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padārthavyatirikte tu nāśanāmni kṛte sati bhāve hetvantarais tasya na kiñcidupajāyate | If destruction, [which is] different from the thing, is brought about, then nothing is produced in the thing itself by those other causes [of destruction]. |
tenopalambhakāryādi prāgvadevānuṣajyate | Therefore effects such as [the thing's] apprehension continue just as before. |
tādavasthyāc ca naivāsya yuktamācaraṇād api na hyanyasya karaṇe 'nyadupakṛtaṃ nāma atiprasaṅgāt | And because [the thing] remains in the same state, its concealment etc. is not possible; for the production of one thing cannot benefit another thing, as [this would lead to] an unwanted consequence. |
nāpi tat sambandhino nāśasya karaṇād bhāva upakṛto bhavatīti yuktaṃ vaktum sambandhāsiddheḥ | Nor is it correct to say that "the thing is benefited by the production of destruction related to it," because [such] a relation is not established. |
tathā hi bhedābhyupagamān na tādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ nāpi tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ vināśahetor eva tadutpatteḥ nacānyo vāstavaḥ sambandho 'sti | For indeed, due to the acceptance of difference [between them], the relation cannot be characterized by identity, nor can it be characterized by being produced from it, since [destruction] is produced only from the cause of destruction; and there exists no other real relation [between them]. |
satyapi vā sambandhe bhāvasyāvasthitatvāt tathaivopalambhādikāryaprasaṅgaḥ upalambha eva kāryam | Even if there were a relation [between them], because the entity remains established, the effects such as apprehension would likewise follow; [in the compound] "upalambhakāryādi," apprehension itself is meant as the effect. |
ādiśabdena jalasaṃdhāraṇajaṅgābhaṅgādiparigrahaḥ | By the word "ādi" [are meant] the inclusion of [functions] such as the holding of water, the breaking of legs, and so forth. |
tena vyatiriktena nāśenāvṛtatvāt pratibaddhatvād vā nopalambhādikāryaṃ karotīti cedāha tādavasthyād ityādi | [It might be objected that] "when [a thing] is concealed or obstructed by destruction, which is different from it, it does not produce effects such as [its own] apprehension." To this [the author] responds with [the words] "as [it remains in] the same condition" etc. |
na hi bhāvasya svabhāvātiśayamakhaṇḍayannanutpādayan vā tasyāvārakaḥ pratibandhako vā yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt | Indeed, nothing can be a 'concealer' or 'obstructor' of an entity without either destroying or preventing the production of its essential nature, as [this would lead to] an unwanted consequence. |
tasmātyaktānāvṛtāpratibaddhapūrvasvabhāvatvāt tasyāvaraṇaṃ pratibandhaś ca na yujyate | Therefore, since [the entity's] previous nature remains unabandoned, unconcealed, and unobstructed, neither concealment nor obstruction of it is possible. |
syād etan na prāgvadupalabdhyādiprasaṅgaḥ tena vyatiriktena nāśena bhāvasya vināśyamānatvād ity āha nāśanāmnetyādi | [Someone] might say: "The consequences [such as] apprehension etc. do not [occur] as before because the entity is being destroyed by destruction which is different from it." To this [the author] responds with [the words] "by [something] named destruction" etc. |
nāśanāmnā padārthena bhāvo nāśyata ityasat | [The claim that] "an entity is destroyed by something named destruction" is invalid. |
anyatvādivikalpānāṃ tatrāpyarthānuvṛttitaḥ | Because the alternatives of [its being] different [from the entity] etc. apply there as well. |
nāśo hi bhāvaṃ nāśayan kimanyamānanyaṃ vā yadvā pradhvamsalakṣaṇaṃ nāśaṃ kurvāṇo nāśayati mudgarādivat | For when destruction destroys an entity, [one must ask:] does it destroy [something] different or non-different [from itself]? Or if [it is claimed that] it destroys [by] producing destruction characterized as annihilation, like a hammer etc. |
itrāpi tulyā eva vikalpāḥ punar āvartante | Here too the same alternatives recur. |
tatra cokto doṣaḥ vakṣyate ca tatrāpīti | And the fault mentioned previously will be explained [as applying] there also. |
yo 'sau nāśanāmnāparo nāśaḥ kriyate tatrāpi | [This applies] even to the case where another destruction named "destruction" is produced. |
arthānuvṛttita iti anyatvādivikalpānām anuvṛtter ity arthaḥ | "By implication" means that the alternatives of [its being] different etc. apply [here too]. |
evaṃ tāvad vastubhūto na kriyata iti pratipāditam | Thus it is established that [destruction] cannot be produced as an entity. |
nāpyavastubhūta iti darśayann āha bhāvābhāvātmaka ityādi | Showing that [it cannot] even [be] non-entity, [the author] states [the words beginning with] "of the nature of existence and non-existence." |
bhāvābhāvātmako nāśaḥ pradhvaṃsāparasaṃjñakaḥ | [The supposed] destruction, which is of the nature of both existence and non-existence, [and is] otherwise called annihilation... |
abhāvasya ca kāryatve vastunaivāṅkurādivat | If non-existence were an effect, it would be an entity like a sprout etc. |
prasaktājanyarūpasya hetuśaktyā samudbhavāt | Because while its nature implies that it cannot be produced, [in this case] it would arise from the power of a cause. |
Here are the sentence pairs with precise translations, using IAST and square brackets where needed: | null |
bhāvasya hi karaṇaṃ bhavati nābhāvasya nimittīkartavyasakalasvabhāvirahalakṣaṇatvān na kiñcid utpādyaṃ rūpam asti / | Only an entity can be brought about, not a non-entity, because [a non-entity], which is characterized by the absence of any positive nature that could be made into a cause, has no form that could be produced. |
ato bhāvābhāvātmakaḥ bhāvaniṣedhātmako nāśo na kenacit kriyate avastutvāt kharaviṣāṇavat / | Hence destruction, which is of the nature of non-existence [and] consists in the negation of being, cannot be brought about by anything, due to [its] being a non-entity, like a hare's horns. |
anyathā hi kāryatvād aṅkurādivad vastutvam eva syāt / | For otherwise, being an effect, it would necessarily be an entity, like a sprout and other [effects]. |
prayogaḥ yat kāryaṃ tadvastu yathāṅkurādayaḥ kāryaś ca nāśa iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | [Here is] the logical formulation: Whatever is an effect is an entity, as [seen in] sprouts and other [things], and destruction is an effect - this is a natural reason. |
vyāptimasya sādhayann āha hetuśaktyā samudbhavād iti / | [The author], establishing the pervasion of this [argument], states: "because it arises from the power of a cause." |
tadeva hi kāryam ucyate yatkāraṇaśaktyā viśiṣṭamātmātiśayamāsādayati / | For only that is called an effect which obtains a specific excellence of nature through the power of [its] cause. |
samāsāditātmātiśayam eva ca vastu / | And only an entity can obtain such excellence of nature. |
atra cārthe naiyāyikāderapyavivādaḥ / | And on this point there is no dispute even with the Naiyāyikas and others. |
tathā hi sattāsamavāyāḥ svakāraṇasamavāyo vā kāryatvam ucyate / | For thus they define the nature of an effect as either inherence in existence or inherence in its own cause. |
na ca nāśe sattāsamavāyaḥ svakāraṇasamavāyo vā tasya dravyādivadastitvāśrayatvaprasaṅgāt / | And destruction cannot have inherence either in existence or in its own cause, because [if it did] it would follow that it would be a substrate of existence like substances and other [entities]. |
yadyevaṃ bhavatu vastutvaṃ nāśasya tatra ko doṣa ity āha / | [Someone] says: "If this is so, let destruction be an entity - what is wrong with that?" |
vidhinaivam abhāvaś ca paryudāsāśrayāt kṛtaḥ / | This [view that] negation [is produced] through affirmation has been constructed by taking recourse to preclusion. |
yas tatra vyatirekādivikalpo vartate punaḥ / | But whatever alternative regarding difference and other [relations] applies there again. |
kathaṃ punar abhāvasya vidhinā karaṇam ityākāṅkṣāyām idam uktam paryudāsāśrayād iti / | In response to the question "How is negation brought about through affirmation?", this is stated: "[It is] through recourse to preclusion." |
paryudāsasyāśrayaṇād ity arthaḥ / | The meaning is: "through taking recourse to preclusion." |
vivakṣāvaśāddhi kutaścana bhāvād vilakṣaṇo bhāva evābhāva ityākhyāyate | Through the speaker's intention, sometimes an entity different from some [other] entity is designated as an absence. |
tatrāpi vināśahetoḥ sphuṭataramevākiñcitkaratvaṃ pratipāditamiti darśayann āha athetyādi | Showing that even in this case the ineffectiveness of the cause of destruction has been clearly established, he says [the verse beginning with] "atha." |
atha kriyāniṣedho 'yaṃ bhāvaṃ naiva karoti hi / tathāpyahetutā siddhā kartur hetutvahānitaḥ | If [it is argued that] this negation of action indeed does not produce an entity, even then [its] non-causality is established due to the absence of causality in the agent. |
tathā hi prasajyapratiṣedhe sati naṭaḥ karotinā sambandhādabhāvaṃ karoti bhāvaṃ na karotīti kriyāpratiṣedhādakartṛtvaṃ nāśahetoḥ pratipāditaṃ bhavetyaścākartā sa kathaṃ hetuḥ syād ityato na vināśahetuḥ kaścit | For when there is absolute negation, due to the connection with "does not produce," [the meaning is that] it produces an absence [and] does not produce an entity; thus from the negation of action, the non-agency of the cause of destruction would be established. And how could that which is not an agent be a cause? Therefore, there is no cause of destruction whatsoever. |
atrāviddhakarṇoktāni vināśasya hetumatvasādhane pramāṇāni nirdidikṣur āha nanvityādi | Here, wishing to point out the proofs for establishing the causedness of destruction as stated by Aviddhakarṇa, he says [the verses beginning with] "nanu." |
nanu naiva vināśo 'yaṃ sattākāle 'sti vastunaḥ | "This destruction is indeed not present at the time of the existence of the thing. |
na pūrvaṃ na cirātpaścād vastuno 'nantaraṃ tvasau | [It is] neither before nor long after, but [occurs] immediately after the thing. |
evaṃ ca hetumāneṣa yukto niyatakālataḥ | And thus, since [it occurs at] a fixed time, it must have a cause. |
kādācitkatvayogo hi nirapekṣe nirākṛtaḥ | For the possibility of occasional occurrence is ruled out in [something] independent [of causes]." |
tathā hi na vastunaḥ sattākāle vināśaḥ kṣaṇamātrāvasthāyino 'pyabhāvaprasaṅgāt nāpyutpādāt pūrvam ajātasya vināśāyogāt na hi vandhyāputrādayo 'nutpannā eva vinaśyanti paścād api bhavannacirād bhavati tṛtīyādiṣu kṣaṇeṣuvinaṣṭasya punar vināśāyogāt bhasmīkṛtajvalanavat kintu vastvanantaraṃ dvitīye kṣaṇe vināśaḥ | For destruction is not [present] at the time of the thing's existence, since [if it were] even something existing for just a moment would be absent. Nor [can it be] before [the thing's] origination, since what is unborn cannot be destroyed—for the son of a barren woman and similar [non-existent things] are not destroyed while unborn. Even though occurring afterwards, it does not occur long after, since what is destroyed in the third and subsequent moments cannot be destroyed again, like fire that has been reduced to ashes. Rather, destruction [occurs] in the second moment immediately after the thing. |
tataś ca niyatakālatvāddhetumān vināśo 'ṅkurādivad iti siddham / niyatakālata iti / | Thus it is established that destruction must have a cause, just like a sprout [has a cause], because [destruction] has a fixed time [of occurrence] |
kādācitkatvād ity arthaḥ / | [This means] because it occurs occasionally |
vyāptimasya sādhayann āha kādācitkatvayogo hītyādi / | [The author], establishing the pervasion of this [reason], states "because there is occasional occurrence" etc. |
na hyanapekṣe kādācitkatvaṃ yuktaṃ nityaṃ sattvādiprasaṅgāt / | Indeed, occasional occurrence would not be possible in something independent [of causes], because [that would] entail perpetual existence |
tasmāt kādācitkatvāt siddham asya sahetutvam // | Therefore, from [its] occasional nature, its having a cause is established |
ito 'pi siddham iti darśayati vastvanantarabhāvāccetyādi / | [The author] shows that it is established also from this [reason], [stating] "because it occurs immediately after the thing" etc. |
vastvanantarabhāvāc ca hetumāneva yujyate / | And because it occurs immediately after the thing, [destruction] must certainly have a cause |
abhūtvābhāvataścāpi yathaivānyaḥ kṣaṇo mataḥ // | And also because, having previously not existed, [destruction] comes into existence, just like another moment |
tadevam ete trayo hetava uktāḥ / sahetuko vināśaḥ kādācitkatvāt vastūtpattyanantarabhāvitvena bauddhair abhyupagamyamānatvāt prāgabhūtvātmalābhāc ca kṣaṇāntaravat / | Thus these three reasons have been stated: destruction must have a cause [1] because it is occasional, [2] because it occurs immediately after the thing as admitted by the Buddhists, and [3] because, having previously not existed, it gains existence, like another moment |
vaidharmyeṇa śaśaviṣāṇādaya iti // | The hare's horn and similar [impossibilities] serve as examples by dissimilarity |
ahetukatvāt kiñcāyam asanvandhyāsutādivat / athavākāśavannityo na prakārāntaraṃ yataḥ // | If [destruction] is without cause, it would either be non-existent like 'the son of a barren woman' and such things, or eternal like ākāśa, since no other alternative exists. |
asattve sarvabhāvānāṃ nityatvaṃ syād anāśataḥ / | If [destruction] were non-existent, all entities would be eternal due to the absence of destruction. |
sarvasaṃskāranāśitvapratyayaścānimittakaḥ // | And the notion that all conditioned things are subject to destruction would be groundless. |
nityatve 'pi saha sthānaṃ vināśenāvirodhataḥ / | If [destruction] were eternal, [a thing] could coexist with its destruction, as there would be no contradiction. |
ajātasya ca nāśoktir naiva yuktyanupātinī // | And the assertion of destruction of what has not [yet] been produced would not conform to reason. |
kimakāraṇatvādvināśo nāsti vyomotpalādivat athākāraṇatvān nityo vyomādivad iti | [Does this mean that] due to having no cause, destruction does not exist, like a sky-lotus, or that due to having no cause, it is eternal like ākāśa and such things? |
bhavatāṃ hi pakṣe akāraṇaṃ dvidhā dṛṣṭaṃ nityamasacca na hi sattvāsattvavyatirekeṇa prakārāntaram asti | In your view, what is without cause is seen to be of two kinds: eternal and non-existent, for there is no other alternative besides existence and non-existence. |
tatra yadyakāraṇatvād asat vināśaḥ tadā sarvabhāvānāṃ nityatvaprasaṅgaḥ vināśābhāvāt | Therefore, if destruction is non-existent due to being without cause, then all entities would necessarily be eternal due to the absence of destruction. |
atha nityaḥ tadā bhāvasya vināśena sahāvasthānaṃ prāpnoti sarvadāvasthānāt | If [on the other hand, destruction] is eternal, then an entity would end up coexisting with its destruction, because [destruction] would exist at all times. |
na caitadyuktaṃ bhāvābhāvayoḥ parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvāt | And this is not reasonable, because existence and non-existence are characterized by mutual exclusion. |
atha sahāvasthānaṃ neṣyate tadā kāryasyotpādo na prāpnoti tat pratyanīkabhūtasya nāśasya sadāvasthitatvāt / | If co-existence is not admitted, then the production of an effect would not be possible, since its contrary [factor], destruction, would always be present. |
tataścājātasya vināśo 'pi na saṃgacchate na hyajātāḥ śaśaviṣāṇādayo vinaśyantīti loke pratītam tenājātasya vināśa iti vacanaṃ naiva yuktyanupāti // | And consequently, the destruction of what is unproduced is not possible, for unproduced things like a hare's horns are not known in the world to be destroyed; therefore, the statement that "there is destruction of what is unproduced" is not in accordance with reason. |
tadatretyādinā sarvaṃ pratividhatte | [The author] responds to all this with [the words] beginning with "tadatra." |
tadatra katamaṃ nāśaṃ paraṃ paryanuyuñjate / kiṃ kṣaṇasthitidharmāṇaṃ bhāvam eva tathoditam // atha bhāvasvarūpasya nivṛttiṃ dhvaṃsasaṃjñitam / pūrvaparyunuyoge hi naiva kiñcidvirudhyate // | Which kind of destruction are the opponents questioning here? [Is it] the momentary existence of entities as explained [by us], or the cessation of the entity's form called "destruction" [dhvaṃsa]? If [the objection concerns] the former, there is no contradiction at all. |
dvividho hi vināśo vidheḥ pratiṣedhalakṣaṇaḥ / | For destruction is of two kinds: positive and negative. |
tathā hi kṣaṇasthitidharmā bhāva eva calo vinaśyatīti kṛtvā vināśa ityākhyāyate / | Thus, when a momentarily existing entity, being impermanent, is destroyed, this is called "destruction" [of the positive kind]. |
yadvā bhāvasvabhāvapracyutilakṣaṇapradhvaṃsāparanāmā vinaśanaṃ vināśa iti / tatra pūrvasminnāśe hetumatvasādhanaparyanuyogaḥ kriyate yathoktair hetubhiḥ tadā siddhasādhyatā // | Or [there is] destruction which is characterized by the loss of positive nature and is called "disruption" [pradhvaṃsa]. If, regarding the first kind of destruction, [their] objection concerns establishing [its] having a cause through the reasons stated, then [they are] proving what is [already] established. |
tām eva siddhasādhyatāṃ yo hītyādinā darśayati | [The author] shows this very proving of what is [already] established with [the words] beginning with "yo hi." |
yo hi bhāvaḥ kṣaṇasthāyī vināśa iti gīyate / | That entity which, being momentarily existent, is called "destruction," |
taṃ hetumantamicchāmaḥ parābhāvāttvahetukam // | that [kind of destruction] we accept as having a cause; [but] due to the absence of anything else [that could be its cause], the other [kind of destruction] is without cause. |
yadyevaṃ kathamahetuko vināśo bhavatāṃ pratīta ity āha parābhāvāttvahetukam iti | "If that is so [and you admit what we have argued], then how have you maintained destruction to be 'without cause'?" [To this] he says "It is without cause due to the absence of other [causes]." |
parasya svakāraṇavyatiriktasyottarakālaṃ mudgarāder nāśakasyābhāvād ahetukamicchāma iti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ | We consider [destruction] to be without cause because of the absence of any destroyer like a hammer etc. which would be different from its own cause [and] which would come at a later time - this is the connection with the topic at hand. |
atra caivambhūte vināśe dharmiṇi kādācitkatvāt prāgabhūtvātmalābhāditīmau hetūsiddhau | In this case, regarding destruction as the subject [of inference] being of this nature, the two reasons - "because it is occasional" and "because having not existed before, it comes into existence" - are established. |
vastvanantarabhāvitvam api yadi sāmānyena vivakṣitaṃ tadā siddham eva kāraṇabhūtastvanantaram asya bhāvaprasiddheḥ | If the characteristic of "occurring immediately after the thing" is meant in a general sense, then that too is established, because its existence immediately after that which is its cause is well-known. |
athātmabhūtavinaśvaravastvanantarabhāvitvam asya vivakṣitaṃ tadā hetur asiddha iti darśayati | But if what is meant is its occurring immediately after the perishable thing which constitutes its own self, then [such] a reason is not established - thus he shows. |
calabhāvasvarūpasya bhāvenaiva sahodayāt | Because [destruction] arises simultaneously with the thing itself, being of the nature of a momentary entity. |
na hi niraṃśavastuno bhago 'sti yena tadanantarabhāvitvam asya bhavet | Indeed, a partless thing has no parts by virtue of which its destruction could occur immediately after it. |
tatsvabhāvavat tadavyatirekiṇo nāśasya tanniṣpattāveva niṣpannatvāt | Because destruction, being non-different from it, like [the thing's] own nature, is accomplished precisely when that [thing] is accomplished. |
anyathā tat svabhāvatvam eva tasya na syād ityuktam | Otherwise, as has been stated, it would not be [the thing's] very nature. |
yaccoktaṃ sarvasaṃskāranāśitvapratyayaścānimittaka iti tadapyata eva pratikṣiptam iti darśayati | He shows that what was stated - that "the notion that all conditioned things are destructible is without cause" - is also refuted by this very [argument]. |
ato vināśasadbhāvān na nityāḥ sarvasaṃskṛtāḥ | Therefore, due to the presence of destruction, all conditioned things cannot be eternal. |
na vināśītibuddhiś ca nirnimittā prasajyate | And the notion that "[things] are destructible" cannot be without cause. |
yata eva hi kṣaṇasthitidharmāṇaḥ padārthās tathādhyavasīyamānatanavastasyā buddher nimittamato nānimittatvaprasaṅgaḥ // | Since things have the character of momentary existence, and [those same] things that are apprehended as perishable form the basis for the cognition [of perishability], therefore there is no possibility of [this cognition] being without basis. |
atha pradhvaṃsalakṣaṇo vināśo dharmyabhipretas tadā trayo 'pi hetavo 'siddhā iti darśayati pradhvaṃsasyetyādi / | If destruction characterized as annihilation is intended as the subject [of inference], then all three reasons are unestablished - this is what is shown [in the following]. |
pradhvaṃsasya tu nairātmyān nāstyanantarabhāvitā / | Due to [its] lacking essence, annihilation cannot have the property of occurring immediately after [something]. |
nābhūtvābhāvayogasya gaganendīvarādivat // vastunyeva hyanantarabhāvitvādayo dharmāḥ samāśritā nāvastuni yathā śaśaviṣāṇādau pradhvaṃsaś ca nirātmā niḥsvabhāvaḥ tat katham asyānantarabhāvitvādayaḥ sambhaveyuḥ / | [It] cannot have the property of coming into existence after having not existed, like a sky-lotus and similar [non-existent things]. For properties like occurring immediately after [something] can only inhere in real things, not in non-entities like hare's horns. And since annihilation is essenceless [and] without own-nature, how could properties like occurring immediately after [something] be possible for it? |
nābhūtvā bhāvayogaśceti / | And [it] cannot have the property of coming into existence after having not existed. |
cakārātkādācitkatvaparigrahaḥ // | The particle 'ca' includes [the negation of] the property of being occasional. |
yadyevam yadi dhvaṃsasyānantarabhāvitvaṃ nāsti tadā bhāvasya dhvaṃso bhavatīti / na hi yo na bhavatyeva tasya bhavatīti syād ityāśaṅkyāha pradhvaṃsa ityādi / | [One might object:] "If this is so, if annihilation does not have the property of occurring immediately after [something], then what does it mean to say 'there is annihilation of the thing'? For what does not exist cannot be said to 'be'" - thinking thus, [the author] states [the following]. |
pradhvaṃso bhavatītyeva na bhāvo bhavatītyayam / arthaḥ pratyāyyate tvatra na vidhiḥ kasyacin mataḥ // | When it is said "there is annihilation," what is conveyed is [merely] that "the thing is not [there]" - no affirmation of anything is intended here. |
yadyapi dhvaṃso vidhīyamānatayā nirdiśyate tathāpi bhāvaniṣedha eva pratīyate na paramārthataḥ kasyacidvasturūpasya vidhiḥ // | Although annihilation is expressed in an affirmative form, what is understood is merely the negation of [the thing's] existence, not the real affirmation of any positive entity. |
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