sanskrit
stringlengths 2
508
| english
stringlengths 2
924
⌀ |
|---|---|
ghaṭo vā svaviṣaye jñānādīnyaugapadyena janayannupalabhyate na tadaiva tānkrameṇeti pratyakṣāvasitametat sarvam / | And when a jar is observed producing cognition and other [effects] simultaneously in its own domain, it is not observed producing those same [effects] successively at that same time - all this is established through direct perception. |
ataḥ kramasya yaugapadyavyavacchedenaiva paricchedādyaugapadyasya ca kramavyavacchedenaivetyekapramāṇavṛttir dvayor anyatarat paricchindatī tataḥ paraṃ pratiyoginaṃ vyavacchinatti prakārāntarbhāvaṃ ca sūcayatīti pratyakṣapramāṇāvasita evānayor anyonyavṛttiparihārasthitilakṣaṇo virodhaḥ / | Therefore, since succession is cognized only through the exclusion of simultaneity, and simultaneity only through the exclusion of succession, a single means of valid cognition that determines either of these two subsequently excludes [its] counterpart and indicates the impossibility of another mode - thus their mutual contradiction characterized by the impossibility of co-existence is established through direct perception alone. |
tena tṛtīyasyābhāvāt kramayaugapadyābhyāmarthakriyā vyāptā / | Due to the absence of a third [possibility], all efficacious activity is pervaded by succession and simultaneity. |
sā ca sthireṣu bhāveṣu svavyāpakānivṛttau nivartamānā tallakṣaṇaṃ sattvaṃ nivartayatīti siddhā vyāptiḥ / | And when that [activity] ceases in permanent entities due to the absence of its pervader, it negates existence which is their characteristic - thus the pervasion is established. |
na caitacchakyaṃ vaktum kramayaugapadye eva bhāvānāṃ na siddhe vyatiriktakālapadārthānabhyupagamād iti / | And it cannot be said that "succession and simultaneity of entities are not established because [we] do not accept time as a separate category." |
na hi vayaṃ bhāvānām arthāntarabhūtakālapadārthakṛtaṃ kramayaugapadyaṃ brūmaḥ / | For we do not say that succession and simultaneity of entities are caused by time as a separate category. |
kiṃ tarhi tathātathotpādakṛtam / | Rather, [they are] caused by [things] arising in those respective ways. |
tathā hi yadi caikaḥ sattāmanubhavati tadaiva yadā pare tadvadeva tamanubhavanti ta evaṃ sarve tathotpadyamānā akramavyapadeśanibandhanaṃ bhavanti / | For when one experiences existence and at that very time others experience it similarly, then all of them arising in that way become the basis for the designation of non-succession [i.e. simultaneity]. |
tadyathā samagrasāmagrīkā bahavo 'ṅkurāḥ samutpadyamānāḥ / | For example, [when] many sprouts arise from complete causal conditions. |
viparyayāt kramavyapadeśabhājo yathāṅkurakāṇḍapatrādayaḥ / | From the opposite [situation], [things] become subject to the designation of succession, like sprout, stem, leaves, etc. |
ete ca pratyakṣa eva siddhās tathaiva ca vyapadiśyante janaiḥ / | And these are established by direct perception itself and are designated thus by people. |
tathābhūtapadārthaviṣayo 'pi kāraṇavyāpāras tadviṣayakramayaugapadyābhyāṃvyapadiśyata ityacodyam etat / | The operation of causes also, with regard to such entities, is designated by succession and simultaneity with regard to them - thus this is not a valid objection. |
nanu ca yadi sthiro bhāvaḥ siddho bhavet tadā tatra kramayaugapadyanivṛttau satyāmarthakriyāyāḥ sāmarthyanivṛttiḥ siddhyet / | [Objection:] "If a permanent entity were established, then even when succession and simultaneity are absent there, the negation of the capacity for efficacious activity would [not] be established. |
yathā kvacit pradeśe dharmiṇi vṛkṣanivṛttau śiṃśapānivṛttiḥ / | Just as when 'tree' as the property-bearer is negated in some place, [then] śiṃśapā [tree] is negated." |
anyathā hyasiddhe pradeśadharmiṇi kutra śiṃśapābhāvaḥ pratīyeta / na cāsau siddhas tasyaiva pratiṣeddhumiṣṭatvāt / | If the locus [of qualities] is not established, where could the absence of śiṃśapā be cognized? And that [locus] is not established [for you], since [you] wish to deny precisely that. |
athāpi siddho 'ṅgīkriyata na tarhi tasya pratikṣepo yuktaḥ tasya dharmiṇaḥ svarūpeṇa siddhyabhyupagamāt / | If, however, [you] accept [it] as established, then [your] denial of that [locus] is not reasonable, since [you would be] admitting the existence of that substratum in its own nature. |
tataś ca sattvādibhya yamapyanaikāntika eva hetuḥ vipakṣe vṛtter iti / | Therefore, [your] reason based on "existence" and so forth is indeed inconclusive, because it occurs in the counter-instance. |
naitadasti / | This is not so. |
na hyasmābhiḥ svātantryeṇa pramāṇatayā vyatirekasādhinyā asyā vyāpakānupalabdheḥ prayogaḥ kriyate / | For we do not employ this non-perception of the pervader as an independent means of valid cognition establishing a negative conclusion. |
kiṃ tarhi prasaṅgāpādanaṃ paraṃ prati kriyate / | Rather, [we] present a reductio ad absurdum against the opponent. |
yadi bhavatā teṣāṃ sthirarūpatāṅgīkriyate tadārthakriyāsāmarthyamapi nāṅgīkartavyam tatra kramayaugapadyayogasya tadvyāpakasyābhāvāt / | If you accept their permanent nature, then [their] causal efficacy cannot be accepted, because succession and simultaneity, which are pervaders of that [causal efficacy], are absent there. |
nahi vyāpakanivṛttau vyāpyamavasthātumutsahate / | For when the pervader is absent, the pervaded cannot possibly remain. |
anyathā vyāpyavyāpakabhāva eva tayor na syāt / | Otherwise, there would not even be a relation of pervaded and pervader between them. |
tataścārthakriyāsāmarthyanivṛttau satvam api teṣāṃ nāṅgīkartavyam arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvāt satvasyeti / | And therefore, when causal efficacy is precluded, their existence too cannot be accepted, since existence is characterized by causal efficacy. |
anenopāyena teṣām abhāva eva pratipādyate / | By this method their [the things'] non-existence indeed becomes established. |
na cāpi vaidharmyadṛṣṭānte 'vaśyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ dharmyāśrayaṇīyaḥ tatra sādhyanivṛttau sādhananivṛttimātrasya sādhayitumiṣṭatvāt / | Nor is it necessary in a vaidharmya instance [i.e., example by dissimilarity] that the substrate must be a real entity, since what is intended to be proved there is merely the absence of the probans when the probandum is absent. |
tac ca vyāpyavyāpakabhūtayor dharmayor vyāpyavyāpakabhāvasiddhau satyāṃ dharmiviśeṣaparigrahamantareṇaiva sāmānyena vyāpakābhāve vyāpyam api na bhavatīti vacanamātrād eva pratīyate / | And this is understood from the mere statement that "when the pervader is absent, the pervaded too cannot exist," without requiring acceptance of any particular substrate, once the pervasion relationship between two properties [as pervaded and pervader] has been established in general. |
yathā vṛkṣābhāve śiṃśapā na bhavatīti | As for example, [the statement] "when tree is absent, śiṃśapā cannot exist." |
yathoktam tasmād vaidharmyadṛṣṭānte neṣṭo 'vaśyam ihāśrayaḥ / | Thus it has been stated: "Therefore in a vaidharmya instance, a [real] substrate is not necessarily required here." |
tadabhāve{tu} tanneti vacanād api tadgateḥ // | Because that [meaning] is obtained even from the mere statement "when that is absent, this [cannot exist]." |
kāryāṇi hi vilambante kāraṇāsannidhānataḥ / | Effects are indeed delayed due to the non-proximity of [their] cause. |
samarthahetusadbhāve kṣepas teṣāṃ hi kiṅkṛtaḥ // | If an efficient cause is present, due to what indeed would their delay be? |
nahi kāryasya svecchayā bhavanamabhavanaṃ vā kintu kāraṇasadasattānuvidhāyinī tasya sadasattve / | An effect's coming into being or not coming into being is not by its own wish; rather, its existence and non-existence follow [their] cause's presence and absence. |
tatra yadyasau sthiraikarūpo bhāvaḥ sarvadā sarvakāryāṇāṃ hetubhāvenāvasthitas tadā kimiti tat sattāmātrākāṅkṣiṇī sakṛdeva sarvāṇi notpadyante yena krameṇa bhaveyuḥ / | In that case, if that entity of permanent single form were always present as the cause of all effects, then why would not all [effects], which depend merely on its presence, arise simultaneously rather than arising in sequence? |
kṣepa iti / | "Kṣepa" means delay. |
tena pāścātyam api tadīyaṃ kāryaṃ prāgeva bhavet / apratibaddhasāmarthyakāraṇatvād abhimatakāryavad iti bhāvaḥ // | Therefore even its subsequent effect should occur beforehand, because its cause would have unobstructed capability, just like the effect [already] accepted [by the opponent] – this is the meaning. |
athāpītyādinā parasyottaramāśaṅkate | With [the words] beginning "athāpi," [the author] anticipates the opponent's response. |
yadyapi sthiraḥ padārthaḥ sarvadā sannihitas tathāpi krameṇa sahakārīṇi tasya saṃnidhīyante / | Even though the permanent entity is always present, its auxiliaries come to it [only] in succession. |
atas tadapekṣayā krameṇāsau kāryāṇi janayiṣyatīti // | Therefore, depending on these [auxiliaries], it will produce its effects in succession. |
sādhvityādinā pratividhatte | [The author] responds with [the words] beginning with "sādhu" ["good"]. |
sādhv etat kiṃtu te tasya bhavanti sahakāriṇaḥ / kiṃ yogyarūpahetutvād ekārthakāraṇena vā // | This is well [said], but do those things become its auxiliaries because they are the cause of [its] causal efficiency, or because they serve the same purpose? |
yogyarūpasya hetutve sa bhāvas taiḥ kṛto bhavet / | If they are the cause of [its] causal efficiency, then that entity would be produced by them. |
sa cāśakyakriyo yasmāt tatsvarūpaṃ tadā sthitam // | And since it cannot be produced, as its nature is [already] established. |
kṛtau vā tat svarūpasya nityatāsyāvahīyate / | Or if the very nature [of the permanent thing] were produced, its permanence would be destroyed. |
vibhinno 'tiśayas tasmād yady asau kārakaḥ katham // | If the modification is different from it [the permanent thing], then how can it [the permanent thing] be the agent? |
na hi tasya nityasya kaścit sahakārī sambhavati. | Indeed, no auxiliary is possible for that permanent [entity]. |
tathā hi atiśayādhānād vā sahakārī bhavet yathā bījasya kṣityādaya ucchūnādyavasthāviśeṣamādadhānāḥ sahakāriṇaḥ / ekārthakriyayā vā yathonmiṣitamātreṇa rūpadarśane cakṣuṣo rūpādayaḥ. | For would [something] be an auxiliary either by producing a modification - as earth and other [elements] are auxiliaries of the seed by producing specific conditions like swelling and so forth - or by serving the same purpose - as color and other [qualities] are [auxiliaries] to the eye in seeing color through mere manifestation? |
tatra na tāvad ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ. | Of these, the first alternative is not [acceptable]. |
tatra na tāvad ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, tat svarūpavat tadavyatirekitayā tasyāpi sadāvasthitatvāt, sataś ca karaṇāyogāt, karaṇe vā tadvad eva bhāvasyāpi karaṇaprasaṅgāt / | The first alternative is not tenable, because the [condition], being non-different from the thing's own nature, would like it be ever-present, and what exists [already] cannot be produced, or if it were to be produced, the thing itself would also have to be produced in the same way. |
tataś ca nityatvahāniḥ / | And from this would follow the loss of [its] permanence. |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadātiśayād eva kāryotpatter bhāvasyākārakaprasaṅgaḥ / | If the second alternative [is accepted], then since the effect would arise from that excellence [alone], it would follow that the thing [itself] would not be the agent. |
asāviti / nityaḥ padārthaḥ // | The word "asau" [refers to] the permanent entity. |
etad eva spaṣṭayati tasmin satītyādi / | This very [point] is clarified [by the words] beginning with "tasmin sati." |
tasmin sati hi kāryāṇāmutpādas tadabhāvataḥ / anutpādāt sa evaivaṃ hetutvena vyavasthitaḥ // | When that [condition] is present, the effects arise; when it is absent, they do not arise; thus that [condition] alone would be established as the cause. |
atiśaye satītyarthaḥ / | [This means] "when the excellence is present." |
evam iti / tadgatānvayavyatirekānuvidhānāt // | "Thus" [means] because [it] follows the positive and negative concomitance pertaining to that [condition]. |
athāpi tena sambandhāt tasyāpyastyeva hetutā / | [If you say] "due to its connection with that [condition], causality belongs to that [thing] also" |
kaḥ sambandhas tayoriṣṭas tādātmyena vibhedataḥ // | What relation between these two is accepted? [It cannot be] identity, because of [their] difference. |
na ca tasya tadutpattir yaugapadyaprasaṅgataḥ / tataś ca yaugapadyena kāryāṇāmudayo bhavet // | Nor can the relation be [held to consist in the fact] that it is produced from it, as [in that case] there would be simultaneity; and consequently the appearance of effects would be simultaneous. |
teneti / atiśayena / | "Tena" [means] "by the condition." |
tasyāpīti / nityasya / | "Tasya api" [refers to] "of the permanent [thing]." |
kaḥ sambandha ityādinottaramāha kaḥ sambandhaḥ naiva kaścid ity arthaḥ / | To [the question] "what relation" etc., [the author] gives the answer that there is absolutely no relation [possible] - this is the meaning. |
dvividha eva hi sambandhas tādātmyaṃ tadutpattiś ca / tatra na tāvat tādātmyalakṣaṇo bhedasyāṅgīkṛtatvāt / | For there are only two kinds of relation: identity and being produced from it; of these, [it] cannot be identity-based because difference [between them] has been accepted. |
nāpi tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ sahakāribhya eva tasyotpatteḥ / | Nor [can it] be characterized as being produced from it, because it is produced from the auxiliaries themselves. |
tatas tasyotpattiraṅgīkriyate tadā tanmātrabhāvitvād atiśayānāṃ yugapad evotpattiḥ syāt / tataś ca sarvakāryāṇāṃ yugapadutpattiprasaṅgaḥ / | If its production is accepted, then due to [their] dependence on that alone, the conditions would arise simultaneously; and consequently there would follow the simultaneous production of all effects. |
atiśayavataḥ kāraṇasya sarvadāvasthitatvāt // | Because the cause possessing the conditions would be present at all times. |
tatrāpyanyavyapekṣāyām anavasthā prasajyate / | And if in that case dependence on something else is [claimed], an infinite regress would follow. |
ekadāpi tataḥ kāryaṃ nāsambandhāt prakalpyate // | Therefore, due to absence of relation, the effect cannot be produced even once. |
atha tatrāpyatiśayotpattau sahakārikāraṇāpekṣaṇāt krameṇātiśayotpatter na kāryāṇāṃ yaugapadyaṃ bhavatīti syāt tadayuktam evaṃ hyanavasthā syāt / | If [it be argued that] "even for the production of these conditions there is dependence on auxiliary causes, and because the conditions arise successively, there cannot be simultaneity of effects," [then we reply that] this is incorrect, as this would lead to an infinite regress. |
tathā hi tatrāpi sahakāriṇām atiśayāntarakaraṇāt sahakāritvaṃ vaktavyam tasya cātiśayasya vyatirekitvāt sambandhāsiddhiḥ tadutpattau sakṛdutpattiprasaṅgaḥ tatrāpi sahakārivyapekṣāyāṃ punar iyam eva cintāvatarati / | For in that case too, one would have to posit [further] auxiliaries for producing other conditions for these auxiliaries; and since that condition would be different, there would be no established relationship; if [the condition] were produced from that [same thing], there would follow simultaneous production; and if there is dependence on [yet another] auxiliary for that, the same consideration would arise again. |
tataścānavasthāyāṃ na kadācid atiśayena saha tasya sambandhaḥ siddhyet / | And thus, due to this infinite regress, no relationship between it [the thing] and the condition could ever be established. |
tadasiddhau na tasmāt kāryotpattiratiśayād eva kāryotpatteḥ / | When this [relationship] is not established, the effect would not arise from that [permanent thing], but rather the effect would arise from the condition alone. |
sambandhaḥ samavāyaścet tatrāpyevaṃ vicintyate / upakārībhavaṃs tasya samavāyīṣyate sa kim // na vā tatheti prathamo vikalpo yadi gṛhyate / saiva prāptā tadutpattir vyapāstā sāpyanantaram // | If the relationship is [claimed to be] inherence, then this too must be considered: Is that which inheres accepted as being helpful to it [the thing] or not? If the first alternative is taken, then we arrive at the same [notion of] production from that, which has just been rejected. |
athāpi syān na tadutpattilakṣaṇas tasyātiśayena saha sambandhaḥ / | If it might be argued that "the relationship of that [permanent thing] with the condition is not characterized by production from it, |
kiṃ tarhi tat samavāyalakṣaṇaḥ tatra nitye dharmiṇi tasyātiśayasya samavetatvāt / | but rather it is characterized by inherence, because the condition inheres in that permanent substrate," |
tadetad ayuktam iti darśayann āha tatrāpītyādi / na vā tatheti / | [the author], showing that this is incorrect, states "then also" etc. [and] "or not so"; |
tatra prathamapakṣe upakārasyopakriyamāṇapadārthāvyatirekāt sa eva tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ sambandho 'ṅgīkṛtaḥ syāt / | in the first alternative, because the help [rendered] is non-different from the thing being helped, it would amount to accepting the very same relationship characterized by production from that; |
sa cānantaram eva nirastaḥ / | and this has just been rejected. |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā viśeṣābhāvāt sarvaḥ sarvasya samavāyī syāt / | If the second alternative is accepted, then, due to [there] being no distinction, everything would be inherent in everything. |
taddarśayati anye 'pītyādi / | This [he] shows [by beginning with the words] "anye 'pi" ["others also"]. |
anye 'pi sarvabhāvāḥ syus tathaiva samavāyinaḥ / aviśeṣān na tasyāyamupakārī mato yadi // | If that [which is inherent] is not considered helpful to that [wherein it inheres], then all other entities would likewise be inherent [in everything], due to [there being] no distinction. |
abhimatapadārthavadanupakāritvenāviśiṣṭatvāt // | [They would be inherent] because of being indistinguishable in terms of non-helpfulness, like the entity accepted [by the opponent]. |
bhedābhedavikalpasya pratyekaṃ pratiṣedhanāt / dvirūpo 'tiśayas tasya vyasto bhavati vastunaḥ // | Because each alternative of difference and non-difference has been rejected separately, the dual nature of that entity becomes discarded. |
pratyekapakṣanirākaraṇād evobhayātmakapakṣasya nirākaraṇam tadvyatirekeṇobhayātmakapakṣābhāvāt / | From the very rejection of each alternative follows the rejection of the both-sided alternative, because there is no both-sided alternative apart from those [two alternatives]. |
kiñcaikākāratyāgaparigrahayor aparākāraparigrahatyāgānāntarīyakatvād ayuktaṃ vastusata ubhayānubhayarūpatvam na hyekasyaikadā vidhipratiṣedhau parasparaviruddhau yuktāvekatvahāniprasaṅgāt // | Moreover, since the acceptance or rejection of one form necessarily involves the rejection or acceptance of the other form, it is incorrect [to say] that a real entity has both or neither form, for affirmation and negation, being mutually contradictory, cannot [apply] simultaneously to one [thing], as [that would] result in the loss of unity. |
etac ca pudgalādiparīkṣāyāṃ pratipāditaṃ taddarśayati pudgalādītyādi / | And this has been explained in the examination of the pudgala and other [topics]; this [he] shows [by beginning with the words] "pudgalādi". |
pudgalādiparīkṣāsu dvaurāśyapratiṣedhanāt / dvirūpo 'tiśayo nāsti na vāpyanubhayātmakaḥ // | Because of the rejection of both alternatives in the examinations of the pudgala and other [topics], there is neither a dual nature nor a neither-[different-nor-non-different] nature. |
athaikārthakriyākāritvena sahakāriṇas tasyeti dvitīyaḥ pakṣa āśrīyate / | The second alternative [that] is now taken up [states that] these auxiliaries belong to that [permanent thing] by virtue of their performing the same purpose. |
yathāhur eke naivāsau sahakāriṇo 'pekṣate na cāpi sahakāriviyuktaḥ kāryasya kārakaḥ yata īdṛśas tasya nisargasiddhaḥ svabhāvo yat sannihitasakalasahakārikāraṇa eva kārako 'ntyahetuvan na kevalaḥ / tena tasya bhāve 'pi na kāryasya sarvadotpattiprasaṅga iti / | As some [philosophers] say: "This [permanent thing] does not require auxiliaries, and yet when separated from auxiliaries it cannot produce the effect, because its inherent nature is established such that it becomes productive only when all auxiliary causes are present, like the final cause, [but] not alone. Therefore, even though it exists, there is no possibility of the effect being produced at all times." |
tadetad darśayati athetyādi / | This [view] is shown [in what follows] beginning with "atha." |
atha nāpekṣate nityaḥ pratyayānsahakāriṇaḥ / tathāpi tadviyukto 'yaṃ kārako nāntyahetuvat // | "Even though the permanent [thing] may not depend on auxiliary conditions, nevertheless when separated from them it cannot be productive, like the final cause." |
nijas tasya svabhāvo 'yaṃ teṣām eva hi sannidhau / | "This is indeed its own inherent nature [that it is productive] only in the presence of those [auxiliaries]." |
kārakatvamataḥ kāryaṃ tadbhāve 'pi na sarvadā // neti / | "Therefore, even though it exists, [its] effect does not [arise] at all times." |
kāraka ityanena sambandhanīyam / | This should be connected with [the word] "kāraka" [productive]. |
antyahetuvad iti vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ /yadvottareṇa kārakatvamityanena sādharmyadṛṣṭāntatayā sambadyate / ṣaṣṭhyantāc ca vatiḥ kāryaḥ / tadbhāve 'pīti / tasya nityasya padārthasya sadbhāve 'pi // | "Like the final cause" is an example of dissimilarity; or it may be connected with the following [phrase] "being productive" as an example of similarity. The suffix "vat" should be applied to the genitive case. "Even though it exists" means even though that permanent entity exists. |
astvevam ityādinā pratividhatte / | [This view] is answered by [the passage] beginning with "let it be so." |
astvevaṃ kintu sākalye yā tasya prakṛtir matā / vaikalye saiva ced iṣṭā nityāḥ syuḥ sahakāriṇaḥ // | "Let it be so; but if the nature that is accepted for it in [its] complete state is held to be the same in [its] incomplete state, [then] the auxiliaries would [also] be permanent." |
bhavatvevaṃ kalpanā kiṃtvidam iha nirūpyate yā tasya sahakārisākalyāvasthāyāṃ prakṛtiḥ kiṃ saiva vaikalyāvasthāyām āhosvidanyā yadi saiva tadā sahakāriṇo 'pi nityāḥ prāpnuvanti // | Let it be so. But what is to be examined here is this: Is that nature which [belongs to it] in the state of completeness with auxiliaries the same [nature] in the state of incompleteness, or is it different? If it is the same, then the auxiliaries also must be permanent. |
katham ity āha tatsambaddhasvabhāvasyetyādi / | How [is this so]? [The author] explains [this] by [saying] "tatsambaddhasvabhāvasya" and so forth. |
tat sambaddhasvabhāvasya bhāve teṣām api sthiteḥ / | Because when that whose nature is connected with them exists, they [i.e., the auxiliaries] must also exist. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.