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athāpi viphalaṃ viśeṣaṇamupādāya tat sādhanārtham anyadeva sādhanam ucyate / | Moreover, if after taking up a useless qualification, another proof entirely is stated for the purpose of establishing that [qualified subject]. |
tathā sati prakṛtādarthād aprakṛtsambaddhārthamarthāntaraṃ nigrahasthānaṃ bhavet / | In that case, there would be the nigrahasthāna [point of defeat] called arthāntara [irrelevant topic], as [one would be] discussing something unconnected with the matter at hand. |
kvacitsamāśritatvaṃ ca yadīcchādeḥ prasādhyate / | If it is being proved that desire and other [mental states] must have some substrate somewhere, |
tatra kāraṇamātraṃ cedāśrayaḥ parikalpyate / | and if in that case mere cause is postulated as the substrate, |
iṣṭasiddhis tadādhārastvāśrayaścen matastava / | If you consider the substrate to be the receptacle [of desire etc.], |
tathāpi gatiśūnyasya niṣphalādhārakalpanā / | even then, postulating a receptacle for what is motionless is pointless. |
yaccoktam icchādayaścetyādi tatra yadi kāraṇamātramāśraya icchādīnāṃ sādhyate tadā siddhasādhyatā na hi niṣkāraṇā icchādayo 'smābhiriṣyante / | As for what was said regarding "desire and other [mental states]", if it is being proved that mere cause is the substrate of desire etc., then [this involves] proving what is [already] established, for we do not accept that desire etc. are without cause. |
caturbhiścittacaittā hīti vacanāt / | As [is clear] from the statement that "mind and mental states [arise] from the four [conditions]." |
parikalpyata iti / varṇyata ity arthaḥ / | "Is postulated" means "is described." |
athādhāralakṣaṇa āśrayaḥ sādhyate tadāpi pratijñārthasyānumānabādhitatvān na tena hetor vyāptiḥ siddhyatīti darśayati tadādhāra ityādi / | If a substrate in the form of a receptacle is being proved, then because what is claimed is contradicted by inference, no pervasion of the reason with that [claimed property] is established - this is what is shown by [the verse beginning] "If the substrate..." |
teṣām icchādīnām ādhārastadādhāraḥ / | "That receptacle" [means] the receptacle of those desires etc. |
mūrtānāṃ hi bhāvānāṃ prasarpaṇadharmāṇāṃ syād adhaḥpātapratibandhādādhārakalpanā / | For material entities that have the property of movement, a receptacle might be postulated to prevent downward falling. |
ye tu sukhādayo gatiśūnyās teṣām adhaḥpatanāsambhavāt kiṃkurvannātmādirādhāraḥ syāt / | But for those [mental states] like pleasure etc. which are motionless, since downward falling is impossible, what function could something like the soul perform as their receptacle? |
nanu yathā ghaṭādayo badarādīnām akiñcitkarā apyādhārās tadvadātmā sukhādīnām ādhāro bhaviṣyatītyāha āśraya ityādi | [One might object:] "Just as jars and similar [vessels], though not doing anything for jujube fruits and other [things], still serve as their receptacles, similarly the Self could be the receptacle of pleasure and other [mental states]." |
āśrayo badarādīnāṃ kuṇḍādirupapadyate / gater vibandhakaraṇād viśeṣotpādanena vā | A receptacle like a pot can serve for jujube fruits and other [things] either by obstructing their movement or by bringing about specific modifications [in them]. |
gater bandhakaraṇād ityakṣaṇikapakṣe | "By obstructing their movement" - this applies to the view that [things are] non-momentary. |
viśeṣotpādanena veti kṣaṇikapakṣe / upādānakāraṇasamānadeśotpādanaṃ tat | "By bringing about specific modifications" - this applies to the view that [things are] momentary; that [modification] being produced in the same location as its material cause. |
ayaṃ dvividho 'pi prakāra icchādīnāṃ na sambhavatīti na teṣāṃ kaścidādhāro yuktaḥ | Neither of these two types [of receptacle] is possible for desire and other [mental states], therefore no receptacle for them is logically possible. |
yaccāpi vastutve satīti viśeṣaṇaṃ tadanarthakameva vyavacchedyābhāvād iti darśayannāha nīrūpasyetyādi | [The author] shows that the qualification "while being entities" is entirely meaningless due to there being nothing to exclude. |
nīrūpasya ca nāśasya kāryatvaṃ naiva yuktimat | The state of being an effect is not at all logically possible for formless destruction. |
ato viśeṣaṇaṃ vyarthaṃ hetāvuktaṃ parair iha | Therefore the qualification stated by others in the reason here is useless. |
yadi hi vināśasya kāryatvaṃ sambhavet tadā tadvyavacchedāya vastutve satītiviśeṣaṇaṃ sārthakaṃ bhavet | If destruction could possibly be an effect, then the qualification "while being entities" would serve a purpose in excluding it. |
yāvatā tasyāvastutayā hetubhir na kiñcitkriyata iti kathaṃ hetumattā bhavet / prayogaḥ yadavastu na tat kasyacitkāryam yathā śaśaviṣāṇam | However, since it is a non-entity, causes cannot do anything to it - so how could it have a cause? The formulation is: "Whatever is a non-entity cannot be an effect of anything - like a hare's horn." |
kāryatve sati vastutvaprasaṅgaḥ sukhādivad itīdamatra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam / | If [something] were a product, it would [necessarily] be an entity, like pleasure etc. - this here is the counter-evidence. |
kiñcābhyupagamavirodho bhavatām / | Moreover, there is a contradiction in your own acceptance [of this position]. |
tathā hi kāryamityātmalābhākhyātsvakāraṇasamavāyāt sattāsamavāyād bābhidhānapratyayau bhavataḥ / | For the name and notion "product" arise either from [its] acquiring its nature, or from [its] inherence in its material cause, or from the inherence of existence [in it]. |
na ca vināśasya dravyādisvabhāvarahitasya svakāraṇe samavāyo 'sti / | And destruction, being devoid of the nature of substance etc., has no inherence in its material cause. |
tasya nīrūpatvāt / | Because of its [destruction's] formlessness. |
anyathā hyasau dravyādividāśrito 'pi syād vastu ceti na hetuviśeṣaṇena vyavacchedyo bhavet / | For if it were otherwise, it would, like substance etc., be dependent on a substrate and be an entity, and thus could not be excluded by the qualification in the reason. |
ato vastutve satīti viśeṣaṇaṃ vyartham // | Therefore the qualification "being an entity" is purposeless. |
mayetyādi / mayeti pratisandhānamavidyopaplavādidam / | [The notion of] "by me" etc. - this recollection of "by me" is [merely] a disturbance of ignorance. |
kṣaṇikeṣvapi sarveṣu kartrekatvādibhāsataḥ // | Because the appearance of the unity of the agent etc. occurs even with respect to all momentary [things]. |
mithyāvikalpataścāsmān na yuktā tattvasaṃsthitiḥ / | And from such false conceptualization, the determination of reality is not possible. |
sāmarthyabhedād bhinno 'pi bhavatyekanibandhanam // | Even [things that are] different due to a difference in their capacities become a single cause [of effects]. |
mayā dṛṣṭaṃ mayā śrutam ityevaṃ yadekajñātṛnimittatvena pratyayānāṃ ghaṭanalakṣaṇaṃ pratisandhānaṃ tadetadanaikāntikam / | The recollection characterized by the connection of cognitions, as in [the statements] "seen by me" [and] "heard by me," which [is claimed] to have a single cognizer as its cause, is inconclusive. |
yataḥ kṣaṇikeṣvapi bhāveṣu bhrāntād ekakartṛtvābhimānataḥ pratisandhānasambhavāt / | Because even regarding momentary entities, recollection is possible due to the mistaken assumption of [their having] a single agent. |
tasmād evambhūtātpratisandhānān na yuktā vastuvyavasthā / | Therefore, the determination of reality cannot properly be [established] from such recollection. |
kathaṃ punarbhavataḥ kṣaṇāḥ pratisandhānanimittatāmupagacchantītyāha sāmarthyabhedād ityādi / | [Someone] asks: "How do your moments become the cause of recollection?" [The answer] begins with "due to difference in capacities." |
sāmarthyabhedāt sāmarthyaviśeṣāt / | [It is] due to difference in capacities, [that is,] due to specific powers. |
aneko 'pyartha ekākāraparāmarśādikāryasyaikasya nibandhanam kāraṇam; yathā guḍūcyādayo jvarādiśamana iti paścād vistareṇa pratipādayiṣyati // | Even a manifold thing becomes the causal basis of a single effect such as recollection in one form, just as guḍūcī and other [herbs become the basis] for alleviating fever and other [conditions] - [this] will be explained in detail later. |
atha bhrāntatvam eva katham asya niścitamityāha ekānugāmītyādi / | Now [someone] asks "How is its erroneousness determined?" [The answer] states [the verse beginning with] "ekānugāmi." |
ekānugāmikāryatve paurvāparyaṃ virudhyate / rūpaśabdādicittānāṃ śaktakāraṇasannidheḥ // | If [these were] the effects of a single continuous [cause], sequential order would be contradicted for cognitions of form, sound, etc., due to the presence of their capable cause. |
yadi hyekasya pūrvottarakālānuyāyina ātmāder nityasya kāryatvam eṣāṃ nīlādipratyayānāṃ syāt tadā kramabhāvitvam eṣāṃ virudhyeta / | For if these cognitions of blue and other [objects] were effects of a single eternal [entity] like the ātman that persists through prior and subsequent times, then their sequential nature would be contradicted. |
avikalakāraṇatvena yugapad evotpādaprasaṅgāt / | Since the cause is unimpaired, [there would be] the undesirable consequence that [all effects would] arise simultaneously. |
na cāpi nityasya parāpekṣāsti / | And moreover, something eternal has no dependence on anything else. |
tasya kenacidanupakāryatvāt // | Because it cannot be assisted by anything whatsoever. |
kiṃ ca sāmānyena kāraṇapūrvakatvamātraṃ prasādhyate tadā siddhasādhyateti darśayati ekānantaretyādi / | Moreover, if only the general fact of being preceded by a cause is being established, then [that results in] proving what is [already] proven - this is shown [in the text beginning with] "from a single preceding [cognition]." |
ekānantaravijñānāt ṣaḍvijñānasamudbhavaḥ / | From a single immediately preceding cognition [arises] the arising of six cognitions. |
yugapad vedyate vyaktam atra iṣṭaprasādhanam // | Here what is to be proven is clearly perceived simultaneously. |
yata ekasmād anantaravijñānātsamanantarapratyayāt ṣaṇṇāṃ cakṣurādivijñānām utpādaḥ spaṣṭaṃ saṃvedyate / | From a single immediately preceding cognition as [their] immediate condition, the arising of six cognitions of the eye and other [senses] is clearly experienced. |
tathā hi yadaiva nartakīrūpaṃ paśyati tadaiva murajādiśabdaṃ śṛṇoti kuvalayādigandhaṃ ca jighrati karpūrādirasamāsvādayati vyajanānīlādisparśaṃ cānubhavati vastrādi ca manasādātuṃ cintayati / | For just when [one] sees the form of the dancing girl, at that very moment [one] hears the sound of drums and other [instruments], smells the fragrance of water lilies and other [flowers], tastes camphor and other [substances], experiences the touch of fans and blue [cloth] and other [things], and thinks about taking up clothes and other [items]. |
na cālātacakradarśanavat taddṛṣṭirāśusañcārād iti yuktaṃ vaktum / | And it is not reasonable to say that this perception [appears simultaneous] due to rapid movement like the perception of a whirling firebrand. |
aspaṣṭapratibhāsitatvaprasaṅgāt / | Because [that would lead to] the undesirable consequence of [the perceptions] appearing unclear. |
tathā hi darśanānāṃ prasisandhānādayaṃ sakṛdgrahābhimāno bhavatā varṇyate / | For you describe this notion of grasping [all perceptions] at once as being due to the recollection of the perceptions. |
pratisandhānaṃ ca smṛtyā kriyate / | And recollection is accomplished through memory. |
sā cātītaviṣayatvād aspaṣṭā / | And that [remembrance] is indistinct due to its having past things as its object. |
spaṣṭaścāyaṃ sakṛdrūpādipratibhāsaḥ saṃvedyate / | But this single manifestation of form and other [qualities] is experienced distinctly. |
kiñca saro rasa ityādau sutarāmāśu sakārādivarṇagrāhiṇāṃ jñānānām udayo 'stīti / | Moreover, in [expressions] like "saro rasa," there is indeed a quick arising of cognitions that apprehend the letter 'sa' and other sounds. |
atrāpi sakṛdgrahābhimānaḥ syāt / | In this case also there might be the notion of a single apprehension. |
tataś ca na kvacit kramo vyavasīyeta / | And consequently, no sequence would be ascertained anywhere. |
etac ca paścādvistareṇa pratipādayiṣyate / iha tu vyaktam iti vacanāt parihāradik pradarśitaiva // | And this will be explained in detail later; here, by the word "vyaktam," merely the direction of the refutation has been indicated. |
kramiṇāṃ tvekahetutvaṃ naivetyuktamanantaram / | That sequential things cannot have a single cause has just been stated. |
ato 'numānabādhāsmin vyāpter vyaktaṃ samīkṣyate // | Therefore, in this case, the pervasion [claimed by the opponent] is clearly seen to be invalidated by inference. |
ekānugāmītyādinā / | [This was stated] by [the verse] beginning with "ekānugāmī." |
tatredaṃ bādhanam; ye sannihitā apratibaddhasāmarthyakāraṇās te yugapadeva bhavanti / | Here is the invalidation: those [things] whose causes are present and whose efficacy is unobstructed must arise simultaneously. |
yathā samagrasāmagrīkāḥ sakṛdbhāvino 'ṅkurādayaḥ / | Just as sprouts and similar [effects], whose complete causal apparatus exists, arise simultaneously, |
sannihitāpratibaddhasāmarthyakāraṇāś ca devadattasya rūpādiviṣayāḥ pratyayāḥ iti svabhāvehetuḥ / | [And just as] Devadatta's cognitions of color and other objects have [their] causes present, unobstructed and capable [of producing their effects] - this is a reason based on [their] inherent nature. |
na caivaṃ sambhavati / | However, this is not possible [in reality]. |
tasmād viparyayaḥ // | Therefore, [your conclusion] is contradicted. |
nartakībhrūlatābhaṅgo naivaikaḥ paramārthataḥ / | The movement of the dancing girl's eyebrow is not truly a single [entity]. |
anekāṇusamūhatvād ekatvaṃ tasya kalpitam // | Because it consists of many atomic particles, its unity is [merely] conceptually constructed. |
na hi nartakībhrūlatādireko 'sti tasyānekaṇusamūhatvāt / | Indeed, the movement of the dancing girl's eyebrow and similar [things] are not single [entities], because they consist of aggregates of many atoms. |
yadyevaṃ katham ekaśabdaviṣayatvaṃ tasya bhavatītyāha ekatvaṃ tasya kalpitamiti // | [If someone asks:] "If this is so, how does it become the object of a singular word?" [The answer is:] "Its unity is [merely] conceptually constructed." |
buddhicittādiśabdānāṃ vyatiriktābhidhāyitā naivaikapadabhāve 'pi paryāyāṇāṃ samasti naḥ // | For synonymous terms like "buddhi," "citta," and others, even though each is a single word, [they] do not denote different [things] for us. |
ato 'naikāntiko hetur nanūktaṃ tadviśeṣaṇam / ucyate naiva siddhaṃ taccetaḥparyāyatāsthiteḥ // | Therefore the reason is inconclusive. [If you say] "But that qualification has been stated," [we] reply that it is not established, because consciousness remains synonymous [with Self]. |
ahaṅkārāśrayatvena cittamātmeti gīyate / | The Self is declared to be consciousness because it is the substrate of ego-consciousness. |
saṃvṛttyā vastuvṛttyā tu viṣayo 'sya na vidyate // | From the conventional point of view, but not from the real point of view, there exists no object [that is denoted] by this [word]. |
ekapadatvādityanaikāntiko hetuḥ / | The reason "because it is a single term" is inconclusive. |
tathā hi buddhiścittaṃ jñānam indriyamakṣaṃ vedanā cittanuḥ kāyaḥ śarīramityādīnāṃ buddhīndriyavedanāśarīraparyāyāṇām ekapadatve 'pi nāsmante 'sti tadvyatiriktapadārthābhidhāyiteti tato vipakṣādvyāvṛttyasiddher anaikāntikatvam / | For in the case of such synonyms as buddhi, citta, jñāna; indriya, akṣa; vedanā and citta; kāya and śarīra - [which are] synonyms for buddhi, indriya, vedanā and śarīra [respectively] - even though they are single terms, according to us there is no denotation of distinct objects, and therefore, due to the non-establishment of exclusion from the counter-example, [the reason] is inconclusive. |
nanu cedamevāśaṅkya siddhaparyāyabhinnatve satīti tasya hetor viśeṣaṇam uktaṃ tat katham anaikāntikatā bhavati | [The opponent:] "Having anticipated precisely this [objection], the qualification 'when there is difference from established synonyms' was stated for that reason - so how can there be inconclusiveness?" |
tadatrābhidhīyate / asiddhametaddhetuviśeṣaṇam kasmāt/ | To this we reply: This qualification of the reason is not established. Why? |
cetaḥparyayatāsthiteḥ / ātmetyetasya cittaparyāyatvavyavasthānāt / | Because the status [of the term "ātman"] as a synonym of consciousness is established, [that is,] because it is established that this [word] "ātman" is a synonym of citta. |
yathoktam; cittamevāhaṅkārasaṃśrayatvād ātmetyupacaryate; iti / | As has been stated: "Consciousness itself, being the substrate of ego-consciousness, is metaphorically called 'ātman'." |
ātmetyupacaryate vyavahriyata ity arthaḥ / | The meaning of "upacaryate" is "[conventionally] used." |
tena yaduktamuddyotakārena mukhyasambhavād upacāro na yukta iti tadabhiprāyāparijñānād iti grahītavyam / | Therefore, what Uddyotakāra has said - that "metaphorical usage is not appropriate when literal usage is possible" - should be understood [to arise] from not understanding the intention. |
etadeva gīyata ityanena spaṣṭayati / | This very [point] is made clear by the expression "gīyate" ["is spoken of"]. |
tasmād asiddhaviśeṣaṇaṃ hetuḥ / | Therefore the reason has an unestablished qualification. |
etac ca saṃvṛttyā saviṣayatvam upagamyāsya hetor anaikāntikatvam uktam / | And this inconclusiveness of the reason has been stated while accepting, from the conventional point of view, that it has an object. |
yadi tu paramārthena tu buddhyādivyatiriktārthābhidhāyitvaṃ prasādhyate tadā vyāpter anumānabādhitatvādayukta evāyaṃ hetur iti darśayann āha vastuvṛttyetyādi / | But if what is to be proved is the denotation of an object distinct from buddhi etc. from the ultimate point of view, then this reason is entirely inappropriate because its pervasion is invalidated by inference - showing this, he states "vastuvṛttyā" etc. |
adhyāropitārthaviṣayatvāt sarvasyaiva śābdasya/ | Because all verbal usage has as its object something [merely] superimposed. |
vyavahārasyeti paścātpratipādayiṣyate / | [The meaning of] "vyavahārasya" is going to be explained later on. |
tenāsyātmaśabdasya viṣayo nāstyeveti kathaṃ hetoḥ sādhyena vyāptir bhaved iti bhāvaḥ // | Thus, [since] there is nothing that is denoted by this term 'ātman', how could there be any invariable concomitance between the reason and the probandum? |
nabhastalāravindādau yadekaṃ viniveśyate / kārakādipadaṃ tena vyabhicāro 'pi dṛśyate // | When a single term like 'kāraka' and so forth is applied to [things] like the sky-lotus, by that [application] deviation [of the reason] is also observed. |
yathā hi gaganakusumādāvatyantābhāvena kenacitkārakādipadaṃ niveśyate tadā tasyobhayaprasiddheḥ śarīrādivācakavyatiriktatve satyekapadatvam asti na ca śarīrādivyatiriktavastuviṣayatvamapītyanaikāntiko hetuḥ // | For when a term like 'kāraka' is applied to absolute non-entities like the sky-flower, then, as accepted by both parties, while it is a single term distinct from terms denoting the body etc., it does not denote an object distinct from the body etc., therefore the reason is inconclusive. |
kathaṃ punaḥ kārakādipadaṃ nirupākhye śakyaṃ niyoktumityāha saṅketamātrabhāvinya ityādi / | [Someone asks:] "How can terms like 'kāraka' be applied to that which is without characteristics?" [The answer] is stated [in the words] beginning with "based solely on convention." |
saṅketamātrabhavinyo vācaḥ kutra na saṅgatāḥ / naivātmādipadānāṃ ca prakṛtyārthaprakāśanam // | To what can words, being based solely on convention, not be applied? And terms like 'ātman' do not by nature express any meaning. |
svatantrecchāmātrabhāvī hi saṅketaḥ; tanmātravācinyaś ca vācaḥ tatkathamāsāṃ kvacid api pravṛttiprasararodho bhavet / | For convention arises solely from independent will, and words express only that [convention], so how could there be any restriction on their application anywhere? |
athāpi syād asāmayikaikapadatvādityayaṃ hetvartho vivakṣitas tena vyabhicāro na bhaviṣyatītyāha naivetyādi / | If it be said that the intended meaning of the reason is "because it is a single term not based on convention" and thereby there would be no deviation, [the answer] is stated [by the words] beginning with "never." |
na hi saṅketamantareṇa śabdānāṃ prakṛtyārthaprakāśanam asti avyutpannasyāpi tato 'rthapratītiprasaṅgāt / | For without convention, words do not by nature express meaning, since [if they did] even an untrained person would understand their meaning. |
svecchayā ca niyogābhāvaprasaṅgāt / | And [if words had meaning by nature] there would be no possibility of arbitrary assignment [of meanings]. |
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