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kartṛtvādivyavasthā tu santānaikyavivakṣayā / kalpanāropitaiveṣṭā nāṅgaṃ sā tattvasaṃsthiteḥ // | The notion of agency and such is [stated] with reference to the unity of the continuum; it is accepted as merely conceptually imposed [and] is not a component of the real state of things. |
pracuratarājñānatimirasaṅghātopahatajñānāloko loka ātmani tattvānyatvāsattvādivicāramavadhūya viśiṣṭahetuphalabhāvaniyatarūpāṇāṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ prabandhamekatvenādhyavasāya sa evāhaṃ karomīti vyavaharati, muktaye ca pravartate / | People, whose light of knowledge is obscured by a dense mass of ignorance, disregarding investigation into [their] self's identity, difference, existence and so forth, determine the sequence of conditioned factors, which have forms fixed by specific causes and effects, as being one [entity], speak [thus]: "I myself am doing [this]," and proceed towards liberation. |
tadabhimānānurodhena ca bhagavantas tathāgatāḥ samucchedadṛṣṭiprapātato vineyajanarirakṣayiṣayā santānaikatāṃ darśayantaḥ kartṛtvādi vyavasthāpayanti / | And in accordance with this self-conception, the Blessed Tathāgatas, showing the unity of the continuum in order to protect disciples from falling into the view of annihilation, establish [the notions of] agency and such. |
tathāvidhāyā eva vyavasthāto vastusiddhir iti cedāha nāṅgaṃ setyādi / | If [someone] says "The reality [of the self] is established from just such an explanation," [the author] states "it is not a component" and so forth. |
na hi tattvaparīkṣāparāṅmukhamatīnāṃ saṃvṛtipatitānāṃ bālajanānām abhiniveśavaśena śakyaṃ tattvaṃ vyavasthāpayitum, tadabhiniveśasya nairātmyakṣaṇabhaṅgavihitapramāṇabādhitatvāt // | Indeed, reality cannot be established through the insistence of childish people who are fallen into conventional [truth] and whose minds turn away from investigation of reality, because their insistence is refuted by the valid cognition established by selflessness and momentariness. |
anvayāsambhave saiva kāryakāraṇatā bhavet / viśiṣṭā yujyate yadvat santānāntarabhāvibhiḥ // | In the absence of continuity, that very causality would be specific, just as [it is] with things existing in different continuums. |
nanu bījāṅkurādīnāṃ kāryakāraṇatekṣyate / niyatā tatra sūkṣme 'ti nāṃśo 'styanugamātmakaḥ // | In the case of the seed, sprout and such things, while the relation of cause and effect is observed to be definitely fixed, there is not the slightest trace of [any] continuity. |
anvayo 'nugamaḥ kasyacit svabhāvasyeti śeṣaḥ // | The term "anvaya" means "anugama" [which refers to] the continuity of some particular nature. |
syād etat bījādiṣvapyanvayo 'styeva / | [One] might say this: "There certainly is continuity in seeds and such things." |
yathoktam udyotakāreṇa tatrāpi ye bījāvayavās te pūrvavyūhapartiyāgenavyūhāntaramāpadyante, vyūhāntarāpattau ca pṛthivīdhāturapdhātunā saṃgṛhītamāntareṇa tejasā pacyamāno rasadravyaṃ nirvartayati / | As declared by Uddyotakara: "In that case too, those components of the seed, abandoning their previous arrangement, assume a different arrangement, and when [they] assume this different arrangement, the earth-element, being combined with the water-element and being heated by the internal fire-element, produces a liquid substance in the form of sap." |
sa rasaḥ pūrvāvayavasahito 'ṅkurādibhāvamāpadyata iti / | "That sap, together with the previous components, assumes the form of the sprout and such things." |
tat kathaṃ tatra sūkṣmo 'pi nāṃśostītyucyata ity āha kṣityādīnām ityādi / | [If this is so], how can it be said that "there is not even the slightest trace [of continuity] there"? [To this] he states "[the verses about] earth and other [elements], etc." |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi pṛthivyādaya uttarasmin sanniveśe vartamānā aparityaktaprāktanasvabhāvā eva vartante, tadā na teṣāṃ pūrvavyūhatyāgo vyūhāntarāpattiścopapadyate tādātmyāt / | This means: If earth and other [elements], while existing in the later arrangement, continue to exist without abandoning their previous nature, then their abandonment of the previous arrangement and assumption of a different arrangement would not be possible, due to [their] identity [remaining the same]. |
tataś ca bījāṅkurādīnāṃ parasparaṃ bhedo na prāpnoti / | And consequently, there would be no mutual difference between the seed, sprout and such things. |
atha bhedo 'ṅgīkriyate 'ṅkurādīnāṃ tadā niyamena prāktanasvabhāvaparityāge sati kṣityādīnāṃ pūrvavyūhatyāgo vyūhāntarāpattiścāṅgīkartavyā / | If [you] accept [that there is] difference among sprouts and such things, then necessarily, since there is abandonment of the previous nature, [you] must accept that earth and other [elements] abandon their previous arrangement and assume a different arrangement. |
anyathā bheda eva na syād ityuktam / | Otherwise, as [already] stated, there would be no difference at all. |
tataścāparāparasvabhāvānām utpatteḥ kuto 'nvetṛtvam / | Since [there is] an arising of successive different natures, how could there be any continuity? |
yataścaivaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāve sādhite sarvaṃ karmaphalasambandhādi ghaṭate, dūṣite ca vighaṭate, tasmāt karmaphalādīnāṃ bhāvasiddhaye kāryakāraṇatāsiddhau yatno vidhātavyaḥ / | Since when the causal relation is thus proven, everything like the connection between action and its result becomes established, and when [it is] disproven [these] become dispelled, therefore effort should be made to prove the causal relation for establishing the existence of actions and their results. |
paraiḥ uttamadarśanānusāritayotkṛṣṭair boddhair iti yāvat / | [This means] by others who are superior due to following the highest doctrine, i.e., by the Buddhists. |
kāryakāraṇatāsiddhāv ityetaddvirāvartanīyam / ekatrākārapraśleṣaḥ kāryaḥ // | The term "kāryakāraṇatāsiddhau" should be read twice, [with] the joining of "a-" [to "siddhau"] in one case. |
atrocyate dvitīye hi kṣaṇe kāryaṃ prajāyate / | Here it is said: The effect arises in the second moment; |
prathame kāraṇaṃ jātam avinaṣṭaṃ tadā ca tat // | the cause has arisen in the first moment and at that time it is not [yet] destroyed. |
kṣaṇikatvāt tu tat kāryaṃ kṣaṇakāle na vartate / | But due to [its] momentariness, that [cause] does not exist at the moment of the effect; |
vṛttau vā viphalaṃ kāryaṃ nirvṛttaṃ tadyatas tadā // | or if it did exist [then], it would be purposeless, since the effect would already have come into existence then. |
avinaṣṭādeva kāraṇāt kāryaṃ bhavatīti naḥ pakṣaḥ, na caivaṃ yaugapadyaprasaṅgaḥ / | Our position is that the effect arises from the cause while it is still not destroyed, and thus there is no undesired consequence of simultaneity. |
tathā hi prathamakṣaṇabhāvikāraṇatāsāditātmalābhamavinaṣṭam eva pratītya dvitīye kṣaṇe kāryaṃ prajāyate / | For indeed, the effect arises in the second moment depending on [the cause] which has attained its own nature through causality that exists in the first moment and is still not destroyed. |
tac ca tathā jāyamānam avinaṣṭād eva jāyate | When the effect [kārya] comes into existence, it arises from what is still undestructed [i.e., the cause]; |
prathame kṣaṇe tasyāvinaṣṭatvāt | because it [the cause] has not been destroyed in the first moment. |
kāryasattākālaṃ ca na kāraṇamanuvartate / kṣaṇikatayānavasthānāt | And the cause does not continue [to exist] at the time of the effect's existence, because due to [its] momentariness it cannot persist. |
satyām api cānuvṛttau na tadānīṃ tasya kāraṇatvam niṣpanne kārye tasyākiñcitkaratvāt | Even if [the cause] were to continue [to exist], it would not have causality at that time, because when the effect is produced, it [the cause] would serve no purpose. |
tadevākiñcitkaratvaṃ darśayati nacetyādi | [The text] shows this very purposelessness [by saying] "na ca" etc. |
na ca jātaṃ purastena śakyaṃ janayituṃ punaḥ | And what has [already] come into existence cannot be produced by it again; |
abhūtabhāvarūpatvāj janmato nānyathā sthitiḥ | because production [means] the nature of bringing about what did not exist [before], [and] there is no other possibility. |
nānyathā sthitir iti / anyathā, sthitiḥ niyamo na bhaved iti yāvat | "There is no other possibility" means: otherwise there would be no fixed rule. |
anavasthā bhaved iti yāvat | That is to say, there would be an infinite regress. |
yadi hi jātam api janyeta, tadā punar apyaviśeṣāt tasya jananaprasaṅgaḥ | For if what has [already] been produced were to be produced [again], then due to there being no distinction, there would follow the possibility of producing it yet again. |
tataś cānvasthā janmanāṃ syāt / kāraṇānāṃ ca vyāpārānuparatiḥ kāraṇasyāpi anyatvaprasaṅgo viśeṣābhāvāt / | And thus there would be an infinite regress of births, and [there would be] no cessation in the activity of causes, and the causes themselves would be liable to [further] causation, due to [there being] no distinguishing characteristic. |
tataścedaṃ kāraṇam idaṃ kāryam iti vyavasthā na syāt // | And [consequently] there could not be the determination that "this is the cause" and "this is the effect." |
tasmād anaṣṭāt taddhetoḥ prathamakṣaṇabhāvinaḥ / kāryamutpadyate śaktād dvitīyakṣaṇa eva tu // | Therefore, the effect arises in precisely the second moment from that efficient cause which arose in the first moment [and] which has not [yet] been destroyed. |
vinaṣṭāt tu bhavet kāryaṃ tṛtīyādikṣaṇe yadi / | If the effect were to arise in the third moment or later, [then] it would [arise] from a destroyed [cause]. |
vipākahetoḥ pradhvastād yathā kāryaṃ ca vakṣyate // | Just as the effect [arises] from a destroyed ripening cause, as will be explained [later]. |
yaugapadyaprasaṅgo 'pi prathame yadi tadbhavet / sahabhūhetuvat tac ca na yuktyā yujyate punaḥ // | And if it [the effect] were to arise in the first [moment], there would be simultaneity, and that again is not logically tenable, being like [the theory of] simultaneous causation. |
vinaṣṭavikalpastvanabhyupagamād evāyuktaḥ / | The alternative of [arising from] what is destroyed is improper precisely because it is not accepted [by us]. |
tathā hi yadi tṛtīyādiṣu kṣaṇeṣu kāryaṃ bhavatītyabhyupetaṃ bhavet, yathā vaibhāṣikair aṅgīkṛtam eko 'tītaḥ prayacchatīti / | For if it were accepted that the effect arises in the third and subsequent moments, as accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas in [their statement] that "the past [cause] alone gives [the effect]"... |
tadā vinaṣṭāt kāraṇāt kāryotpādo 'ṅgīkṛtaḥ syāt / | Then it would amount to accepting that the effect arises from a destroyed cause. |
na cāyaṃ pakṣo 'smākam / | And this position is not ours. |
ayuktyupetatvāt | Because [it] is devoid of reason. |
yaugapadyaprasaṅgo 'pi kadācid bhavet, yadi prathama eva kṣaṇe kāryam iṣyate | The anomaly of simultaneity might arise if the effect were assumed [to appear] at the very first moment. |
yathā taireva vaibhāṣikaiḥ sahabhūr hetur iṣyate | Just as those same Vaibhāṣikas maintain [the concept of] a co-existent cause. |
taccaitadayuktam | This [position] is unreasonable. |
kasmād ity āha asata ityādi | [The text] states why [it is unreasonable] beginning with "asataḥ." |
asataḥ prāgasāmarthyāt sāmarthye kāryasambhavāt / kāryakāraṇayoḥ spaṣṭaṃ yaugapadyaṃ virudhyate | Because what is non-existent has no prior potency, [and] if there were potency the effect would [already] exist, simultaneity between cause and effect is clearly contradictory. |
sahabhūtaṃ hi kāryaṃ janayan heturanutpanno vā janayedutpanno vā | For a cause producing a co-existent effect would produce [it] either while [itself] unproduced or while [itself] produced. |
na tāvad anutpannaḥ tasya kāryotpatteḥ prāgasattvāt / asataścāśeṣasāmarthyaśūnyatvāt | [It cannot be] while unproduced, because it does not exist prior to the production of the effect, and because what is non-existent is devoid of all potency. |
yadā tarhyutpannas tadā samarthatvāj janayiṣyatīti cedāha sāmarthye kāryasambhavād iti | If one says "when [the cause] is produced, then being capable it will produce [the effect]," [the text] states "if there were potency, the effect would exist." |
yadā hi tasyotpannāvasthāyāṃ sāmarthyaṃ tadā kāryam iti tatsvabhāvavadevotpannam iti kvāsya sāmarthyam upayogamaśnuvīta | For when it has potency in its produced state, then the effect would [already] exist along with its nature, so where would its potency find application? |
tasmād anumānapramāṇaviruddhaḥ kāryakāraṇayaugapadyābhyupagamaḥ | Therefore the acceptance of simultaneity of cause and effect contradicts the valid means of inference. |
nanu kāryakāraṇabhāvo hi karmakartṛbhāvaḥ sa ca bhinnakālo viruddhyate | [Objection:] "But the relation of cause and effect is [like] the relation of action and agent, and that [relation] would be contradicted if [they occurred at] different times." |
na hi ghaṭakulālayor ayaugapadye sati karmakartṛbhāvo dṛṣṭa ity āha nahītyādi | For the relation of action and agent is not observed when there is non-simultaneity between pot and potter, thus [the text] states "na hi" etc. |
na hi tat kāryamātmīyaṃ saṃdaṃśeneva kāraṇam | For that effect [does] not [grasp] its cause as if with tongs. |
gṛhītvā janayatyetad yaugapadyaṃ yato bhavet // nāpi gāḍhaṃ samāliṅgya prakṛtiṃ jāyate phalam / | If [the effect] were to grasp [the cause] and produce [itself], simultaneity would result. Nor does the effect come into being by firmly embracing prakṛti [i.e. the cause]. |
kāmīva dayitā yena sakṛdbhāvas tayor bhavet // | Through which there would be a simultaneous existence of the two, like [between] a lover and [his] beloved. |
yadi hi saṃdaṃśagrahaṇanyāyena kāraṇaṃ kāryotpattau vyāpriyeta, kāryaṃ vā vanitopagūhanavatsvakāraṇa'śleṣāt svajanmani vyāpāraṃ pratipadyeta, tadā saha bhāvitā niyamena syāt / | If the cause were to operate in the production of the effect in the manner of grasping tongs, or if the effect were to undertake its own production through embracing its own cause like [embracing] a woman, then there would necessarily be co-existence. |
yāvatā nirvyāpāramevedaṃ viśvaṃ na hi paramārthataḥ kaścit kartā karma vāstyanyatra dharmasaṅketād iti samudāyārthaḥ / | However, this entire universe is completely devoid of activity; in reality there is no agent or object whatsoever apart from conventional designation - such is the meaning of the whole [passage]. |
prakṛtim iti / kāraṇam // | 'Prakṛti' means cause. |
yadyevaṃ yadi nirvyāpāram eva kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ vā / tat kathaṃ bhavanti vaktāro dhūmamagnir janayati dhūmo 'gnimāśrityotpadyata ity āha niyamād ityādi / | "If this is so, if both effect and cause are completely inactive, then why do speakers say 'fire produces smoke' [and] 'smoke arises in dependence on fire'?" [In response to this] he states "due to restriction" and so forth. |
niyamād ātmahetūtthāt prathamakṣaṇabhāvinaḥ / yadyato 'nantaraṃ jātaṃ dvitīyakṣaṇasannidhiḥ // | Due to the restriction arising from its own cause existing in the first moment, that which arises immediately afterwards comes into contact with the second moment. |
tat tajjanayatītyāhur avyāpāre 'pi vastuni / | They say "that produces that" even though the thing is inactive. |
vivakṣāmātrasambhūtasaṅketānuvidhāyinaḥ // | [They are] following conventions that arise merely from desire to express. |
svahetupratyayasamutthāpitāt kāraṇasya śaktipratiniyamāddhetor yat kāryaṃ yataḥ kṣaṇaprathamabhāvinaḥ kāraṇāj jātaṃ kiñcidviśiṣṭam, dvitīye kṣaṇe sannidhiḥ sadbhāvo yasyeti vigrahaḥ, tat kāraṇaṃ tat kāryaṃ janayatītyucyate / | Due to the restriction of potency of the cause that is produced from its own causal conditions, whatever particular effect arises from the cause existing in the first moment - which [effect] has its presence in the second moment - that cause is said to produce that effect. |
tadasmin samaye tadāśrityotpadyata ityapi vijñeyam / | It should be understood [that this means] also that [the Effect] comes into existence by depending on that [Cause] at that time. |
ke punas ta evam āhuḥ ityādi / | "Who, then, are those who speak thus?" and so forth. |
bahirarthanirapekṣavivakṣābhāvisaṅketānurūpavyavahārakāriṇo vyavahartāra evam āhur ity arthaḥ // | The meaning is that those who engage in verbal practices in accordance with conventions based on mere speaker intention, without regard for external objects, speak thus. |
nanu ya utpadya vyāpāraṃ nāviśet viśeṣotpādārthaṃ sa kathaṃ hetuḥ syād ity āha janmātiriktetyādi / | [One might ask:] "Indeed, how could something that, after coming into existence, does not enter into activity for the purpose of producing a specific [effect] be a cause?" – To this [the author] says "janmātirikte" and so forth. |
janmātiriktakālena vyāpāreṇātra kiṃ phalam / sattaiva vyāpṛtis tasyāṃ satyāṃ kāryodayo yataḥ // | What purpose is there in [postulating] an operation at a time different from [the cause's] coming into existence? [The cause's] mere existence is [its] operation, because when that exists, the effect arises. |
kāraṇasattāsamanantaram eva kāryasya niṣpannatvād akiñcitkara eva kāryasya janmottarakālabhāvī vyāpāraḥ kārye / | Since the effect is produced immediately after the existence of the cause, any operation on the effect occurring after [the cause's] coming into existence would be completely ineffective. |
tathā hi vyāpāro nāma kāraṇasya ka ucyate / yadanantaram eva kāryam udayam āsādayati kāraṇasattānantaram eva ca kāryam udbhavati iti sattaiva vyāpāraśabdavācyāstu kiṃ janmātirekiṇā vyāpāreṇa kalpitena // | For what indeed is called an "operation" of the cause? [It is that] immediately after which the effect attains arising. And since the effect arises immediately after the existence of the cause, let existence itself be what is denoted by the word "operation" – what [need is there] for a postulated operation different from [the cause's] coming into existence? |
ya ānantaryaniyamaḥ saivāpekṣā abhidhīyate / | That which is the fixed relation of immediate succession – that alone is called "dependence." |
kāryodaye sadā bhāvo vyāpāraḥ kāraṇasya ca // | And in the arising of the effect, the operation of the cause is always [just] its existence. |
idam eva hi kāryasya kāraṇe 'pekṣā yat tadanantarabhāvitvam kāraṇasyāpi kārye 'yam eva vyāpāro yat kāryodayakāle sadā sannihitatvam // | For this alone is the effect's dependence on the cause – namely its occurring immediately after that [cause]; and this alone is the cause's operation with respect to the effect – namely its being invariably present at the time of the effect's arising. |
api ca vyāpārasya vyāpāravato vā bhāvasya kāryaṃ prati hetubhāvas tadbhāvabhāvitvād eva bhavatā grahītavyaḥ, na hy anvayavyatirekābhyām anyaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvādhigame 'bhyupāyo 'sti, tataś caivam sati vastumātrasyāpi kim iti kāraṇabhāvo na gṛhyate, na hi kāryasya vastumātragatānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvaṃ na prasiddham, atas tad eva vastumātraṃ varaṃ kāraṇam astu yadgatānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvaṃ kāryasya siddham ity etad darśayati tadbhāvetyādi / | Moreover, you must accept that the causal nature of either an operation or of a thing possessing an operation with respect to an effect exists solely because [the effect] occurs when that exists. For there is no other means of ascertaining the cause-effect relationship besides positive and negative correlation. And this being so, why is the causal nature not grasped for the mere thing itself? For it is not [the case] that the effect's conformity to positive and negative correlation with respect to the mere thing is not well-established. Therefore, let that mere thing itself be the cause, with respect to which the effect's conformity to positive and negative correlation is established – this is what [the author] shows by "tadbhāve" and so forth. |
tadbhāvabhāvitāmātrād vyāpāropyavakalpitaḥ / hetutvam eti tadvān vā tadevāstu tato varam // | Either the mere presence of the thing [itself] or that which possesses it may be conceived as having causality - let it rather be that [thing] itself. |
avakalpita iti / | [It is] conceived thus. |
bhāve sati hi dṛśyante bījādevāṅkurodayāḥ / | For when the [mere] existence [of the seed] is present, the sprouts are seen to arise from the seed itself. |
na tu vyāpārasadbhāve bhavatkiñcit samīkṣyate // | But nothing whatsoever is observed to arise from the presence of an operation. |
bhāve bhāvamātre, bījādau vyāpārāntarasamāveśaśūnye satītyarthaḥ / | By "existence" [is meant] mere existence, that is, when the thing like a seed exists devoid of any other operation. |
etena bhāvamātragatānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvam eva kāryāṇāṃ siddhaṃ na tu vyāpāragatānvayādyanuvidhāyitvam iti darśitaṃ bhavati // | By this it is shown that effects follow only the positive and negative concomitance with the mere thing itself, not the concomitance with operations. |
syād etadyadyapi vyāpāragatānvayādyanuvidhānaṃ kāryasya na siddham, tathāpi tasya kāraṇabhāvo bhaviṣyatītyāha adṛṣṭaśakter ityādi / adṛṣṭaśakter hetutve kalpyamāne 'pi neṣyate / kimanyasyāpi hetutvaṃ viśeṣo vāsya kastataḥ // | [The opponent] says this: "Even though the concomitance of the effect with operations is not established, still their causal nature might exist." [The answer is:] If causality is assumed for [something with] unperceived power, why not assume causality for something else too? Or what distinguishing feature does it [the operation] have? |
evaṃ hi vyāpāramapi hetuṃ prakalpyāparo 'pi kalpanīyaḥ syāt / | For if one assumes an operation to be a cause, one would have to assume yet another [cause]. |
adṛṣṭaśaktitvena viśeṣābhāvāt, tataścānavasthā syāt / athānyo na kalpate nibandhanābhāvāt tadā vyāpārasyāpi kalpanā mābhūt tatrāpi nibandhanābhāvasya tulyatvāt / | Due to there being no distinction in terms of having unperceived power, an infinite regress would result. If another [cause] is not assumed due to lack of basis, then let there also not be assumption of operation, since the lack of basis applies equally there too. |
kiñca yo 'pyasau vyāpāraḥ kāryaṃ janayati sa kiṃ vyāpārāntarasamāveśādāhosvit sattāmātreṇa, yadi vyāpārāntarasamāveśāt tadā vyāpārāntarasyaivakāraṇatvaṃ syān na vyāpārasya, tasyāpi vyāpārāntarasya kāraṇatve tulyaḥ paryanuyogaḥ / | Moreover, does this operation that produces the effect do so through involvement of another operation or through mere existence? If through another operation, then causality would belong to that other operation, not to [the first] operation, and for that other operation too the same question would apply. |
tasyāpi hi yadi vyāpārāntarasamāveśāt kāraṇabhāvaḥ kalpyeta tadānavasthā syāt | If for that [operation] too the causal nature were to be assumed due to the inclusion of another operation, then there would be an infinite regress. |
atha sattāmātreṇeti pakṣas tadā padārtho 'pi vyāpāravat sattāmātreṇaiva kāryaṃ janayiṣyatīti vyarthā vyāpārakalpaneti darśayati | If the position is that [it produces effects] through mere existence, then the substance too, like the operation, would produce the effect through mere existence, and thus the assumption of an operation would be pointless. |
anyena ca vinā hetur yathā vyāpāra iṣyate / kāryasya vā bhavet tadvat kimanye 'pi na hetavaḥ | Just as the operation is accepted as a cause of the effect without [requiring] another [operation], why cannot other things too likewise be causes? |
yathaiva hi vyāpāro 'nyena vyāpārāntareṇa vināpi kārye 'ṅkurādike hetur iṣyate, tadvad anye 'pi bhāvā vilakṣaṇavyāpāraśūnyā eva hetavaḥ kiṃ neṣyante | Just as the operation is accepted as a cause of effects like sprouts without [requiring] another operation, why cannot other entities too, even without any distinctive operation, be accepted as causes? |
kiṃ tarhi bhāvam eva vyāpāravantamityāha | What then? [The opponent] states that [one should accept] only an entity possessing an operation. |
heturiṣyata iti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ | [The phrase] "is accepted as a cause" is connected with the current [discussion]. |
tavāpi hi vyāpāravati heturasau bhavanvyāpārāntarasamāveśarahita eva bhavatīti sa eva dṛṣṭānto bhaviṣyati | For you too, when something becomes a cause while possessing an operation, it does so without including another operation, so this very [fact] will serve as an example. |
nacāpi sattāvyatirekeṇa vyāpāraḥ padārthasyāsti / upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher | And moreover, there is no operation of a thing apart from [its] existence, because something that has obtained the characteristics of being perceptible [would be perceived but] is not perceived. |
dṛśyatvābhimataṃ naivaṃ vayaṃ copalabhāmahe / tat kathaṃ tasya sambandham aṅgīkurmo nibandhanam | Though it is considered to be perceptible, we do not perceive it thus; how then can we accept its connection as the basis [of causality]? |
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