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evaṃ jñātāraṃ dharmiṇaṃ kṛtvā prayogo darśitaḥ | Thus has been shown the argument taking the cognizer as the subject (dharmin) |
sāmpratamahampratyayānāṃ sādhyadharmitāṃ kṛtvā prayogāntaraṃ darśayannāha teṣām ityādi | [The author], showing another argument by taking the present ahaṃpratyayas as having the property to be proved, speaks [the words] beginning with "teṣām" |
teṣām iti atītādyananānām ahampratyayānām sādhyateti | [The phrase] "teṣām" [refers to] the ahaṃpratyayas of the past etc., [and] "sādhyatā" [means] they fulfill the conditions of the probandum |
katham ity āha ekasantānetyādi | [To the question] "how?", he states [the verse] beginning with "ekasantāna" |
ekasantānasambandhajñātrahampratyayatvataḥ hyastanādyatanāḥ sarve tulyārthā ekabuddhivat | All [ahaṃpratyayas], both of yesterday and today, must have the same object because they are ahaṃpratyayas belonging to a cognizer connected with one and the same continuum, like a single cognition |
hyastanādyatanāḥ sarve ahampratyayā ityayaṃ sādhyadharminirdeśaḥ / | "All I-notions [belonging to both] yesterday and today" - this states the subject [pakṣa] in regard to which the probandum is to be predicated. |
tulyārthā iti sādhyadharmaḥ / ekaviṣayā ity arthaḥ / | "[They] have the same object" - this states the probandum; the meaning is that [they] have one and the same object. |
ekena devadattādisantānena sambaddho yo jñātā tatra tasya vā ye 'hampratyayā ekasantānasambaddhajñātrahampratyayāḥ tadbhāvastatvam / | [The probans consists in their] being such I-notions as belong to a cognizer who is connected with one and the same continuum, such as that of a single person like Devadatta. |
ayaṃ ca hetunirdeśaḥ / | And this is the statement of the probans. |
ahampratyayatvamātraṃ puruṣāntarīyeṣvapyahaṅkāreṣu pravartata ityato 'naikāntikatvaparihārārtham ekasantānasambaddhajñātṛviṣayatvaṃ hetuviśeṣaṇaṃ kṛtam / | Since the mere character of being an I-notion applies also to the I-notions of other persons, therefore to avoid [the fault of] inconclusiveness, the probans has been qualified by [the specification of] pertaining to a cognizer connected with one and the same continuum. |
ekabuddhivad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ / | "Like a single cognition" - this is the corroborative instance. |
tad atretyādinottarapakṣam ārabhate / | With [the words] "tad atra" etc., [the author] begins the counter-position. |
tad atra cintyate nityamekaṃ caitanyamiṣyate / yadi buddhir api prāptā tadrūpaiva tathā sati // | In this connection, this is to be considered: if consciousness is accepted as eternal and one, then cognition too would necessarily have that same nature. |
yadi hi caitanyaṃ nityaikarūpamaṅgīkriyate tadā buddhir api caitanyarūpāvyatirekānnityaikarūpā prāpnoti / | For if consciousness is accepted as eternal and one in nature, then cognition too, being non-different from the nature of consciousness, would necessarily be eternal and one in nature. |
na caivamiṣṭamato 'bhyupagamavirodhaḥ pratijñāyāḥ / | And this [conclusion] is not desirable [for you], therefore [there is] a contradiction with [your own] accepted position regarding the thesis. |
tathā hi bhāṣyakāreṇoktam kṣaṇikā hi sā na buddhyantarakālamavatiṣṭhata iti / tathā jaiminināpy uktam satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tatpratyakṣam iti / | Thus indeed, the Bhāṣyakāra has stated: "It [cognition] is momentary and does not persist during the time of another cognition." Likewise, Jaimini too has stated: "Perception is the arising of cognition in a person when the senses come into contact with an existent [object]." |
nityatve sati janmāyogāt / | Because if [cognition] were eternal, its production would be impossible. |
svavacanavirodhaś ca kumārilasya yathoktaṃ tenaiva na hi tatkṣaṇamapyāste jāyate vāpramātmakam / yenārthagrahaṇe paścād vyāpriyetendriyādivat // | And [there would be] self-contradiction in Kumārila's own words, as he himself has stated: "It neither remains for even a moment, nor does it arise as invalid [cognition], by which it could later engage in grasping objects like the senses and so forth." |
ekatvāc ca buddheḥ pramāṇaṣaṭkābhyupagamavirodhaś ca / | And due to [assuming] the oneness of cognition, [there would be] contradiction with the accepted doctrine of six pramāṇas. |
buddhīnām api caitanyasvābhāvyātpuruṣasya ca / nityatvamekatāceṣṭā bhedaścedviṣayāśrayaḥ // | The eternality and oneness of both cognitions and the puruṣa is claimed due to [their] having the nature of consciousness; and if there is difference, it is based on [their] objects. |
buddhīnāṃ puruṣasya ca nityatvamekatā ceṣṭā kasmātcaitanyasvābhāvyāt buddhilakṣaṇacaitanyasvābhāvyāt puruṣasyāsmanmatenetyarthaḥ / | The eternality and oneness of cognitions and the puruṣa is claimed - why? Due to [their] having the nature of consciousness; that is, according to our view, because the puruṣa has the nature of consciousness characterized by cognitions. |
kathaṃ tarhi rūpabuddhī rasabuddhir ityādi bhedaḥ pratīyata ity āha bhedaścedviṣayāśraya iti / | "How then," [one asks], "is difference perceived as 'color-cognition', 'taste-cognition' and so forth?" He responds: "If there is difference, it is based on objects." |
cecchabdaḥ paramatābhyupagame / | The word "if" [refers to] the acceptance of another's view. |
yadyevaṃ kalpyata ity arthaḥ // | The meaning is: "if it is assumed thus." |
syād etad yadi nityaikā buddhis tadā kimiti krameṇa rūpādīn pratipadyate / yāvatā sakṛdeva pratīyād viśeṣābhāvād ity āha svarūpeṇetyādi / | This objection might arise: if cognition is eternal and one, then why does it apprehend color and other [objects] in sequence? Since there is no distinction [in cognition itself], it should apprehend [everything] simultaneously - thus he says "by its own nature" and so forth. |
svarūpeṇa tathā vahnir nityaṃ dahanadharmakaḥ / upanītaṃ dahatyarthaṃ dāhyaṃ nānyan na cānyadā // | Though by its very nature fire is eternally of the nature of burning, it burns only what is brought near [to it], [and] only what is combustible, not anything else, nor at any other time. |
yathā kila vahnir nityaṃ dahanātmako 'pi san na sarvadā dahati kiṃ tarhiupanītam ḍhaukitam eva dahati | Just as fire, even though eternally possessing the nature of burning, does not burn at all times, but rather burns only what is brought near [to it]. |
tatrāpi yadeva dāhyaṃ dagdhuṃ śakyaṃ tadeva dahati nābhrādikam ityato dāhyam ity āha | Even then it burns only that which is capable of being burnt, not things like the sky and so forth; therefore it is said [to burn only what is] combustible. |
yathā vetyādinā dṛṣṭāntāntaram āha | By [the words] beginning with "yathā vā" [he] presents another example. |
yathā vā darpaṇaḥ svaccho yathā vā sphaṭikopalaḥ / yadevādhīyate tatra tacchāyāṃ pratipadyate | Just as a clean mirror or a crystal stone receives the reflection of only what is placed before it. |
tathaiva nityacaitanyaḥ pumāṃso dehavṛttayaḥ / gṛhṇantī karaṇānītān rūpādīndhīrasau ca naḥ | In the same way, souls, though possessing eternal consciousness, [when] embodied, grasp colors and other [objects] brought [to them] by the sense organs, and this is [what we call] our cognition. |
malinasya cchāyāpratipattyabhāvāt svaccha ityuktam | The word "clean" is used because something dirty does not receive reflections. |
ḍhaukyata ity arthaḥ / tathaiveti dārṣṭāntikopadarśanam | The meaning is "is brought near"; "in the same way" shows the application of the example. |
yattvetannityaṃ caitanyamasāvasmākaṃ dhīḥ; buddhiḥ na tu sāṅkhyavat tadvyatirekī buddhiḥ | This eternal consciousness is our cognition [itself], not something separate from consciousness as [maintained] by the Sāṅkhyas. |
yadyevaṃ katham asau dhīrbhaṅginī prasiddhetyetadāśaṅkya tenetyādinā sūcitam eva kāraṇamupadarśayan buddher bhaṅginītvaṃ samarthayate | If this is so, then how is it that this cognition is commonly known to be diverse? Having raised this doubt, [he] explains the reason already indicated by [the words] beginning with "tena" and thus establishes the diversity of cognition. |
tenopanetṛsaṃrambhabhaṅgitvād bhaṅginī matiḥ | Therefore cognition appears diverse due to the diversity of what is brought [before it] by the presenters [i.e., the sense organs]. |
tatra bodhātmakatvena pratyabhijñāyate matiḥ | There [in that case] cognition is recognized through its nature of being consciousness. |
saiveti nocyate buddhir arthabhedānusāribhiḥ / na cāstyapratyabhijñānam arthabheda upāśrite | Those who follow the diversity of objects do not speak of cognition as "that same [cognition]," yet there is no non-recognition [of cognition] when the diversity of objects is attended to. |
pratipattṛbhiḥ | [This refers to] those who understand [or perceive]. |
anenānvayavyatirekābhyāṃ arthabhedakṛta eva buddhirbheda iti darśayati | This shows through positive and negative concomitance that the difference in cognitions is caused solely by the difference in objects. |
na cāstyapratyabhijñānam iti | And there is no non-recognition [of cognition], [which means] there is recognition. |
nanv ityādinā pratividhatte | [The opponent] responds with "if" and so forth. |
pratyayā ye pravartante bhedas tatra kimāśrayaḥ | What is the basis for the difference in those cognitions that arise [in imagination]? |
yadi hyarthabhedakṛta eva buddhirbhedas tadā ye hastyādiśūnyāyāṃ bhuvi krameṇa gajaturagādīnavasthitān samāropayantaḥ pratyayāḥ pravartante teṣu bhedaḥ kimāśrayaḥ pratīyeta / naiva kaścidbhedavyavasthāśrayo 'stīti yāvat | If the difference in cognitions is caused solely by the difference in objects, then what could be the basis for the difference in those cognitions that arise successively imposing [the concepts of] elephants, horses, etc. on ground where there are no elephants, etc.? [This means] there is indeed no basis for establishing any difference. |
tathā hi na svato bhedo 'sti | For there is no difference [in cognitions] in themselves. |
sravabuddhīnām ekatvābhyupagamāt | Because all cognitions are accepted as being one. |
nāpyupadhānabhūtaviṣayanānātvāt tatropadhāyakasya kasyacid arthasyābhāvāt | Nor [can the difference be] due to the multiplicity of superimposed objects, because there is no real object there doing the superimposition. |
svaprādipratyaye bāhyaṃ sarvathā nahi neṣyate / sarvatrālambanaṃ bāhyaṃ deśakālānyathātmakam // | [It is claimed that] external objects are not accepted in any way in self-illuminating cognition, [though] everywhere [there is supposed to be] an external basis characterized by different times and places. |
anyadeśādibhāvinyo vyaktayaś cen nibandhanam / | If the individual objects existing at other places and times are [claimed to be] the basis [of cognition], |
sarvatrālambanaṃ yasmād deśakālāny athātmakam // | because in every case there is a basis [that exists] with a different nature in terms of place and time, |
buddher bhedavyavasthānaṃ prati kāraṇam ity arthaḥ / | The meaning is that [nibandhanam refers to] the cause for establishing the diversity of cognitions. |
deśakālāvanyathātmakāvanyaprakārau yasya tat tathoktam deśakālābhyāṃ vānyathātmā yasyeti vigrahaḥ // | The compound "deśakālānyathātmakam" is to be analyzed as "that which has time and place different [from the cognition]" or as "that whose nature is different with respect to time and place." |
nanvityādinā pratividhatte | [The author] gives a response beginning with "nanu." |
nanu taddeśasambandho naiva tāsāṃ tathāsti tat / | But indeed, these [cognitions] have no connection with that place in that way; |
kimiti pratibhāsante tena rūpeṇa tatra ca // | why then do they appear in that form and in that place? |
yasmin hi deśe yena krameṇa tāḥ samāropitā vyaktayas tadā pratibhāsante tena deśena sambnadho naiva tāsāṃ deśāntarakālāntaragatānāṃ tathā tena krameṇāsti | For in whatever place and in whatever sequence those superimposed individuals appear, there is no connection between them [and] that place, since they belong to different places and times, [nor is there a connection] with that sequence. |
na hyanyena rūpeṇānyasya pratibhāsanaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | For it is not reasonable that one thing should appear in the form of another, as this would lead to an unwanted consequence [of everything being able to appear as anything else]. |
evaṃ hi sarvam eva jñānaṃ sarvaviṣayaṃ prasajyeta / tataśca pratiniyatārthavyavasthoccheda eva syāt // | If [this were accepted], then all cognition would [necessarily] extend to all objects, and consequently there would be a complete disruption of [all] specifically determined object-relations. |
bhavan mate hi nākāro buddher bāhyastu varṇyate / | According to your view, the external form is not described as belonging to cognition. |
na vivakṣitadeśe ca gajayaṣṭyādayaḥ sthitāḥ // | And [according to you] the elephant, pole, and other [objects] do not [actually] exist in the intended location. |
kiṃ ca bhavato mīmāṃsakasya mate yo bhāsamānaḥ sa ākāro na buddheḥ; kintvasau bāhyārthasvabhāvo varṇyate / | Moreover, according to your Mīmāṃsaka view, that form which appears [in cognition] does not belong to cognition; rather, it is described as having the nature of an external object. |
yadi nāmaivambhūtaṃ tataḥ kimityāha na vivakṣitetyādi / | [If you ask] "What if it is indeed so?" [then we respond with] the statement about "not in the intended [location]" and so forth. |
tataś ca yaddeśakālasambaddhaste gajādayas taddeśasambandhitvenaiva pratibhāseran / | In that case, those elephants and other [objects] which are connected with [specific] space and time should appear only as connected with that [same] space. |
svavirahiṇi tu deśāntare kālāntare ca kimiti pratibhāsante / | Why then do they appear in a different space and time where they themselves are not present? |
tasmānnirālambanā evaite pratyayāḥ paramārthato 'saṅkīrṇasvabhāvāścalātmānaś ca; kādācitkatvād iti siddham / | Therefore it is established that these cognitions are objectless, fundamentally of unmixed nature, and mobile in essence, [as proven] by their occasional nature. |
tat svabhāvasya ca puṃso 'nityatvānekatve ca siddhe / | And thus it is established that the self, which has that [cognition] as its nature, is both impermanent and multiple. |
syān matam pratyayas tasya puruṣasya dharmaḥ; tena tasya bhede 'pi na puṃso bhedo dharmitvāt tasyeti / | [One might object:] "Cognition is a property of the puruṣa [self]; therefore, even when it [cognition] is different, the self is not different, as it is the property-bearer." |
tadayuktam pratyayaścaitanyaṃ buddhir jñānamityanarthāntaratvāt / | This is incorrect, because pratyaya [cognition], caitanya [consciousness], buddhi [intelligence], and jñāna [knowledge] are not different things [but synonymous]. |
na hi nāmabhedamātreṇa vastūnāṃ svabhāvo bhidyate / | [Indeed,] the nature of things does not become different merely through a difference in names. |
kiṃ ca nāmabhede 'pi teṣāṃ pratyayānāṃ caitanyātmakamekamanugāmirūpamiṣṭameva / tasya ca caitanyasyābhede pratyayānām api tat svabhāvānām avibhāga eva / | Moreover, even with a difference in their names, these cognitions are [already] accepted [by you] as having the nature of a single, continuous consciousness (caitanya); and since this consciousness is undivided, there can be no distinction among the cognitions which share that nature. |
anyathā hi viruddhadharmādhyāsādekāntiko bheda eva syāt / | For if it were otherwise, due to the attribution of contradictory properties, there would necessarily be an absolute difference [between them]. |
etenaiva nirālambanapratyayapratipādanenāpratyakṣatvaṃ buddheḥ pratyuktam / | By this same demonstration of cognitions being without [external] support, the imperceptibility of cognition has [also] been refuted. |
tathā hi sa parisphurannākāro na bāhyo gajādir iti sādhitam tataś ca taṃtathā parisphurantamākāramātmabhūtam eva pratipadyamānā buddhayaḥ svayamprakāśarūpatvāt svasaṃvidrūpāḥ siddhyanti // | For it has been proven that the appearing form is not [the] external elephant etc.; and therefore the cognitions, apprehending that appearing form as being identical with themselves, are established as being of the nature of self-awareness due to their self-luminous character. |
sarvārthabodharūpā ca yadi buddhiḥ sadā sthitā / sarvadā sarvasaṃvittis tat kimarthaṃ na vidyate // | If cognition always exists in the form of apprehension of all things, then why is there not cognition of everything at all times? |
yadi sarvārthabodharūpā sadā buddhir avasthitā tadā sarvadā sarvārthavedanaprasaṅgaḥ // | If cognition, which has the nature of apprehension of all things, exists eternally, then it would follow that all things would be cognized at all times. |
katham ity āha śabdopadhānetyādi / | [The opponent] explains how [this is so] by [stating] "śabdopadhāna" etc. |
śabdopadhānā yā buddhī rasarūpādigocarā / saiva hīti na cedbhedās tvayā caivopapāditāḥ // | That cognition upon which sound is superimposed must be the same [cognition] that apprehends taste, color, and other [objects]; if this is not [accepted], then differences [among cognitions] have indeed been admitted by you yourself. |
tathā hi yā śabdopadhānā śabdaviṣayā buddhiḥ; saiva rasarūpādiviṣayā; nānyā; tataścaikārthānubhavavelāyām aśeṣārthānubhavaprasaṅgaḥ; tadupalambhātmikāyā buddheḥ sarvadā vyavasthitatvāt / | Thus, the cognition on which sound is imposed [and which is] the cognition of sound would be the very same [cognition] that apprehends taste, color and other things, [and] not different; consequently, at the time of experiencing one object, there would follow the experience of all objects, because that cognition which is of the nature of apprehending [all objects] would be ever-present. |
ekayānekavijñāne buddheta sakṛdeva tat / | If many [things] are cognized by a single cognition, all that would be cognized simultaneously. |
aviśeṣāt krameṇāpi mā bhūt tadaviśeṣaḥ // | Due to [there being] no distinction, there could not even be a sequence [of cognitions], as there would be no distinction in that [cognition]. |
na cediti / | If this is not [accepted]; |
yadi yā śabdopadhānā buddhiḥ saiva rasādigocarā nāṅgīkriyate evaṃ sati bhedo buddhīnāṃ bhavatā svavācaivopapāditaḥ syāt // | If you do not accept that the cognition on which sound is imposed is the very same [cognition] that apprehends taste and other things, then, in that case, the difference among cognitions would be established by your own statement. |
yaścāyaṃ vahnidṛṣṭāntaḥ so 'pyasiddha iti darśayann āha samastetyādi / | [Now the author], showing that this example of fire is also unproven, states [the verse beginning with] "samasta" etc. |
samastadāhyarūpāṇāṃ na nityaṃ dahanātmakaḥ / | [Fire] is not eternally of the nature of burning with respect to all burnable forms; |
kṛśānurapi niḥśeṣamanyathā bhasmasād bhavet // | otherwise even fire would reduce everything completely to ashes. |
na hyaśedṣadāhyadahanasvabhāvo dahano nityamavasthito 'nyathā sakalam eva dāhyaṃ bhasmasādbhavet; dahanajvalānuṣaktadāhyavat sadāsannihitasvadāhakatvāt / | For the burner [i.e., fire] is not eternally present as having the nature of burning all combustible things; otherwise everything combustible would be reduced to ashes, because it would always have its burner present, like a combustible thing that is in contact with a burning flame. |
na kevalaṃ buddhiḥ sarvārthabodhasvabhāvā na bhavatītyapiśabdena darśayati // | By the word "api" [in the verse], [the author] shows that it is not only cognition that is not of the nature of apprehending all objects. |
yadyevaṃ nityadahanātmakaḥ kṛśānur na bhavati; kathaṃ tarhyupanītamapyarthaṃ dahed ity āha dāhyārthasannidhāv ityādi / | If thus fire is not eternally of the nature of burning, how then would it burn even an object that is presented [to it]? To [answer] this, [the author] states [the verse beginning with] "dāhyārthasannidhāv" etc. |
dāhyārthasannidhāveva tasya taddāhakātmatā | It is only when [fire] is in close proximity to the combustible object that it has the nature of being its burner |
yuktā sarvārthadāho hi sakṛdevaṃ na sajyate | For this reason, the burning of all things does not occur simultaneously |
evam iti | Thus it is |
samanantaroditārthābhyupagame sati; sarvārthadāho yugapan na sajyate na prasajyata ity arthaḥ | When accepting the view just stated above, the burning of all things does not occur simultaneously – this is the meaning |
nīlopalādisambandhād ityādi / nīlotpalādisambandhād darpaṇasphaṭikādayaḥ / tacchāyāvibhramotpādahetavaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅginaḥ | Through connection with blue lotuses and such things, mirrors, crystals and similar [objects], being momentary in nature, become causes of producing the illusion of their reflections |
sopadhānetarāvastha eka eveti sarvadā | [If this were not so], it would always remain one and the same whether in the state of having adjuncts or not having adjuncts |
tacchāyas tadviyukto vā sa dṛśyetānyathā punaḥ | And consequently it would be seen either always with its reflection or always without it |
sphaṭikadarpaṇādiḥ pratikṣaṇadhvaṃsī san nīlotpalādisamparkād viparyastajñānotpattāvādhipatyaṃ pratipadyate | The crystal, mirror and similar [objects], being destructible every moment, acquire the power to produce erroneous cognition when they come into contact with blue lotuses and such things |
anyathā yadyakṣaṇikaḥ san chāyāṃ pratipadyeta; tadā ya eva sopadhānāvasthaḥ sa evānupadhānavasthitir iti kṛtvā; nīlādyupadhānaviyukto 'pi nīlādicchāyaḥ samupalabhyeta; aparityaktapūrvarūpatvāt / yadvopadhānāvasthāyām api nīlādyākāraviyukto dṛśyeta; pūrvarūpāviśeṣād iti | If, on the other hand, it were non-momentary while receiving reflections, then – since the state with adjuncts would be identical to the state without adjuncts – either the reflection of blue and other [colors] would be perceived even when separated from the blue and other adjuncts (because it would not have abandoned its previous form), or even in the state of having adjuncts it would be seen without the form of blue etc. (because there would be no difference from its previous form) |
etena akṣaṇikapakṣe sāmānyena sarveṣām eva sphaṭikadarśapaṇādīnāṃ chāyāpratipattir apāstā | By this [argument], the possibility of reflections in general for all crystals, mirrors and similar [objects] is refuted under the non-momentary view |
sthiratvānnirvibhāgatvān mūrtānām asahasthiteḥ / bibharti darpaṇatalaṃ naiva cchāyāṃ kadācana // | The mirror-surface never contains [any] reflection, because it is permanent, because it is indivisible, and because material forms cannot subsist together [in one place]. |
sthiratvāt akṣaṇikatvāt; darpaṇatalaṃ pūrvacchāyāṃ bibhartīti sambandhaḥ / | Because it is permanent, i.e., because it is non-momentary, the mirror-surface cannot contain [any] previous reflection - this is the connection. |
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