaikarūpaḥ tasyāpi svahetubalabhāvitvena kādācitkī śaktiḥ
For it is not of one permanent form; its power too is occasional, being dependent on the force of its own causes.