sanskrit
stringlengths 2
508
| english
stringlengths 2
924
⌀ |
|---|---|
atas tathā kṣaṇikatvenāvācye pudgale vastutā nāsti / tatra tadvyāpakasya kṣaṇikatvaya nivṛtteḥ vṛkṣatvanivṛttau śiṃśapātvādinivṛttivad iti / | Therefore, in a pudgala that cannot be expressed as being momentary, there is no entity-hood, because of the absence there of momentariness which pervades it [i.e., entity-hood], just as in the absence of tree-hood there is the absence of śiṃśapā-hood and so forth. |
yathoktam anityatvena yo 'vācyaḥ sa hetur nahi kasyacid iti / | As has been said: "That which cannot be expressed as non-eternal cannot be a cause of anything." |
syād etadyadi pudgalo nityaḥ syāt tadā tasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhaḥ syāt yāvatā yathāsāvanityatvenāvācyaḥ tathā nityatvenāpītiato 'rthakriyāsāmarthyamasyāviruddhameveti | [One might argue that] if the pudgala were eternal, then its effective activity would be incompatible [with it] through [both] succession and simultaneity; however, just as it is 'inexpressible' as non-eternal, so it is [inexpressible] as eternal; therefore its capacity for effective activity is indeed not incompatible. |
tadasamyak na hyubhayākāravinirmuktaṃ vastu svalakṣaṇaṃ yuktam nityānityayor anyonyavṛttiparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvāt | This is incorrect, for no entity possessing a specific characteristic can be devoid of both these forms [i.e. eternal and non-eternal], since eternality and non-eternality have the characteristic of being mutually exclusive. |
vastunyekākāratyāgaparigrahayos tadaparākāraparigrahatyāganāntarīyakatvāt | Because in an entity, the abandonment or acceptance of one form necessarily entails the acceptance or abandonment of the other form. |
na hyasmābhir avācyaśabdaniveśanaṃ pudgale pratiṣidhyate svatantrecchāmātrānītasya kenacit pratiṣeddhumaśakyatvāt kiṃtvidamiha vasturūpaṃ nirūpyate | We are not objecting to the application of the term 'inexpressible' to the pudgala, since what is brought about by mere independent will cannot be refuted by anyone; rather, what is being examined here is the nature of the entity. |
kimasau pudgalākhyasya vastunaḥ svabhāvaḥ sarvadāstyāhosvinnāstīti yadyasti tadā nitya evāsau na hi nityo nāmānya eva kaścit api tu yaḥ svabhāvo sadāvasthāyī na vinaśyati sa nitya ucyate | Is this nature of the entity called pudgala always present or not? If it is present, then it must be eternal, for 'eternal' means nothing else but that nature which is always present [and] does not perish. |
yathoktam nityaṃ tamāhur vidvāṃso yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyati iti | As it has been said: "The wise call that eternal whose nature does not perish." |
atha nāstīti pakṣas tadāpyanitya evāsāvanavasthāyisvabhāvalakṣaṇatvād anityasya | If, on the other hand, the position is that it is not [always present], then it must be non-eternal, since non-eternal is characterized by having a non-permanent nature. |
ataḥ kṣaṇikākṣaṇikavyatirekeṇa gatyantarābhāvād akṣaṇikasya ca kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt kṣaṇikatvenārthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇaṃ sattvaṃvyāptamiti pudgale kṣaṇikatvanivṛttau sattvanivṛttiḥ siddhā | Therefore, since there is no other alternative besides momentary and non-momentary, and since effective activity is incompatible with the non-momentary through both succession and simultaneity, existence characterized by the capacity for effective action is pervaded by momentariness; thus, when momentariness is absent in the pudgala, [its] existence is proven to be absent. |
yadyevaṃ yadi pudgalo nāstyeva kasmād bhagavatā sa jīvas taccharīramanyo jīvo 'nyaccharīram iti pṛṣṭe noktam avyākṛtametad iti yāvatā nāstyeveti kasmānnoktam | [The opponent asks:] "If this is so, if the pudgala does not exist at all, why did the Blessed One, when asked whether 'that is the life-force, that is the body' [or] 'the life-force is different, the body is different', say 'this is unexplained' rather than simply saying 'it does not exist'?" |
nāstikyapratiṣedhāya citrā vāco dayāvataḥ | [The answer is that] the Compassionate One's various statements [were made] to prevent nihilism. |
yadi hi pudgalo dharmī siddho bhavet tadā tasya tattvānyatvādidharmo 'vyākṛtamarhet | For if the pudgala were established as a property-bearer, only then would its properties such as identity and difference deserve to be unexplained. |
yāvatā sa eva dharmī na siddhas tatkatham asatas tasya dharmo nirdiśyeta / | As long as that very entity [itself] is not proven, how could a property of that non-existent [thing] be specified? |
na hyasataḥ kharaviṣāṇādes tīkṣṇatādi sambhavati yenāsau vyākriyate / | For indeed, sharpness and other [properties] cannot exist for non-existent things like a hare's horn, by which it could be characterized. |
ataḥ prajñaptisattvameva khyāpayan pudgalasyāvyākṛtam etad iti bhagavānuvāca / | Hence, while revealing only the conceptually-constructed existence of the pudgala, the Blessed One declared "this is unexplained." |
nāstītyevaṃ tu noktam pareṇa dharmisvarūpasyāpṛṣṭatvāt / | But He did not directly state "it does not exist," because [He] was not asked about the inherent nature of the entity. |
athavā prajñaptisato 'pyabhāvābhiniveśaparihārārthaṃ śūnyatādeśanāyāmabhavyavineyajanāśayāpekṣayā nāstītyeva noktam / | Or alternatively, even though [it] has only conceptually-constructed existence, He did not directly state "it does not exist" in order to prevent attachment to non-existence, considering the disposition of people not [yet] ready for the teaching of emptiness. |
dṛṣṭidaṃṣṭrāvabhedaṃ ca bhraṃśaṃ cāvekṣya karmaṇām / deśayanti jinā dharmaṃ vyāghripotāpahāravat // | Having considered the difference between views and tusks, and the loss of karmic [results], the Jinas teach the dharma like [the story of] carrying away a tiger cub. |
evamācāyavasubandhaprabhṛtibhiḥ kośaparamārthasaptatikādiṣvabhiprāyaprakāśanāt parākrāntam atas tata evāvagantavyam / | Thus it has been established through the revelation of [this] intention by Ācārya Vasubandhu and others in works like the Kośaparamārthasaptatikā and others; therefore it should be understood from those [texts]. |
iha tvatigranthavistarabhiyā na likhyata iti bhāvaḥ / | Here [however], it is not written due to fear of [the text becoming] too extensive. |
yadyevam asti sattva upapādaka ityetat kathaṃ nīyata ity āha nāstikyetyādi / | If this is so, how is the statement "there is a being which proves [it]" to be interpreted? [To this] he says "[for preventing] unbelief" and so forth. |
sattvāstitvābhidhāyinyo hi deśanāścitrā dayāvataḥ na virudhyanta iti vākyaśeṣaḥ / | For the various teachings of the Compassionate One that speak of "being" and "existence" are not contradictory - this is the completion of the statement. |
yatra hi cittasantāne sattvaprajñaptis tasyāṃ satyām anucchedamabhisandhāyāsti sattva ityuktaṃ bhagavatā / | Indeed, where there is the conceptual designation of a being in the mental continuum, with reference to its non-cessation, the Blessed One said "there is a being." |
anyathā hyanuparatakāryakāraṇakṣaṇaparamparāṇām api saṃskārāṇām abhāvāvagamāt / | Otherwise, [there would be] understanding of the non-existence even of those saṃskāras whose series of momentary cause and effect has not ceased. |
paralokino 'sattvāt paralokāsiddhir iti nāstikyadṛṣṭayo bhaveyur vineyāḥ / | [And thus] the disciples would develop nihilistic views [thinking] "there is no establishment of the other world because of the non-existence of one who goes to the other world." |
yat tarhīdam uktam bhāraṃ vo bhikṣavo deśayiṣyāmi bhārādānaṃ bhāranikṣepaṃ bhārahāraṃ ca / | [It has been stated thus:] "O bhikṣus, I shall explain to you the burden, the taking up of the burden, the laying down of the burden, and the bearer of the burden." |
tatra bhāraḥ pañcopādānaskandhāḥ bhārādānaṃ tṛptiḥ bhāranikṣepo mokṣaḥ bhārahāraḥ pudgalā iti tadetat kathaṃ nīyate na hi bhāra eva bhārahāro yukta ity āha samudāyādītyādi / | Therein, the burden consists of the five upādāna-skandhas, the taking up of the burden is satisfaction, the laying down of the burden is liberation, and the bearer of the burden is the pudgala. How is this to be understood? For surely the burden itself cannot reasonably be the bearer of the burden. |
samudāyādicittena bhārahārādideśanā / | The teaching about the bearer of the burden and so forth [was given] with reference to the aggregates and so forth. |
viśeṣapratiṣedhaś ca taddṛṣṭīn prati rājate // | And the specific negation shines forth against those [holding] such views. |
tatra samānakālāḥ skandhā eva sāmastyena vivakṣitāḥ samudāyavyapadeśabhājaḥ ta eva hetuphalabhūtāś ca yugapat kālabhāvinaḥ santāna iti vyapadiśyante ekākāraparāmarśahetavaś ca sambhavantaḥ saṃtānisamudāyiśabdābhyāṃ nirdiśyanta ityataḥ samudāyādicittena bhārahārādideśanā na virudhyata iti śeṣaḥ / | Here, the skandhas occurring at the same time, when meant to be spoken of collectively, are designated as 'aggregates'; those same [skandhas], being causes and effects occurring simultaneously, are designated as 'series'; and when serving as bases for conceiving as a single form, they are designated by the terms 'members of the series' and 'components of the aggregate'. Therefore, the teaching about the bearer of the burden and so forth, [given] with reference to the aggregates and so forth, is not contradictory. |
[Continued in next message due to length limits] | null |
etena hi rūpādayaḥ skandhā ahaṅkāraviṣayatvena pratiṣiddhāḥ | By this, the aggregates beginning with rūpa are denied as being objects of the I-consciousness |
viśeṣapratiṣedhaścāyaṃ na sāmānyapratiṣedhaḥ | And this is a particular denial, not a universal denial |
ātmānaṃ cānabhyupagacchatā sāmānyenaiva pratiṣeddhavyam | One who does not accept [the existence of] the ātman should make [their] denial in universal terms only |
naiva tvamasīti | [Saying] "You indeed are not" |
yathā vāmenākṣṇā na paśyāmītyukte gamyata eva dakṣiṇena paśyāmīti | Just as when one says "I do not see with [my] left eye," it is understood that "I see with [my] right [eye]" |
tenāpyadarśanena vāmagrahaṇamanarthakam na paśyāmītyeva vācyaṃ syāt | If there were non-seeing with that [right eye] also, the qualification "left" would be meaningless [and] one should simply say "I do not see" |
tathehāpi na rūpamātmā yāvannahi vijñānamātmetyukte tadvilakṣaṇo 'styātmeti sūcitaṃ bhavati | Similarly here also, when it is said "form is not the ātman" up to "consciousness is not the ātman," it is suggested that the ātman exists [and] is different from these |
sa cāvācyo 'nyo vā bhavatu sarvathāstyātmeti | Whether it be ineffable or something else, in any case the ātman exists |
atrāha viśeṣapratiṣedhaścetyādi | Here [someone] says "the particular denial" and so forth |
etaduktaṃ bhavati viṃśatiśikharasamugato 'yaṃ satkāyadṛṣṭiśailaḥ kumatīnāṃ pravartate | This is what is being said: this mountain of the belief in a real personality, risen up with twenty peaks, proceeds among those of evil understanding |
yaduta rūpamātmā yāvad vijñānamātmā rūpavānātmā yāvad vijñānavānātmā ātmani rūpaṃ yāvad vijñānamātmanīti | Namely, [views such as] "form is the ātman" up to "consciousness is the ātman," "the ātman possesses form" up to "the ātman possesses consciousness," "form is in the ātman" up to "consciousness is in the ātman" |
tatrādyadṛṣṭipañcakapratiṣedhāya taddṛṣṭikān prativiśeṣarūpeṇa pratiṣedhaḥ śobhate | There, for the refutation of the first set of five views, the denial is appropriate in its particular form against those holding those views |
sārūpamātmetyādikā dṛṣṭir yeṣāṃ te taddṛṣṭikāḥ | Those who hold the view that "form is the ātman" and so forth are [called] "holders of those views" |
yadeva hi mūḍhamater āśaṅkāsthānaṃ tadevānūdya nivartyate | For precisely that which is a point of doubt for the confused mind is quoted and then refuted |
na tvatra kasyacidvidhirabhipretaḥ | But here no affirmation whatsoever is intended |
anyathā hyaśrotṛsaṃskārakaṃ vākyaṃ bruvāṇo 'prekṣāvāneva pratipādakaḥ syād iti // | Otherwise, [if] speaking words that cannot benefit [His] listeners, the expounder would certainly prove [himself] to be lacking in discernment. |
iti vātsīputrīyātmaparīkṣā // | [This is the] end of the examination of the Vātsīputrīya [doctrine of the] Self. |
calam ity etad viśeṣaṇasamarthanārtham āha athavetyādi / | For the purpose of justifying this qualification "mobile," he states "alternatively" and so forth. |
athavāsthāna evāyamāyāsaḥ kriyate yataḥ / | Alternatively, this effort [of ours] is indeed made in vain, because |
kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasiddhyaiva prakṛtyādi nirākṛtam // | [all theories about] prakṛti and the rest are refuted simply through establishing momentariness. |
uktasya vakṣyamāṇasya jātyādeścāviśeṣataḥ / | For refuting without distinction what has been stated, what will be stated, and [concepts] such as universals, |
niṣedhāya tataḥ spaṣṭaṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ prasādhyate // | therefore momentariness is clearly established. |
niravaśeṣapadārthavyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya prasādhanād eva prakṛtīśvarādeḥparaparikalpitasya sakalapadārtharāśer ekaprahāreṇaiva nirastyamānasyāpi sato yadidamasmākam atigranthavistarasaṃdarbheṇa pratipadamuccārya dūṣaṇopakramaṇaṃ tat kevalamāyāsaphalameva svalpopāyenaiva tasya dūṣitatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | Since by establishing momentariness, which pervades all entities without exception, the entire mass of entities imagined by others, such as prakṛti and īśvara, is rejected at a single stroke, our undertaking to refute [them] by stating [arguments] word by word through an extensive composition is merely a fruitless effort, as [all of] this is [already] refuted through a much simpler means. |
tathā hi sarvam eva prakṛtyādi parairudayānantarāpavargi niranvayanirodhadharmakaṃ vā kaiścinneṣyate / | For indeed, prakṛti and other [such entities] are not accepted by any [philosophers] as being destroyed immediately after arising or as having the nature of absolute destruction without continuation. |
tataścaitat samastavastuvyāpakakṣaṇabhaṅgaprasādhanenaiva nirastaṃ bhavatītimanyamānair asmābhiruktasya prakṛtyādeḥ pudgalaparyantasya vakṣyamāṇasya ca jātiguṇadravyādeḥ śabdārthayoḥ pramāṇaprameyayor mecakādimaṇiprakhyacitrasya vastunastrikālānuyāyino bhāvasya cārvākādyupagatasya ca bhūtacatuṣṭayasya jaiminīyeṣṭasya ca vaidikaśabdarāśer nirāsāya viśeṣeṇa kṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ prasādhyate / | Hence, we who hold that [all the aforementioned entities] become refuted merely through establishing the doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇabhaṅga) pervading all things, proceed to establish this momentariness with special care, for the purpose of refuting [the following]: what has been stated earlier from prakṛti up to pudgala, what will be stated later such as universals (jāti), qualities, substances, etc., words and their meanings, means and objects of valid cognition, variegated things resembling emeralds, etc., entities persisting through the three times, the four elements accepted by the Cārvākas and others, and the mass of Vedic words accepted by the followers of Jaimini. |
spaṣṭam iti / tat sādhakasya hetos trirūpasya pradarśanāt / | [This is] clear, because of showing the three-formed reason that proves it. |
ato 'syām eva sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyāṃ sakalaśāstrārthaparisamāptir bhavatītyuktaṃ bhavati // | Hence it is stated that in this very examination of permanent entities, the entire purpose of [our] treatise reaches its completion. |
katham asau prasādhyata ity āha kṛtakākṛtakatvenetyādi / | [The author] states how this [momentariness] is established, [beginning with] "through [the division into] created and uncreated..." |
kṛtakākṛtakatvena dvairāśyaṃ kaiścidiṣyate / | Some accept a twofold division [of entities] through [the distinction of] created and uncreated. |
kṣaṇikākṣaṇikatvena bhāvānām aparair matam // | Others hold [there is a twofold division] of entities through [the distinction of] momentary and non-momentary. |
iha hi naiyāyikādayaḥ kṣaṇikamekam api vastu nāstīti manyamānāḥ kṛtakākṛtakatvena bhāvānāṃ dvairāśyamavasthāpayanti / tatra kecit kṛtakā yathā ghaṭādayaḥ kecidakṛtakā yathā paramāṇvākāśādayaḥ / | For here the Naiyāyikas and others, thinking that not even a single entity is momentary, establish a twofold division of entities through [the distinction of] created and uncreated. Among these, some are created like jars etc., [while] some are uncreated like atoms, ākāśa, etc. |
aparais tu vātsīputrīyādibhiḥ kṣaṇikākṣaṇikatvenāpi bhāvānāṃ dvairāśyam iṣyate / | But others like the Vātsīputrīyas accept a twofold division of entities through [the distinction of] momentary and non-momentary. |
tathā hi buddhiśabdārciḥprabhṛtayas tanmatena kṣaṇikāḥ kṣitivyomādayastvakṣaṇikā iti // | For according to their view, cognition, sound, light-rays etc. are momentary, while earth, ākāśa etc. are non-momentary. |
tadevaṃ darśanavibhāge 'vasthite ye kṛtakatvenābhīṣṭās tāṃstāvatpakṣīkṛtyapramāṇam abhidhīyata iti darśayannāha tatretyādi / | When such a division of views is established, [the author] shows that he states the proof first taking as subject those accepted as created, [beginning with] "Among these..." |
tatra ye kṛtakā bhāvās te sarve kṣaṇabhaṅginaḥ / vināśaṃ prati sarveṣām anapekṣatayā sthiteḥ // | Among these, all created entities are momentary, because they all exist independently with respect to [their] destruction. |
vināśaṃ prati sarveṣāṃ hetvantarānapekṣatayā sthitvādityanena hi trilakṣaṇohetuḥ sūcitas tameva spaṣṭayann āha yadbhāvaṃ pratītyādi / | As regards destruction, all [things] are independent of other causes. This indicates the reason fulfilling the three conditions [of a valid probans]. [The author] clarifies this further by stating "yadbhāvam prati" etc. |
yadbhāvaṃ prati yannaiva hetvantaramapekṣate / tat tatra niyataṃ jñeyaṃ svahetubhyas tathodayāt // | When something does not depend on any other cause for bringing about a certain condition, that [thing] should be known to be permanently connected to that [condition], because it arises thus from its own causes. |
nirnibandhā hi sāmagrī svakāryotpādane yathā / | Just as the totality of causes is independent in producing its own effect, |
vināśaṃ prati sarve 'pi nirapekṣāś ca janminaḥ // | so too all produced things are independent with respect to [their] destruction. |
prayogaḥ ye yadbhāvaṃ pratyanapekṣās te tadbhāvaniyatāḥ / yathā samantanantaraphalā sāmagrī svakāryotpādane niyatā / | The formal argument is: Those which are independent with respect to a certain condition are permanently connected to that condition, just as the totality of causes producing immediate effects is permanently connected to [the production of] its own effect. |
vināśaṃ pratyanapekṣāś ca sarve janminaḥ kṛtakā bhāvā iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | And all produced things, [that is] created entities, are independent with respect to destruction - this is a natural reason. |
niyatam ityatra kāraṇamāha svahetubhya iti / | [The author] states the cause for [the term] "permanent" by [saying] "from its own causes." |
tathā tena niyatena rūpeṇotpannatvād ity arthaḥ / | The meaning is: because it is produced with that permanent form. |
nanu cānaikāntiko hetus tathā hi yadi nāma vināśaṃ prati hetvantarānapekṣā bhāvās tathāpi sthitvā deśāntare kālāntare ca bhāvasya vināśasambhavād udayānantarāpavargitvam abhīṣṭam eṣāṃ sādhayituṃ na sidhyatītyāha anapekṣo 'pītyādi / | [The opponent says:] "But isn't the reason inconclusive? For even if things are independent of other causes with respect to destruction, since destruction can occur after persisting for some time, in another place and at another time, what you wish to prove - namely their cessation immediately after arising - is not established." [To this he] states "even though independent" etc. |
anapekṣo 'pi yadyeṣa deśakālāntare bhavet / tadapekṣatayā naiṣa nirapekṣaḥ prasajyate // | Even though this [destruction] is independent, if it should occur at another time and place, then due to [that] dependence, it would follow that it is not independent. |
eṣa iti / vināśaḥ / | 'Eṣa' [refers to] destruction. |
tadapekṣatayeti / deśakālāntarāpekṣatayā / | 'Due to that dependence' [means] due to dependence on another time and place. |
yo hi yatrānapekṣaḥ sa yadi kvacid bhavet kadācid vā tadā taddeśakālāpekṣatvād anapekṣa eva na syāditi kuto vyabhicāraḥ / tathā hi ekadeśakālāparihāreṇānyatra deśakālādau vartamānaḥ katham anapekṣo nāma yatas tathāvṛttir eva tasyāpekṣā na tu samīhā tasyābhiprāyaśūnyatvāt // | For if something that is independent with regard to something were to exist somewhere or at some time, then due to its dependence on that time and place, it would not be independent at all - so how could there be any deviation? Indeed, how could something existing at certain times and places, and not at others, be called independent, since such occurrence itself constitutes its dependence - not desire [for something], since it lacks intention? |
yadi tarhi sarvathā nirapekṣatvād iti hetvartho 'bhipretaḥ na tarhi hetuḥ siddhaḥ / | If then what is meant as the reason is [its] being completely independent, then that reason is not established. |
tathā hi kecid vināśaṃ prati mudgarādikamapekṣamāṇā dṛśyante / yathā ghaṭādayaḥ / | For some things are seen to depend on [things] like hammers for their destruction, like jars and such. |
ye 'pi buddhiśabdādayo 'napekṣatvena prasiddhās te 'pi yadi nāma mudgrādikaṃ nāpekṣante tathāpi deśakālāvapekṣanta ityato 'siddhatā hetor ityāśaṅkhya pariharann āha sarvatraivetyādi / | [Anticipating the objection that] even those things which are known to be independent, like cognition and sound, though they may not depend on [things] like hammers, still depend on time and place, and thus the reason is unestablished - [the author] gives an answer beginning with "sarvatraiva." |
sarvatraivānapekṣāś ca vināśe janmino 'khilāḥ / | All produced things are indeed independent everywhere with regard to [their] destruction. |
sarvatraiveti / sarvasmin deśakālādike vināśahetau nirapekṣā janmina ity arthaḥ / | 'Everywhere' means: produced things are independent of causes of destruction in all times, places, etc. |
nāśahetutvenābhyupetānām akiñcitkaratvād anupakāritvāt na cānupakāryapekṣo yukto 'prasaṅgāt // | Because things accepted as causes of destruction are ineffective [and] non-beneficial, and dependence on what is non-beneficial is not logical, as [that would lead to] unwanted consequences. |
nāśako hetur na bhāvāvyatirekiṇaḥ / nāśasya kārako yuktaḥ svahetor bhāvajanmataḥ // | The destructive cause cannot be justified as bringing about destruction [which is] non-different from the entity [itself], since the [positive] entity arises from its own cause. |
vināśo hi kriyamāṇaḥ kadācid vastu vā syād avastu vā | When destruction is being brought about, it must either be an entity or a non-entity. |
tatra yadi vastu tadāsau vināśahetunā tato vināśahetor bhāvād anarthāntarabhūto vā kriyeta arthāntarabhūto vā | If it is an entity, then it would be produced by the cause of destruction either as non-different from that cause of destruction, or as different from it. |
vastusato vikalpadvayānativṛtter ubhayānubhayapakṣastvayukta eva | For an existent entity, there can only be these two alternatives, and [any position involving] both or neither would be unjustified. |
vastunyekākāratyāgaparigrahayostadaparākāraparigrahatyāganāntarīyakatvāt | Because in [regard to] an entity, the abandonment and acceptance of one form necessarily involves the acceptance and abandonment of its opposite form. |
ekasya vidhipratiṣedhoyogādi ityuktam | As has been stated, affirmation and negation cannot apply simultaneously to one [thing]. |
tatra na tāvad anarthāntarabhūta iti pakṣaḥ bhāvasvabhāvasya svahetor eva janmata utpatteḥ | Of these [alternatives], the position that [destruction is] non-different [from its cause] is not tenable, since what has the nature of a positive entity arises only from its own cause. |
tasyāpi bhāvavat tadavyatirekiṇo niṣpannatvāt | Because that [destruction] too, like the [original] entity, would be produced as non-different from it [i.e., its cause]. |
na ca niṣpannasya kāraṇaṃ yuktam kāraṇāvirāmaprasaṅgāt | And what has [already] been produced cannot [logically] have [another] cause, as this would lead to an endless series of causes. |
na cānaṃśe samudbhūte bhavātmanyātmahetutaḥ | And when the entity-nature, which is partless, has arisen from its own cause, |
tadātmaiva vināśo 'nyair ādhātuṃ pāryate punaḥ | destruction cannot again be imposed upon that very nature by other [causes]. |
na hyekasya svabhāvadvayam asti yenāṃśena niṣpattiḥ syāt kiṃ tu niraṃśa eva bhāvaḥ sa ca svahetor utpadyamānaḥ sarvātmanaivotpanna iti kathaṃ tasyottarakālaṃ kāraṇāntaraiḥ svabhāvāntaramādhīyeta | A single [entity] cannot have two natures by virtue of which [its] production could occur in parts; rather, an entity is entirely without parts; and when it is being produced from its own cause, it is produced in its entirety; how then could another nature be imposed upon it at a later time by other causes? |
na hi yanniṣpattau yo na niṣpannaḥ sa tasya svabhāvo yuktaḥ ekayogakṣemalakṣaṇatvād abhedasya tasmād yo 'sāvuttarakālamutpadyate nāśātmā bhāvaḥ so 'paraḥsvabhāvaḥ yaścāparaḥ sa kathaṃ tasya bhaved iti yatkiñcid etat | For what is not produced at the time of [a thing's] production cannot logically be its nature, since non-difference is characterized by having a single preservation and destruction; therefore, that entity which is produced later, having the nature of destruction, is [of] a different nature; and how could that which is different belong to it? Thus this [argument] is nonsensical. |
athārthāntarabhūta iti pakṣas tatrāpyakiñcitkara eva vināśahetur bhāvasyeti darśayati padārthavyatirikta ityādi | If the alternative position is accepted that "destruction that is produced is something different [from the thing]," even then the cause of destruction would be entirely ineffective for the entity - this is what is shown by [the words] "different from the thing" and so forth. |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.