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pratibibodayadvārā caivam asyopabhoktṛtā / | Thus his character of being the "enjoyer" comes about through the arising of the reflection. |
na jahāti svarūpaṃ tu puruṣo 'yaṃ kadācana // | Yet this puruṣa never abandons his own nature. |
na hi vikārāpattyā bhoktṛtvamasyeṣṭam kiṃ tarhi / | For his being an enjoyer is not accepted as [occurring] through undergoing modification; rather, |
buddhyavasitasyārthasya pratibimbodayanyāyena / | [it occurs] through the principle of the arising of the reflection of the object determined by buddhi. |
tathā hi buddhidarpaṇārūḍham arthapratibimbakaṃ dvitīyadarpaṇakalpe puṃsi saṃkrāmati tadevāsya bhoktṛtvam na tu vikārāpattiḥ / | For thus the reflection of the object, first appearing in the mirror of buddhi, transfers to the puruṣa who is like a second mirror - this alone is his being an enjoyer, not any undergoing of modification. |
na ca pratibimbamātrasaṃkrāntāvapi puruṣaḥ svarūpaṃ jahāti darpaṇavat tadavathatvāt / | And even with the mere transference of the reflection, the puruṣa does not abandon his own nature, because like a mirror he remains exactly as he was. |
ato yadabhoktavasthānirviśiṣṭaṃ ityatra prayoge 'naikāntikatā hetoḥ // | Therefore in that argument [stating] "that which is non-different from the non-enjoyer..." the reason is inconclusive. |
ucyata ityādinā pratividhatte / | [This] is answered by [the phrase] beginning with "it is said." |
ucyate pratibimbasya tādātmyena samudbhave / | It is said: When the reflection arises with the same nature [as the reflecting substance]. |
tadevodayayogitvaṃ vibhede tu na bhoktṛtā // | If it [remains] identical [with Spirit], then there is involvement with arising [and perishing]; if [it is] different, then there is no experiencership. |
yattadbuddhidarpaṇārūḍham arthapratibimbakaṃ dvitīyadarpaṇakalpe puṃsi saṃkrāmatītīṣyate tadyadipuruṣādavyatiriktam tadā tadevānantaroktamudayavyayayogitve prasajyate / | If that reflection of objects which appears in the mirror of Cosmic Intellect and which you claim transfers to the Spirit [who is] like a second mirror is non-different from the Spirit, then the same consequence of involvement with arising and perishing mentioned just before follows. |
udayavyayayogipratibimbarūpavat tadavyatirekāt / | Because of [its] non-difference from the reflection, which has the nature of being subject to arising and perishing. |
atha vyatiriktam iti pakṣas tadā bhoktṛtā na prāpnoti abhoktravasthāto viśeṣasya kasyacid abhāvāt / | If, on the other hand, the position is that [the reflection] is different [from Spirit], then experiencership cannot arise, since there would be no difference from [Spirit's] condition as non-experiencer. |
na cāpyarthapratibimbena saha puṃsaḥ sambandhād bhoktṛtvaṃ yuktam parasparamanupakārakayoḥ sambandhāsiddheḥ // | Nor is it reasonable [to say] that Spirit's experiencership comes from contact with the reflection of objects, since there can be no relation between two things that do not mutually benefit each other. |
didṛkṣādyānukūlyena pradhānaṃ sampravartate / vicitraracanābhede kathaṃ vācetanātmakam // | [If you say] Pradhāna operates in accordance with [Spirit's] desire to see etc., then how can it be of an insentient nature in [bringing about] the diverse creation? |
kiṃ ca yadi pradhānaṃ puruṣasya didṛkṣādi jānīyāt tadānukūlyena tasya puruṣasyārthaṃ prati pravṛttir yuktā yāvatā jaḍarūpatvāt satyapi cetanāvatāsambandhe paṅgvandhavat pravṛttir na yuktā / | Moreover, if Pradhāna knew the Spirit's desire to see etc., then its activity for the sake of Spirit in accordance with that [desire] would be reasonable; [but] since it is of unconscious nature, its activity even when in contact with something sentient cannot reasonably be like [the cooperation of] the lame and blind. |
tathā hi andho yadi nāma mārgaṃ nopalabhate tathāpyasau paṅgor vivakṣāñcetayayeva tasya cetanāvattvāt / | For even though the blind man does not perceive the path, he still understands the lame man's desire to speak because he [the blind man] is sentient. |
na caivaṃ pradhānaṃ puruṣasya didṛkṣādi vetti tasyācetanātmakatvena jaḍarūpatvāt / | But Pradhāna does not thus know Spirit's desire to see etc., because being of insentient nature it is unconscious. |
na cāpi tayoḥ parasparamanupakāriṇoḥ paṅgvandhavat sambandho 'sti // | Nor is there a relationship between these two [Spirit and Pradhāna] like [that of] the lame and blind, since they do not mutually benefit each other. |
kartuṃ nāma prajānāti pradhānaṃ vyañjanādikam / bhoktuṃ ca na vijānāti kimayuktam ataḥ param // | Pradhāna supposedly knows how to make condiments etc., yet does not know how to enjoy [them] - what could be more contradictory than this? |
atha puruṣasya didṛkṣādi vetti pradhānam itīṣyate / | If it is maintained that Pradhāna [Primordial Matter] knows the Spirit's desire-to-see and so forth, |
tathā ca sati bhoktṛtvamapyasya prasajyeta / | Then in that case it would follow that it [Pradhāna] must also possess the quality of being an experiencer. |
yo hi nāma kartuṃ vijānāti sa kathaṃ bhoktum api na jānīyāt / | For how indeed could one who knows how to produce [something] not know how to experience [it]? |
tasmāt kartuṃ jānāti na bhoktumityataḥ paraṃ kimayuktam asti naiva kiñcid ity arthaḥ / | Therefore, what could be more incongruous than [saying] "it knows how to produce but not how to experience"? - this is the meaning. |
na hi sūpakāro vyañjanādeḥ kartā tadbhoktuṃ na vijānātīti / | For indeed, a cook who prepares condiments and so forth cannot be said not to know how to enjoy them. |
atretiśabdo 'dhyāhāryaḥ / | Here the word "iti" should be supplied [after vijānāti]. |
buddhimattvādityādinā parasyottaramāśaṅkate buddhimattvāt pradhānasya sarvamasyāvirodhi cet / | [An objection] anticipates the opponent's reply beginning with "because of possessing intelligence": "If, due to Pradhāna's possession of intelligence, all this is not contradictory..." |
buddhimattvena tu prāptaṃ caitanyaṃ puruṣeṣviva / | Then by virtue of possessing intelligence, consciousness would follow [in Pradhāna] just as in the Spirits. |
buddhiradhyavasāyo hi saṃvitsaṃvedanaṃ tathā / saṃvittiścetanā ceti sarvaṃ caitanyavācakam / | For "intelligence," "determination," "consciousness," "awareness," and "sentience" - all these are terms expressing consciousness. |
sarvam iti / | "All this" [means all the above terms]. |
asyeti pradhānasya / | "Its" refers to [the nature] of Pradhāna. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi nāma pradhānaṃ cidrūpaṃ na bhavati tathāpi buddhyāvyavasāyalakṣaṇayā yuktatvāt puruṣagataṃ didṛkṣādi parijñāya pravartiṣyata ityataḥ sarvam avirodhīti / | This means: "Even though Pradhāna may not be of the nature of consciousness, nevertheless, because it is endowed with intelligence characterized by determination, it will act after knowing the Spirit's desire-to-see and so forth; therefore everything is non-contradictory." |
atrottaram āha buddhimattvenetyādi / | To this [the author] gives the answer beginning with "by virtue of possessing intelligence." |
yadi hi pradhānasya buddhimattvam aṅgīkriyate tadāsya puruṣavaccaitanyavattvaprasaṅgaḥ / | For if it is accepted that Pradhāna possesses intelligence, then it would follow that it must possess consciousness like the Spirit. |
buddhyādīnāṃ caitanyaparyāyatvāt | Since buddhi and other [faculties] are synonyms of consciousness |
tathā hi yat prakāśātmatayā svasaṃviditarūpaṃ paranirapekṣam eva prakāśate taccaitanyamucyate tattvaṃ buddher apyastīti kimiti sā cidrūpā na bhavet | For indeed, that which shines by its own nature, has its form known by itself, and shines independently of others is called consciousness, [and] since this nature exists in buddhi also, why should it not be of the nature of consciousness? |
na cāpi buddhivyatirekeṇāparaṃ cidrūpam upalakṣyāmaḥ | And moreover, we do not perceive any other form of consciousness apart from buddhi |
atra pariścidrūpād buddher bhedaprasādhanāyāha acetanātmikā buddhir ityādi | Here [the opponent] speaks to establish the difference of buddhi from pure consciousness [by saying] "buddhi is of an unconscious nature" and so forth |
utpattimattvānāśitvahetubhyām iti cen matam | If [your] view is based on the reasons of [buddhi] having the nature of being produced and being perishable |
prayogaḥ yadyadutpattimattvanāśitvādidharmayogi tat tadacetanam yathā rasādayaḥ tathā ca buddhir iti svabhāvahetuḥ | The formal argument [is]: Whatever possesses the properties of being produced, being perishable and so forth is unconscious, like tastes etc.; and such is buddhi - this is a reason based on essential nature |
naitāvityādinā pratividhatte | [The author] responds with [the verse] beginning with "these two are not..." |
naitau hetū dvayoḥ siddhau svatantre sādhane mate | These two reasons are not established for both [parties] if intended as independent proofs |
na viparyayabādhāsti prasaṅgo 'pyabhidhitsite | There is no refutation of the contrary [position] even if the [reasoning] is intended as reductio ad absurdum |
kadācid idaṃ svātantryeṇa sādhanaṃ syāt prasaṅgasādhanaṃ vā | This [argument] might be either an independent proof or a proof by reductio ad absurdum |
yadi svātantryeṇa tadānyatarāsiddho hetuḥ | If [it is meant as] an independent [proof], then the reason is not established for either [party] |
tathā hi yathāvidhamutpattimattvamapūrvotpādalakṣaṇaṃ nāśitvaṃ vātyantasamucchedātmakaṃ bauddhasya prasiddhaṃ na tathāvidhaṃ bhavataḥ sāṅkhyasya | For indeed, the kind of producibility characterized as production of something previously non-existent and the perishability characterized as complete annihilation that are accepted by the Buddhist are not accepted in that form by you, the Sāṃkhya |
tayoḥ pariṇāmatirodhānarūpatvena bhavadbhir aṅgīkaraṇāt | Because you accept these two as being of the nature of transformation and concealment |
yathā ca bhavatas tathā na bauddhasya siddham ityanyatarāsiddho hetuḥ | And just as [these are accepted] by you, they are not established for the Buddhist; thus the reason is not established for either [party] |
na ca śabdamātrasya siddhau hetusiddhiḥ vastuno hi vastusiddher vastuta eva hetutvāt / | The mere admission of a verbal expression does not prove the [validity of the] reason, since only a real thing can be the cause of establishing [another] real thing. |
yathoktam tasyaiva vyabhicārādau śabde 'pyavyabhicāriṇi / doṣavat sādhanaṃ jñeyaṃ vastuno vastusiddhitaḥ // | As has been stated: "Even when the verbal expression is free from deviation [from truth], the proof may be faulty in cases of deviation and the like, since a real thing can only be established by [another] real thing." |
atha prasaṅgasādhanamitipakṣas tathāpi sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇānupadarśanād anaikāntikatā hetvoḥ / | If one holds that this is meant as an indirect proof, even then, since no contradictory evidence has been shown against the opposite of what is to be proved, both reasons remain inconclusive. |
ko hyatra pratibandho yaccaitanyasyotpattimattvanāśitvābhyāṃ na bhavitavyam iti / | For what is there to prevent consciousness from having the properties of producibility and perishability? |
yāpīyaṃ kalpanā vatsavivṛddhinimittaṃ kṣīrasya yathā pravṛttir ajñasya / puruṣavimokṣanimittaṃ tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya iti / | As for this assumption [in the form] "Just as insentient milk flows for the sake of the calf's growth, so does pradhāna [primordial matter] act for the liberation of puruṣa [spirit]"— |
na hi kṣīraṃ svātantryeṇa vatsavivṛddhinimittaṃ pravartate / | For milk does not flow independently for the sake of the calf's growth; |
kiṃ tarhi pratiniyatebhyaḥ kādācitkebhyaḥ svahetupratyayebhyaḥ samutpadyate / | Rather, it is produced from its own specific occasional causes and conditions; |
taccotpannaṃ saddhatsavivṛddher nimittatāṃ yātītyajñam api pravartata iti nirdiśyate / | And once produced, it becomes the cause of the calf's growth, [and] in this sense it is said that "even an insentient thing acts." |
na caivaṃ pradhānasya pravṛttir yuktā / tathā hi nityatvāt tadanyahetvabhāvāc ca na tāvat kādācitkāraṇasaṃnidhānāyattā tasya kādācitkī śaktir yuktā / | But such activity is not possible for pradhāna, because, being eternal and having no cause other than itself, its occasional power cannot reasonably depend on the presence of occasional causes. |
nāpi svābhāvikī sadā saṃnihitāvikalakāraṇatvena sarvasyābhyudayaniḥśreyasalakṣaṇasya puruṣārthasya yugapad utpattiprasaṅgāt // | Nor can [this power] be inherent [in pradhāna], because then, due to the presence of the complete cause at all times, all human purposes characterized by prosperity and final liberation would arise simultaneously. |
caitanye cātmaśabdasya niveśe 'pi na naḥ kṣatiḥ / | And even if the word "ātman" [self] is applied to consciousness, there is no harm to our [position]. |
nityatvaṃ tasya duḥsādhyamakṣyādeḥ saphalatvataḥ | [We assert that] its eternality is difficult to prove, because the eye and other [organs] serve [their] purpose. |
akṣyārthādyaphalaṃ tu syāc caitanyaṃ śāśvataṃ yadi | If consciousness were eternal, then the eye and other [organs] would be purposeless. |
na bhaved indhanenārtho yadi syācchāśvato 'nalaḥ | There would be no need for fuel if fire were eternal. |
na hyātmaśabdaniveśanamātramasmābhiścaitanye pratiṣidhyate kiṃ tarhi yas tatra nityatvalakṣaṇaḥ samāropito dharmaḥ sa niṣidhyate | We do not deny merely the application of the word "ātman" to consciousness, but rather we deny the property of eternality that is [falsely] attributed to it. |
kasmāt akṣyālokamanaskārādeḥ sāphalyāt | [Why?] Because of the purposefulness of the eye, light, mind and other [organs]. |
anyathā yadi śāśvataṃ nityaṃ caitanyaṃ syāt tadākṣyādi viphalam eva syāt | Otherwise, if consciousness were eternal and permanent, then the eye and other [organs] would indeed be purposeless. |
tadutpattyarthatvāt teṣām | Because these [organs] exist for the purpose of producing it [i.e., consciousness]. |
nityasya copattyasambhavāt | And because what is eternal cannot be produced. |
atraiva dṛṣṭāntam āha na bhaved ityādi | On this very [point] he gives an example, [starting with] "there would not be" etc. |
yadi śāśvato vahnir bhavet tadā naiva jano 'nalārtham indhanamupādadīta tasmān na nityaikarūpaṃ caitanyaṃ yuktam | If fire were eternal, then people would never gather fuel for [making] fire; therefore consciousness cannot reasonably be of one eternal nature. |
pārārthyaṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ yat punaḥ pratipādyate śayyāśanādivattena saṃghātatvena hetunā | The fact that the eyes and other [organs] exist for another's purpose is asserted [by the Sāṃkhya], using as reasoning their being composite entities, like beds, seats and such [things]. |
ādheyātiśayārthatvaṃ yadyeṣām upapādyate / | If [by this] it is meant to prove that these [sense-organs] serve the purpose of something which is capable of having additional properties produced in it, |
iṣṭasiddhir yadiṣṭās te 'smābhir jñānopakāriṇaḥ // | [then] what is [sought to be] proved is already admitted, since these [organs] are accepted by us as being helpful to cognition. |
avikāryupakāritvasādhane sādhyaśūnyatā / | In proving [their] being helpful to something unmodifiable, there is absence of the probandum in the corroborative instance, |
dṛṣṭāntasya calasyaiva yuktās te 'pyupakāriṇaḥ // | since those [things cited as instances] are also helpful only to what is mobile [i.e., perishable]. |
sāmānyena tu pārārthyaṃ yadyeṣāṃ samprasādhyate / tathāpi sādhanaṃ vyarthaṃ siddhāścittopayoginaḥ // | If, however, what is meant to be proved is merely their being helpful to "another" in general, even then the proof is superfluous, as [they are] already established as being useful to the mind. |
ādheyātiśayo vā paro 'bhipreto bhavet yadvānādheyātiśayarūpatvādavikārī atha vā sāmānyena pārārthyamātramavicāritaramaṇīyaṃ sādhyata iti trayo vikalpāḥ / | There are three alternatives: Is the "other" that is meant [to be proved] (a) one capable of having additional properties produced in it, or (b) one that is unmodifiable due to being incapable of having additional properties, or (c) is merely the general fact of "being for another's purpose" - [which is] pleasing [only] when unexamined - being proved? |
tatra prathamapakṣe siddhasādhyatā yatas te cakṣurādayo 'smābhir vijñānopakāriṇa iṣṭāḥ / | In the first alternative, [there is] the fallacy of proving what is [already] established, since those [organs] like the eye are accepted by us as being helpful to cognition. |
cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate taccakṣur vijñānam yāvat kāyaṃ pratītya spraṣṭavyāni cotpadyate kāyavijñānam iti vacanāt / | [This is] according to the statement that "That visual cognition arises depending on the eye and forms" and "That bodily cognition arises depending on the body and tangible objects." |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā viruddhatā hetor ityādarśayann āha avikāryupakāritvetyādi / | Now, regarding the second alternative, [the text] states "avikāryupakāritva" etc., showing that there is contradictoriness of the reason. |
avikāriṇo nityasyopakāritvam avikāryupakāritvam tasya cakṣurādīnāṃ sādhane sati dṛṣṭānte sādhyaviparyayeṇaiva hetor vyāptatvād viruddhatā yatas te śayanādayaścalasyānityasyaivopakāriṇo yuktāḥ avikāriṇyatiśayasyādhātumaśakyatvāt / | When proving that the eyes and other [organs] are helpful to something unmodifiable [and] eternal, there is contradictoriness because the reason is pervaded by the opposite of the probandum in the example, since those [things] like beds are properly helpful only to what is mobile [and] non-eternal, as it is impossible to produce additional qualities in something unmodifiable. |
atha sāmānyenādheyātiśayādivikalpamapāsya pārārthyamātraṃ sādhyata ititṛtīyaḥ pakṣaḥ | [Now] if excluding the alternatives of [being the receptacle of] excellence etc., merely the being-for-another is to be proved, [then this is] the third position. |
tadāpi siddhasādhyatā cittopakāritvena cakṣurādīnāmiṣṭatvāt | Even then [there would be] the proving of what is [already] established, because the eye and other [organs] are admitted [by us] to be beneficial to the mind. |
atha cittam api sādhyadharmitvenābhyupagamyate yathā naiyāyikair abhyupagatam | If the mind too is accepted as having the property to be proved, as accepted by the Naiyāyikas, |
evam api bhavatāṃ neṣṭasiddhiḥ cittavyatirekeṇātmano 'niṣṭatvāt | Even so your desired [conclusion] is not established, because you do not accept the Self as distinct from the mind. |
nāpi naiyāyikānām abhimatārthasiddhiḥ parasparopakāritvena cakṣurādīnāmparopakāropagraheṇotpatteḥ saṃghātatvaṃ kalpitamastyeveti | Nor is the desired meaning of the Naiyāyikas established, because the eye and other [organs] being mutually beneficial, the notion of being-for-another is [already] established. |
iti kāpilakalpitātmaparīkṣā | Thus [ends] the examination of the Soul as conceived by the Kāpilas [Sāṃkhyas]. |
jaiminīyā iva prāhur jaināścillakṣaṇaṃ naram | The Jainas, like the followers of Jaimini, declare that the person [soul] is characterized by consciousness. |
dravyaparyāyarūpeṇa vyāvṛttyanugamātmakam | [It is] comprehensive in the form of substance and exclusive in the form of modifications. |
jainā iti digambarās | By "Jainas" [is meant] the Digambaras. |
digambarās ta evaṃ prāhuḥ cillakṣaṇa evātmā sa ca dravyarūpeṇa sarvāvasthāsvabhinātvād anugamātmakaḥ paryāyarūpeṇa tu pratyavasthaṃ bhinnatvādvyāvṛttyātmakaḥ | The Digambaras declare thus: the Self is characterized by consciousness alone, and in the form of substance, being non-different in all states, it is comprehensive in nature, while in the form of modifications, being different in each state, it is exclusive in nature. |
etac ca pratyakṣata eva siddhamātmano dvairūpyam iti na pramāṇāntarataḥ prasādhyam | And this two-fold nature of the Self is established through direct perception itself, hence it need not be proved through other means of valid cognition. |
tathā hi sukhādyavasthābhede 'pi yadavasthātṛ sarvāvasthāsu caitanyamupalabhyate taddravyam / | Thus that substance [is that] which persists as the experiencer through all states and in which consciousness is found [to continue] even when the states differ in the form of pleasure and so forth. |
paryāyas tu kramabhāvinaḥ sukhādyavasthābhedāḥ / | The successive modes, however, are the different states of pleasure and so forth that occur in sequence. |
te ca pratyakṣata eva siddhā iti parasya bhāvaḥ // | And these [modes] are established through direct perception alone - such is the view of the opponent [i.e., the Digambara Jainas]. |
tatrāpītyādinā pratividhatte / | [The author] presents the counter-argument to this with [the words] "tatrāpi" and so forth. |
tatrāpyavikṛtaṃ dravyaṃ paryāyair yadi saṅgatam / na viśeṣo 'sti tasyeti pariṇāmi na tadbhavet // | Even in this case, if an unmodified substance is connected with [its] modes, then there would be no change in it, and thus it could not be subject to modification. |
atra pakṣadvayam yattaccaitanyātmakaṃ dravyaṃ tatparyāyaiḥ kadācid avikṛtamatyaktapaurastyacaitanyādirūpaṃ satsambadhyate yadvā parityaktapūrvarūpam / | Here there are two alternatives: either that substance which consists of consciousness connects with those modes while remaining unmodified (i.e., without abandoning its previous form of consciousness), or [it connects with them] having abandoned its previous form. |
tatra yadyanantaraḥ pakṣas tadā nityatvahāniprasaṅgaḥ avasthātuḥ kasyacidapyabhāvāt / | If the latter position is accepted, then the consequence would be the loss of permanence, since there would be no persisting experiencer whatsoever. |
athāvikṛtam iti prathamapakṣas tadā pūrvottarayor avasthayor na viśeṣaḥ anyathātvam astīti pariṇāmi tacaitanyaṃ na bhavet na prāpnoti / | If the first position is accepted - that [the substance remains] unmodified - then there is no difference or change between the prior and subsequent states, and thus that consciousness could not be subject to modification. |
anyathātvalakṣaṇatvāt pariṇāmasya / | Because modification is characterized by becoming something else. |
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