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nanu caitasya putro bhavatītyādivad bhavatiśabdaprayogād atrāpi bhavanam evavidhīyata ity āha na hītyādi / na hi bāleya ityevannāmamātre kṛte kvacit / | [One might object:] "Just as in expressions like 'it is Caitra's son,' due to the use of the word 'is,' here too existence must be affirmed" - [responding to this, the author] says "For indeed..." [The mere use of words does not entail real existence], just as when someone is merely named 'donkey,' [it does not make them one]. |
na hi vastūnāṃ śabdaprayogamātrānuvidhāyinī sadasattve tasyecchāmātrapratibaddhapravṛttitvāt / | The existence and non-existence of things do not depend upon the mere use of words, since such usage [of words] depends solely upon the speaker's will. |
anyathā hi kvacit puṃsi kenacid icchāvaśād bāleya iti nāmni niveśite sarvasya gardabhadharmasya tatra prasaṅgaḥ syāt / | For if it were otherwise, then if someone were to assign the name "bāleya" to a person on a whim, all the properties of a donkey would have to be attributed to that person. |
bāleyarāsabhaśabdau gardabhaparyāyau // | The words "bāleya" and "rāsabha" are synonyms for "gardabha" [donkey]. |
avaśyaṃ caitad vijñeyam yaduta vastusvabhāvaniṣedha eva na tu kiñcid vidhīyata iti | This must be understood: that there is only negation of the inherent nature of things, nothing is being affirmed. |
vastuno jāyate kiñcid ityetat kiṃ nivartate // | How can the statement "something is produced from a thing" be negated? |
anyathā dhvaṃsākhyasya padārthāntarasya vidhāne sati na kiñcid vastuno jātam iti tadvastu kimiti nivartate // | Otherwise, if what is called "destruction" were affirmed as a separate category, and nothing is produced from the thing, why would that thing cease [to exist]? |
yaccoktam asatve sarvabhāvānām ityādi tatrāha bhāvadhvaṃsātmanaścaivam ityādi / | Regarding what was said about "the non-existence of all entities" and so forth, [the text] states about the nature of the destruction of entities thus: |
vasturūpaviyogena na bhāvābhāvarūpataḥ // | [Destruction occurs] through dissociation from the form of a thing, not through [absolute] non-existence of being. |
vastusvabhāvaviyogarūpatvāt na tu bhāvasvabhāvasya sataḥ svarūpanivṛtter asattvam tat kathaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ nityatvaṃ syāt yadi hi svabhāvaniṣedhalakṣaṇo vināśas teṣām asan syāt tadā nityatvam eṣāṃ syāt / yāvatā svabhāvaniṣedhalakṣaṇo nāśaḥ svayam asadrūpasteṣām astyeveti kathaṃnityā bhaveyuḥ / | Since [destruction] has the nature of dissociation from the inherent nature of a thing, and not non-existence through the cessation of the existing nature of being itself, how could all entities be eternal? If destruction, characterized by the negation of inherent nature, were non-existent for them, then they would be eternal. However, since destruction, characterized by the negation of inherent nature, though itself negative in form, does actually exist for them, how could they be eternal? |
sarvasaṃskāranāśitvapratyayasya tu nimittamabhihitam eva // | The cause for the notion that all conditioned things are destructible has indeed been already explained. |
yaccoktaṃ nityatve 'pi sahasthānam ityādi tatrāha nivṛttirūpatetyādi / nivṛttirūpatāpyasmin vidhinā nābhidhīyate / | Regarding what was said about "co-existence even in permanence" and so forth, [the text] states about the nature of cessation thus: Even the nature of cessation in this [context] is not affirmed as something positive. |
vasturūpānuvṛttiś ca kṣaṇād ūrdhvaṃ niṣidhyate // | [It] denies the continuity of the thing's form beyond [a single] moment. |
ato vyavasthitaṃ rūpaṃ vihitaṃ nāsya kiñcana / iti nityavikalpo 'smin kriyamāṇo nirāspadaḥ // | Therefore no permanent form is established for this [destruction], [and] hence any consideration of [its] eternality is baseless. |
nivṛttir bhavatītyanenāpi vacanenāsmin pradhvaṃse vidhirūpeṇa nivṛttirūpatā nābhidhīyate yato nāsya vidheyaṃ kiñcidrūpam asti / | Even when it is said "cessation occurs," this statement does not express cessation as a positive entity with regard to this destruction, since it has no positive form whatsoever. |
kiṃ tarhi vastusvarūpasya kṣaṇād ūrdhvaṃ svabhāvānuvṛttir niṣidhyate / | Rather, [it] denies the continuity of the thing's own nature beyond [a single] moment. |
tasmād ayam ekāntenābhāvarūpa eveti nityavikalpo 'nāspada eva niḥsvabhāvatvād eva sadā vyavasthitarūpāyogāt / | Therefore, the alternative that this [destruction] is absolutely of the nature of non-existence is baseless, precisely because, being without any nature, [it] cannot possibly have a permanent form. |
svabhāvapratibaddhatvān nityanityasvabhāvapratibaddhadharmayoḥ / | Because the properties of eternality and non-eternality are bound to [things'] own nature. |
yaccoktamakāraṇaṃ bhavatāṃ dvidhā nityamasacceti tatparasiddhāntānabhijñatayā yato nyāyavādināṃ bauddhānām akāraṇamasadeva / yathoktaṃ bhagavatā sadharmeṣu dharmānudarśī viharan bodhisattvo 'ṇumapi dharmaṃ na samanupaśyati / | What was said about [something] without cause being either eternal or non-existent shows ignorance of others' doctrines, since for Buddhist logicians, what is without cause is [necessarily] non-existent. As the Blessed One has said: "The Bodhisattva dwelling in observation of properties among similar things does not perceive even the smallest property." |
yaḥ pratīya samutpādavinirmukta iti / | Which is free from dependent origination. |
evaṃ nāśahetūnāṃ sarveṣāmākiñcitkaratvānnāsiddhatā hetoḥ / | Thus, since all causes of destruction are ineffective, [our] reason is not unestablished. |
tathā hi bhāvaḥ svahetorutpadyamānaḥ kadācitprakṛtyā svayaṃ naśvarātmaivotpadyate anaśvarātmā vā / yadi naśvaras tasya na kiñcinnāśahetutā svayaṃ tat svabhāvatayaiva nāśāt / | For indeed, when an entity is being produced from its cause, is it sometimes produced by nature as having an inherently perishable nature or as having an imperishable nature? If [it is] perishable, then nothing can be a cause of [its] destruction, since [it] perishes by its very nature. |
yo hi yasya svabhāvaḥ sa svahetor evotpadyamānas tādṛśo bhavati na punas tadbhāve hetvantaramapekṣate / | When something has a certain svabhāva [inherent nature], it arises from its own cause with that same nature [and] does not depend upon any other cause for [maintaining] that state. |
yathā prakāśadravoṣnakaṭhinādayas tadātmāna utpannā na punaḥ prakāśādibhāva hetvantaram apekṣante / | For instance, things that are luminous, fluid, hot, solid and so forth arise with those [properties] as their essential nature [and] do not depend upon another cause for [maintaining] their state of luminosity and so forth. |
syād etat yathā bījādayo 'ṅkurādijananasvabhāvāḥ santo 'pi na kevalā janayanti salilādikāraṇāntarāpekṣatvāt tadvadbhāvo 'naśvarasvabhāvo 'pi nāśekāraṇāntarāpekṣo bhaviṣyatīti / | [One might argue that] "just as seeds and similar things, though having the nature of producing sprouts etc., do not produce [them] by themselves alone due to dependence on other causes like water etc., similarly, even a thing with an imperishable nature might depend on other causes for [its] destruction." |
tadetadasamyak / | This is incorrect. |
antyāvasthāprāptasyaiva janakasvabhāvatvābhyupagamāt nānyasya / | Because only that which brings about the final state [of something] is acknowledged as having a productive nature, nothing else [is so acknowledged]. |
tena yo 'sau tat svabhāvaḥ sa janayatyeva nāsau paramapekṣate / | Therefore, that which has such a nature definitely produces [its effect] [and] does not depend on anything else. |
yastu kuśūlādistho na janayati nāsau tat svabhāvaḥ / | But that which, while staying in a granary etc., does not produce [anything], does not have that nature. |
kāraṇakāraṇatvāt tu tasyāpi kāraṇavyapadeśo na mukhyata iti nāsti vyabhicāraḥ / | Because it is [only] the cause of a cause, its designation as a cause is not primary; thus there is no contradiction. |
athānaśvarātmeti pakṣastadapi nāśahetur akiñcitkara eva / | If the position is that [something has] an imperishable nature, then any cause of destruction would be completely ineffective. |
tasya kenacit svabhāvānyathābhāvasya kartumaśakyatvāt / | Because it would be impossible for anyone to bring about a change in [such] a nature. |
tathā hi yadi svabhāva utpādānantaraṃ na vinaśyet tadā paścād api sa eva tasya sthidharmā svabhāvas tadavastha iti kiṃ nāśahetunā tasya kṛtam yena vinaśyeta / | For if [its] nature were not destroyed immediately after arising, then later too, since that same nature with its property of permanence would remain unchanged, what could a cause of destruction do to it by which it would be destroyed? |
athāpi syāt yathā tāmrādīnāṃ kaṭhinarūpāṇām api satāmagnyādisamparkādanyathātvaṃ bhavati / | Moreover, it might be argued that "just as copper and similar things, though solid, undergo change through contact with fire etc., |
tathā bhāvasyāvinaśvarasvabhāvasyāpi sato vināśahetunānyathātvaṃ kriyate / | similarly, even a thing that has an indestructible nature might be changed by a cause of destruction, |
tena vināśahetuṃ prāpya vinaśyatīti / | [and] thus upon encountering a cause of destruction, it would be destroyed." |
tadetad asamyak / | This is incorrect. |
na ih sa evānyathā bhavati / | Indeed, here it is not [the case that] the very same [thing] becomes different. |
svabhāvāntarotpattilakṣaṇatvād anyathātvasya / | Because change is characterized by the production of a different essential nature. |
tathā hi yat tadanyathātvaṃ nāma tat kiṃ bhāvādarthāntaramāhosvid bhāvaeva na tāvad bhāva eva tasya svahetor eva pūrvaṃ niṣpannatvāt / | For what is this so-called "change" - is it something different from the entity or is it the entity itself? It cannot be the entity itself, since it [the entity] has already been produced by its own cause. |
athārthāntaram tathā sati bhāvo 'cyutidharmā tathaivāvasthita iti na tasyānyathābhāvaḥ / | If it is something different [from the entity], then the entity, having the nature of permanence, remains exactly as it was, so there is no change in it. |
tāmrādidṛṣṭānto 'pyasiddha eva tathā hi tāmrādīnāṃ pūrvakasya kaṭhinādikṣaṇasya svarasanirodhitvād vināśe satyagnyādeḥ sahakārikāraṇāntarāt svopādānakāraṇāc ca sāmagryantarād dravākhyamaparam eva svabhāvāntaramutpadyate / | Even the example of copper and such [metals] is not established, because in their case, when the preceding moment of hardness of copper etc., being inherently destructible, is destroyed, then from other auxiliary causes like fire and from its own material cause and from a different totality [of conditions], another different essential nature called "fluidity" is produced. |
punar api dravādisvabhāvasya svarasanirodhitayā vināśe sati sahakārikāraṇāntarāt svopādānakāraṇāc ca kāṭhinyākhyamaparam eva svabhāvāntaramutpadyata iti naikasyānyathātvam asti / | Again, when the nature of fluidity etc., being inherently destructible, is destroyed, from other auxiliary causes and from its own material cause another different essential nature called "hardness" is produced - thus there is no change of one [and the same thing]. |
tasmāt sarvathāpyakiñcitkara eva nāśahetur iti nāsiddho hetuḥ / | Therefore, the cause of destruction is entirely ineffective in all ways, [and] thus our reason is not unestablished. |
nacāpi viruddhaḥ svapakṣe bhāvāt / | Nor is [our reason] contradictory, as it exists in our own position. |
nacāpyanaikāntikaḥ pūrvaṃ prasādhitatvāt / | Nor is [our reason] inconclusive, as it has been established previously. |
syād etat yathākāśaṃ mūrtatvāya na paramapekṣate atha ca tatra niyataṃ na bhavati tadvadbhāvaḥ kṛtako 'pi yaḥ pareṇānityo neṣyate / hetumataḥ sarvasyānityatvābhyupagamāt / | It might be [objected]: just as space does not depend on anything else for [its] corporeality and yet there is no fixed rule there, similarly an entity, though produced, which is not accepted by the opponent to be impermanent [might exist] - [but this is wrong] because it is accepted that everything that has a cause is impermanent. |
ta eva ceha pakṣīkṛtā nānya iti kuto 'naikāntikatā / | Only these are taken as [valid] positions here, not others; hence, how could there be inconclusiveness? |
nāpyākāśāder murttatvādidharmaṃ pratyanapekṣā siddhā | Nor is the independence of ākāśa and other [entities] established with regard to corporeality and other properties. |
yasya hi yo dharmo nāsti sa taṃ prati sāpekṣa eva | For indeed, when something lacks a property, it is certainly dependent [on something else] with regard to that [property]. |
na hi prāptaṃ dharmaṃ prati kācid apekṣā bhāvānāṃ vyavasthāpyate | For indeed, entities are never considered dependent with regard to properties [they] already possess. |
kiṃ tarhi aprāptam evetyasiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ | Rather, [they are dependent] only with regard to what is not [yet] obtained; thus the example [cited by the opponent] is unproven. |
ye tu vyomādayo bhāvā akṛtatvena saṃmatāḥ / vastuvṛttyā na santyeva te ca śaktiviyogataḥ | Those entities like ākāśa which are considered to be uncreated do not exist as real substances, because they are devoid of potency. |
kṣaṇikākṣaṇikatvādivikalpasteṣvanāspadaḥ | [Therefore] the alternative between momentariness and non-momentariness and such [qualities] has no basis in them. |
tadā vastveva yena syāt kṣaṇikaṃ yadivānyathā | [Only] then could it be a real entity, whether momentary or otherwise. |
yadi hi vyomādayo bhāvāḥ siddhasattākāḥ syus tadā teṣu kṣaṇikatvādidharmacintāvataret | For if entities like ākāśa were established as existent, only then could there arise any consideration of properties like momentariness in them. |
na hi dharmāṇāṃ svātantryeṇa siddhirasti | For properties do not have independent existence. |
anyathā hi dharmatvam eva teṣāṃ hīyate | For otherwise, their very nature as properties would be lost. |
na cākāśādayo 'kṛtakā dharmiṇas teṣāṃ sarvasāmarthyavirahitvena vandhyāputravadasa[t]dvyavahāraviṣayatvāt | And ākāśa and others are not uncreated property-bearers, because being devoid of all potency, they are objects of discourse about non-existence, like the son of a barren woman. |
prayogaḥ yat sarvasāmarthyaśūnyaṃ tadavastu yathā vandhyāputraḥ sarvasāmarthyaśūnyaṃ cākāśādīti svabhāvahetuḥ | The formal argument is: Whatever is devoid of all potency is non-existent, like the son of a barren woman; and ākāśa etc. are devoid of all potency - this is a natural reason. |
vastuto vyāpakānupalabdhir vā | Or in reality, [this is] the non-apprehension of the pervader. |
na cānaikāntiko hetuḥ etāvan mātranibandhanatvād asadvyavahārasya | And the reason is not inconclusive, because the discourse about non-existence depends on this alone. |
nāpyasiddhir iti paścāt pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ | And [it is] not unproven - this we shall explain later. |
sapakṣe bhāvānnāpi viruddhaḥ | And [it is] not contradictory, because [it is] present in similar instances. |
kasmāt punaravastuni kṣaṇikākṣaṇikavikalpo nāvataratītyāha | [If one asks] "Why does the alternative between momentary and non-momentary not arise in a non-entity?" - to this [he] says... |
kṣaṇāvasthitarūpaṃ hi vastu kṣaṇikamucyate / sthirarūpasamākrāntaṃ vastvevākṣaṇikaṃ punaḥ // | A thing whose form exists [only] for a moment is called 'kṣaṇika' [momentary], while a thing possessed of a stable form is conversely called 'akṣaṇika' [non-momentary]. |
udyotakarastvāha kṣaṇika iti matvarthīyānupapattiḥ tathā hi yadi niruktanyāyena kṣayaḥ kṣaṇaḥ so 'syāstīti kṣaṇika iti bodhyate tatra yuktaṃ kālabhedāt yadā hi kṣayo na tadā kṣayīti bhinnakālayor na matvarthīyo dṛṣṭaḥ / | Uddyotakara says: "There is an impossibility regarding the possessive suffix [-ika] in [the word] 'kṣaṇika'. For if according to the Nirukta method 'kṣaṇa' [means] 'destruction' [and] 'kṣaṇika' is understood as 'that which has it', this is not proper due to the time difference, since when there is destruction, the thing being destroyed [does not exist], and the possessive suffix is not seen [to be used] between things of different times." |
atha punarbhāvānantaravināśena viśiṣyamānaḥ kṣaṇa ity ucyate / | If it is said that 'kṣaṇa' is characterized by destruction immediately after [a thing's] existence, |
tadāpi sa tenaiva tadvātra bhavatīti na yukto matvarthīyaḥ / | even then the possessive suffix is not proper because [one cannot say] "this has that" or "this exists through that." |
atha kṣaṇasthitikālāḥ kṣaṇikāḥ sarvāntyo hi kālaḥ kṣaṇastaṃ ye 'vatiṣṭhante te kṣaṇikāḥ / | If [it is said that] 'kṣaṇikas' are [things whose] duration is a moment – for a moment is the ultimate [unit of] time – [and] those which exist for that [duration] are 'kṣaṇika', |
etad api na yuktam / | this too is not proper, |
saṃjñāmātreṇa kālasyābhyupagamāt na ca saṃjñāmātraṃ vastuviśeṣaṇatvena yuktam iti / | because time is accepted [by Buddhists] as mere designation, and what is mere designation cannot properly be a qualifier of a real thing. |
tatrāha utpādānantarāsthāyītyādi / | To this [objection], he states "[that which is] not remaining after arising" etc. |
utpādānantarāsthāyi svarūpaṃ yac ca vastunaḥ / taducyate kṣaṇaḥ so 'sti yasya tatkṣsaṇikam matam // | That nature of a thing which does not remain after [its] arising is called a 'kṣaṇa', and that which has this [nature] is considered 'kṣaṇika'. |
nanvevam api svabhāvasyānarthāntaratvāt so 'syāstīti vyatirekanibandhanaḥ pratyayo nopapadyata ity āha asatyapītyādi / | [Objection:] "Even so, since [a thing's] nature is not different from the thing [itself], the notion that 'this belongs to that', which is based on difference, is not possible." To this he says "even though not real" etc. |
asapyarthabhede ca so 'styasyeti na bādhyate | Even when there is no difference between two things, [this] does not prevent [using] the notion "this belongs to that" |
icchāracitasaṅketamātrabhāvi hi vācakam | For every expressive word exists merely through convention established by [speaker's] desire |
yathā svasya svabhāvaḥ śilāputrakasya śarīram ityādāvasatyapi vāstave bhede buddhiparikalpitaṃ bhedamāśritya vyatirekaṣaṣṭhīvibhaktir bhavati tathehāpi bhaviṣyati na hi vastusvabhāvānuvidhāyinyo vācaḥ | Just as in expressions like "one's own nature" [and] "the body of the stone-image", even though there is no real difference [between the things], the genitive case expressing difference is used based on a mentally constructed difference, so it will be in this case too; for verbal expressions do not [necessarily] conform to the real nature of things |
kiṃ tarhi vakturicchāmanuvidadhate | Rather, they follow the speaker's intention |
apica yāvatyarthe yāvāneva vaktṛbhir viniyujyate dhvaniḥ sa tāvāneva tamarthaṃ saṅketavaśāt pratyāyayati na tu paramārthataḥ prakṛtiḥ pratyayoḥ vāsti | Moreover, whatever sound is employed by speakers for whatever meaning, that [sound] conveys just that meaning through the force of convention, but in reality there exists neither stem nor affix |
kṣaṇika iti cāyaṃ śabda utpādānantarāsthāyini vastumātre niyukto vidvadbhiḥ | And this word "kṣaṇika" is applied by the learned only to a thing that does not persist after [its] origination |
tatra caivambhūte vastuni kṣaṇikaśabdena vivakṣite kṣaṇikaḥ śabdaḥ sapratyayo vā prayujyatāṃ pratyayarahito veti nātrāsmākam icchāmātrānurodhini sāṅketike vacasyatyādara ityetad darśayati udayānantarasthāyītyādi | And when such a thing is meant to be denoted by the word "kṣaṇika", whether the word is used with an affix or without an affix, we have no special regard for such usage which follows mere convention based on desire - this is what is shown by [the phrase] "existing after origination" etc. |
udayānantarasthāyi vastvevaṃ tu vivakṣitam | But a thing existing after origination is meant to be expressed thus |
evam iti / kṣaṇikam ityanena | "Thus" means by [the word] "kṣaṇika" |
saha pratyayena matvarthīyena vartata iti sapratyayaḥ | "With affix" means [it] occurs with the possessive affix [expressing the meaning "having that"] |
evaṃ vyomādīnām akṛtakatvābhyupagame sati niyamenāsadvyavahāraviṣayataiveti pratipāditam idānīṃ sattvābhyupagame tu kṣaṇikatvamevaiṣāṃ prasajyata itisādhanayannāha yadi tvityādi / | If [these things like] ākāśa [etc.] are accepted as uncreated, they necessarily become objects of non-existence, and now if they are accepted as existent, their momentariness necessarily follows - [the author] demonstrates this by saying "yadi tu" etc. |
yadi tu vyomakālādyāḥ santaḥ syus te tathāsati / | If however these [things] like ākāśa and time were to be existent, then in that case [they would be momentary]. |
kṛtā iveti / kṛtakā ivetyarthaḥ / | The word "kṛtāḥ" means "kṛtakāḥ" ["like created things"]. |
etena sattvādityayaṃ hetuḥ sūcitaḥ // tameva spaṣṭīkurvannāha tathāhītyādi / | By this, existence is indicated as the reason [for momentariness]. [The author], clarifying this very [reason], states "tathā hi" etc. |
tathā hi santo ye nāma te sarve kṣaṇabhaṅginaḥ / tadyathāsaṃskṛtā bhāvās tathāsiddhā anantaram // | For indeed, all those things which are existent are subject to momentary destruction, just as [all] created things have been proven [to be] just now. |
santaścāmī tvayeṣyante vyomakāleśvarādayaḥ / | And these [things] like ākāśa, time, and īśvara are accepted by you as existent. |
na bhavanti sthirā bhāvā niḥsatvās te tato matāḥ // | [These] entities cannot be permanent; therefore they are considered to be without [permanent] existence. |
prayogaḥ yat sattātsarvaṃ kṣaṇikam yathā samanantaraṃ pratipāditāḥ kṣaṇikāḥ padārthāḥ santaś ca bhavatā vyomādayo bhāvā iṣyante iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | The logical formulation is: Whatever is existent is momentary, just as [those] entities proven [to be] momentary just now; and ākāśa and other entities are accepted by you as existent - this is [thus] a natural reason. |
tathā siddhā iti / | [The phrase] "tathā siddhāḥ" [means "those] that have been thus proven". |
kṣaṇikatvena / | [That is,] through [their] momentariness. |
arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇamiha sattvaṃ hetotveneṣṭam tacca kṣaṇikatvanivṛttau nivartate / | [The kind of] existence characterized by [its] capacity for purposive action is accepted here as the reason, and this [existence] ceases when momentariness ceases. |
tathā hi bhāvā arthakriyāṃ kurvantaḥ krameṇa vā kurvīranyaugapadyena vā na hi kramayaugapadyābhyāmanyaḥ prakāraḥ sambhavati tayor anyonyavyavacchedarūpatvāt / | For indeed, entities performing purposive action must perform [it] either successively or simultaneously, [and] there cannot be any other mode [of action] besides succession and simultaneity, since these two are mutually exclusive in nature. |
etac ca pratyakṣata eva prasiddham / | And this is established directly through perception. |
tathā hi ghaṭo madhūdakādīṃstadanyadravyavyatibhinnān krameṇāharan svajñānodakāharaṇe na ca yaugapadyena kurvan pratyakṣeṇaiva paricchidyate / | For instance, a jar is perceived as bringing in wine, water and other distinct substances successively, [but] not simultaneously performing [both] its self-cognition and the bringing in of water. |
tatra yān kāryabhedān krameṇāharan samupalabhyate ghaṭaḥ kulālo vā śarāvodañcanādīn na tadaiva tānyaugapadyena janayituṃ samarthaḥ / | Moreover, whatever different effects the jar is observed to bring about successively, or [whatever] plates, water-pots, etc. the potter [is observed to make], these cannot be produced simultaneously at that same time. |
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