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nityatā hi nāma tādavasthyamucyate atādavasthyaṃ tvanityatā na ca rūpaśabdādipratibhāsivijñānam ekāvasthaṃ sarvadānubhūyate kintu krameṇa kadācidrūpapratibhāsamanyadā ca śabdādipratibhāsam | Indeed, eternality means remaining in the same state, while non-eternality means not remaining in the same state; and cognition manifesting color, sound, and other [objects] is not experienced as being in one state always, but rather [appears] sequentially - sometimes manifesting color, other times manifesting sound and other [objects]. |
tadyadi nityaikajñānapratibhāsātmakā amī śabdādayaḥ syus tadā vicitrāstaraṇapratibhāsavat sakṛdeva pratibhāseran | If these sounds and other [objects] were of the nature of manifestation in a single eternal cognition, then they would appear simultaneously, like the appearance of a multicolored blanket. |
tatpratibhāsātmakasya jñānasya sarvadāvasthitatvāt | Because that cognition which is of the nature of their manifestation would [in that case] be ever-present. |
athāpi syād avasthāntaram etat krameṇa śabdādipratibhāsaṃ jñānasyotpadyate tena sakṛdeva śabdādisaṃvedanaṃ na bhaviṣyatītyāha nitye 'vasthāntaraṃ na ceti | Even if it be maintained that "these different manifestations of sound and other [objects] arise in cognition sequentially, therefore the apprehension of sound etc. will not be simultaneous," [he] states that "in an eternal [entity] there cannot be different states." |
avasthānām avasthātur ananyatvādavasthāvadavasthātur api nāśotpādau syātām | Because the states are not different from that which possesses the states, that which possesses states would also be subject to destruction and origination just like the states. |
avasthātṛvadvāvasthānam api nityatvaprasaṅgaḥ | Or conversely, the states too would have the unwanted consequence of being eternal like that which possesses the states. |
rūpādivittito bhinnaṃ na jñānamupalabhyate / tasmāḥ pratikṣaṇaṃ bhede kimabhinnaṃ vyavasthitam // | Cognition is never apprehended as distinct from the cognitions of color and other [objects]; since these [cognitions] differ from moment to moment, what non-different [entity] could remain established? |
vyatireke cāvasthānāṃ tasyaitā iti sambandhāsiddhiḥ upakārābhāvāt / | If states are different [from their substrate], their relation [expressed as] "these [states] belong to that [substrate]" cannot be established, because there is no mutual benefit. |
nityaikavijñānamātrābhyupagamavirodhaś ca // | And [this] contradicts the acceptance of eternal single consciousness alone. |
kiñca nityasya jñānātmanaḥ pratyakṣato vā siddhir bhavedanumānato vā na tāvat pratyakṣata iti darśayati rūpetyādi / | Moreover, the establishment of an eternal conscious self could be either through perception or through inference; that it is not [established] through perception is shown [in the verse beginning with] "rūpa" etc. |
na hi kramapratibhāsirūpādisaṃvidvyatirekeṇa nityaikarūpamavasthātṛ jñānamanubhūyate yena pratyakṣataḥ siddhiḥ syāt / | For no permanent, unitary, abiding consciousness is experienced apart from the sequentially appearing cognitions of color and other [objects], by which [consciousness] there could be establishment through perception. |
tasyāśca rūpādisaṃvitte krameṇānubhūyamānāyāḥ pratikṣaṇaṃ dhvaṃse siddhe kimaparamabhinnamastīti vācyam / | And when it is established that these cognitions of color etc., which are experienced in sequence, are destroyed moment by moment, it must be said what else non-different [from them] exists. |
tasmād upalabdhikṣaṇaprāptasya tathāvidhajñānātmano 'nupalabdher asadvyavahāraviṣayataiveti bhāvaḥ / | Therefore, because such a conscious self, which would be apprehended if present at the moment of cognition, is not apprehended, it is simply an object of the convention of non-existence - this is the meaning. |
na cāpyanumānataḥ siddhir iti manyate / | Nor should it be thought that [there is] establishment through inference. |
tathāhyanumānaṃ bhavatyabhāvaliṅgaṃ vā bhavet kāryaṃ vā na tāvat svabhāvas tathābhūtasya jñānātmanaḥ sādhakaṃ pramāṇam asti bādhakaṃ tu pratyakṣādi vidyata ityayukto nityajñānavivartaḥ // | For such an inference would be based either on [its] nature or on [its] effects; firstly, there is no means of proof establishing that such is the nature of that conscious self, while perception etc. exists as [its] refutation; thus the transformation of eternal consciousness is untenable. |
kiñcāsmin pakṣe bandhamokṣavyavasthā na prāpnotīti darśayati viparyastetyādi / | Moreover, in this view the determination of bondage and liberation cannot be obtained - this is shown [in the verse beginning with] "viparyaste" etc. |
viparyastāviparyastajñānabhedo na vidyate / ekajñānātmakaṃ puṃsi bandhamokṣau tataḥ katham // | If cognition consists of a single [eternal consciousness], there can be no distinction between wrong and right cognition; how then can there be bondage and liberation for the soul? |
yasya hi pratikṣaṇadhvaṃsi pratipuruṣamanekameva vijñānaṃ santānabhedi pravartata iti pakṣas tasya viparyastāviparyastajñānaprabandhotpādavaśād bandhamokṣavyavasthā yuktamatī / | For one who holds the view that cognition perishes moment by moment, is different for each person, and varies in its continuity, the conception of bondage and liberation is quite reasonable, [occurring] due to the arising of a series of wrong and right cognitions. |
yogābhyāsakrameṇa ca pariśuddhataratamajñānotpādādapariśuddhajñānasaṃtānanivṛtter apavargaḥ prāpyata iti saphalo mokṣaprāptaye prayāsaḥ / | And through the gradual practice of yoga, increasingly pure cognitions arise while the stream of impure cognitions ceases, [thus] liberation is attained and the effort for achieving liberation becomes fruitful. |
yasya tu punarbhavato nityaikajñānasvabhāva ātmeti pakṣas tasya katham ekajñānātmake puṃsi bandhamokṣau bhavataḥ / | But for you who maintain that the soul is of the nature of one eternal cognition, how can there be bondage and liberation in a soul that consists of a single cognition? |
tathā hi yadi viparyastasvabhāvam ekaṃ jñānaṃ sadā tadāparasyāvasthāntarasyābhāvān na mokṣavyavasthā syāt / | For if that one cognition is always of an erroneous nature, then since there can be no other state [for it], there could be no possibility of liberation. |
athāviparyastaṃ tadā nityaṃ pariśuddhasvabhāvatvān na bandhaḥ syāt / | And if [that cognition] were unerroneous, then being eternally pure by nature, there could be no bondage. |
asmākaṃ tu santānabhedena vijñaptiḥ saṃkliṣṭā śuddhā ceṣyata iti yuktā bandhamokṣavyavasthā / | But according to our [view], cognition is considered to be either defiled or pure depending on the variations in its continuity, thus the conception of bondage and liberation is reasonable. |
saṃkliṣṭā ca viśuddhā ca samalā nirmalā ca sā / | It [i.e., cognition] is both defiled and pure, both impure and spotless. |
saṃkliṣṭā cedbhaven nāsau muktāḥ syuḥ sarvadehinaḥ // | If it were never defiled, all embodied beings would be liberated. |
viśuddhā cedbhavennāsau vyāyāmo niṣphalo bhavet / | If it were never pure, [all] effort would be fruitless. |
kiṃ vā nivartayedyogī yogābhyāsena sādhayet / kiṃ vā na hātuṃ śakyo hi viparyāsas tadātmakaḥ // | What could a yogin remove or accomplish through yoga practice? And what could be abandoned, since error too would be of its [i.e., eternal cognition's] very nature? |
tattvajñānaṃ na cotpādyaṃ tādātmyātsarvadā sthiteḥ | The knowledge of truth cannot be something to be produced, since [it] exists eternally due to [its] identity [with consciousness] |
yogābhyāso 'pi tenāyamaphalaḥ sarva eva ca | Therefore this entire practice of yoga is completely fruitless |
yadi hi tattvabhāvanayā yogī kiñcinnivartayet pravartayed vā tadā syād asya saphalaḥ prayāsaḥ yāvatā na tāvad asau viparyāsaṃ nivartayati yasmād asau viparyāsas tadātmakaḥ nityajñānātmakaḥ tasmān na hātuṃ śakyaḥ | If through contemplation of truth a yogin could remove or produce anything, then his effort would be fruitful; however, he cannot remove false cognition, because this false cognition is of that [same] nature, [namely] of the nature of eternal consciousness, [and] therefore cannot be abandoned |
nityasyāvināśitayā tyāgāsambhavāt | Because what is eternal is indestructible, rejection [of it] is impossible |
nāpi tattvajñānaṃ bhāvanayā sādhayati nityajñānātmatayā sarvadā tattvajñānasyāvasthitatvāt | Nor can [the yogin] accomplish knowledge of truth through contemplation, since knowledge of truth, being of the nature of eternal consciousness, is always present |
tasmān na yuktam etat | Therefore this [view] is not reasonable |
kecit tu saugatammanyā apy ātmānaṃ pracakṣate pudgalavyapadeśena tattvānyatvādivarjitam | Some who consider themselves Buddhists describe a self under the designation of "pudgala," [which is] devoid of identity and difference [with the aggregates] |
kecid iti vātsīputrīyaḥ | By "some" [he means] the Vātsīputrīyas |
te hi sugatasutamātmānaṃ manyamānā api pudgalavyājena skandhebhyastattvānyatvābhyāmavācyamātmānaṃ kalpayanti / ye hi nāma bhagavato nairātmyavādinas sugatasya sutatvamabhyupagatās te katham iva vitathātmadṛṣṭimabhiniviṣṭāssyuriti darśayannupahāsapadamāha saugatammanyā apīti | For although considering themselves sons of the Sugata, they postulate under the pretext of "pudgala" a self that cannot be described as either identical with or different from the aggregates; showing how those who accept being sons of the Blessed One, the Sugata who taught the doctrine of no-self, could possibly be attached to a false view of self, [the author] uses the mocking term "who consider themselves Buddhists" |
tathāhīdam ātmano lakṣaṇam yo hi śubhāśubhakarmabhedānāṃ kartā svakṛtakarmaphalasya ceṣṭāniṣṭasya ca bhoktā yaś ca pūrvaskandhaparityāgād aparaskandhāntaropādānāt saṃsarati bhoktā ca sa ātmeti | For this is their definition of the self: he who is the agent of various good and bad actions, the experiencer of the desirable and undesirable fruits of his own actions, and who transmigrates from the abandonment of previous aggregates to the appropriation of other aggregates, and is the experiencer - that is the self |
etac ca sarvaṃ pudgalo 'pīṣṭam iti kevalaṃ nāmni vivādaḥ // | All this is held [to be true] of the pudgala also [by the Vātsīputrīyas]; the disagreement is merely about the name. |
skandhebhyaḥ pudgalo nānyas tīrthadṛṣṭiprasaṅgataḥ / | The pudgala cannot be different from the skandhas, as [this would lead to] the consequence of [accepting] the Tīrthika view. |
nānanyo 'nekatādyāseḥ sādhvī tasmād avācyatā // | [It is] not non-different [from the skandhas] due to the fault of plurality; therefore its ineffability is proper. |
yadi skandhebhyo 'nyaḥ pudgalaḥ syāt tadānīṃ tairthikaparikalpitātmadṛṣṭir bhavet tataś ca śāśvatātmaprasaṅgaḥ / | If the pudgala were different from the skandhas, then it would become the view of the ātman imagined by the Tīrthikas, and consequently [there would be] the unwanted consequence of [accepting] an eternal ātman. |
na ca śāśvatasyātmanaḥ kartṛtvabhoktṛtvādi yuktam ākāśavat tasya sarvadā nirviśiṣṭatvāt / | And agency, experiencership, etc. of an eternal ātman are not possible, because it would be always undifferentiated like ākāśa. |
pratiṣiddhaś ca bhagavatā śāśvatā ātmā nirātmānaḥ sarve dharmā iti ca vacanaṃ vyāhanyeta / | And the eternal ātman has been rejected by the Blessed One, and [accepting it would] contradict the statement that "all dharmas are without ātman." |
ananyas tarhi bhavatviti cedāha nānanya ityādi / | If one says "then let it be non-different," [the text] states "not non-different" and so forth. |
yadi hi skandhā eva rūpādayaḥ pudgalaḥ syāt tadā bahubhyaḥ skandhebhyo 'nanyatvāt tatsvarūpavadanekatā prāpnoti pudgalasya / | For if the pudgala were just the skandhas like form and so forth, then being non-different from many skandhas, plurality would follow for the pudgala, like [the plurality of] their own nature. |
ekaśceṣyate / | But it is accepted as one. |
yathoktam ekaḥ pudgako loka utpadyamāna utpadyate yadvat tathāgata iti / | As it has been stated: "A single pudgala being born is born in the world just as the Tathāgata." |
ādiśabdenānityatvādiparigrahaḥ / | By the word "ādi" [in the earlier compound], impermanence and other [characteristics] are included. |
evaṃ ca sati uccheditvaṃ skandhavat pudgalasyāpi syāt / | In such a case, the pudgala too would be subject to destruction, just like the skandhas. |
tataś ca kṛtakarmavipraṇāśaprasaṅgaḥ pratiṣiddhasya bhavatocchedavāda ityato 'styavācyaḥ pudgala iti siddham // | And from this would follow the destruction of [the fruits of] performed actions - [which amounts to] the rejected annihilationist view; therefore it is established that the pudgala is avācya ["inexpressible"]. |
te vācyā ityādinā vastuvatpudgalo na bhavatyavācyatvād iti svavacanād eva bhavadbhiḥ pratipāditam iti darśayati te vācyāḥ pudgalo naiva vidyate pāramārthikaḥ / | [The opponent] shows that "they should be told" etc. [means that] by your own statement the pudgala cannot be a real entity due to [its] being inexpressible, [and] that the pudgala does not exist as an ultimate reality. |
tattvānyatvād avācyatvān nabhaḥkokanadādivat // | [This is] because of [its] being inexpressible either as identical or different [from the skandhas], like a sky-lotus and similar [non-existent things]. |
prayogaḥ yadvastunaḥ sakāśāt tattvānyatvābhyāṃ vācyaṃ na bhavati na tadvastu yathā gagananalinam na bhavati ca vācyaḥ pudgala iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ / | The logical formulation is: Whatever cannot be expressed as either identical to or different from a [real] thing is not a [real] entity, like a sky-lotus; and the pudgala cannot be so expressed; thus due to the absence of the pervader [i.e., expressibility, reality is also absent]. |
vaidharmyeṇa vedanādi // | The feelings etc. [serve as] the dissimilar example. |
kathaṃ punar atra vyāptiḥ siddhetyāha anyatvam ityādi / | [If one asks:] "How is the pervasion established here?", [the text] states "difference" etc. |
anyatvaṃ vāpyananyatvaṃ vastu naivātivartate / | A [real] entity cannot transcend being either different or non-different [from another thing]. |
vastuto yat tu nīrūpaṃ tadavācyaṃ prakalpyate // | But what is formless in reality is conceived as "inexpressible." |
vastuno hi sakāśād vastu naiva tattvānyatve vyatikrāmati gatyantarābhāvāt / | For a [real] entity cannot escape being either identical to or different from [another] entity, as there is no other alternative. |
anyathā rūpādīnām api parasparato 'vācyatvaṃ syāt / | If [it were] otherwise, then color and other [qualities] would also be mutually 'incapable of being spoken of'. |
tasmānnīrūpamasvabhāvamevāvācyaṃ prakalpyate na tu vastu // | Therefore, only that which is formless [and] without inherent nature is conceived as 'unspeakable', but not a real entity. |
katham ity āha bhedābhedavikalpasyetyādi / | [Someone asks] "How [is that]?" He explains [this] beginning with [the words] "of the alternative of difference and non-difference." |
bhedābhedavikalpasya vastvadhiṣṭhānabhāvataḥ / | Due to [the fact that] an entity [must be] the substrate of the alternative of difference and non-difference, |
tattvānyatvādyanirdeśo niḥsvabhāveṣu yujyate // | the non-designation of identity, difference, and so forth is appropriate [only] for things without inherent nature. |
na vastuni yadetaddhi tanneti pratiṣedhanam / tadvastvantaravat tasmād vyaktamanyatvamucyate // | Not [so] for an entity, because when there is the negation "this is not that," like [the comparison with] another entity, difference is clearly expressed. |
atadbhāvaniṣedhaś ca tattvamevābhidhīyate / nātikrāmati tadvastu tattvaṃ bhedaṃ ca vastunaḥ // | And when there is negation of non-identity, identity itself is expressed; that entity cannot transcend either identity or difference from [another] entity. |
vastveva hi bhedābhedavikalpayor adhiṣṭhānam nāvastu / | For indeed only an entity, not a non-entity, can be the substrate of the alternatives of difference and non-difference. |
tena tattvānyatvādyanirdeśo niḥsvabhāveṣveva svabhāvavirahiteṣveva yujyate / | Therefore, the non-designation of identity, difference, and so forth is appropriate only for things without inherent nature, [that is,] only for things devoid of own-being. |
na vastuni tattvānyatvādyanirdeśo yujyata iti sambandhaḥ / | The non-designation of identity, difference, and so forth is not appropriate for an entity - such is the [syntactic] connection. |
tatra bhedābhedābhyāṃ gatyantarabhāvāt / | [This is so] because there is no other alternative besides difference and non-difference. |
kathaṃ punar gatyantarābhāva ity āha yadetaddhītyādi / | [One asks:] "How is there no other alternative?" [The answer] is stated [in what follows]. |
tathā hi rūpādisvabhāvaḥ pudgalo na bhavatīti yadetat tanniṣedhanam tat tasmād rūpādeḥ sakāśād anyatvamevābhidhīyate / | For when there is the denial [in the form] "the pudgala is not of the nature of rūpa and so forth," this denial expresses only difference from rūpa and the rest. |
svabhāvāntaravidhināntarīyakatvā dvastuno rūpaṃ vedanātaḥ rūpādisvabhāvavirahi ca pudgalākhyaṃ vastu iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | Because the affirmation of a different nature necessarily follows [from such denial], as [when we say] "rūpa [is different] from vedanā," and "the entity called pudgala is devoid of the nature of rūpa etc." - this is an argument from essential nature. |
yaścāyaṃ vastuno 'tadbhāvaniṣedhaḥ atadrūpaniṣedhaḥ sa tattvamavyatireka evābhidhīyate / | And when there is denial of something's non-identity [with another thing], i.e. denial of its having a different nature, that expresses only non-difference [from that thing]. |
tattvavidhināntarīyakatvād vastusato 'rthāntarabhāvaniṣedhasya / | Because the denial of a real entity's difference from another necessarily involves the affirmation of [its] identity [with it]. |
anyathā hi yadi tasya na kaścitsvabhāvo vidhīyate tadā sarvasvabhāvaniṣedhādavastutvam eva syāt / | For otherwise, if no nature whatsoever is affirmed for it, then from the denial of all natures it would follow that it is a non-entity. |
sarvasvabhāvaniṣedhalakṣaṇatvād avastutvasyeti / | Because non-entity is characterized by the denial of all natures. |
prayogaḥ yadvastu yato 'rthāntaratvena pratiṣiddhātmatattvaṃ tat tadeva yathā rūpaṃ svasvabhāvād arthāntaratvena pratiṣiddhātmatattvam / | The formal argument is: Whatever entity is denied the nature of being different from something is identical with that [something], just as rūpa is denied the nature of being different from its own nature. |
pratiṣiddhātmatattvaś ca rūpādibhyo 'rthāntaratvena pudgala iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | And the pudgala is denied the nature of being different from rūpa etc. - this is an argument from essential nature. |
tat tasmād vastunaḥ sakāśāt tattvānyatve vastu nātikrāmatīti siddhā vyāptir maulasya hetoḥ / | Therefore an entity cannot transcend [the alternatives of] identity or difference from another entity - thus the pervasion of the original reason is established. |
evaṃ tāvad avācyatvābhyupagame prajñaptisatvam pudgalasya prāptam iti pratipāditam | Thus it has been established that by accepting [its] ineffability, the pudgala's [status as mere] conventional entity has been proven. |
skandho na pudgalaś ceti vyaktā tasyeyam anyatā | The statement "the aggregate is not the pudgala" clearly shows its difference. |
api cāvācyaḥ pudgala iti bruvāṇair bhavadbhiḥ sphuṭataram eva skandhebhyaḥ pudgalasyānyatvam uccair udghoṣitam iti darśayati | Moreover, by stating "the pudgala is ineffable," you [yourselves] have very clearly proclaimed loudly the difference of the pudgala from the aggregates. |
viruddhadharmasaṅgo hi vastūnāṃ bheda ucyate | For the conjunction of contradictory properties is called the difference between entities. |
skandhapudgalayoś caiva vidyate bhinnatā na kim | Is there not indeed a difference between the aggregates and pudgala? |
prayogaḥ yau parasparaparihārasthitadharmādhyāsitau tau parasparabhinnau yathā rūpavedane mūrtatvāmūrtatvayukte vācyatvāvācyatvādiparasparaviruddhadharmādhyāsitau ca skandhapudgalāv iti svabhāvahetuḥ | [Here is] the logical application: Those two which possess mutually exclusive properties are mutually different, like form and feeling which possess materiality and immateriality [respectively]; and the aggregates and pudgala possess mutually contradictory properties like "expressibility" and "inexpressibility" - this is the natural reason. |
na cāyam asiddho hetur iti darśayann āha | [The author], showing that this reason is not unestablished, states [the following]. |
tathā hi vedanādibhyaḥ pudgalo 'vācya ucyate | For thus the pudgala is said to be inexpressible in relation to feeling and the rest. |
tattvānyatvena vācyās tu rūpasaṃjñādayas tataḥ | But form, perception and the rest are expressible as [either] identical or different from them. |
tathā hi pudgalo vedanāsaṃjñādibhyas tattvānyatvābhyām avācya iṣyate | That is, the pudgala is held to be inexpressible as either identical to or different from feeling, perception and the rest. |
rūpavedanādayas tu tataḥ vedanādibhyaḥ parasparam anyatvena vācyā ity ato nāsiddhatā hetoḥ | But form, feeling and the rest are expressible as mutually different from feeling and the rest, therefore the reason is not unestablished. |
ito 'pi viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ siddha ity ādarśayati | [The author] shows that from this too the possession of contradictory properties is established. |
anityatvena vācyāś ca rūpaskandhādayo matāḥ | And the form-aggregate and the rest are held to be expressible as impermanent. |
pudgalastu tathā neti tato vispaṣṭamanyatā // | [But] the pudgala is not like that; hence there is a clear difference [between them]. |
anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārā iti vacanād rūpādayo hyanityatvena vācyāḥ pudgalastu tathā nānityatvena vācya iṣṭaḥ sarvaprakāreṇa tasyāvācyatvāt / | From the statement "all saṃskāras are non-eternal", [it follows that] form and other [dharmas] are indeed expressible as non-eternal, but the pudgala is not considered to be thus expressible as non-eternal, because it is entirely inexpressible. |
na cāpyanaikāntikatā hetoḥ etāvanmātranibandhanatvād bhedavyavahārasya anyathā hi sakalam eva viśvam ekaṃ vastu syāt tataś ca sahotpādavināśaprasaṅgaḥ // | Nor is the reason inconclusive, since all usage of difference is based merely on this [distinction]; for otherwise the entire universe would be a single entity, and consequently there would be the unwanted consequence of simultaneous origination and destruction. |
arthakriyāsu śaktiś ca vidyamānatvalakṣaṇam / | And the capacity for causal efficacy is the defining characteristic of existence. |
kṣaṇikeṣveva niyatā tathāvācye na vastutā // | [This capacity] is restricted to momentary [things] only; hence in what cannot be expressed as such, there is no entity-hood. |
idam eva hi vidyamānatvalakṣaṇaṃ vastusvabhāvo yadutārthakriyāsu śaktiḥ sarvasāmarthyavirahalakṣaṇatvād avastutvasyeti sāmarthyād arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇame va vastutvamavatiṣṭhate / | For this indeed is the defining characteristic of existence, the nature of an entity: namely, the capacity for causal efficacy; since non-entity-hood is characterized by the absence of all capacity, it follows that entity-hood is characterized solely by the capacity for causal efficacy. |
sā cārthakriyā kṣaṇikeṣveva niyatā / | And this causal efficacy is restricted to momentary [things] only. |
kṣaṇikatvenaiva vyāpteti yāvat / nityasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt / | That is to say, it is pervaded by momentariness alone, because for an eternal [entity], causal efficacy would be contradictory both successively and simultaneously. |
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