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saṅketavaiyarthyaprasaṅgāc ca / | And because [if words had meaning by nature] convention would be pointless. |
tasmād ātmādipadānāṃ naiva prakṛtyārthaprakāśanaṃ siddham ityasiddho hetuḥ / | Therefore it is established that terms like 'ātman' do not by nature express any meaning, hence the reason is unproven. |
athāviśeṣāspadapadārthāntarbhūtajñeyaviṣayatve satītyaparaṃ viśeṣaṇamupādīyate / yathoktaṃ bhāviviktena / evam api yathoktaviśeṣaṇāsiddher asiddho hetur vyāptyabhāvāccānaikāntikaḥ // | If [it is suggested that] a further qualification be added [stating] that "it has for its objective a cognizable [thing] which is included under a category which cannot be specified" - as has been asserted by Bhāviveka - even so, because such a qualification would be unproven, the Reason itself would be 'Inadmissible', as well as 'Inconclusive', due to the absence of invariable concomitance. |
prāṇādīnāṃ ca sambanho yadi siddhaḥ sahātmanā / bhavet tadā prasaṅgo 'yaṃ yujyate saṅgato 'nyathā // | The contingency that has been urged would be valid if the connection between the vital functions [like breathing], etc. and the soul were established; otherwise, it would not be coherent. |
na vandhyāsutaśūnyatve jīvaddehaḥ prasajyate / | [The opponent has argued that] "The living body would not be devoid of [functions like] breathing etc. if [it were like] the son of a barren woman." |
prāṇādivirahe hyevaṃ tavāpyetatprasañjanam // | Indeed, this contingency of yours regarding the absence of vital functions [like breathing] etc. [is answered in what follows]. |
yadi hi prāṇādīnām ātmanā saha tādātmyalakṣaṇas tadutpattilakṣaṇo vā kaścit sambandhaḥ siddho bhavet tadātmanivṛttau śarīre prāṇādinivṛttiprasaṅgo yuktimān bhavet / anyathā hyapratibaddhasya nivṛttāvanyanivṛttiprasaṅgo 'saṅgata eva syād atiprasaṅgāt / | If between vital functions [like breathing] etc. and the Soul, there were some established connection - either in the form of identity or in the form of being produced from it - then there would be some reason for urging the contingency that the absence of the Soul would involve the absence of vital functions etc. in the body. Otherwise, the urging of the absence of one thing upon the absence of another thing not connected [with it] at all would be incoherent, as it would lead to an unwanted consequence. |
na hi vandhyāputranivṛttau tadasambaddhānāṃ prāṇādīnāṃ nivṛttir bhavati / tasmād yathā vandhyāsūnunivṛttau tadasambaddhānām pi prāṇādīnāṃ nivṛttiḥ prāpnoti ghaṭādivad iti kenacit prasaṅgāpādanaṃ kriyamāṇamanaikāntikaṃ bhavati evaṃ tavāpyetadātmanivṛttau prāṇādinivṛttiprasañjanam anaikāntikameva sambandhāsiddher iti bhāvaḥ // | Indeed, the absence of 'the son of a barren woman' does not entail the absence of vital functions etc. which are unconnected [with it]. Therefore, if someone were to put forward the contingency that the absence of vital functions etc., though unconnected [with it], would follow from the absence of the 'son of a barren woman' - like [the absence] of a jar - this would be inconclusive. Similarly, your argument putting forward the contingency of vital functions etc. being absent due to the absence of the Soul is also inconclusive, because no connection [between them] is established. |
kathaṃ punaḥ sambandhāsiddhir ity āha na tāvad ity āha | [Question:] "How [is it known] that the connection is not established?" [Answer follows:] |
tathā hi anityā avyāpino mūrtāś ca prāṇādayaḥ tadviparītastvātmā / | For vital functions etc. are non-eternal, non-pervasive and corporeal, whereas the soul is of the opposite [nature]. |
etenecchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānādīni yānyātmaliṅgatvena parair uktāni tāni pratiṣiddhāni draṣṭavyāni sambandhāsiddheḥ / | By this [same argument], those [things] like desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain, cognition etc. which have been stated by others to be marks of the soul should be understood as refuted, due to the non-establishment of [their] connection [with the soul]. |
na cāsiddho hetuḥ / | And the reason is not unestablished. [The explanation follows:] |
pūrvaṃ dvividhasyāpi sambandhasya nirastatvāt | Since [we have] previously rejected both types of relation |
ādyajñānavat madīyaśarīravat iti yadetannidarśanamuktaṃ tadyathoktasādhyadharmavikalamātmano 'siddhatvāt | The examples cited [by the opponent] such as "like the first cognition" and "like my body" lack the property to be proved, since [the existence of] the ātman is unproven |
na cāpyanaikāntikaḥ sarvasya sarvagamakatvaprasaṅgāt na cāpi viruddhaḥ sapakṣe bhāvād iti | [The probans] is neither inconclusive - as [that would lead to] the undesirable consequence that everything would prove everything - nor contradictory, since it exists in similar cases |
yaścāpyāha kartuḥ prasiddhiḥ karaṇaprasiddher iti tadasiddham | And what some say - that "the agent is established through the establishment of the instrument" - that [too] is unproven |
vijñānotpattau sarveṣāṃ hetubhāvasya tulyatvāt | Because in the arising of consciousness, the causal nature is equal for all [factors] |
svechāmātraparikalpitatvāc ca kartṛkaraṇavyavahārasyeti | And because the usage of [terms like] "agent" and "instrument" is merely conceptually constructed according to one's wishes |
evaṃ ca sādhanaiḥ sarvair ātmasattvāprasiddhitaḥ | Thus, through all [these attempted] proofs, the existence of the ātman remains unestablished |
asya ca na rūpādir viṣayaḥ | And color etc. are not the objects of this [I-cognition] |
tadvijñānabhinnapratibhāsattvāt | Because it appears different from the cognition of those [i.e. color etc.] |
tasmād anya eva viṣaya iti | Therefore [its] object must be something entirely different [i.e. the ātman] |
tadayuktamityādinā pravidhatte / | This [objection] is answered by [the section beginning with] "that is incorrect" [in the following verses]. |
tadayuktamahaṅkāre tadrūpānavabhāsanāt / | That [view] is incorrect, because the form of that [ātman] does not manifest in the I-consciousness. |
na hi nityavibhutvādinirbhāsas tatra lakṣyate // | For indeed, no manifestation of eternality, omnipresence and such [properties] is perceived therein. |
gauravarṇādinirbhāso vyaktaṃ tatra tu vidyate / | But what is clearly present therein is the manifestation of fair complexion and such [properties]. |
tatsvabhāvo na cātmeṣṭo nāyaṃ tadviṣayastataḥ // | And the ātman is not accepted to be of that nature; therefore this [I-consciousness] does not have that [ātman] as its object. |
asiddhamahaṅkārasyātmaviṣayatvaṃ tadākāraśūnyatvāt / | The fact that I-consciousness has the ātman as its object is unproven, because it is devoid of the form of that [ātman]. |
prayogaḥ yadyadākāraśūnyaṃ na tadviṣayam / | The formal argument [is]: Whatever is devoid of the form of something cannot have that thing as its object. |
yathā cakṣur jñānaṃ na śabdaviṣayam / | For example, visual cognition cannot have sound as its object. |
ātmākāraśūnyaṃ cāham iti jñānam iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ / | And the cognition "I" is devoid of the form of the ātman - thus [this is] an argument from non-perception of the pervader. |
na cāyamasiddho hetur iti darśayati na hītyādi / | And [the text] shows that this reason is not unproven by [stating] "for indeed... not" etc. |
tathā hi nityavibhutvacetanatvādiguṇopeta ātmeṣyate / | For thus the ātman is accepted as endowed with qualities such as eternality, omnipresence, consciousness and so forth. |
na cātrāhampratyaye nityatvādipratibhāso lakṣyate / | In this case, no manifestation of permanence and other [such qualities] is perceived in the I-consciousness. |
kiṃ tu gauro 'haṃ mandalocanaḥ parikṛśastīvravedanābhinna ityādidehāvasthāsaṃsparśenotpatter gauravarṇādilakṣaṇaḥ pratibhāsaḥ pratīyate / | Rather, [what] is perceived is a manifestation characterized by fair complexion and other [qualities], arising through contact with bodily conditions, as [seen] in expressions like "I am fair-complexioned, weak-eyed, thin, afflicted with severe pain" and so forth. |
tasmāddehādyavasthāsaṃsparśenotpadyamāno 'haṅkāro dehādyālambana eveti jñāyate / | Therefore it is understood that the I-consciousness, which arises through contact with bodily conditions and such, has the body and such [things] as its support. |
vyaktam iti / | [It is] manifest, thus. |
spaṣṭamaskhaladvṛttitvāt / | Because [it] has a clear, unfailing operation. |
tataś ca yaduktamuddyotakaraprabhṛtibhiḥ upabhogāyatane śarīre 'yamātmopacāraḥ yathānukūle bhṛtye rājā brūte ya evāhaṃ sa evāyaṃ me bhṛtya iti / | And thus, what was stated by Uddyotakara and others [that] "this attribution of Self to the body, [which is merely] the locus of experience, is like when a king says of a favorable servant 'this servant of mine is just what I am'" |
tadapāstaṃ bhavati / | That becomes rejected. |
tathā hi yadyayaṃ gauṇaḥ syāt tadā skhaladvṛttir bhavet / | For if this [attribution] were secondary [i.e., figurative], then it would have a failing operation. |
na hi loke siṃhamāṇavakayor mukhyāropitayor dvayor api siṃha ityaskhalitā buddhir bhavati / | For in common experience, when [the concept of] lion is primarily attributed to both a lion and a boy, there is no unfailing cognition [of both] as "lion." |
madīyāḥ śarīrādaya iti vyatirekadarśanāt skhaladvṛttirahaṅkāraḥ śarīrādiṣviti cet / | If [you say] that I-consciousness has a failing operation with respect to body and such [things] because of the observation of distinction [as in the expression] "my body" etc. |
ātmanyapi skhaladvṛttitvaprasaṅgāt | [No,] since there would be the undesirable consequence of false attribution even in [the case of] the Self. |
tatrāpi hi madīya ātmeti vyatireko dṛśyate | For even in that case, a distinction is observed [in expressions] such as "my Self." |
kalpito 'tra bheda iti cet / itaratrāpi samānam astu | If [you say] "the distinction here is [merely] imagined," then let it be the same in the other case also. |
tarhi gauro 'ham ityādipratyayo mukhyatas tathāpi kasmād ātmāsya viṣayo na bhavatītyāha tatsvabhāva iti | [If you ask:] "Even if the cognition 'I am fair' etc. is used in its primary sense, why should the Self not be its object?" - [the answer] is stated: "[Because it is not] of that nature." |
gaurādisvabhāvaḥ | [The Self is not] of the nature of being fair-complexioned and so forth. |
tasya rūpādiguṇāsambhavāt | Because qualities like color and so forth are impossible for it [i.e., the Self]. |
yadi pratyakṣagamyaś ca satyataḥ puruṣo bhavet / tatkimarthaṃ vivādo 'yaṃ tat sattvādau pravartate | If the puruṣa were really perceptible, then why would this dispute arise regarding its existence and other [properties]? |
tasyātmanaḥ sattvanityatvavibhutvādau | [That is,] regarding the existence, eternality, all-pervasiveness etc. of that Self. |
syād etadyathā bhavatāṃ pratyakṣīkṛte 'pi nīlādau tat svabhāvāvyatirekṣaṇikatvādau vivādaḥ pravartate / tathātmanyapi bhaviṣyatītyāha tathā hītyādi | [One might object:] "Just as for you [Buddhists], even though blue etc. are perceived, disputes arise regarding [their] momentariness etc. which is non-different from their nature, similarly [disputes] could arise regarding the Self also" - [to this he] says "For thus..." |
tathā hi niścayātmāyamahaṅkāraḥ pravartate | For thus this I-notion operates [as] having the nature of certainty. |
niścayāropabuddhyoś ca bādhyabādhakatā sthitā | The relationship of annulment exists between cognitions of certainty and superimposition. |
yukto hi nīlādau pratyakṣeṇa gṛhīte 'pi tadavyatirikte kṣaṇikatvādau vivādaḥ tasya pratyakṣasya nirvikalpatvenāniścāyakatayā kṣaṇikatvāder aniścitatvāt | In the case of blue and similar [objects], even though [they are] apprehended by perception, dispute regarding [their] momentariness and other inseparable properties is justified, because due to that perception being non-conceptual and thus non-ascertaining, [their] momentariness and other [properties] remain unascertained. |
bhavatpakṣe tu na yukto 'hampratyayasya savikalpakatvena niścayātmakatayātmano niścitatvāt | But according to your position [this dispute] is not justified, because the I-cognition, being conceptual, is of the nature of ascertainment, and thus the Self is [already] ascertained. |
na ca niścayena viṣayīkṛte vastuni tadviparītākāragrāhiṇaḥ samāropapratyayasya pravṛttir asti yena vivādo bhavet | And when an object has been made the content of a certain cognition, there can be no occurrence of a superimposed cognition that grasps a contrary form, by which dispute could arise. |
tayoḥ sahāvasthāyitvena bādhyabādhakabhāvāt | Because between those two [cognitions] there is a relation of annuller and annulled due to [their] co-existence. |
iyam eva hi niścayānāṃ svārthapratipattir yattanniścayanaṃ te cen na niścinvanti na gṛhṇantyeveti prāptam | For this indeed is the comprehension of their objects by ascertaining cognitions - if they do not ascertain those [objects], it follows that they do not apprehend [them] at all. |
tasmādicchādayaḥ sarve naivātmasamavāyinaḥ | Therefore desire and all [such properties] cannot be inherent in the Self. |
krameṇotpadyamānatvād bījāṅkuralatādivat | Because [they] arise successively, like seed, sprout, creeper and so forth. |
atha vādhyātmikāḥ sarve nairātmyākrāntamūrtayaḥ vastusattvādihetubhyo yathā bāhyā ghaṭādayaḥ | Or, all internal [phenomena] must have forms pervaded by selflessness, because of reasons such as being things and being existent, just like external [objects] such as pots. |
prayogaḥ ye krameṇotpadyante te nātmasamavāyino yathā bījāṅkuralatādayaḥ krameṇotpadyante ca sukhādaya iti viruddhavyāptopalabdheḥ | The formal argument is: Those which arise successively are not inherent in the Self, like seed, sprout, creeper etc.; and pleasure etc. arise successively - thus [we have] the observation of a contradictory pervasion. |
ātmasamavāyitvaviruddhenānātmasamavāyitvena kramotpatter vyāptatvāt | Because successive origination is pervaded by non-inherence in the Self, which contradicts inherence in the Self. |
sannihitāvikalakāraṇatvādyugapadutpattiprasaṅgo viparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇam / | A counter-argument refuting [the opponent's view] is that [there would be] the undesired consequence of simultaneous production [of all effects] when the cause is present in its unimpaired form. |
athavā ye vastutvakṛtakatvotpattimattvādidharmopetās te sarve nirātmāno yathā bāhyā ghaṭādayaḥ | Or [alternatively], whatever things are endowed with properties such as being real things (vastutva), being produced (kṛtakatva), having an origin (utpattimatva), and so forth - all these are without a Self (nirātman), just as external things like jars and so forth. |
vastutvādidharmopetāścādhyātmikā jīvaśarīramanobuddhiduḥkhasukhādaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ | And [all] internal [entities] such as the living body, mind, intellect, pain, pleasure and so forth are endowed with properties such as being real things (vastutva) and the rest - [this constitutes] an argument from essential nature (svabhāvahetu). |
sātmakatve hi nityatvaṃ taddhetūnāṃ prasajyate / nitvāścārthakriyāśaktā nātaḥ sattvādisambhavaḥ | For if [these things] possessed a Self, then what is caused by that [Self] would necessarily be eternal; and being eternal, they would be incapable of producing effects, hence [their] existence and other [properties] would be impossible. |
yadi sātmakatvam ātmādhiṣṭhitatvaṃ dehādīnāṃ bhavet;tadaiṣām ātmā hetuḥ syāt | If possessing a Self means being controlled by a Self for the body and other [things], then this Self would be their cause. |
na hyakāraṇamadhiṣṭhātā yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt | For what is not a cause cannot reasonably be a controller, as [this would lead to] an overextension [of the concept]. |
tataś ca taddhetūnām ātmahetukānāṃ śarīrādīnām avikalakāraṇatayā nityatvam akramitvaṃ prasajyeta | And consequently, for the body and other things caused by that [Self], having their cause always present in unimpaired form, eternality and non-successiveness would necessarily follow. |
syād etadyadi nāma nityatvam eṣāṃ prasaktam;tathāpi vastutvādikam anuvṛttam eva | One might say: "Even if their eternality follows, they still retain their properties of being real things and so forth." |
nityāś ca santaḥ śarīrādayor 'thakriyāyām aśaktāḥ prasajyanta | [But] being eternal, the body and other [things] would necessarily be powerless in producing effects. |
nityasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhād | Because for an eternal [entity], effective action is incompatible with both succession and simultaneity. |
arthakriyāsāmarthyanivṛttau ca vastutvanivṛttir arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ | And upon the cessation of [their] capacity for effective action, [things] cease to be real entities, because the capacity for effective action is the defining characteristic of real entities. |
vastutvanivṛttau sattvādīnām api vastudharmāṇāṃ nivṛttir iti siddhā vyāptiḥ | When [their] entity-hood ceases, [their] properties as entities, such as existence and so forth, also cease — thus the pervasion is established. |
uddyotakarastvāha atha nirātmakatvam iti ko 'rthaḥ sādhyatveneṣṭaḥ | Uddyotakara, however, says: "What meaning of 'being without a soul' [nirātmakatva] is intended as the probandum?" |
yadi tāvad ātmano 'nupakārakam iti na dṛṣṭānto 'sti | If [it means] 'not serving any purpose for the soul', then there is no [possible] example [for the inference]. |
na hi kiñcid ātmano 'nupakārakam asti | For there is nothing that does not serve some purpose for the soul. |
athātmapratiṣedha ātmā śarīraṃ na bhavatīti | If [it means] the denial of the soul [in the sense that] 'the soul is not the body'... |
kasya cātmā śarīram uttarapadaviṣayatvāc ca nisaḥ kiṃ sātmakam iti vācyam | Then who [even claims that] the soul is the body? And since the prefix nis- relates to what follows it, one must [first] specify what [exactly] is 'with a soul' [sātmaka]. |
na hyasatyuttarapade nisaḥ prayogaṃ paśyāmaḥ yathā nirmakṣikam iti | For we never see the prefix nis- used without [reference to] something that follows it, as in [the word] nirmakṣika ["without flies"]. |
atha śarīra ātmā pratiṣidhyate siddhaṃ sādhayasi | If [you mean that] the soul is being denied [to be] in the body, you are proving what is [already] established. |
kasya vā śarīra ātmā vidyate | For who [claims that] the soul exists in the body? |
atha śarīramātmasambandhe{ndha}na bhavatīti punar dṛṣṭānto nāsti | If [you mean that] 'the body has no connection with the soul', then again there is no [possible] example. |
sarve caite viśeṣapratiṣedhāḥ viśeṣapratiṣedhāc ca sāmānyaṃ gamyate | And all these are denials of specific attributes, and from the denial of specifics, the general [category] is implied. |
evaṃ sati yatpratiṣeddhavyaṃ tadabhyanujñātaṃ bhavati | This being so, what was intended to be denied becomes [implicitly] accepted. |
athātmaśabdaḥ śabdatvād anityaviṣaya iti sādhyate tathāpi nityaśabdenānaikāntikaḥ | If it is to be proved that 'the word "soul," being a word, must refer to something impermanent', even then [the reasoning] is inconclusive due to [the counterexample of] the word "eternal". |
śarīrādīnāṃ copacārād ātmavācyatvāt siddhasādhanam / | Since [the term] 'ātman' can refer to the body and other [things] through secondary usage, [your argument] proves what is [already] proven. |
atha śarīrādivyatiriktānityapadārthaviṣayatvenānityaviṣaya ātmaśabdaḥ sādhyate / tathāpi rūpādivyatiriktaviṣayābhyupagamād virodha iti / | If the word 'ātman' is established as referring to something impermanent other than the body etc., then [this leads to] a contradiction because [it] admits something distinct from form etc. |
tadetat pratividhatte ghaṭādiṣvityādi / | This [objection] is countered [by the phrase] beginning with "in regard to jars etc." |
ghaṭādiṣu samānaṃ ca yavairātmā{yannairātṃyaṃ---}niṣidhyate / parairviccharīre 'smiṃs tadātmābhiḥ prasadhyate // | That same [kind of] "soullessness" which others seek to negate regarding jars and other [things], we shall prove regarding this living body. |
tadetad bhavato 'pi tulyaṃ codyam / | This objection applies equally to your [position] as well. |
tathā hi ghaṭādiṣu bāhyeṣu ātmānadhiṣṭhitatvena tadupabhogānāyatanatvenavā nairātmyaṃ bhavadbhir apīṣyata eva / | For you too certainly accept the soullessness of external things like jars, either because they are not inhabited by a soul or because they are not receptacles for [the soul's] experience. |
anyathā nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaśarīramaprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgād ghaṭādivad iti prasaṅge dṛṣṭāntatvena teṣām upādānaṃ na syāt / tataś ca tatrāpi ghaṭādiṣu tulyaṃ codyaṃ"kathameṣāṃ nairātmyaṃ yadi tāvad ātmānupakārakam"ityādi / | Otherwise, you could not use them as examples in the argument "this living body is not soulless, because [if it were] it would lack breath etc., like jars etc." And then the same question would apply to jars etc.: "how are they soulless - is it because they do not serve the soul?" etc. |
tasmādyena prakāreṇātmānadhiṣṭhitatvena vā tadupabhogānāyatanatvena vā teṣu ghaṭādiṣu bāhyeṣu sarveṣu sādhāraṇaṃ nairātmyaṃ bhavatām api prasiddham / | Therefore, in whatever way - whether through not being inhabited by a soul or through not being receptacles for [the soul's] experience - you too accept the universal soullessness of all external things like jars. |
yac ca jīvaccharīre bhavadbhir niṣidhyate nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīram iti yasya niṣedhājjīvaccharīram eva sātmakamupagamyate na mṛtaśarīraghaṭādaya iti tadevāsmābhiḥ prasādhyate nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīraṃ vastutvādibhya iti / | And what you deny regarding the living body by saying "this living body is not soulless" - from which denial you accept that only the living body has a soul, not dead bodies or jars etc. - that very [point] we prove [differently]: "the living body is soulless because it is a real thing" etc. |
tasmād ātmano 'nupakārakam ityādivikalpo 'nāspada eva bhavatām api nairātmyasya prasiddhatvāt / | Therefore, the alternatives like "it does not serve the soul" etc. are entirely baseless, since you too accept soullessness [in some cases]. |
kiṃ ca yattāvaduktamātmānupakāritvasiddhau na dṛṣṭānto 'stīti tadasamyak / | Further, what has been stated [by you], that "there is no corroborative instance to prove the non-usefulness [of the body] to the soul" - that is incorrect. |
tathā hi śakyam evaṃ prasādhayitum yo yasya svabhāvātiśayaṃ nādhatte nāsau tasyopakārī yathā vindhyo himavataḥ nādhatte cātmano nityaikarūpasya svabhāvātiśayaṃ śarīrādaya iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ / | For it is possible to establish this thus: Whatever does not add any exceptional property to something cannot be useful to that thing - like the Vindhya [mountain] to the Himālaya; and the body and other [things] do not add any exceptional property to the eternally uniform soul - [this follows] from the non-perception of the pervader. |
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