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na hyalabdhātmakaṃ vastu parāṅgatvāya kalpate / | For an entity that has not obtained its own existence cannot be fit for [producing] something else. |
na vinaṣṭaṃ naca sthānaṃ tasya kāryakṛtikṣamam // | Neither what is destroyed nor [its mere] presence is capable of producing its effect. |
pūrvakṣaṇavināśe ca kalpyamāne niranvaye / paścāt tasyānimittatvād utpattir nopapadyate // | Further, if the destruction of the previous 'moment' is held to be absolute [i.e. without remnant], then there could be no production of any subsequent 'moment', as there would be no cause for it. |
anāgataṃ hi nāmocyate yadalabdhātmatattvam, yaccālabdhātmatattvaṃ tadasat, yaccāsas tadaśeṣasāmarthyaśūnyam, yaccāśeṣasāmarthyarahitaṃ tat kathaṃ parāṅgatvāya kalpate paraṃ prati hetubhāvaṃ pratipadyata ity arthaḥ / | That which has not yet obtained its own essence is called 'future'; and what has not obtained its own essence is non-existent; and what is non-existent is devoid of all potentiality; and what is devoid of all potentiality - how could it serve to bring about something else or function as a cause for another thing? |
samarthasyaiva hetubhāvasampratipatteḥ / | Because it is established that only something possessing potentiality can serve as a cause. |
evaṃ vinaṣṭam api sarvasāmarthyaśūnyatvān na parāṅgatvāya kalpata iti sambandhaḥ / | Similarly, what has perished also cannot serve to bring about something else, because it is devoid of all potentiality. |
na cāpi vartamānasya sthānam asti, yat kāryakṛtau kāryakaraṇe kṣamaṃ bhavet / | And the present [moment] has no stability by which it could be capable of producing an effect. |
kiṃ ca yadi pūrvakakṣaṇo niranvayaṃ vinaśyatīti kalpyate tadā pāścātyasyakṣaṇasya nimittābhāvād utpattir na prāpnoti // | Moreover, if it is held that the preceding moment perishes without remnant, then the production of the subsequent moment cannot occur due to the absence of a cause. |
syād etad yathā tulāntayor nāmonnāmau samaṃ bhavatas taddhetuphalayor nāśotpādāviṣṭāvato vartamānād avinaṣṭād eva kāryotpatter iṣṭatvānnānimittātasyotpattir bhaviṣyatītyāha nāśotpādasamatve 'pītyādi / | [The opponent] might argue thus: "Just as the rising and falling of the two ends of a scale occur simultaneously, so too the destruction [of the cause] and production [of the effect]; since it is accepted that the effect arises from the present [cause] while it is still not destroyed, its production will not be without cause" - [to this we] reply [with the verse beginning] "Even if destruction and production are simultaneous..." |
nāśotpādasamatve 'pi naivāpekṣā parasparam / | Even if destruction and production are simultaneous, there is still no mutual dependence between them. |
na kāryakāraṇatve stastadvyāpārānanugrahāt // nāśotpādayoḥ samatve 'pi kalpyamāne na nāśotpādayos tadvator vā kāryakāraṇatve staḥ sambhavataḥ, tayḥ parasparānapekṣatvāt / | Even if the destruction [of the first moment] and the production [of the second moment] are assumed to be simultaneous, there can be no causal relationship between the said destruction and production, nor between their respective substrates, because they are independent of each other. |
katham anapekṣatvam ity āha tadvyāpārānanugrahād iti / | [If one asks] "How are they independent?" [The answer is:] because there is no assistance through their respective operations. |
tasya nāśasya tadvato vā vyāpāreṇa kāryasyānanugrahāt ananugṛhītatvād ity arthaḥ | [This means that] due to the lack of assistance to the effect through any operation of destruction or of that which possesses it, [the effect] remains unassisted. |
nāśasya hi nīrūpatvād vyāpārābhāvaḥ, hetvabhimatasyāpi vastunaḥ kāryasaktākāle sannidhānābhāvād vyāpārābhāvaḥ | For destruction, being featureless, has no operation; and the entity regarded as the cause has no operation because of [its] absence at the time when the effect comes into being. |
syādetad antareṇāpi vyāpāramānantaryamātreṇa hetuphalabhāvo bhaviṣyatītyāha | One might say that even without any operation, the relation of cause and effect could exist through mere immediate succession. |
jāyamānaś ca gandhādir ghaṭarūpe vinaśyati | The odor and other [qualities] arise when the form of the jar is destroyed. |
tat kāryaṃ neṣyate yadvat tathā rūpāntarāṇyapi | Just as that is not accepted as [its] effect, so too [are] the subsequent forms [not its effects]. |
yadi yadanantaraṃ uajjāyate tat tasya kāryam iti syāt tadā ghaṭādisanniveśino rūpakṣaṇasyānantaraṃ samānajātīyarūpakṣaṇavat tatkalāpāntargata eva gandhādir jāyata iti so 'pi tat kāryaṃ syāt | If whatever arises immediately after [something] were its effect, then just as homogeneous color-moments [arise] immediately after a color-moment residing in the jar, so too the odor and other [qualities] arising within that same collection would be its effect. |
na hi bhautikānām anyonyaṃ hetuphalabhāvo 'sti, yathā bhūtānām, bhinnasantānatvād iti paro manyate | For there is no mutual cause-effect relationship among material properties, as [there is] among material elements, because they belong to different series - thus thinks the opponent. |
tasmāt prākkāryaniṣpatter vyāpāro yasya dṛśyate / tadeva kāraṇaṃ tasya na tvānantaryamātrakam | Therefore, that alone whose operation is seen before the production of the effect is its cause, not mere immediate succession. |
saṃkṣepo 'yaṃ vinaṣṭāccetkāraṇāt kāryasambhavaḥ / pradhvastasyānupākhyatvān niṣkāraṇam idaṃ bhavet | This is the summary: if an effect were to arise from a destroyed cause, it would be without cause, since what is destroyed has no characterization. |
avinaṣṭāc ca tajjātāvanekakṣaṇasambhavāt / kṣaṇikatvaṃ na bhāvānāṃ vyāhanyeta tadā katham | And if [it arises] from an undestroyed [cause], then since that would exist for multiple moments after its arising, how could the momentariness of things not be contradicted? |
atra dvayī kalpanā / vinaṣṭād vā kāraṇāt kāryaṃ bhaved avinaṣṭād vā / naṣṭānaṣṭavinirmuktasya vastuno 'bhāvāt | Here there are two possibilities: either the effect arises from a destroyed cause or from an undestroyed [cause], since there cannot be anything free from [being either] destroyed or undestroyed. |
tatra na tāvadādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, naṣṭasyāsattvena tata utpādābhyupagame kāryasyanirhetukatvaprasaṅgāt / | The first view cannot be right, because if production from what has been destroyed [and is therefore] non-existent were admitted, it would follow that the effect would be without cause. |
tataś ca nityaṃ sattvādir yujyate / | And from this it would follow that [everything] would be eternally existent from [its] beginning. |
nāpi dvitīyo 'nekakṣaṇāvasthāyitvena bhāvānāṃ kṣaṇikatvahāniprasaṅgāt / | Nor [can] the second [view be right], because things would exist for multiple moments, which would result in the loss of [their] momentariness. |
na kathaṃ vyāhanyeteti / vyāhanyata evetyarthaḥ / | [If one asks:] "Why could it not be contradicted?" [The answer is:] "It would certainly be contradicted" – this is the meaning. |
tathā hi bhāvaḥ prathamaṃ tāvad utpadyate, tato vyāpriyate, tataḥ kāryamutpādya paścād vinaśyatītyevam ekasyaiva vastuno 'naikasmin kṣaṇe sannidhānam iti kṣaṇikatvavyāhatiḥ syāt // | For thus: a thing first comes into existence, then it functions, then after producing [its] effect it perishes – in this way there would be presence of one and the same entity in multiple moments, which would contradict [its] momentariness. |
kṣaṇasthāyī ghaṭādiścennopalabhyeta cakṣuṣā / | If a jar and similar [things] existed [only] for a moment, they could not be perceived by the eye; |
na hi naṣṭāḥ pratīyante cirātītapadārthavat // | For destroyed [things] are indeed not cognized, like objects long past. |
kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'pi pratyakṣānupalambhataḥ / te pūrtti(naivaiti---)siddhiṃ bhāvānāṃ svabhāvānupalambhanāt // | And the relation of cause and effect [cannot be established] through perception and non-apprehension, because the nature of things is not apprehended. |
pratyakṣānupalambhasādhano hi kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ kṣaṇikatve ca bhāvānāṃ svajñānakāle 'navasthānād apratyakṣataiva / | For the relation of cause and effect is established through perception and non-apprehension, and if things are momentary, they cannot be perceived because they do not exist at the time of their own cognition. |
samānakālaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvānupapatteḥ / | Because the relation of cause and effect is not possible between [things existing] at the same time. |
tataś ca pratyakṣānupalambhayor abhāva eva / | Thus there is [indeed] no possibility of perception or non-apprehension [in this matter]. |
ananyasaṃsṛṣṭavastūpalambhātmarūpatvenānupalambhasyāpi pratyakṣaviśeṣātmakatvāt / | Because non-apprehension too is only a form of perception, being of the nature of apprehending a thing as not connected with anything else. |
ataḥ padārthopalambhābhāve tasyāpyayoga eveti kathaṃ pratyakṣānupalambhasādhanaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ syāt // | Therefore, when there is no apprehension of objects, that [non-apprehension] too cannot be applied, so how could the causal relation be established through perception and non-apprehension? |
bhavatu nāmopalambho vastunas tathāpi pūrvottarayoḥ kṣaṇayoḥ pratisandhāturekasya kasyacid abhāvāt sambandho na siddhyatīti darśayann āha ko vetyādi / | Even if there be an apprehension of a thing, due to the absence of any single entity that could connect the preceding and succeeding moments, no relation can be established - showing this, he says "ko vā" etc. |
ko vā vyavasthitaḥ kartā saṃdhatte kramavad gatim / | What permanent agent [is there who] connects the successive cognitions? |
asya dṛṣṭāvidaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ nāsyādṛṣṭau tu lakṣyate // | [When] this is seen, that is seen; but when this is not seen, that is not observed. |
gatirupalabdhiḥ / | The word "gati" [means] apprehension. |
kramavatī cāsau gatiśceti kramavadgatiḥ / | "Kramavadgatiḥ" [means] that apprehension which is successive. |
tāṃ kaḥ pratisaṃdhatte ghaṭayati / | Who connects that [succession], who synthesizes [it]? |
naiva kaścit / yadi hi kaścid asyāgner upalambhādidaṃ dhūmādyupalabdhamasyānupalabdhau nopalabhyata ityevaṃ kramavatīṃ gatimekakartṛtvena pratisaṃdadhīta, tadā syāt kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhiḥ, sa ca nāsti pratisandhātā tvan mateneti na kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ siddhyed ity arthaḥ // | Indeed no one. For if someone could, as a single perceiver, connect the successive cognition that "from the apprehension of this fire, this smoke is apprehended, and without the apprehension of the former, the latter is not apprehended," then the causal relation could be established. But according to your view, there is no such connector, therefore the causal relation cannot be established. |
kṣaṇabhaṅgiṣu bhāveṣu pratyabhijñā ca durghaṭā / | And in [the case of] momentarily perishing entities, recognition too is impossible. |
na hyanyanaradṛṣṭo 'rthaḥ pratyabhijñāyate paraiḥ // | For indeed, an object seen by one person cannot be recognized by others. |
ya eva mayā pūrvaṃ dṛṣṭo 'rthaḥ sa evāyam etarhi dṛśyata ityevaṃ pūrvottarayor darśanayor ekaviṣayatayā ekajñātṛtayā ca yadghaṭanaṃ tat pratyabhijñānam / | Recognition consists in the connection of two perceptions - earlier and later - as pertaining to one object and one cognizer [through the notion] "this very same object which was seen by me earlier is being seen [by me] now." |
tac ca sarvabhāvānāṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgitve sati nopapadyate / | And this [recognition] is not possible if all entities are subject to momentary destruction. |
na hi devadattena dṛṣṭam arthaṃ viṣṇumitraḥ pratyabhijānīte / | For indeed, Viṣṇumitra does not recognize an object [that] has been seen by Devadatta. |
anyataragrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam / | The mention of "one [person]" is [meant as] an illustration. |
nāpyanyo 'rthaḥ pratyabhijñāyata ityapi draṣṭavyam // | It should also be understood that neither can a different object be recognized. |
nanu lūnapunar jātakeśanakhādiṣviva bhede 'pi sādṛśyāt pratyabhijñānaṃ bhaviṣyatītyetad āśaṅkyāha sādṛśyād ityādi / | [Anticipating] this objection that "as in the case of cut and regrown hair, nails, etc., recognition might occur due to similarity even when there is difference," he states [the verse beginning with] "due to similarity." |
jñātur ekasya sadbhāvād dvibhede tvanibandhanam // | Due to the existence of a single cognizer [recognition may occur despite difference in one factor], but when there is difference in both [cognizer and object], there would be no basis [for recognition]. |
pratisandhānakārī ca yadyeko 'rtho na vidyate / rūpe dṛṣṭe 'bhilāṣādis tat kathaṃ syād rasādiṣu // | And if there exists no single entity that makes the connection, then how could there arise desire etc. for taste etc. when [only] the form is seen? |
yadi hyeko jñātā bhavet tadā syāt pratisandhātṛvaśājjñeyasya bhede 'pi sādṛśyakṛtaṃ pratyabhijñānam / | For if there were a single cognizer, then there could be recognition based on similarity even when there is difference in the object known, [this being] due to the power of the connecting cognizer. |
dvibhede tu dvayor jñātṛjñeyayor bhedo dvibhedaḥ, tasmin satyanibandhanam eva pratyabhijñānam | When there is a twofold difference—[that is], when there is difference between both the cognizers and the cognized objects—pratyabhijñāna [recognition] would be without foundation. |
api ca yadi na kaścid ekaḥ pratisandhātā puruṣo bhavet tadā yadetan mātuluṅgaphalādirūpe dṛṣṭe tadrūpāvinābhāviṣu rasādiṣu smaraṇāpūrvamabhilaṣaṇaṃ paribhogāya ca pravṛttis tat kathaṃ bhavet | Moreover, if there were no single person [who acts as] a connector [of experiences], then how could there be remembering of tastes etc. that are invariably connected with that form when the form of a citron fruit etc. is seen, [followed by] desire and activity for experiencing [that taste]? |
na hyanyena dṛṣṭe 'nyasyābhilāṣādir bhavet | For indeed, one person cannot have desire etc. for what has been seen by another person. |
rāgādinigaḍair baddhaḥ kṣaṇo 'nyo bhavavārake | In the prison-house of existence, one moment is bound by the chains of attachment etc., |
abaddho mucyate cānya itīdaṃ nāvabudhyate | while another [moment] that was never bound becomes liberated—this is incomprehensible. |
anyo hi kṣaṇo rāgādibhir baddho 'nyastu mucyata ity etan nāvabudhyate na sambhāvyata iti yāvat | For [the idea that] one moment is bound by attachment etc. while another becomes liberated—this is incomprehensible, that is to say, impossible. |
bhavaḥ saṃsāraḥ, sa eva vārakam bandhanāgāram | Bhava means saṃsāra [cyclic existence], which itself is the prison-house, the place of bondage. |
prayatnaś ca mokṣārtho vyartho mokṣābhāvād iti darśayannāha mokṣo naiva hītyādi | [The author] shows that effort for the sake of liberation would be futile due to the impossibility of liberation, saying "indeed there is no liberation" etc. |
mokṣo naiva hi baddhasya kadācid api sambhavī | Indeed, liberation is never possible for one who is bound. |
nanvabuddhasyaiva mokṣo bhaviṣyati, tat ko 'tra virodha ity āha mokṣamityādi | [One might object:] "But liberation will be for the unbound one—what contradiction is there in that?" [To this he] speaks [the verse beginning with] "mokṣam" etc. |
mokṣamāsād ayandṛṣṭo baddhaḥ sa nigaḍādibhiḥ | [The one] who is seen attaining liberation [is always seen to have been] bound by fetters etc. |
abaddho muktimetīti dṛṣṭavyāhatamīdṛśam // | [The statement] "the unbound [person] attains liberation" is contradicted by direct perception. |
ya eva hi baddhaḥ sa eva mucyata iti loke pratītaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ ca / | It is well-known and observed in the world that the very same [person] who was bound is [the one who] becomes liberated. |
abaddhasya tu mokṣapratijñānaṃ lokapratītyā pratyakṣeṇa ca bādhyata iti pratyakṣapratītivirodhaḥ pratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ // | The claim of liberation for an unbound [person] is contradicted by common understanding and direct perception - thus there is a conflict between the proposition and direct perception. |
ekādhikaraṇāvetau bandhamokṣau tathā sthiteḥ / | These two, bondage and liberation, must have the same substrate, because of their nature [being such]. |
laukikāviva tau tena sarvaṃ cārutaraṃ sthitam // | Like worldly [bondage and liberation], these two [must be related], and thus everything is beautifully established. |
prayogaḥ yau bandhamokṣau tāvekādhikaraṇau, yathā laukikau bandhamokṣau, bandhamokṣau ca vivādāspadībhūtāvetāvanuśayatadvisaṃyogalakṣaṇau bandhamokṣāviti svabhāvahetuḥ / | The logical application [is as follows]: The bondage and liberation [in question] must have one substrate, just like worldly bondage and liberation, and these disputed bondage and liberation are characterized by attachment and its dissolution - this is an argument based on essential nature. |
tathā sthiter iti / | [The phrase] "because of their nature" [means]: |
bandhamokṣātmanā sthiteḥ, bandhamokṣarūpatvād ity arthaḥ / | because they exist in the form of bondage and liberation, [that is], because they have the nature of bondage and liberation. |
tāviti bandhamokṣau / | [The word] "tau" [means] these two: bondage and liberation. |
ataścaikasyādhikaraṇasyātmanaḥ siddheḥ sarvakarmaphalasambandhādi cārutaraṃ sthitam śobhanataramavasthitam ity arthaḥ / | Therefore, with the establishment of a single substrate in the form of the Self, everything concerning the relation between actions and their fruits, etc., is beautifully established - meaning, is most elegantly proved. |
yathoktadoṣābhāvāt // | Since there is no [validity] in the aforementioned criticisms. |
etenaiva prakāreṇa smṛtyādīnām asambhavaḥ / ekādhikaraṇābhāvāt kṣaṇakṣayiṣu vastuṣu // | In this very same manner, memory and similar [phenomena] would be impossible, due to the absence of a single substratum in momentarily perishing things. |
ekasya karturabhāvāt / pūrvoktānāṃ smṛtiniścayasvayaṃnihitapratyanumārgaṇādīnām asambhavo boddhavyaḥ / | Due to the absence of a single agent, it should be understood [that there would be] an impossibility of the aforementioned [phenomena] such as memory, certain knowledge, searching for what one has hidden oneself, and so forth. |
tatrāpi bhinnādhikaraṇatve dṛṣṭādivorodhaprasaṅgāt / | Moreover, in that case, due to the difference in substrata, there would follow contradictions with [direct] perception and other [means of valid cognition]. |
nahi caitre 'nubhavitari sandihāne nidhātari vāñchāvati ca sati maitrasya smṛtiniścayānumārgaṇakutūhalaviratyādayaḥ sambhavanti // | For when Caitra is the experiencer, doubter, concealer and desirer, Maitra's memory, certainty, searching, curiosity, detachment and such [states] cannot occur. |
atrābhidhīyata ityādinā pratividhatte atrābhidhīyate sarvakāryakāraṇatāsthitau / satyāmavyāhatā ete sidhyantyevaṃ nirātmasu // | [The Buddhist] responds to this as follows: "These [phenomena] are established without contradiction even in soulless [entities], when the relationship of cause and effect is present." |
satyapi hi bhāvānāṃ nairātmye kāryakāraṇatāprabhāviteyaṃ karmaphalasambandhādivyavasthā sati ca kāryakāraṇabhāve sarvamaviruddham eveti na kiñcit kṣīyate // | For even when entities are without a soul, this system of action-result relationship and so forth is determined by causality, and when the causal relationship exists, everything is indeed uncontradicted, so nothing is lost. |
syād etat sa eva kāryakāraṇabhāvapratiniyamo nāntareṇātmānam upapadyata ity āha yathā hītyādi / | [Someone] might object: "This very fixed relationship of cause and effect is not possible without a soul." [The Buddhist] responds with "just as" and so forth. |
yathaiva hi bījāder aṅkurādiṣu niyatā śaktir antareṇāpyātmānam adhiṣṭhātāraṃ tathādhyātmike 'pi vastuni bhaviṣyati / | For just as seeds and such things have a fixed potency regarding sprouts and such things even without a soul as controller, so too will it be with internal phenomena. |
na hi bījādiḥ śarīravad upabhogāyatanatvenātmanādhiṣṭhitaḥ / | For seeds and such things are not controlled by a soul as receptacles of experience, as the body [supposedly] is. |
anyathā hi nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīramaprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgādityetannopapadyate / | Otherwise, [if it were so,] the [Naiyāyika's] argument that "this living body cannot be without a soul, for [if it were] it would lead to the absence of breathing and other [vital functions]" would not be tenable. |
ghaṭādau kilātmanivṛttau prāṇādi nivartamānaṃ dṛṣṭam iti vyatirekitā hetoḥ siddhyet / | For in [the case of] jars and such [things], if breathing etc. were observed to cease when the soul is absent, only then would the negative concomitance of the reason be established. |
yadi tu ghaṭāder api sātmakatvaṃ bhavet tat katham ayaṃ hetur vyatirekī bhavet / | But if jars etc. also possessed a soul, how could this reason have negative concomitance? |
anvayinaḥ kasyacit svabhāvasya viyoge 'pītyarthaḥ // | [This means] even in the absence of some inherent nature that persists [throughout]. |
pāramparyeṇa sākṣād vā kvacit kiñciddhi śaktimat / | Either mediately or immediately, only something specific has potency in specific cases. |
tataḥ karmaphalādīnāṃ sabandha upapadyate // | From this, the connection between actions and their results [and similar relationships] becomes established. |
tathaiva hi bāhye niyatā hetuphalavyavasthā tathaivādhyātmike saṃskārarāśāviyam, kāraṇaśaktiniyamāt / | Just as in external [things] the relationship between cause and effect is fixed, so too is it in the internal collection of dispositions, due to the restriction of causal potency. |
kutaścidevahi śubhāśubhakarmaṇaḥ kṣaṇaparamaparayā niyata phalam iṣṭamaniṣṭaṃ vāvirbhavati, rūpādyanubhavāt smaraṇam, vimarśānnirṇayaḥ, sthānād anveṣaṇam, abhivāñchato 'rthadarśanam, tataḥ kutūhalaviratiriti sarvam aviruddham / | For only from certain good and bad actions do fixed results—desired or undesired—arise through a series of moments: from the experience of form [comes] memory, from reflection [comes] determination, from placement [comes] searching, from desire [comes] perception of the object, and from that [comes] cessation of curiosity—all this is consistent. |
na hi kvacid ekapadārthānvayitvena smaraṇādayo bauddhasya prasiddhāḥ / | For Buddhists never accept memory and other [such functions] as being connected with any single persistent entity. |
kiṃ tarhiidaṃ pratyayamātram / | Rather, this is merely conceptual. |
asti karmāstiphalaṃ kārakastu nopalabhyate, ya imān skandhānnikṣipati, anyāṃś ca skandhānupādatte, anyatra dharmasaṅketāt / | "The action exists, the result exists, but no agent is perceived who discards these aggregates and takes up other aggregates—[there is] nothing apart from the convention of dharmas." |
tatrāyaṃ dharmasaṅketaḥ, yadutāsmin satīdaṃ bhavati, asyotpādādidam utpadyata iti / | This is the Law of Dependent Origination: [namely] when this exists, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises. |
karmaphalādīnām ityādiśabdena smṛtyādiparigrahaḥ / | By the word "ādi" [in "karmaphalādi"], memory and other [phenomena] are included. |
sambandhas tu janyajanakabhāvaḥ // | The relation, however, is that of produced and producer. |
yadyevaṃ kathaṃ tarhi loke śāstre ca tat tatpudgalamadhikṛtyocyate, anenaiva kṛtaṃ karma ko 'nyaḥ pratyanubhaviṣyatītyāha kartṛtvādītyādi / | [Question:] "If this is so, then why is it said in common parlance and in scripture with reference to the person: 'When an action has been done by this [person], who else will experience [its results]?'" [Answer begins with] "kartṛtvādi" [in the next verse]. |
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