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kṣaṇikatve 'pi nirvibhāgatvān na bibharīti sambandhanīyam / | Even if [the mirror-surface] were momentary, it cannot contain [the reflection] because it is indivisible. |
tathā hi kūpāntargatodakavaddarpaṇatale pratibimbakamantargatamupalabhyate;na ca darpaṇatalasya vibhāgaḥ randhramasti; nibiḍatarāvayavasanniveśāt; tasmād bhrāntiriyam / | For just as water is perceived [as being] inside a well, the reflection is perceived [as being] inside the mirror-surface; and yet the mirror-surface has no divisions [or] empty space, because its component parts are very densely arranged; therefore this [perception] is an illusion. |
athavā nirvibhāgatvaṃ pūrvottarāvasthāyām anānātvam / | Or [the term] 'nirvibhāgatva' [means] the absence of difference between prior and subsequent states. |
atra kāraṇaṃ sthiratvād iti / | And the reason for this [absence of difference] is "because it is permanent." |
tenāyamartho bhavati / sthiratvena nirvibhāgatvāt pūrvottarāvasthārahitatvād ity arthaḥ / | Thus the meaning becomes: "because due to [its] permanence it is indivisible," that is, because it lacks prior and subsequent states. |
kiṃ ca mūrtānām asahasthiteḥ naiva darpaṇatalaṃ chāyāṃ bibhartīti sambadhyate / | Moreover, "because material forms cannot subsist together, the mirror-surface cannot contain [any] reflection" - this is how [the sentence] should be construed. |
tathā hi darpaṇatale taddeśānyeva parvatādipratibimbānyupalabhyante; na camūrtaḥ padārthāḥ kadācid ekadeśatām āpadyante; aikātmyaprasaṅgāt / | For in the mirror-surface, reflections of mountains and such are perceived [as occupying] the very same space; but material objects can never occupy the same space, because [if they did] they would [absurdly] become identical. |
etac ca kṣaṇikākṣaṇikatve sādhāraṇaṃ dūṣaṇam // | And this objection applies equally whether [things are considered] momentary or non-momentary. |
pārśvadvitayasaṃsthāś ca suśuklaṃ sphaṭikopalam / samīkṣyante tad eṣo 'pi na chāyāṃ pratipannatvāt // | [Those] standing on both sides perceive the crystal as purely white; hence this [crystal] also does not take on the reflection. |
tathā hi yadi vāgrataḥ sthitaḥ pratipattā japākusumasamparkād raktaṃ sphaṭikamupalabhate; tadaiva ye pārśvaddhitayāvasthitās te sakalam eva sphaṭikopalaṃ suśuklamupalabhante; na bhāgaśaḥ / | For when the perceiver standing in front perceives the crystal [placed] in contact with the japā flower as red, at that very time those standing on both sides perceive the entire crystal as purely white, not [even] partially [red]. |
tataś ca yadi chāyāpratipattis tasyābhaviṣyat tadā puro 'vasthitapuṃsa iva pārśvaddhitayāvasthitayor api pratipanno raktāvabhāsā pratipattir abhaviṣyat / | And if there were an actual transformation into a reflection, then just like for the person standing in front, for those standing on both sides too there would have been a perception appearing as red. |
ayaṃ ca kṣaṇikākṣaṇikapakṣayorapi sādhāraṇo doṣaḥ // | And this flaw applies equally to both the momentary and non-momentary views. |
bhedaḥ pratyupadhānaṃ cetyādinā tv akṣaṇikatvapakṣa eva doṣam āha | With [the words] beginning "difference [and] each presentation," he states a flaw specific to the non-momentary view. |
yadi hi paramārthataḥ sphaṭikāder upadhānoparāgapratipattir bhavet tadā yathākramabhāvinīnām upadhānamupadhānaṃ chāyānāṃ svabhāvabhedānnaikātmyam / | For if there were truly a transformation of the crystal etc. into the reflection of the presented object, then just as there is no identity among the successively appearing reflections of each presented object due to their different natures, |
tadvattadātmanaḥ sphaṭikāder apyupadhānamupadhānaṃ prati pratyupadhānam bhedaḥ prasajyeta / | Similarly for the crystal etc. itself, there would follow a difference for each presentation with respect to each presented object. |
yadi punar bhrāntiriyamityaṅgīkriyate tadāyam adoṣa iti jñāpanārthaṃ tātvikītyāha // | He uses the word "real" to indicate that if this is accepted as an illusion, then this flaw does not apply. |
tasmādbhrāntir iyaṃ teṣu vicitrācintyaśaktiṣu / | Therefore this [perception of reflection] is an illusion [occurring] in those [things] possessing diverse unthinkable powers. |
yadyevaṃ kasmāt sphaṭikādāveva sā bhrāntir bhavati na kuḍyādāvityāha vicitrācintyaśaktiṣviti / | [To the question] "If this is so, why does this illusion occur only in crystal etc. and not in walls etc.?" he says "[in things] possessing diverse unthinkable powers." |
vicitrāḥ nānāprakārāḥ; acintyāḥ śaktyo yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | "Diverse" [means] of various kinds; those which have "unthinkable" powers are called thus. |
na hi bhāvānāṃ śaktipratiniyamaḥ paryanuyogamarhati svahetuparamparākṛtatvāt tasya / | No objection can be raised against the specific potencies of things, since these [potencies] are produced by their respective chains of causes. |
bhavatām api cātrāṃśe nāsti vivādaḥ / | And you too can have no dispute regarding this point. |
yathoktam agnirdahati nākāśaṃ ko 'tra paryanuyojyatām iti / | As has been stated: "Fire burns [but] not ākāśa - who can raise an objection to this?" |
yadyevaṃ buddhāvapi tarhi viṣayacchāyāpratipattir bhrāntirevāstu mābhūcchāyāpratipattir ity āha | [Someone might say:] "If this is so, then in the case of cognition also, the apprehension of the reflection of objects might be mere illusion, [and] there need not be [actual] reflection-apprehension." |
na buddhau bhrāntibhāvo 'pi yukto bhedaviyogataḥ // | In cognition, even illusion is not possible, due to the absence of difference. |
na buddhau bhrāntisadbhāvo yuktaḥ / | The existence of illusion is not possible in cognition. |
na kevalaṃ chāyāpratipattir na yuktetyapiśabdaḥ / | The word "api" [even] [indicates that] not only is reflection-apprehension impossible. |
kasmāt/ bhedaviyogataḥ bhedābhāvāt / | Why? Due to the absence of difference, because there is no differentiation. |
sphaṭikādiṣu hi bhrāntiryuktā; tebhyo bhinnāyā buddher bhrāntāyāḥ sambhavāt; natvevaṃ buddhāvaparā bhrāntirūpā buddhir asti; yasmād ekaiva buddhir iṣṭā / | For in cases like crystal, illusion is possible because an illusory cognition different from these [objects] can exist; but in cognition, there cannot be another cognition in the form of illusion, since cognition is accepted as being singular. |
na ca svayam eva vibhramarūpā jāyate dhīriti yuktaṃ vaktum; buddher nityatvābhyupagamāt // | Nor can it be said that cognition itself arises in the form of illusion, since cognition is accepted to be eternal. |
abodharūpabhedaṃ tu samānaṃ sarvabuddhiṣu | The character of being different from non-cognition is common to all cognitions |
āropya pratyabhijñānaṃ nānātve 'pi pravartate | Recognition proceeds even in [cases of] diversity through [such] superimposition |
anaikāntikametat pratyabhijñānam; yasmād avabodharūpebhyo ghaṭādibhyo bhedam vyāvṛttiṃ samāropya pratyabhijñānaṃ sarvabuddhiṣu nānātve satyapi pravartamānamaviruddham eva | This recognition is inconclusive, since recognition operating in all cognitions, even when diversity exists, through the superimposition of difference from non-cognitive things like pots, is not contradictory |
avaśyaṃ vaitadvijñeyam yannānātvaṃ eva sati vijātīyavyāvṛttinibandhanakṛtametat pratyabhijñānam na punar anānātva eveti | This must be understood: that this recognition occurs precisely when there is diversity, being based on exclusion from what is of a different kind, and not in [cases of] non-diversity |
tathā hi nirālambanāsu samāropabuddhiṣvarthabhede 'nupāśrite 'pyapratyabhijñānamastyeva | For indeed, in [the case of] superimposed cognitions without [real] objects, even when difference between objects is not admitted, there is certainly non-recognition |
na hi tatraivaṃ bhavati; yaiva gajabuddhirāsīt saiva turaṅgasyandanabuddhir iti | For there is no [recognition] there like "the very cognition which was of an elephant is the same as the cognition of a horse and chariot" |
prasādhitaṃ cānālambanatvamāsāṃ buddhīnām iti na punar ucyate | And since the objectlessness of these cognitions has [already] been established, it is not stated again |
tena yaduktam "na cāstyapratyabhijñānamarthabhede 'nupāśrite" iti; tadasiddham iti grahītavyam | Therefore what was stated that "there is no non-recognition when difference between objects is not admitted" should be considered unproven |
kiṃ ca yadi nityaikarūpa ātmeṣyate bhavadbhis tadā sukhādyavasthābhedo naprāpnoti | Moreover, if the Self is accepted by you to be eternally of one form, then differences in states like pleasure etc. would not be possible |
atha sukhādyavasthābhedo 'bhyupagamyate na tarhi nityaikarūpatvamasyābhyupetavyam | If difference in states like pleasure etc. is accepted, then its being eternally of one form cannot be accepted |
na hyekasya bhedābhedau parasparaviruddhau svabhāvau yuktāv iti | For difference and non-difference, being mutually contradictory natures, cannot reasonably [exist] in one [thing] |
etaccodyaparihārārthaṃ yatkumārilenoktaṃ tattāvad dūṣayitum upakṣipannāha | He introduces what Kumārila said to address this objection, in order to refute it |
atra kāraṇam āha sthirātmanīti | Here he states the reason regarding the permanent Self |
sthiraḥ nityaḥ, ātmā svabhāvo yasyātmanaḥ, sa tathoktaḥ | [He is called] stable [and] eternal, whose nature is the Self |
yadi vā avasthābhedaḥ avasthāviśeṣāḥ sukhādayaḥ, tebhya ekāntena bhedaḥ pṛthagbhāvaḥ, tena śūnyas tadavyatirikto 'pītyarthaḥ | Or if [there are] different states, [namely] specific conditions such as pleasure and so forth, [the Self] is absolutely distinct from them, [meaning it is] devoid of them while not being separate [from them] |
sukhaduḥkhādyavasthāś ca gacchannapi naro mama ciatanyadravyasattvādirūpaṃ naiva vimuñcati | Even while [the Self] undergoes states of pleasure, pain and so forth, my soul never abandons its nature of being conscious, being a substance, having existence and so forth |
gacchannapi | [Even while] undergoing |
nara iti | [The word] "nara" [means] the soul |
sattvādītyādiśabdena jñeyatvaprameyatvakartṛtvabhoktṛtvādisāmānyadharmaparigrahaḥ | The word "and so forth" includes common properties like being knowable, being cognizable, being an agent, being an experiencer and so on |
na cāvasthāntarotpāde pūrvātyantaṃ vinaśyati | And when a different state arises, the previous [state] is not completely destroyed |
uttarānuguṇārthaṃ tu sāmānyātmani līyate | Rather, it merges into the common Self in order to facilitate the subsequent [state] |
sukhādyāvasthā | [The term "previous state" refers to] the state of pleasure and so forth |
yadyevaṃ sukhādyavasthāyām api duḥkhāvasthā kiṃ na saṃvedyata ity āha uttarānuguṇārtham ityādi | [One asks:] "If this is so, why is the state of pain not experienced even during the state of pleasure?" The answer is given: "It merges..." and so forth |
svarūpeṇaiva hi sthitāyāṃ sukhāvasthāyāṃ nottarā duḥkhāvasthā bhavatītyataḥ sā līyamānā sāmānyātmani sarvāvasthānugāmini caitanyadravyatvādilakṣaṇe uttaraduḥkhāvasthotpādānuguṇā bhavantīti tadarthaṃ sā tatra līyate | Indeed, while the state of pleasure remains in its own form, the subsequent state of pain does not arise; therefore it [the previous state], merging into the common Self which pervades all states and is characterized by consciousness, substantiality and so forth, becomes conducive to the arising of the subsequent state of pain; for this purpose it merges there |
yady evam avasthāntaravat sāmānyātmanyapi layo 'vasthānamayukto virodhādityāśaṅkyāha svarūpeṇa hītyādi | [One might] object: "If this is so, then like [the impossibility of simultaneous] different states, the merging and remaining in the common Self would also be unsuitable due to contradiction" - [to this he] responds: "Indeed in its own form..." and so forth |
svarūpeṇa hy avasthānām anyonyasya virodhitā / | The states, by their own nature, are mutually incompatible [with each other]. |
aviruddhas tu sarvāsu sāmānyātmā pratīyate // | However, the universal Self is perceived as non-contradictory in all [states]. |
svena sukhādirūpeṇāvasthānāṃ parasparaṃ virodhādanyonyaṃ layo na yuktaḥ | Due to the mutual contradiction between states in their form of pleasure and so forth, their mutual dissolution is not logical. |
avasthāntare tu sāmānyātmani laye ko virodho yenāsau tatra na bhavet | But what contradiction could there be in the dissolution into the universal Self in another state, by which it would not occur there? |
tathāhyasau sāmānyātmā sarvāvasthāsvaviruddho 'nuyāyī dṛśyate | For thus that universal Self is seen as the non-contradictory underlying [principle] in all states. |
sarvasyām avasthāyāṃ caitanyādīnām upalambhāt | [This is evident] from the perception of consciousness and other [universal properties] in every state. |
tatretyādinā pratividhatte | [The opponent] responds with "tatra" and so forth. |
tatra no cedavasthānām ekāntena vibhinnatā / puruṣāt tadvyatotpāde syātām asyāpi tau tathā | If there is not complete difference of the states from the puruṣa, then upon their destruction and origination, these two [changes] would likewise occur for it [the puruṣa] as well. |
yadi hi puruṣādavasthānām ekāntena bhedo neṣyate, tadā tadvyayotpāde tāsām avasthānāṃ vyayotpāde sati, asyāpi puṃsastau vyayotpādau syātām | For if absolute difference between the states and puruṣa is not accepted, then when those states undergo destruction and origination, this puruṣa too would undergo those two [changes], destruction and origination. |
ekānteneti vacanaṃ kathañcidapyavyatireke 'vasthāvadudayavyayaprasaṅgo durvāra iti jñāpanārtham | The word "absolutely" is used to indicate that even with the slightest non-difference, the undesirable consequence of [the Self having] origination and destruction like the states would be unavoidable. |
sukhādyavyatiriktasvabhāvaśca puruṣa iti svabhāvahetuḥ | And [the statement that] "the puruṣa has a nature distinct from pleasure etc." is a reason based on essential nature. |
viruddhadharmasaṅge tu bheda ekāntiko bhavet | When there is conjunction of contradictory properties, the difference must be absolute. |
yadi hyavasthānām evotpādavyayau na puruṣasyetyevam utpādānutpādalakṣaṇo viruddhadharmasa[ṅgo] 'bhyupagamyate, tadā bhedaprasaṅgaḥ | If it is accepted that there is a conjunction of contradictory properties characterized by origination and non-origination - namely that origination and destruction belong only to the states and not to the puruṣa - then difference [between them] follows. |
yathā puṃsāṃ bahūnāmparasparaṃ pratisvaṃ niyateta pratyātmaniyatena svabhāvena parasparato bhedaḥ | Just as among the many puruṣas, there is mutual difference due to each one's own nature being restricted to itself. |
etāvan mātranibandhanatvād bhedavyavahārasyeti bhāvaḥ | This is the meaning - because the conventional usage of difference is based merely on this much. |
naikayogakṣemāś ca sukhādyvasthāḥ puṃsā saheti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ // | The states of happiness and the like cannot be co-existent with the soul due to the non-perception of the pervader. |
yac coktam na cāyamavasthāntarotpāde pūrvātyantaṃ vinaśyatīti tatrāha svarūpeṇaivetyādi / | As for what has been stated that "when another state arises, the previous [state] is not entirely destroyed," to this [the author] says "in their own form" etc. |
avasthā hi sāmānyātmani līyamānāḥ svarūpeṇaiva vā līyeran, paraūpeṇa vā / | For states, when merging into the universal soul, would merge either in their own form or in another form. |
yadyādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, tadā sukhādisamudbhave 'pi sukhādyavasthānubhave 'pi, tadduḥkhamapyanubhūyeta upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvāt // | If [we accept] the first alternative, then even when happiness arises, even when the state of happiness is experienced, unhappiness too would be experienced, because it [too] possesses the characteristic of being perceivable. |
na cānyarūpasaṅkrāntāv anyasaṅkrānti{sambhavaḥ} / | And when there is transformation into another form, there cannot be transformation into [yet] another form. |
tādātmyena ca saṅkrāntir ity ātmodayavān bhavet // | And if the transformation [occurs] through identity [with their own form], then the soul would become subject to origination. |
kiṃ ca puṃsi sukhādīnāṃ saṃkrāntis tādātmyenaiveṣṭā / | Moreover, the transformation of happiness and other [states] into the soul must occur through identity [with their own form]. |
tataś ca duḥkhādivat tadavyatirekād ātmā puruṣa udayavān utpattimān bhavet // | And consequently, like unhappiness and other [states], due to non-difference from them, the soul [too] would become subject to origination [and] capable of being produced. |
yadi kartṛtvabhoktṛtve naivāvasthāṃ samāśrite / tadavasthāvatas tatvān na kartṛtvādisambhavaḥ // | If agency and experiencership do not depend on state, then since [these properties can] exist only in one who has that state, agency and other [properties] cannot [exist in the soul]. |
yadi hi pumāṃsamevāśritaṃ kartṛtvādi syāt tadatyaktapūrvarūpasyātmano na sambhavet / | For if agency and other [properties] were to reside in the soul alone, then they could not belong to the soul, which never abandons its previous form. |
prayogaḥ yo 'parityaktākartrabhoktravasthaḥ sa na karoti na cāpi bhuṅkte, yathākāśam, aparityaktākartrabhoktravasthaś ca sarvadā puruṣa iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ // | [The following] is the argument: One who has not abandoned [his] state of being a non-doer and non-experiencer neither acts nor experiences - like ākāśa - and the puruṣa never abandons [its] state of being a non-doer and non-experiencer; thus [we have] a perception contradicting the pervader. |
iti yad etad ācāryadiṅnāgapādair uktaṃ tatra kumārilenoktam | This is what was stated by Ācārya Dignāga, to which Kumārila responded: |
nānityaśabdavācyatvam ātmano vinivāryate / | The fact of the ātman being denoted by the word 'eternal' is not being denied; |
vikriyāmātravācitvāt tadvyucchedo 'sya tāvatā // | [but] due to it denoting mere modification, its destruction [follows] from that much. |
iti tadatra nigamanavyājena doṣamāha tadityādi / tannityaśabdavācyatvaṃ nātmano vinivāryate / | Thus here, under the pretext of a conclusion, he states the fault beginning with "tat": "The fact of the ātman being denoted by the word 'eternal' is not being denied; |
svarūpavikriyāvattvād vyucchedas tasya vidyate // | [but] due to its possessing modification of form, its destruction exists." |
tat tasmāt, nityaśabdavācyatvaṃ na vāryate 'smābhiḥ, svopādānapurassarasya pratikṣaṇadhvaṃsinaścaitanyasyāsaṃsāramavicchedāt / | Therefore, we are not denying the fact of [the ātman] being denoted by the word 'eternal', because consciousness, which perishes moment by moment along with its material cause, continues uninterrupted throughout saṃsāra. |
kintu svarūpasya svabhāvasya, vikriyāvatvāt niyamena pūrvasvabhāvaparityāgāt, svabhāvāntaraprādurbhāvaśceti, vyucchedaḥ vināśo 'tra sphuṭataramevāsajyate // | But since its essential nature possesses modification, necessarily abandons its previous nature, and [since there is] manifestation of another nature, destruction [and] annihilation is here very clearly implied. |
sarpo 'pi kṣaṇabhaṅgitvāt kauṭilyādīn prapadyate / | Even a snake, due to being subject to momentary destruction, attains states like crookedness and so forth; |
sthirarūpe tu puṃsīva nāvasthāntarasaṅgatiḥ // | but if [it had] a permanent form, like the puruṣa, there would be no connection with another state. |
yathaiva hi puṃsi sthiraikarūpatvād avasthāntarasambhavo na yuktas tathā sarpasyāpi / | Just as in the case of the puṃs [Soul], because of [its] being of a single unchanging nature, another state is not possible, so [it is] in the case of the serpent also. |
yadānukṣaṇabhaṅgitāsya bhavet tadā yukto 'vasthāntarasambhavaḥ, svabhāvāntarodayalakṣaṇatvād avasthāntaraprādurbhāvasya // | If it were subject to destruction at every moment, then another state would be possible, since the manifestation of another state is characterized by the arising of another nature. |
yac coktam ahaṃ vedmītyahambuddhir jñātāraṃ pratipadyata iti tadasiddham iti darśayann āha nirālambana evāyam ityādi / | What has been stated [earlier] that "the I-notion in [the cognition] 'I know' apprehends the cognizer" - [the text] shows this to be unproven by saying "this [I-notion] is indeed without foundation" etc. |
na hyasyāhaṅkārasya paramārthataḥ kiñcid ālambanam asti yenāsya viṣayo jñātā syāt / | For this I-consciousness has no real foundation whatsoever by which the cognizer could be its object. |
yadyevaṃ kimasyotpatter nibandhanam ity āha anādītyādi / | "If this is so, what is the cause of its origination?" - thus [the text] states "[it is] beginningless" etc. |
sattvadṛk satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ, tasyā bījam vāsanāśaktirity arthaḥ / anādi ca tat sattvadṛgbījaṃ ceti vigrahaḥ / | The vision of being is the vision of the existing body; its seed is the power of dispositions - this is the meaning. And this seed of the vision of being is beginningless - this is the analysis. |
tasya prabhāvaḥ ādhipatyam / | Its influence is [its] dominance. |
kvacid eveti / adhyātmaniyata eva ṣaḍāyatane // | [It occurs] only in certain places, that is, only in the internal sixfold sense-base. |
kecid eva hi saṃskārās tadrūpādhyavasāyini / | For only certain impressions [lead to] the determination of that form. |
ādhipatyaṃ prapadyante tan na sarvatra vartate // tadrūpādhyavasāyinīti / | [These impressions] attain dominance, therefore it does not occur everywhere. [This refers to] "the determination of that form." |
pūrvottarakālānuyāyijñātṛrūpādhyavasāyinyahaṅkāre / na sarvatreti / sāntānāntare ghaṭādau // | [This refers to] the I-notion which apprehends the form of the cognizer as persisting through prior and subsequent times - [but] not everywhere, [that is,] not in other series [of cognitions] like [those] of jars and so forth. |
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