sanskrit
stringlengths 2
508
| english
stringlengths 2
924
⌀ |
|---|---|
dṛśyatvena hi bhavatāṃ vyāpāro 'bhimataḥ, yathoktaṃ kumārilena ---"prākkāryaniṣpatter vyāpāro yasya dṛśyate" ityādi / | 'Operation' has been held by you to be something perceptible, as asserted by Kumārila: "When the operation of something is perceived before the production of the effect." |
api ca sa vyāpārātmā padārthastasmād vyāpāravato bhāvād arthāntarabhūto vā syād anarthāntarabhūto vā, vastusataḥ prakārāntarābhāvāt, ubhayānubhayavikalpasyāsambhava eva / | Furthermore, that entity which is of the nature of operation must either be different from the thing possessing the operation or non-different from it, since [for real entities] no other alternative exists, and the possibilities of [it being] both [different and non-different] or neither are impossible. |
saca yadyarthāntarabhūtas tadā padārthasya kāraṇatvaṃ na prāpnoti / tadvyatirekiṇo vyāpārasyaiva kāraṇabhāvāt / | If it is something different, then the thing itself cannot be the cause, as the causal character would belong [only] to the operation which is different from it. |
vyāpāreṇa sambandhāt tasyāpi kāraṇabhāvo 'stīti cet na / | If [you say] "due to its connection with the operation, it [the thing] also has causal character" - [we say] no. |
parasparānupakāriṇoḥ sambandhāsiddheḥ / | Because there can be no connection between things that do not help each other. |
athopakriyata eva vyapāraḥ padārtheneti syāt / | If [you say] "but the operation is indeed helped by the thing" - |
tadapyayuktam / | That too is incorrect. |
na hi tasyāparo vyāpāro 'sti yena vyāpāram upakuryād anyathā hyanavasthāyāṃ vyāpārāṇām eva parasparaṃ ghaṭanāt padārthena saha vyāpārasya na kadāpi sambandhaḥ siddhyet / | For it [the thing] has no other operation by which it could help the [first] operation; otherwise, there would be an infinite regress [of operations], where operations would only connect with each other, and there would never be any established connection between the operation and the thing. |
atha vyāpārāntaramantareṇaiva padārtho vyāpāramupakarotīti syāt tadā kāryam api vyāpāravadvyāpārarahita eva sattāmātreṇa kiṃ nopakurvīta yena vyāpāro 'rthāntarabhūtaḥ kalpyate / | If [you say] that "the thing helps the operation without any other operation," then why should not the thing, like one possessing an operation, help produce the effect by its mere existence without any operation, for which purpose an operation is postulated as something different? |
tasmānnārthāntarabhūto vyāpāro yuktaḥ / | Therefore, it is not reasonable [to consider] operation as something different [from the thing]. |
athānarthāntarabhūta iti pakṣas tadā siddhaṃ sattaiva vyāpṛtir iti / | If then the alternative is taken that operation is non-different [from the thing], then it is established that existence itself is operation. |
padārthasvabhāvasyaiva sattāśabdavācyatvāt / | Because the term 'sattā' [existence] denotes only the intrinsic nature of a thing. |
tataśca na siddhyati janmātirekitvaṃ vyāpārasya // | Therefore, [the view that] the operation [of a cause] is something distinct from its coming into existence cannot be established. |
api ca yathā buddhir arthapraticchittau jāyamānaiva vyāpārarahitāpi sattāmātreṇa vyāpriyate tathā sarveṣām api bhāvānāṃ hetutvam uttarakālabhāvivyāpāramantareṇa bhaviṣyatītyetad darśayati buddher ityādi / | Moreover, just as cognition, when it arises in the form of apprehension of its object, operates through its mere existence without [any additional] operation, similarly the causal nature of all entities will exist without any subsequent operation – this is what [the author] shows [in the following]. |
buddher yathā ca janmaiva pramāṇatvaṃ nirudhyate / | Just as in the case of cognition, its mere coming into existence is established as [constituting] its nature as a means of valid knowledge, |
tathaiva sarvabhāveṣu taddhetutvaṃ na kiṃ matam // | why should not the causal nature of all entities be considered in the same way? |
na hi buddher janmtātirekī vyāpāro 'sti / | For cognition has no operation distinct from its coming into existence. |
tathā hi ---"satasamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyak"ṣam ityatra sūtre janmagrahaṇasya prayojanaṃ varṇayatā kumārilenoktam | Thus, while explaining the purpose of using the word 'janma' [birth] in the sūtra "Perception is the cognition that arises when there is contact between the sense organs of a person and something existent," Kumārila has stated: |
"buddhijanmeti ca prāha jāyamānapramāṇatām / | "The expression 'birth of cognition' indicates [its] being a means of valid knowledge at the very moment of arising; |
vyāpāraḥ kāraṇānāṃ hi dṛṣṭo janmātirekataḥ // | for in the case of [other] causes, an operation is observed as distinct from their birth; |
pramāṇe 'pi tathā mābhūd iti janma vivakṣyata" / | the word 'birth' is intended [here] so that this [distinction] may not apply in the case of a means of valid knowledge." |
iti / | Thus [ends the quote]. |
taddhetutvam iti / tat kāraṇajanma hetur yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / tadbhāvas tattvam // | "[The term] taddhetutvam [means the following]: those for whom that birth of the cause is the cause are called thus. The state of that is tattva." |
kṣaṇikā hi yathā buddhis tathaivānye 'pi janminaḥ / | Just as cognition is momentary, so too are all other things that come into being. |
sādhitās tadvadevāto nirvyāpāram idaṃ jagat // | [These things] having been proved [to be] just like that, therefore this world is devoid of [real] activity. |
sādhitā iti / | [The term] "having been proved" [is explained as follows]: |
sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyāṃ sakalavastuvyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya sādhitatvāt / | Because in the examination of permanent entities, the momentariness pervading all things has been proved. |
tadvadeveti / buddhivadeva / | [The phrase] "just like that" [means] just like cognition. |
ata iti / kṣaṇikatvāt / | [The word] "therefore" [means] because of [their] momentariness. |
prayogaḥ ye kṣaṇikās te janmātiriktavyāpāraśūnyāḥ, yathā buddhiḥ, kṣaṇikāś ca bījādayaḥ pūrvaṃ prasādhitā iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | The formal argument [is as follows]: Those things which are momentary are devoid of any activity distinct from [their] origination, just like cognition; and seeds etc. have previously been proved to be momentary - thus [this is] a reason based on essential nature. |
paścād avasthityabhāvena nirādhāravyāpārāyogo bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ tasmād ānantaryakamātram eva kāryakāraṇabhāvavyavasthānibandhanaṃ na vyāpāra iti sthitam etat // | Due to the absence of continued existence afterwards, the impossibility of activity without a substrate is the invalidating proof. Therefore it is established that mere immediate succession alone is the basis for the determination of the causal relationship, not [any real] activity. |
prabandhavṛttyā gandhāder iṣṭaivānyonyahetutā / | The mutual causality of odor etc. through continuous occurrence is indeed accepted [by us]. |
tadabādhakamevedaṃ taddhetutvaprasañjanam // | This [argument about] their being causes is indeed not invalidated [by the objection]. |
rūparasādīnāṃ hi parasparaṃ prabandhāpekṣayā sahakārikāraṇabhāvo 'bhīṣṭa eva / | For with regard to color (rūpa), taste (rasa) and other [qualities], their being mutual auxiliary causes in terms of sequential connection is indeed accepted. |
yathoktam "śaktipravṛttyā na vinā rasasyaivānyakāraṇam / | As has been stated: "Without the operation of potency, there is no other cause of taste. |
ityatītaikakālānāṃ gatis tatkāryaliṅgajā" // | This is the explanation of [qualities] existing at one time in the past, [which is] derived from the indications of their effects." |
iti // | Thus [it is stated]. |
nanu cāgneriva gavāśvāder apyanantaraṃ kadācid būmau bhavati tat katham ānantaryaṃ na vyabhicārītyāha anyānantarabhāve 'pītyādi / anyānantarabhāve 'pi kiñcid eva ca kāraṇam / | [The opponent] says: "Just as [smoke appears] immediately after fire, sometimes it appears on the ground immediately after cows, horses, etc. - so why is immediate succession not inconclusive?" [To this we reply:] "Even when there is immediate succession to other [things], only something specific is the cause." |
na hi vayam ānantaryamātraṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvādhigatinibandhanaṃ brūmaḥ kiṃtarhiyanniyatam / | For we do not say that mere immediate succession is the basis for establishing the cause-effect relationship, but rather [we speak of] that which is invariable. |
tathā hi yasyaivānantaraṃ yadbhavati tat tasya kāraṇam iṣyate / | For that immediately after which alone something occurs is considered to be its cause. |
na ca dhūmo gavāder evānantaraṃ bhavati, asatyapi gavādau tasya bhāvāt / | And smoke does not occur immediately after cows etc. alone, since it occurs even when cows etc. are absent. |
kiṃ ca bhavato 'pyatra sthiravādinaścodyametad avatarati, kasmād gavāder anantaraṃ dhūmo bhavannapi tat kāryaṃ na bhavatīti // | Moreover, this objection applies even to you who hold the view that [things are] permanent - why is smoke, even though occurring after cows etc., not their effect? |
atra para āha yo yatretyādi / | Here the opponent speaks [beginning with] "yo yatra" etc. |
yo yatra vyāpṛtaḥ kārye na hetus tasya cenmataḥ / yasminniyatasadbhāvo yaḥ sa hetur itīṣyatām // | "If that which is engaged in producing an effect is not accepted as its cause, then let that be accepted as the 'cause' which has an invariable presence in relation to it." |
yasminnityādinā svapakṣe 'pi parihāram āha // | With [the words] beginning "yasmin" etc., [the author] states the response from his own position. |
evaṃ tāvat kṣaṇikatve 'pi bhāvānāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāva upapāditaḥ / | Thus far it has been established that even given the momentariness of entities, the causal relationship [between them] is possible. |
idānīṃ tadadhigantṛpramāṇopapādanārtham āha bhāvābhāvāvityādi / | Now, for the purpose of establishing the means of cognizing that [causal relationship], [the author] speaks [beginning with] "bhāvābhāvau" etc. |
bhāvābhāvāvimau siddhau pratyakṣānupalambhataḥ / yadi sākāravijñānavijñeyaṃ vastu cenmatam // | These existence and non-existence are established through perception and non-apprehension. If [you] accept that an object is to be known through a cognition possessing form... |
yadānākāradhīvedyaṃ vastu yuṣmābhiriṣyate / | When an object is accepted by you [all] to be known through formless cognition... |
tat kṣaṇatvādipakṣe 'pi samānamupalabhyate // | That [object] is apprehended similarly even in the view of momentariness etc. |
tathā hi padārthasyopalambho bhavan sākāreṇaiva vijñānena bhavedanākāreṇa vā / | For thus the apprehension of an object would occur either through cognition with form or without form. |
tathā hi pūrvakebhya eva svahetubhyas tathā tat jñānam upajāyate yena sa samānakālabhāvirūpādyevāvabudhyate nānyat / | For thus that cognition arises from its own prior causes in such a way that it cognizes only that color etc. which exists at the same time [as the cognition], not anything else. |
tadbodhātmakasyaiva tasyotpannatvāt / | Because that [cognition] arises having the nature of awareness of that [object] alone. |
ataḥ samānakālabhāvirūpādibodhasvabhāve jñāne 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe na kaścid arthasya sthirāsthiratve viśeṣaḥ / | Thus, when [it is] admitted that cognition has the nature of apprehending color and other [qualities] appearing simultaneously, there is no difference regarding the permanent or impermanent nature of the object. |
avaśyaṃ ca bhavatā pūrvahetukṛta eva samānakālabhāvipratiniyatarūpādigrahaṇe jñānasya svabhāvo 'ṅgīkartavyo yena tulye 'pi samānakālabhāvitve rūpādyeva jñānaṃ paricchinatti nendriyam iti syāt / | And you must necessarily admit that cognition has a nature determined by previous causes in apprehending specific colors and other [qualities] appearing simultaneously, by virtue of which, even though simultaneity is equally [present], it is color etc. that delimits cognition, not the sense organ. |
tac ca kṣaṇikatve 'pi bhāvānāṃ tulyam eveti yatkiñcid etat // | And this [holds] equally true even for the momentariness of entities, so this [objection] is completely irrelevant. |
sākāre nanu vijñāne vaicitryaṃ cetaso bhavet / | "If cognition possesses form, then consciousness would have variegated nature. |
nākārānaṅkitatve 'sti pratyāsattinibandhanam // | If [it is] not marked by form, there exists no basis for [its] proximity [to objects]." |
yadi sākāraṃ jñānaṃ tadā citrāstaraṇādiṣu jñānasya citratvaṃ bhavet / | If cognition possesses form, then in [the case of] variegated carpets and such things, cognition would have variegated nature. |
na caikasya citratvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | And variegated nature is not possible for a single [cognition], as [this leads to] an unwanted consequence. |
athānākāraṃ tadā nīlāspadaṃ saṃvedanaṃ na pītasyeti vyavasthānaṃ na siddhyet / | If, on the other hand, [cognition is] formless, then the determination that "this awareness is of blue, not of yellow" would not be established. |
sarvatra bodharūpatayā viśeṣābhāvena pratyāsattinibandhanābhāvāt // | Because everywhere [there would be] the nature of mere awareness, and due to absence of distinction, [there would be] no basis for proximity. |
bhavadbhir apītyādinā pratividhatte / bhavadbhir api vaktavye tadasmin kiñciduttare / | [The author] responds with "by you also" etc.: "You also must give some answer to this, |
yaccātra vaḥ samādhānam asmākam api tadbhavet // | and whatever solution you [have] here would be ours as well." |
samānametad dvayor api codyam, yato bhavatāpi sākārānākārapakṣābhyām avaśyam anyataraḥ pakṣo 'ṅgīkartavyo 'nyathārthagrāhijñānaṃ na siddhyet / | This criticism applies equally to both [parties], since you too must necessarily accept either the view [that cognition is] with form or without form; otherwise object-grasping cognition would not be established. |
na cāpyetat pakṣadvayavyatirekeṇānyaḥ prakāro 'sti / yena jñānamarthaṃ grahīṣyati / | And there is no other way besides these two alternatives by which cognition could grasp [its] object. |
yaccobhayor doṣo na tatraikaścodyo yuktaḥ / | When a fault applies to both [parties], it is not proper for one [party] to raise it as an objection. |
tena yadatrottaraṃ bhavatas tadasmākam api bhaviṣyati / | Therefore, whatever answer you have here will be our answer as well. |
tathā hi sākārapakṣe bhavatāvaśyamākārāṇām alīkatvaṃ sahopalambhaniyamād vaikajñānāvyatirekitvaṃ satyapi bheda ityuttaramupavarṇanīyam / | Thus, in the case of the view [that cognition is] with form, you must explain the answer either that the forms are unreal, or that due to the rule of co-apprehension they are non-different from the single cognition, even though there appears to be a difference. |
tadevāsmākaṃ bhaviṣyati, nirākārapakṣe 'pi pūrvahetukṛta eva pratiniyatārthāvabodhakaḥ svabhāvo jñānasyeti varṇanīyam / | This same [answer] will be ours; and in the case of the formless view also, it must be explained that the nature of cognition which apprehends only particular objects is indeed created by previous causes. |
tadaitadasmākam api nirākāravijñānavādināṃ bauddhānām uttaraṃ bhaviṣyatītyacodyam etat samādhānam iti parihāraḥ // | Therefore this same answer will be [available] for us Buddhists also who maintain [the theory of] formless consciousness; hence this solution [shows that] this is not a valid objection. |
kṛtanāśo bhavedevaṃ kāryaṃ na janayedyadi / heturiṣṭaṃ na caivaṃ yat prabandhe nāsti hetutā // | The destruction of what is done would occur only if the cause did not produce [its] effect; but we do not hold such a view whereby there would be no causality in the continuum. |
akṛtābhyāgamo 'pi syād yadi yena vinā kvacit / jāyeta hetunā kāryaṃ naitanniyataśaktitaḥ // | The accrual of what is not done would also occur if anywhere [an effect] were produced without that which is [its] cause; [but this is not possible] because the effect arises due to the fixed potency [of its cause]. |
yadi hi paramārthataḥ kaścit kartā bhoktā vābhīṣṭaḥ syāt tadā kṣaṇabhaṅgitvāṅgīkaraṇe kṛtanāśādiprasaṅgaḥ syāt yāvatedaṃ pratyayatāmātram evaviśvaṃ na kenacit kartrā kiñcitkṛtaṃ nābhi{pi---}bhyujyate / | If indeed in ultimate reality some doer or experiencer were posited, then [our] acceptance of momentariness would entail the fallacy of destruction of [the results of] actions [and similar issues]; however, this universe is mere ideation [and] nothing is done by any agent nor experienced [by anyone]. |
tat kathaṃ kṛtanāśādiprasaṅgāpādanaṃ syāt / | How then could the fallacy of the destruction of [the results of] actions and so forth be attributed [to our position]? |
atha pūrvakuśalādicetanāhiteṣṭāniṣṭaphalotpādanasāmarthyavipraṇāśāt pūrvakarmānāhitasāmarthyaviśeṣāc ca kāraṇataḥ phalotpatter yathākramaṃ kṛtanāśākṛtābhyāgamadoṣaprasaṅgo vidhīyate / | Now if [you argue that] due to (1) the destruction of the capacity to produce desired and undesired results established by previous wholesome consciousness etc. and (2) the special capacity not established by previous karma, [and] due to the arising of results from [such] causes, the fallacies of destruction of [what is] done and arrival of [what is] not done respectively would follow. |
tadayuktam na hi pūrvakarmāhitasāmarthyānubandhanasya nairātmyena saha kaścid virodhaḥ / | That is incorrect, for there is no contradiction between the continuity of capacity established by previous karma and the doctrine of no-self. |
tathā hi lākṣādirasāvasiktānām iva bījānāṃ santānamanuvartanta eva pūrvakarmāhitāḥ sāmarthyaviśeṣāḥ yata uttarakālaṃ labdhaparipākebhya iṣṭamaniṣṭaṃ vā phalamudeti / | For just as [in the case of] seeds soaked in lac dye and so forth, the special capacities established by previous karma do indeed continue in the series, from which, when matured at a later time, desired or undesired results arise. |
nāpi pūrvakarmānāhitasaṃskārāt santānāt phalotpattiriṣyata iti kutaḥ akṛtābhyāgamo doṣaḥ / | Nor do we accept that results arise from a series with impressions not established by previous karma - so how could there be the fallacy of arrival of [what is] not done? |
uddyotakarastvāha asthiratvāccittasya na karmabhir vāsanaṃ sambhavatīti / | But Uddyotakara says: "Due to the impermanence of mind, impression by actions is not possible." |
tadayuktam na hi sthirasyāparityaktaprāktanasvarūpasya vāsanam asti / | That is incorrect, for there can be no impression on something permanent that has not abandoned its previous form. |
asthirasya tu viśiṣṭasvabhāvāntarotpādanam eva vāsanā / | But for what is impermanent, impression is simply the production of another specific nature. |
yat punaḥ sthiramavyākṛtaṃ vāsyamityuktaṃ śāstre tat prabandhasthiratāmabhipretya / | Moreover, what is stated in scripture about "the permanent [and] undifferentiated being impressed" refers to the permanence of the series. |
yo hyucchedī santānas tasya ciratarakālabhāviphalaprasavakāle sannidhānābhāvān na kāraṇatvam asti tena tasya tathāvidhaphalotpādaṃ prati vāsanādhāratvam ayuktam ityabhi[p.183]prāyaḥ / | For a series that is subject to interruption cannot be a cause due to its absence at the time of production of results occurring after a very long time; therefore it would be incorrect for it to be the substrate of impressions with respect to the production of such results - this is the meaning. |
tasmāt parasiddhāntānabhijñatayā yatkiñcidabhihitamanenetyupekṣām arhati // | Therefore, whatever has been stated by him [Uddyotakara] deserves to be ignored due to [his] ignorance of the doctrines of others. |
kumārilastvāha na vayaṃ kenacit kartrā kṛtasya karmaṇo vipraṇāśāt kṛtanāśākṛtābhyāgamau brūmaḥ nahi bhavatāṃ mate kaścit kartāsti kiṃ tarhi niranvayakarmatat phalayor vināśotpādābhyupagamāt kṛtanāśākṛtābhyāgamau prasajyeta iti / | Kumārila says: "We do not speak of 'the destruction of what is done and the arising of what is not done' as being due to the destruction of an action performed by some agent, for in your view there is no agent at all. Rather, [we say that] 'the destruction of what is done and the arising of what is not done' follows from your acceptance of the absolute destruction of action and the production of its result." |
tadatraivaṃvidhasya kṛtanāśasyākṛtābhyāgamasya ceṣṭatvān nāniṣṭāpādānaṃyuktam iti darśayann āha kṣaṇabhedavikalpeneti / | Showing that since this kind of 'destruction of what is done' and 'arising of what is not done' is [actually] accepted [by us], it is not proper to present it as an undesirable consequence, he [the author] speaks of the "alternatives regarding momentary difference." |
pūrvakasya karmakṣaṇasya niranvayaṃ vināśāt kṛtanāśaḥ phalakṣaṇasya vāpūrvasyaivotpādādakṛtābhyāgama ityevaṃ yatkṣaṇabhedavikalpena kṛtanāśādi codyate tadiṣṭam eva / | "The absolute destruction of the preceding action-moment [leads to] 'the destruction of what is done', and the production of an entirely new result-moment [leads to] 'the arising of what is not done'" - if this is what is objected through the alternatives regarding momentary difference, then this is exactly what we accept. |
na hi svalpīyaso 'pi vastvaṃśasya kasyacid anvayo 'stīti pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ // | For we shall establish that there is no continuity of even the slightest portion of any entity whatsoever. |
ahīnasattvadṛṣṭīnāṃ kṣaṇabhedavikalpanā / santānaikyābhimānena na kathañcit pravartate // | For those whose vision [of truth] is not diminished, the conceptualization of momentary difference does not arise at all due to their notion of the unity of the continuum. |
abhisambuddhatattvās tu pratikṣaṇavināśinām / hetūnāṃ niyamaṃ buddhvā prārabhante śubhāḥ kriyāḥ // | But those who have fully realized the truth, understanding the fixed nature of momentarily perishing causes, undertake wholesome actions. |
ye tāvad aprahīṇasahajetarasatkāyadarśanādayas teṣām ayaṃ kṣaṇabhedavikalponāstyeva / | For those who have not abandoned their innate and other [acquired] views of real entities, this conceptualization of momentary difference does not arise at all. |
tathā hi te santatimekatvenādhyavasāya sukhitā vayaṃ bhaviṣyāma ityāhitaparitoṣāḥ karmasu pravartante / | For they, having determined the continuum to be one [entity] and being satisfied [with the thought] "we shall be happy," engage in actions. |
ye 'pi pṛthagjanakalyāṇā evaṃ yuktyāgamābhyāṃ yathāvatkṣaṇikātmatayor avabodhād abhisambuddhatattvās te 'pyevaṃ pratītyasamutpādadharmatāṃ pratipadyante / | Even those virtuous ordinary people who have fully realized the truth through understanding momentariness and selflessness by means of reasoning and scripture, they too thus comprehend the nature of dependent origination. |
karuṇādipūrvakebhyo dānādibhyaḥ svaparahitodayaśālinaḥ saṃskārāḥ kṣaṇikāevāparāpare paramparayā samutpadyante / | From [actions] like giving preceded by compassion and so forth arise momentary impressions conducive to the welfare of oneself and others, occurring in successive sequence. |
na tu hiṃsādibhya ityatas te hetuphalapratiniyamamavadhārya śubhādikriyāsu pravartante / | But [such impressions do] not [arise] from [actions] like violence; therefore, having ascertained the fixed relationship between causes and effects, they engage in wholesome and other [similar] actions. |
yathoktam yāvaccātmani na premṇo hāniḥ saparitasyati tāvadduḥkhitamāropyana ca svastho 'vatiṣṭhate /mithyādhyāropahānarthaṃ yatno 'satyapi bhoktari"iti / | As has been stated: "As long as there is no loss of attachment to the self, one continues to suffer pain and does not remain at ease; [therefore] effort should be made to remove false superimposition, even though there is no [real] experiencer." |
kāryakāraṇabhāvas tadadhigantṛ ca pramāṇaṃ yathā sidhyati tathā pratipāditam eva // | How the relation of cause and effect and the means of cognizing it are established has already been explained. |
keṣāñcideva cittānāṃ viśiṣṭā kāryakāryitā / | The specific causal efficacy belongs only to certain minds. |
niyatā tena nirbādhāḥ sarvatra smaraṇādayaḥ // | Because of this restriction, remembrance and similar [functions] occur unobstructed everywhere. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.