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pūrvaṃ saṃvihitākāragocaraṃ cedidaṃ bhavet / jāyeta pūrvam evedaṃ tādarthyāt pūrvabuddhivat // | If this [recognition] were to apprehend the form [of the object] as previously arranged, then this [recognition] would arise at that previous time itself, due to having the same object, just like the previous cognition. |
katham ity āha pūrvam ityādi / | [Someone] asks: "How [is that]?" [The answer follows with] "pūrvam" etc. |
yadi hi pūrvopalabdhārthaviṣayamidam abhaviṣyat tadā pūrvamevodaśiṣyata tadviṣayatvenāvikalakāraṇatvāt / | If this [recognition] had as its object the thing cognized previously, then it would have appeared at that previous time itself, because its cause would be complete due to having that [same] object. |
pūrvajñānavat tādarthyād iti / | [It would be] like the previous cognition, due to having the same object. |
sa pūrvasaṃvidito bhāvo 'rtho viṣayo 'syeti tadartham tadbhāvas tādarthyam // | That entity which was cognized before [would be] its object - this is what is meant by "having that object" [and] "sameness of object." |
nacaivaṃ tena naivedaṃ tadarthagrāhakaṃ matam / | But it is not so; therefore this [recognition] is not considered to apprehend that [same] object. |
tajjñānakāla utpādād viṣayāntarabuddhivat // | Because it arises at its own time of cognition, like the cognition of a different object. |
abhedādhyavasāyena bhinnarūpe 'pi vṛttitaḥ / māyāgolakavijñānam iva bhrāntam idaṃ sthitam // | Due to its operation through determination of non-difference even in what has a different form, this [recognition] is established to be erroneous, like the cognition of an illusory ball. |
prayogāḥ yadyasmin vikale 'pi sati na bhavati na tat tadviṣayam yathā rūpe 'vikale 'pi sati tatrābhavacchrotravijñānam bhavatyavikale 'pi vajrādau tadvijñānavelāyāṃ pratyabhijñānam iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ / | The arguments [are as follows]: Whatever [cognition] does not occur even when something is present in complete form cannot have that [thing] as its object - just as auditory cognition does not occur even when color is present in complete form, [and] recognition does not occur even when a diamond etc. is present in complete form at the time of its [previous] cognition - [this is] due to non-perception of the pervader. |
tadevaṃ nityatve sati vajrāder anaparāpekṣasya tadviṣayaṃ pratyabhijñānamavikalakāraṇatvāt pūrvam eva bhavet na ca bhavati tasmād anityatvam asya siddham / | Thus, if a diamond etc. were permanent [and] independent [of other factors], its recognition should occur at the previous time itself since its cause would be complete, but it does not occur; therefore its impermanence is established. |
ata evābādhitaviṣayatvamapyasiddham | Hence the [claim of Recognition] having an uncontradicted object is also unproven. |
yathoktādbhrāntatvaprasādhakād eva hetor bādhitaviṣayatvāt | Because of [its] having a contradicted object due to the very reason that establishes its erroneousness as explained above. |
itaś ca gṛhītagrahaṇān nāsyāḥ prāmāṇyam yathā smṛter | And for this [further] reason, because it grasps what is [already] grasped, it has no validity, just like memory. |
niṣpāditakriye cārthe pravṛtteḥ smaraṇādivat | Because it operates on an object whose action is [already] accomplished, like memory and similar [cognitions]. |
na pramāṇam idaṃ yuktaṃ karaṇārthavihānitaḥ | This cannot be a valid means of knowledge due to the loss of [its] instrumental purpose. |
yad eva hi pramitikriyāsiddhau prakṛṣṭamupakaraṇaṃ tadeva sādhakatamaṃ kārakampramāṇamucyate | For only that which is the most excellent instrument in establishing the action of valid cognition is called the most effective agent [and] means of knowledge. |
yadi ca pratyabhijñā pūrvapramāṇagṛhītārthaviṣayā syāt tadā niṣpannapramitikriye 'rthe pravṛttyāsādhakatamatvāt katham iva pramāṇatāmaśnuvīta | If Recognition has for its object something that has already been grasped by a previous means of knowledge, then how could it acquire the status of a means of knowledge, since it would not be the most effective agent due to operating on an object whose cognitive action is already accomplished? |
anyathā hi smṛter api prāmāṇyaṃ syāt | For otherwise memory too would be a [valid] means of knowledge. |
na cānadhigatapramāṇābhāvā satī bādhakatvāya kalpate atiprasaṅgāt | And not having acquired the status of a valid means of knowledge, it cannot serve to contradict [anything], as [this would lead to] an unwanted consequence. |
syād etat mā bhūd asyāḥ pṛthakprāmāṇyam tathāpyanayā pūrvārthaviṣayatayā kṣaṇabhaṅgitvam bādhyata eva | [One might object:] "Let it be that it has no separate validity as a means of knowledge; nevertheless, by having a previous object as its content, it does contradict momentariness." |
tad asamyak | That is incorrect. |
na hy asyāḥ paramārthataḥ pūrvārthaviṣayatvam asti mābhijalpatvāt | For in reality it does not have a previous object as its content, because it is mere imagination. |
kevalam aviṣayāpi satī vibhramabalāt pūrvadṛṣṭārthādhyavasāyinī samutpadyate | Although actually objectless, it arises through the power of confusion as determining the previously seen object. |
ity adhyavasāyavaśāt pūrvadṛṣṭārthaviṣayety ucyate | Thus, due to [this] determination, it is [merely] said to have the previously seen object as its content. |
tatkuto 'smāt pratyabhijñānāt prakṛtibhrāntāt kṣaṇabhaṅganirākriyā sidhyet | Therefore, how could the refutation of momentariness be established from this Recognition which is fundamentally erroneous? |
idānīntaramastitvaṃ na hi pūrvadhiyā gatam | The existence [of the object] at the present moment has indeed not been grasped by the previous cognition |
tadastyasya viśeṣaścet smaraṇe yo na vidyate | This is its distinctive feature which is not found in remembrance |
pūrvapramitamātre hi jāyate sa iti smṛtiḥ | For remembrance arises [in the form] "that" with reference to what was previously cognized only |
sa evāyam itīyaṃ tu pratyabhijñātirekiṇī | But recognition, [taking the form] "this is that same [one]," is distinctive [from remembrance] |
sa hy āha na hi pūrvapratyakṣeṇārthasyedānīntaramastitvamadhigatam tasya sa evāyam ity evamākāropagrāheṇānutpatteḥ | For he [Kumārila] says that the previous perception has indeed not apprehended the object's existence at the present moment, since it cannot arise with the form "this is that same [one]" |
tasmād asya pratyabhijñānasya smaraṇād asti viśeṣaḥ | Therefore this recognition has a distinction from remembrance |
katham ity āha pūrvetyādi | He explains "how?" through [the words] beginning with "previous" etc. |
sa iti hi pūrvajñānākāropagraheṇaiva smṛtiḥ pravartate | For remembrance operates only by grasping the form of previous cognition [in the form] "that" |
pratyabhijñā tvayam atiriktam apyarthākāraṃ gṛhṇāti | But recognition grasps this additional form of the object |
smṛteḥ sakāśād atirekiṇī viśiṣṭetyarthaḥ | The meaning is that [recognition] is distinct and different from remembrance |
tasmādyau saṃśayaviparyayau tau bādhitvā pratyabhijñā pramāṇatāṃ labhate | Therefore, having refuted both doubt and error, recognition obtains the status of a valid means of knowledge |
jñāte cāvidyamānatvād yau saṃśayaviparyayau bādhitvā tau labhetaiva pratyabhijñā pramāṇatām | Since doubt and error do not exist regarding what is [already] cognized, recognition indeed obtains the status of a valid means of knowledge after having refuted those two |
jñāte 'rthe tayor avidyamānatvād bahalavahniśikhākalāpaparigata iva deśe śītasya | When something is recognized, [doubt and error] do not exist regarding it, just as cold [does not exist] in a place surrounded by masses of blazing flames. |
nanu yathānumānaprasiddhasyātyarthasya putrādigataśyāmatvādeḥ punaḥ kālāntareṇa pratyakṣeṇa bādhyamānasyānyathātvaṃ bhavati tathātrāpi yadi nāma pratyabhijñanato nityatvamarthasya siddham, tathāpyuttarakālaṃ tatkāryeṇa kramiṇā kramasyānumānataḥ siddher anyathātvaṃ siddhameva, tat kathaṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgitvaṃ bādhyata | [One might object:] Just as something established through inference, like the dark complexion of a child, can later be contradicted by direct perception, similarly here, even if the permanence of an object is established through recognition, its successive nature could still be proven later through inference based on its sequential effects - so how is momentariness refuted? |
vijñāto 'pītarairarthaḥ pratyakṣeṇānyathā bhavet | An object cognized through other [means] could be [known] differently through direct perception. |
pratyakṣeṇāvaruddhe tu netarotpattisambhavaḥ | But when [something is] ascertained through direct perception, there is no possibility of other [means of knowledge] arising. |
itarairiti anumānādibhiḥ | "Through others" means through inference and other [means of knowledge]. |
yathā kila śyāmastatputrātvād dṛśyamānatat putravad ityādi | As in [the inference] "he must be dark-complexioned because he is that person's son, like the visible son" and so forth. |
pratyakṣeṇānyathā bhavediti pratyakṣeṇa karaṇabhūtena, anyathā anumānādipramitākāraviparīto bhavedity arthaḥ | "Could be [known] differently through direct perception" means: through direct perception as the instrument [of knowledge], "differently" means having a form contrary to what was established through inference etc. |
netarotpattisambhava iti pratyakṣāditarasyānumānāder naiva bādhakatvenotpattiḥ sambhavatītyarthaḥ | "No possibility of others arising" means: there is no possibility of the arising of means of knowledge other than direct perception, such as inference, in the role of contradicting [direct perception]. |
kasmād ityata āha ko hītyādi / | Why so? He answers with [the verse beginning with] "ko hi..." |
ko hi jyeṣṭhapramāṇena dṛḍhenārthe 'vadhārite / durbalair itaraiḥ paścād adhyavasyedviparyayam // | "For who would determine the contrary afterwards through weaker [means of cognition], when an object has been ascertained through the firmly established highest means of cognition?" |
yuktaṃ hi yadanumānaprasiddhasyārthasya pratyakṣeṇānyathātvaṃ kriyata iti / | For it is reasonable that what has been established through inference can be shown to be otherwise through perception. |
tasya sarvapramāṇajyeṣṭhatvāt / | Because this [perception] is the highest among all means of valid cognition. |
na tu pratyakṣaprasiddhasyānyathātvam anumānādayaḥ kartum īhante, teṣāṃ durbalatvāt / | But inference and other [means of cognition] cannot establish the contrary of what is established through perception, because of their weakness. |
dṛḍheneti / | [The word] "firmly" [means...] |
saṃśayaviparyayābhyāṃ rahitena / viparyayam iti / | [It means] "free from doubt and error." [And the word] "contrary" [means...] |
anyathātvam // nanvityādinā pratividhatte | [It means] "being otherwise." He responds with [the verse beginning with] "nanvi..." |
nanvidānīntaranāstitvaṃ yadi bhinnaṃ tvayeṣyate / pūrvabhāvāt tadā bhedastvayaiva pratipāditaḥ // | "If present existence is accepted by you as different from prior existence, then difference has been established by you yourself." |
yattadidānīntanamastitvaṃ pratyabhijñānasya viṣayaḥ, kiṃ tat pūrvapratyakṣagṛhītādastitvād bhinnamāhosvit tadeva, yadi bhinnaṃ tadā svavacanenaiva bhedasya pratipāditatvād abhyupetahānir bhavato bhavet / | That present existence which is the object of recognition—is it different from the existence grasped by prior perception, or is it the same? If it is different, then, since difference would be established by your own statement, there would be abandonment of [your] accepted position. |
asmākaṃ punar iṣṭasiddhiḥ // | While for us, [this is] the establishment of what is desired. |
ananyatve 'pi sattvasya kathaṃ pūrvadhiyāgatam / tasyāgatau hi vastveva nopalabdhaṃ prasajyate // | If the [present] existence is non-different [from the previous existence], how [can it be] not included in the previous cognition? Indeed, if it were not included [in the previous cognition], it would follow that the thing itself was not apprehended. |
athānanyad iti pakṣas tadā kathaṃ pūrvadhiyā tadagataṃ yenocyeta "na hi pūrvadhiyā gatam" iti / | If the position is that [the present existence] is different, then how could it be not included in the previous cognition, on account of which you say "it is not included in the previous cognition"? |
syād etat yathā kṣaṇikatvaṃ śabdāder avyatiriktam api sattadgrahaṇe satyapyagṛhītam ucyate, tadvad idam api bhaviṣyatīti / | One might say: "Just as momentariness of sound and other [things], though not different from them, is said to be unapprehended even when they are apprehended, similarly this too will be [the case]." |
tadayuktam / | That is not correct. |
na hi śabde dharmiṇi gṛhīte 'pi tadavyatireki kṣaṇikatvam agṛhītam iti vyavasthāpyate / | For it is not established that when sound, the property-bearer, is apprehended, its momentariness, though non-different from it, is unapprehended. |
kiṃ{tarhi---} gṛhītam api tanniścayotpattikāraṇābhāvād aniścitamityabhidhīyate / | Rather, it is said that although [momentariness] is apprehended, it is uncertain due to the absence of causes for the arising of certainty about it. |
nanhyanubhavamātrād eva niścayo bhavati / tasyārthitvābhyāsasādguṇyādisāpekṣatvāt / | For certainty does not arise from mere experience alone, as it depends on [factors like] desire [for knowledge], repetition [of experience], excellence [of conditions], and so forth. |
na caivaṃ bhavataḥ sambhavati / | And this [explanation] is not possible for you. |
pūrvapratyakṣasyāpi vyavasāyātmakatvāt / | Because according to you, even the previous perception is of determinate nature. |
tena ca vasturūpe niścīyamāne tadavyatiriktamidānīntaramastitvaṃ niścitam eva | When the form of the thing is ascertained [through perception], its present existence, which is non-different from that [form], is also necessarily ascertained |
tadaniścaye vastusvarūpasyāpi tadvadevāniścitatvaprasaṅgaḥ | If that [present existence] were not ascertained, the very nature of the thing, being non-different from it, would also not be ascertained |
ye 'pyāhuḥ sandigdhavastunirṇayanibandhanaṃ pratyabhijñāne prāmāṇyam iti tadapyanenaiva pratyuktam | Those who say that "the validity of recognition is based on the ascertainment of a doubtful thing" - that [view] too is refuted by this very [argument] |
na cāpyatra sandigdhavastusadbhāvanirṇayo 'sti sadṛśāparāparotpattāv api keśādivat pratyabhijñānadarśanena sandehāt | Nor is there in this case any ascertainment of the existence of a doubtful thing, because even in cases where similar [things] arise one after another, like hairs, there is recognition despite doubt |
yaccoktaṃ vijñāto 'pītarair artha ityādi tatrāha pratyakṣeṇa cetyādi | Regarding what was said that "a thing known through other [means] could be [known differently]", he speaks of perception etc. |
nānumānādimānaṃ syād bādhātas taimirādivat | An inferential or other means [of knowledge] would not exist due to invalidation, like [the knowledge] of one with eye disease |
yasya tvatputratvādityādikasyānumānāder gocare viṣaye pratyakṣeṇa bādhā sambhavet tasya prāmāṇyam eva nāsti bādhyamānaviṣayatvenārthasaṃvādābhāvāt taimirikādijñānavat | If the subject matter of an inference like "because it is your child [it must be dark-complexioned]" could be invalidated by perception, then that [inference] has no validity at all, because due to its subject matter being invalidated there is no correspondence with reality, like the cognition of one with eye disease |
tenetarair vijñāto 'pyarthaḥ pratyakṣeṇānyathā bhaved iti yaduktaṃ tadasaṅgatam eva asambhavāt | Therefore what was stated - that "a thing known through other [means] could be [known] differently through perception" - is entirely irrelevant, as it is impossible |
arthasaṃvedakatve ca samāne dveṣyatāsya kā | When the capacity to make known objects is equal [in all means of knowledge], what reason is there for prejudice against this [inference]? |
tadabhāve tu naiva syāt pramāṇam anumādikam | And if that [capacity] were absent, inference etc. would not be valid means of knowledge at all |
idam eva hi pramāṇānāṃ pramāṇatvam yadutārthapramāṇam asāmarthyam | For this indeed is the validity of valid means of knowledge - namely their capacity to produce valid knowledge of objects |
taccetsarvapramāṇānām abhyupagamyate tat kenāsya pratyakṣasya jyeṣṭhatā bhavet | If this [capacity] is admitted for all means of knowledge, then how could perception have superiority? |
tasya arthādisaṃvādakatvasya abhāve sati naiva pramāṇam anumānād iti syāt | If that correspondence with objects etc. were absent, inference etc. would not be means of knowledge at all |
arthāvisaṃvādakanibandhanatvāt pramāṇavyavahārasya tasya cātra bhāvāt | Because the designation as a means of knowledge is based on non-deviation from objects, and that [non-deviation] exists here [in inference etc.] |
nanvanenānumānena bādhyate sarvahetuṣu vyāptiḥ sarvopasaṃhārā pratijñārthasya vā kṣatiḥ | The all-comprehensive invariable concomitance [that has been asserted] in all [previous] reasonings becomes invalidated by this inference, or the proposition itself becomes invalidated. |
kiṃ tadanumānam | What is that inference? |
vivakṣitārkacandrādiviṣayaṃ yat pravartate jñānaṃ tatkālasambaddhasūryādiviṣayaṃ param | The subsequent cognition which occurs regarding the intended sun, moon etc. must appertain to the sun etc. that exists at that [same] time [of cognition]. |
pārthivāviṣayatve hi tajjñānatvābhidhānataḥ tadyathā prathamaṃ jñānaṃ tat kālārkādigocaram | Because while not being a cognition of earthly objects, it is designated as the cognition of those [celestial objects], just like the first cognition [which pertained to] the sun etc. of that time. |
taduktam vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannāni candrārkagrahanakṣatrādijñānāni vivakṣitacandrārkagrahatārakādiviṣayaṃ yaddevadattādivijñānaṃ tat kālāvacchinnacandrārkagrahanakṣatratārakādiviṣayāṇyeva, pṛthivīsambandhitvenānupalabhyamānatve sati candrārkagrahanakṣatratārakādijñānaśabdavācyatvāt, prathamakālabhāvidevadattatārakādijñānavad iti | The disputed cognitions of the moon, sun, planets, stars etc. must appertain to the moon, sun, planets, stars etc. as delimited by that time when Devadatta's and others' cognition of these intended celestial objects occurred, because while not being apprehended as related to earth, they are denoted by terms like "cognition of moon, sun, planets, stars etc.", just like Devadatta's cognition of stars etc. at the first moment. |
vivakṣitārkacandrādiviṣayam iti | [The phrase] "must appertain to the intended sun, moon etc." [refers to these] luminous substances. |
pṛthivīsambandhitvenānupalabhyamānatve satīti viśeṣaṇaṃ citrādigatādityādiviṣayair jñānair vyabhicāraparihārārtham | The qualification "while not being apprehended as related to earth" has been added to prevent deviation with respect to cognitions of the sun etc. [as depicted] in pictures and such. |
tasmād anyat atatkālam ity arthaḥ | "Subsequent" means different from that, i.e., [occurring at] a different time. |
ye rūpatvādisāmānyāśrayāḥ ye ca tadāśrayāḥ tadviṣayāś ca ye pratyakṣānumānopamānaśābdasmṛtipratyabhijñānārthasiddhadarśanārekaviparyayānuvyavasāyasvapnasvapnāntikāḥ prajñānaviśeṣāḥ te sarve svātmalābhānantarapradhvaṃsino na bhavanti jñeyatvaprameyatvābhidheyatvasadasadanyataratvasadasadvyatiriktajñeyaviṣayajñānāvacchedyatvāgrāhyaviṣayagrahaṇāgrāhyatvānabhidheyābhidhāyakānabhidheyatvasamānāsamānajātīyadravyasaṃyogavibhāgajanitaśabdakāryaśabdābhidheyatvebhyaḥ prāgabhāvād iti | The substrata of universals like coloredness etc., and their substrata, and the particular cognitions relating to these - [namely] perception, inference, analogy, verbal cognition, memory, recognition, mystic vision, doubt, error, reflective awareness, dream and dream-end cognitions - all these do not undergo destruction immediately after gaining their own existence, because they are characterized by knowability, cognizability, expressibility, being either existent or non-existent, being delimited by cognitions whose objects are different from existence and non-existence, having non-graspable objects that are not graspable, being inexpressible by words that do not express, being expressible by words that are effects of sounds produced by conjunction and disjunction of homogeneous and heterogeneous substances, [all] like prior non-existence. |
tatra rūpatvādisāmānyāśrayā rūpādayaḥ teṣāṃ ca rūpādīnām āśrayās tadāśrayāḥ ke te | The substrata of universals like rūpatva [colorness] etc. are the colors etc. themselves, and [when we speak of] the substrata of these [colors] etc., what are these [substrata]? |
ghaṭādayaḥ siddhadarśanaṃ yogivijñānam śeṣaṃ pūrvam eva vyākhyātam | [They are] jars etc. [As for] siddhadarśana, [it means] the perception of yogis. The rest has been explained before. |
sadasadanyataratvaṃ sattvamasattvaṃ vā | [It means] either existence or non-existence, i.e., being or non-being. |
sadasadbhyāṃ vyatiriktasya jñeyasyābhāvād eva tadviṣayajñānaṃ nāsti tasya cāsattvādeva tenāparicchedyatvaṃ siddham | Since there exists nothing knowable distinct from being and non-being, there can be no cognition having that as its object; and its non-characterizability follows from its very non-existence. |
tathā na vidyate 'bhidheyaṃ yasyāsāvanabhidheyo yobhidhāyakas tenānabhidheyatvamanarthakatvād eva siddham | Similarly, that which has no expressible object is unexpressible, and its inexpressibility through an expressor follows simply from [its] meaninglessness. |
samānajātīyāni dravyāṇyadharadaśanādīni kṛtakatvādisāmānyāt asamānajātīyānyākāśādīni teṣāṃ yau mithaḥsaṃyogavibhāgau tābhyāṃ janito yaḥ prathamaḥ śabdas tasya paramparayā yaḥ kāryabhūtaḥ śrutipathamavatīrṇas tenābhidheyatvam | Homogeneous substances are [things] like lips, teeth etc., having the common property of being products; [and] heterogeneous [substances] are ākāśa etc.; from their mutual conjunction and disjunction is produced the first sound, [and] from that [arises] in succession the resultant [sound] that enters the path of hearing, [and] by that [sound comes about] expressibility. |
tathāhyeṣām iyaṃ prakriyā prathamaḥ kila śabdaḥ saṃyogavibhāgayonis tasmācchabdāntarāṇI kadambagolakanyāyena prādurbhavanti | For their process is thus: the first sound indeed has conjunction and disjunction as its source, [and] from that other sounds appear according to the principle of the kadamba flower-cluster. |
tadeva pramāṇakadambakaṃ darśayati rūpatvādyāśrayāḥ sarve ityādi | This very collection of means of valid cognition is shown [by the words] beginning with "all substrata of colorness etc." |
ye ca tadviṣayāḥ kecijjāyante pratyayās tathā utpādānantaraṃ dhvaṃsabhājo naiva bhavanti te prameyatvābhidheyatvahetutaḥ khāravindavat | And whatever cognitions arise having that as their object, they do not become subject to destruction immediately after arising, like a sky-lotus, due to [their] cognizability and expressibility. |
prameyatvābhidheyatvagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam | The mention of cognizability and expressibility is [merely] illustrative. |
tadanye 'pi hetavo draṣṭavyāḥ / | The other reasons also should be examined. |
khe nabhasi aravindam ākāśakamalam iti yāvat // | The [word] khārabinda means "aravindam" [lotus] in "kha" [sky], that is, a sky-lotus. |
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