sanskrit
stringlengths 2
508
| english
stringlengths 2
924
⌀ |
|---|---|
svahetor yadi bhāvānām iṣyate 'nyan na kāraṇam / vināśasya kathaṃ teṣāṃ kvacid eva viruddhatā // | If no cause other than their own cause is admitted for entities, then how can their destruction be contradictory only in some cases?" |
sa hyāha kṣaṇikatve 'pi bhāvānāṃ kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodha eva / | For he [Yogasena] says: "Even given the momentariness of entities, there is indeed a contradiction in [their] purposive action, whether successive or simultaneous. |
yatas te svayaṃ samarthā bhaveyur asamarthā vā yadi samarthās tadā sahakārikāraṇaṃ nāpekṣeran / | Because they would either be capable or incapable by themselves; if capable, they would not depend on auxiliary causes." |
nahi samarthasya kācid apekṣā yuktā / | [That which is] capable does not reasonably depend on anything else. |
tathā hi ye prathamakalāpāntaścariṣnavas te na parasparato viśeṣamāpnuvanti / | For instance, those [things] that fall within the scope of the first series cannot acquire distinguishing characteristics from one another. |
utpannānutpannāvasthāyāḥ sadasattvenānupakāryopakārakatvāt / | Because [things] in produced and unproduced states, being existent and non-existent [respectively], cannot have the relationship of helped and helper. |
tataś ca prathamāvasthāyāṃ teṣāṃ nirviśiṣṭatvāt tebhyo viśiṣṭakṣaṇāntarotpādo na syāt / | Therefore, since they are undifferentiated in their initial state, no distinct subsequent moment could arise from them. |
nirviśeṣebhyaś ca tebhyaḥ kṣaṇāntarasya viśiṣṭasyotpattau kāryam api kiṃ notpadyeta / na cāpi pūrvakātkalāpād viśiṣṭāt te samutpannā iti yuktam vaktum tatkalāpāntargatāmapyata eva paramparato viśeṣābhāvāt / | And if a distinct subsequent moment could arise from those undifferentiated [things], why would the effect also not arise? Nor would it be reasonable to say that they arise from what is distinct from the previous series, since there is no distinction among the components within that series itself for this very reason. |
teṣām apyanyato viśeṣotpattau satyāmanavasthā syāt / | If these [things] were also to obtain their distinctions from something else, there would be an infinite regress. |
tadevaṃ viśeṣābhāvāt katham aviśiṣṭātkāraṇakalāpāt kāryamutpadyeta / aviśiṣṭāccotpattau sarvaṃ sarvasmād bhavet / | Thus, in the absence of distinction, how could an effect arise from an undifferentiated series of causes? And if there were production from what is undifferentiated, everything would arise from everything. |
tataś ca kramayaugapadyābhyām evam arthakriyāvirodhe 'pi yathaite bhavantyevārthakriyākāriṇas tathā nityā api santo bhaviṣyantīti vyarthas teṣāṃ kṣaṇikatāśrayaḥ / | Thus, even when there is incompatibility in causal efficacy through succession or simultaneity, just as these [things] do indeed possess causal efficacy, so too could they possess it while being permanent; therefore, recourse to [the theory of] their momentariness is pointless. |
tena sattvād iti hetur anaikāntika iti bhāvaḥ / | Therefore, the reason "because [things] exist" is inconclusive—this is the meaning. |
na cāpi santater avasthāviśeṣaprāptāyāḥ kāryotpattir bhaviṣyati na sarvadeti vaktuṃ yuktam / | Nor is it reasonable to say that "the production of the effect will occur from a series that has attained a particular state, [but] not always." |
yathoktayā nītyā sahakārikṛtasya viśeṣasyābhāvāt sarvadaiva santater aviśiṣṭatvāt / | Because in accordance with the reasoning [as] explained above, due to the absence of any peculiarity produced by auxiliary [causes], the series would always remain undifferentiated. |
nacāpi svopādānakāraṇamātrapratibaddho viśeṣaḥ santatiriti yuktam vaktum / | Nor is it correct to say that "the series itself is merely a peculiarity connected with its own material cause"; |
dṛṣṭavirodhāt / | Because this contradicts [what is] directly perceived. |
tathā hi sahakāriṇām upāyāpāyayoḥ kāryavyaktivirāmau dṛṣṭau / yadi ca svopādānakāraṇamātrapratibaddho viśeṣaḥ syāt tadā sahakārinirapekṣasyaiva janakatvaṃ bhavet / | For indeed, the appearance and cessation of an effect are observed [to occur] with the presence and absence of auxiliary [causes]. If the peculiarity were connected only with its own material cause, then productivity would exist independently of auxiliary [causes]. |
api ca yathoktayā nītyā santateḥ sarvadā nirviṣiṣṭatvāt / ghaṭādīnāṃ kapālādiviśeṣotpattyasambhavāt / | Moreover, according to the reasoning stated above, since the series remains always undifferentiated, the production of particular [effects] like potsherds from [causes] like jars would be impossible. |
sajātīyakṣaṇasantānocchedalakṣaṇo vināśo yadi nirhetukaḥ syāt tadā nirapekṣatvāt prāgeva bhavet / | If destruction, characterized by the cessation of a series of homogeneous moments, were without cause, then being independent [of everything], it would occur right at the beginning. |
athādau na bhavet paścād api na bhavet prāgvadviśeṣābhāvāt / | And if it does not occur at the beginning, it could not occur later either, due to the absence of any distinguishing factor [compared to] before. |
kiṃ ca yadi bhāvānāṃ vināśaṃ prati svahetuvyatirekeṇānyatsantānāntaraṃ kāraṇaṃ neṣyate tadānalādayaḥ śītādīnāṃ kathaṃ virodhino bhaveyuḥ nahyakiñcitkaro virodhī yukto 'tiprasaṅgāpatteḥ evaṃ hi sarvaḥ sarvasya virodhī prasajyeta / | Furthermore, if for the destruction of things no cause other than their own cause is accepted in the form of another series, then how could fire etc. be destroyers of cold etc.? For what produces no effect cannot logically be a destroyer, as [this would lead to] an absurd consequence - namely that everything would be the destroyer of everything else. |
tataś ca virodhadvāreṇānupalabdhiprayogaḥ prāṇātipātādivyavasthānaṃ cātidurghaṭamiti bhāvaḥ //428- | Therefore the use of non-apprehension through opposition and the classification of [acts like] taking life would be completely impossible - this is the meaning. |
ucyata ityādinā pratividhatte | [This] is answered by [the section] beginning with "it is said." |
ucyate prathamāvasthā naivānyonyopakāriṇaḥ / | [It] is said [that] things in the initial stage are certainly not mutually beneficial to each other. |
ekārthakriyayā tvete bhavanti sahakāriṇaḥ // | But these [things] become cooperating factors through [their] action toward a single purpose. |
anyonyānupakāre 'pi nāviśiṣṭā ime yataḥ / | Even without mutual assistance, these [things] are not undifferentiated, because |
svopādānabalodbhūtāḥ kalāpotpādakaḥ pṛthak // | [they], having arisen from the power of their own material causes, are separately productive of [their own] series. |
samarthād eva hi kāryotpattiḥ na ca sahakārivaiyarthyam / | For an effect arises only from what is capable [of producing it], yet [there is] no uselessness of cooperating factors. |
tathā hi dvividhaṃ sahakāritvaṃ ekārthakriyākāritayā parasparopakāritayā ca / | For thus cooperation is of two kinds: through performing a single purpose and through mutual assistance. |
tatra vyavahitakāryāpekṣayā ekārthakriyākāritvam eva na parasparopakāritvam / | In this case, with regard to an immediate effect, [there is] only the performance of a single purpose, not mutual assistance, |
ekasmin kṣaṇe nirvibhāgatayā viśeṣasyādhātumaśakyatvāt / | because in a single moment, due to [its] undivided nature, it is impossible to produce any distinction. |
vyavahitakāryāpekṣayā tu parasparata uttaraviśiṣṭakṣaṇotpatteḥ santānāpekṣayā parasparopakāreṇa vyavahitakāryajanakatvāt parasparopakāritvalakṣaṇaṃ sahakāritvam / | But with regard to a remote effect, [there is] cooperation characterized by mutual assistance, because the subsequent qualified moment arises mutually [from both], and because [it is] productive of the remote effect through mutual assistance with regard to [its] series. |
tatra prathamāvasthābhāvināṃ yadyapi parasparato viśeṣo nāsti tathāpi teṣāṃ sahakāritvam aviruddham eva ekārthakriyākāritvāt / | Although there is no mutual distinction among those existing in the initial stage, nevertheless their cooperation is certainly not contradictory because of [their] performing a single purpose. |
nāpi te samanataraviśiṣṭakṣaṇotpādanaṃ pratyaviśiṣṭāḥ pūrvakebhyaḥ eva svahetupratyayebhyas tathāvidhottarakāryakalāpotpādanaṃ prati pratyekaṃ samarthānām utpannatvāt / | Nor are they undifferentiated with regard to producing the immediately following particular kṣaṇa, since each [of them] has arisen from its own preceding causes and conditions, [each being] equally capable of producing such subsequent series of effects. |
teṣām api hetupratyayānama aparebhyaḥ svahetupratyayebhyaḥ teṣām apyaparebhyaityanāder hetuparamparāyā iṣṭatvād anavasthāpyaduṣṭaiva / | These causal conditions [arise] from their own causal conditions, and these again from others, thus [forming] a beginningless series of causes; even though [this leads to] an infinite regress, this [regression] is not at all problematic. |
pratyekaṃ ca sāmarthye 'pi nāpareṣāṃ vaiyarthyam svahetubalena teṣāṃ tathotpannatvāt / | And although each [member] has its own efficacy, the others are not useless, since they too have arisen as such through the power of their own causes. |
nāpi teṣāṃ pṛthagbhāvaḥ sambhavati tathāvidhakāraṇābhāvāt / | Nor is their separate existence possible, due to the absence of such a cause. |
nāpi paścāt kṣaṇikatvāt / | Nor [can it occur] afterwards, due to [everything being] momentary. |
kalāpotpādakāḥ pṛthag iti / | [They are] producers of separate series. |
pratyekaṃ dvitīyakṣaṇabhāvikalāpotpādanasamarthā ity arthaḥ / | This means: each is capable of producing the series that exists in the second moment. |
svopādānagrahaṇaṃ prathamāvasthābhāvisahakārikṛtopayoganiṣedhaparaṃ draṣṭavyam / | The term "own material cause" should be understood as intended to negate the utility of auxiliaries existing in the initial state. |
natu svopādānamātrabhāvi kiñcitkāryaṃ sambhavati sāmagrītaḥ sarvasya sambhavāt / | No effect can arise solely from its own material cause, since everything arises from a totality [of causes]. |
yathoktam na kiñcid ekamekasmāt sāmagryāḥ sarvasambhava iti / | As has been stated: "Nothing [arises] from any single [cause]; everything [arises] from a totality [of causes]." |
tataḥ prabhṛti ye jātā viśeṣās te tu tatkṛtāḥ / | The particular entities that arise from that point onwards are produced by that. |
tadrūpaprakṛtitvena teṣāṃ tadupayoginām / | Because those that contribute to them are of that nature. |
tataḥ prabhṛti dvitīyakṣaṇottaramārabhetyarthaḥ / | [It means] "thenceforward," [i.e.] beginning from the moment following the second kṣaṇa. |
tatkṛtā iti / | [This means] "brought about by that." |
sahakarikṛtaviśeṣakāraṇakṛtāḥ / | [They are] produced by the particular causes brought about by the auxiliary [conditions]. |
kasmāt tadrūpaprakṛtitvāt teṣāṃ tadrūpā viśiṣṭasahakārikṛtaviśeṣakāraṇajanyā prakṛtiḥ svabhāvo yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | [Question:] "How so?" [Answer:] Because their nature is of that character—they whose nature (prakṛti) is produced by particular causes brought about by specific auxiliary [conditions] are described thus. |
tadrūpaprakṛtitvād iti sambandhanīyam / | The phrase "because their nature is of that form" should be construed [with the preceding]. |
tatra tṛtīyāvasthābhāvini kārye ye dvitīyakṣaṇabhāvino viśeṣā upayujyante kāraṇabhāvena teṣāṃ ca tadupayogināṃ sahakārikṛtaviśeṣakāraṇajanyakāryotpādanayogyaprakṛtitvāt tṛtīyādikṣaṇabhāvino viśeṣās tatkṛtā bhavantīti // | In regard to the effect manifesting in the third state, those particular [qualities] existing in the second kṣaṇa are helpful as causes; and since those helpful [qualities] have a nature capable of producing effects generated by particular causes brought about by auxiliary [conditions], the particular [qualities] existing in the third and subsequent kṣaṇas are brought about by them. |
ayam api niyamaḥ katham eṣāṃ bhavatītyata āha niyatetyādi / | [Question:] "How does this restriction apply to these?" [Hence] he states [beginning with] "niyata." |
na hi bhāvānāṃ svabhāvāḥ paryanuyogam arhanti teṣāṃ svahetupratyayaparamparāsamāyātatvātsvabhāvabhedasya yathāgner dāhakatvam yasmād ete parāparapratyayopayogena pratikṣaṇaṃ bhinnaśaktayaḥ samutpadyante / | The natures of entities cannot be questioned, since the diversity of their natures arises from a series of their own causes and conditions—just as [one cannot question] fire's capacity to burn—because these [entities] arise moment by moment with different potencies through the operation of successive conditions. |
ato yadyapyete kutaścit sāmyāt samānarūpāḥ pratīyante tathāpi bhinna evaiṣāṃ svabhāvaḥ / | Therefore, even though these are perceived as having similar forms due to some similarity, their essential nature is nevertheless entirely distinct. |
tena kiñcid eva kasyacit kāraṇaṃ na sarvaḥ sarvasyeti yatkiñcidetat / | Therefore something becomes the cause of [only] something [else], [and] not everything [becomes the cause] of everything - whatever this [objection] may be. |
bhavantīti / jāyanti ity arthaḥ // | [The word] "bhavanti" [means] "they come into existence", that is, "they are produced." |
santānocchedarūpastu vināśo yo na hetumān / | The destruction which is in the form of breaking up of the series is without cause; |
tasyānte 'pi na bhāvo 'sti tathā janma tu vāryate // | it does not have existence even at the end; rather, [its] coming into existence in that form is denied. |
vilakṣaṇakapālāder utpādas tu sahetukaḥ / | The arising of dissimilar [things] like potsherds indeed has a cause; |
so 'pyādau jāyate naiva tadā hetor asambhavāt // | but even that does not arise at the beginning, because at that time [its] cause is not possible. |
dvividho hi vināśaḥ santānocchedarūpo visadṛśasantānotpādalakṣaṇaś ca / | For destruction is of two kinds: [that] in the form of breaking up of the series and [that] characterized by the arising of a dissimilar series. |
tatra yadi santānocchedarūpaṃ vināśamadhikṛtyocyate tadayuktam nahi tasmāt tasya bhāvo 'stīti nīrūpatvāt tat kimucyate ante 'pi sa kathaṃ bhaved iti / tasmāt tasya kadācidapi bhavanānabhyupagamād ādāvante ca yadbhāvābhāvaprasañjanaṃ tadasaṅgatam eva / | If in this regard [what] is spoken about concerning destruction in the form of breaking up of the series, that is incorrect because it has no existence due to [its] formlessness; so what is meant when it is asked "how could it exist even at the end"? Therefore, since [we] do not accept its coming into existence at any time, the implication of [its] existence or non-existence at the beginning or end is entirely irrelevant. |
ghaṭāder ucchedo bhavati{ityasya---} sa eva na bhavatītyarthaḥ / | When it is said "there is destruction of the jar and so forth," the meaning is [that] "that very [similar series] does not come into existence." |
na tu tatra kiñcid vidhīyate / | But nothing is positively affirmed there. |
atha visadṛśakṣaṇotpādalakṣaṇo dvitīyo vināśo 'bhipretas tasyāhetukatvam asiddham / | If the [second type of] 'destruction' meant [by the opponent] is characterized as 'the coming into existence of dissimilar moments', then its being without cause is not established; |
vastutayā tasya mudgarādikāraṇābalenotpādanābhyupagamāt / | because it is accepted that [such destruction] is produced by the force of causes like the bludgeon, [and thus has] the nature of a real entity. |
ata evāsāvādau na jāyate svahetor mudgarādes tadānīm abhāvāt //439- | For this very reason, it cannot arise even at the beginning, since at that time its own cause, such as the bludgeon, is not present. |
dvividhāḥ kṣaṇikā bhāvāḥ keciddhrāsasya hetavaḥ / | There are two kinds of momentary entities: some are causes of decrease, |
śītādereva vahnyādyā apare na tathāvidhāḥ // | like fire [is the cause of decrease] of cold and such things, while others are not of this kind. |
adṛṣṭatattvo lokas tu virodhamabhimanyate / kāryakāraṇabhāve 'pi prathamokteṣvanekadhā // | People who have not perceived the truth imagine [there to be] opposition in many ways among the first-mentioned [entities], even when there is a cause-effect relationship. |
bādhyabādhakabhāvas tu vastuno naiva tāttvikaḥ / | However, the relation of the opposed and opposer is not real among entities. |
vidyate tata evoktaṃ virodhagatirityapi // | For this very reason, it is called "the notion of opposition." |
keciddhiḥ bhāvāḥ keṣāñcin mandatara{ta}makṣaṇotpattikrameṇa yo hrāsas tatra hetavo bhavanti / | Certain entities become causes of decrease for certain [other entities], [where] decrease [consists in] the sequential production of moments of gradually decreasing intensity. |
yathā vahnyādayaḥ śītādīnām apare na tathāvidhāḥ nāpakarṣahetavaḥ tadyathā ta eva vahnyādayo dhūmādīnām / | For example, fire and such things [are causes of decrease] for cold and such things, while others are not of this kind - [they are] not causes of diminution - for example, those very [things] like fire [are not causes of decrease] for smoke and such things. |
tatra prathamokteṣu hrāsahetuṣu kāryakāraṇabhāve 'pi satyajñānatimiratirodhīyamānajñānāloko loko viruddhatvam abhimanyate / | In regard to these first-mentioned causes of decrease, even though there is a cause-effect relationship, people whose light of knowledge is obscured by the darkness of ignorance imagine [there to be] opposition. |
anekadheti / śītasyāgnir viruddhaḥ pradīpasya vāyurāloko 'ndhakārasyetyādinā bhedena / | [This they imagine] in various ways, through distinctions such as: "fire is opposed to cold," "wind to lamp," "light to darkness," and so forth. |
natu vastūnāṃ paramārthataḥ kaścid bādhyabādhakabhāvo 'sti sataḥ sarvātmanā niṣpatteḥ svabhāvānyathātvasya kartumaśakyatvāt tasya vyatirekāvyatirekavikalpe satyubhayathāpi karaṇāsambhavāt / | In reality, however, there exists no relationship of destroyer and destroyed among things, because when an entity comes into existence [it does so] in its complete form, and it is impossible to effect any change in the nature of a thing, [and] because there can be no cause for such [change], whether [that cause be] different or non-different [from the thing]. |
asato 'pyavastutvād eva na kiñcitkriyate ityubhayathāpyakiñcitkaro virodhī / | As for a non-existent [thing], nothing can be done to it precisely because of [its] non-existence, thus in both ways the 'antagonist' can accomplish nothing. |
ata evāvikalakāraṇasya bhavato 'nyabhāve 'bhāvād virodhagatirityācāryeṇoktam / | It is precisely for this reason that the Teacher has stated that "when your cause is present in its complete form, and yet there is non-existence [of its effect] while something else exists, this is [what we call] the notion of antagonism." |
virodhagatiḥ virodhavyavasāyaḥ na tu virodhas tātvika iti bhāvaḥ / | The notion of antagonism means the determination of antagonism, not that antagonism is real - this is the meaning. |
apiśabdaścārthe / | And the word api has the meaning of ca. |
bhinnakramāś ca / | And [these words] have different sequential order. |
nanu ca pratyabhijñānaṃ sa evetyupajāyate / | Moreover, recognition indeed arises [in the form] "this is that very same [thing]." |
kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasiddhyarthamupātteṣu prasajyate // | [This recognition] necessarily applies to those [arguments] brought forward for establishing momentariness. |
nahi timiropahatalocanopajanitaṃ keśavijñānapramapramāṇam upalabdham ityetāvatā svacchanetrajanitam api satyakeśaviṣayaṃ cakṣur vijñānamapramāṇam iti yuktaṃ svacchacetaso 'bhidhātum iti bhāvaḥ / | The meaning is: Just because invalid knowledge of hair [floating in the visual field] produced by an eye afflicted with timira disease has been experienced, it is not proper for a clear-minded person to say that even visual cognition of real hair produced by a healthy eye is invalid. |
tatra niṣprakampatvenāsaṃśayarūpatāmāha sa evāyam athānya ityevaṃvidhasya saṃśayasyābhāvāt / | Here, by [using the word] "firm," he states its nature of being free from doubt, because there is no doubt of the form "is this the same [thing] or something else." |
abādhitamityanenāviparyastatvam //444- | By [using] the word "undeniable," [he indicates] its nature of not being erroneous. |
na khalvityādinā pratividhatte | [The Author] responds with [the words] beginning with "na khalu" [in the following verses]. |
na khalu pratyabhijñānaṃ pratyakṣam upapadyate / | Indeed, recognition cannot be [of the nature of] direct perception; |
vasturūpamanirdeśyaṃ sābhilāṣaṃ ca tadyataḥ // | because the form of the object is inexpressible [in words], and it [recognition] is accompanied by desire. |
bhrāntaṃ ca pratyabhijñānaṃ pratyekaṃ tadvilakṣaṇam / | Recognition is erroneous and [thus] individually distinct from that [perception], |
abhedādhyavasāyena bhinnarūpe 'pi vṛttitaḥ // | because it operates through determination of non-difference even when [the objects are] different in form. |
tatra pratyakṣatvaṃ tāvad asiddhamasyās tathā hi vastutvalakṣaṇasyānanvayitvenāśakyasamayatvāt / | First of all, its perceptual nature is not established, because the characteristic of being a real thing, due to [its] non-continuity, cannot be conventionally [expressed]. |
tadgrāhijñānaṃ manasi jalpam eva / | The cognition that grasps that [real thing] is merely mental discourse. |
avagṛhītasambandhasyārthasya śabdena saṃyojyagrahaṇā{ṇa} sambhavāt / | Because it is impossible to grasp an object whose relation [to words] has not been apprehended together with verbal expression. |
ato 'vaśyaṃ pratyakṣeṇa satā svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvātkalpanāpoḍhena bhavitavyam / | Therefore, being real perception, since it has particular characteristics as its object, it must necessarily be free from conceptual construction. |
pramāṇatvāccābhrāntena / | And being a valid means of knowledge, it must be non-erroneous. |
tataś ca pratyekaṃ kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntam iti nyāyānuyātam idaṃ pratyakṣalakṣaṇamācakṣate kuśalāḥ / | Therefore, the skilled ones declare this definition of perception as "individually free from conceptual construction and non-erroneous," which follows [proper] reasoning. |
na ca pratyabhijñānaṃ kalpanāpoḍham sa evāyam ityevam atijalpākāratayā saṃvedyamānatvāt / | And recognition is not free from conceptual construction, because it is experienced in the form of excessive verbal discourse [thinking] "this is that very [same thing]." |
nāpyabhrāntam bhinneṣvabhedādhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ // | Nor is it non-erroneous, because it operates through determination of non-difference among different [things]. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.