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indīvarādibhyo guṇo bhinna indīvarasya rūpādaya ityevaṃ tenendīvarādinā tasya rūpāder vyavacchedāt / | The quality is different from the lotus and similar [things], because [qualities] like color are distinguished by [being referred to as] "of the lotus." |
yathā caitrasya turaṅgama iti caitreṇa svāmyantarebhyo vyavacchidyamānasturaṅgamas tato bhidyate tathāparaḥ prayogaḥ / | Just as in [the expression] "Caitra's horse," the horse being distinguished from [horses belonging to] other owners by [reference to] Caitra is different from him - such is another application [of this logic]. |
pratyekaṃ pṛthivyaptejovāyavo dravyāṇi rūparasagandhasparśebhyo bhinnānyekavacanabahuvacanaviṣayatvāt, yathā candro nakṣatrāṇīti / | Each of the substances - earth, water, fire, and air - are different from color, taste, smell and touch because they are the subjects of singular and plural numbers [respectively], just as [in the case of] "the moon" and "the stars." |
yathaiva hi candra ityekavacanaṃ nakṣatrāṇīti bahuvacanaṃ candranakṣatrāṇāṃ bhedanibandhanamupalabhyate, tathātrāpi pṛthivītyekavacanaṃ rūparasagandhasparśā iti bahuvacanaṃ / | Just as the singular [in] "moon" and the plural [in] "stars" are understood as the basis for difference between moon and stars, similarly here too [we have] the singular [in] "earth" and the plural [in] "color-taste-smell-touch." |
evaṃ jalādiṣvapi yojyam / | This is to be applied similarly to water and the other [substances] as well. |
nakṣatrabhedās tu puṣyādayaḥ // | The different stars [referred to] are Puṣya and others. |
evaṃ guṇaguṇinor bhedaṃ prasādhyāvayavāvayavinor bhedaprasādhanāyāha vibhinnetyādi / | Having thus established the difference between quality and quality-possessor, [the author] states "vibhinna" etc. to establish the difference between parts and whole. |
vibhinnakartṛśaktyāder bhinnau tantupaṭau tathā / | The thread and cloth are different because of differences in maker, potency, and other [attributes]. |
nāsiddho hetur nāpyanaikāntikaḥ / viruddhadharmādhyāsamātranibandhano hi bhāvānāṃ parasparato bhedaḥ, yathā stambhādīnāṃ sacāvayavāvayavinorapyasti / | This reason [can] neither be [called] 'unproven' nor 'inconclusive'. Indeed, the difference between things is based merely on the presence of contradictory properties, just as [is found] between pillars and such things, and likewise exists between the composite whole and [its] parts. |
tathā hi tantūnāṃ yoṣitkartrī, paṭasya kuvindaḥ, śītāpanodādikāryasamarthaḥ paṭo na tantavaḥ, prāgapi tantūnām upalabdheḥ pūrvakālabhāvitvaṃ, paṭasyatu paścāt kuvindādivyāpārottarakālabhāvitvam, paṭasyāyām avistarābhyāṃ yāvat pramāṇaṃ na tāvat pratyekaṃ tantūnām astīti bhinnaparimāṇatvam ato nānaikāntikatā hetūnām iti bhāvaḥ // | For instance: the maker of the threads is a woman [spinner], [while] the maker of the cloth is a weaver; the cloth has the capacity to ward off cold but the threads do not; the threads exist prior to [their] perception, thus having prior temporal existence, while the cloth exists later, after the operation of the weaver and others; the cloth's length and breadth measurements are not equal to [those of] each individual thread - thus [they] have different dimensions. Therefore the reasons are not inconclusive - such is the meaning. |
evaṃ tāvad anumānato 'vayavāvayavinor bhedaṃ prasādhya pratyakṣato 'pi sādhayann āha sthūlārthetyādi / | Having thus far established through inference the difference between parts and whole, [the author now] proceeds to establish [it] through direct perception also, stating "If there were no gross substances" etc. |
sthūlārthāsambhave tu syānnaiva vṛkṣādidarśanam / | If gross substances did not exist, there would indeed be no perception of trees and such things; |
atīndriyatayāṇūnāṃ nacāṇuvacanaṃ bhavet // | And due to atoms being beyond the senses, the term 'atom' [itself] would not be possible; |
sthūlavastuvyapekṣo hi susūkṣmo 'rthas tathocyate / | For [something] extremely subtle is called thus [only] in relation to a gross substance; |
sthūlaikavastvabhāve tu kimapekṣāsya sūkṣmatā // | But in the absence of even a single gross substance, in relation to what would its subtlety [be determined]? |
yadi hyavayavī na syāt sarvāgrahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ, paramāṇūnām atīndriyatvāt / | For if there were no composite whole, the consequence would be that nothing could be grasped [by perception], because atoms are beyond the senses. |
sthūlābhāve 'ṇur iti vyapadeśa eva na syāt / kasmād ity āha sthūlavastuvyapekṣo hītyādi / | In the absence of [something] gross, the very designation 'atom' would not be possible. Why? [Because], as stated, "for [something] extremely subtle..." etc. |
nanu raktādirūpeṇa gṛhyante sphaṭikādayaḥ / | [Objection:] "But crystal and such things are perceived as having the form of red and other [colors]." |
naca tadrūpatā teṣāṃ svapakṣakṣayasaṅgateḥ // | And they do not [really] have that form, as [that would lead to] the destruction of your own position. |
nanvityādinā pratividhatte yaduktaṃ sphaṭikādayaḥ svagataguṇānupalambhe 'pikevalāḥ samupalabhyanta iti tadasiddham / | [Beginning] with "nanu," [the author] refutes what was stated [earlier], [namely] that "rock-crystal and similar [objects] are perceived by themselves even when their inherent qualities are not perceived" - this is not established. |
tajjñānasyāyathārthatayā bhrāntatvenāviṣayatvāt / | Because that cognition, being non-veridical, is erroneous and thus without [a real] object. |
tathā hi japākusumādyupadhāne raktādirūpeṇāsaneeva sphaṭika upalabhyate / | For instance, when a japā [hibiscus] flower is placed nearby, the rock-crystal is perceived as having a red form, though it does not. |
balākādayo 'pi dhavalāḥ santaḥ śyāmarūpā vīkṣyante / | Similarly, cranes and similar [birds], though [actually] white, are seen as having a dark form. |
na ca teṣāṃ tāttvikī tadrūpatā raktādirūpatāsti / | And they do not really have that form – [namely] the form of being red and so forth. |
kasmātsvapakṣakṣayasaṃgateḥ yadi hi teṣāṃ tadrūpatā tāttvikī syāt tadā tadrūpāgrahaṇe 'pi teṣāṃ grahaṇam astīti yo 'yaṃ bhavatāmanantaroditaḥ pakṣas tasya kṣatiḥ syāt // | Why? Because [it would lead to] the destruction of your own position; for if they really had that form, then your position just stated – that there is perception of them even when that form is not perceived – would be destroyed. |
syād etallohitādirūpavyatiriktaḥ sphaṭikādirapyupalabhyata evetyāha tadrūpetyādi / | One might think that rock-crystal and similar [objects] are indeed perceived as distinct from red and other forms – [addressing this] he states "tadrūpa" and so forth. |
tadrūpavyatiriktaś ca nāparātmopalabhyate / | And nothing of a different nature is perceived apart from that form. |
nacānyākāradhīvedyā yuktāste 'tiprasaṅgataḥ // | And it is not reasonable that they should be cognizable through awareness of a different form, as [that would lead to] an unwanted consequence. |
na hi tasmāl lohitādi-rūpād vyatirikto 'parātmā svabhāvaḥ sphaṭikādi-lakṣaṇo dṛśyate, raktādi-rūpasyaiva upalambhāt | Indeed, apart from that red form [etc.], no other distinct essential nature characterized by rock-crystal [etc.] is perceived, since only the red form [etc.] is apprehended. |
atadrūpā api sphaṭikādayo raktādirūpeṇa upalabhyanta iti cet āha na ca ityādi | If [someone] says that "rock-crystals [etc.], though not having that form, are apprehended as having a red form [etc.]," [we] say "no" [etc.]. |
ākāravaśena hi pratiniyatārthaviṣayatā jñānasyāvasthāpyate | For the relationship of cognition to a particular object is determined on the basis of [its] form. |
yadi ca anyākārasya api jñānasya anyaḥ viṣayaḥ syāt, evaṃ sati rūpajñānam api śabdādi-viṣayaṃ syāt viśeṣābhāvāt | And if a cognition with one form could have a different object, then even the cognition of form could have sound [etc.] as its object, since there would be no distinction. |
śuklādayaḥ tathā vedyā iti evaṃ ca api sambhavet | It would also be possible that white [colors etc.] are thus cognized. |
tasmād bhrāntam idaṃ jñānaṃ kambupītādibuddhivat | Therefore this cognition is erroneous, like the cognition of [the conch as] yellow [etc.]. |
tathā hi śuklādaya eva tadvyatirikta-guṇi-padārtha-rahitaḥ tathā raktādirūpeṇa vidyanta iti evam api sambhāvyate, tataś ca na guṇisiddhiḥ | For it might also be possible that the white [colors etc.] alone, devoid of a distinct substance-possessing-qualities, exist as having red form [etc.], and thus the existence of a quality-possessor is not established. |
cakāraḥ avadhāraṇe, bhinnakramaś ca, śuklādaya ityasya anantaraṃ draṣṭavyaḥ | The [particle] 'ca' expresses restriction, and [there is] a different order, [it] should be seen after 'śuklādayaḥ'. |
bhrāntam idam iti ayathārthatvād iti śeṣaḥ | "This is erroneous" means [it is] "not in accordance with reality" - this is the remainder [of the meaning]. |
yat ca uktaṃ kañcukāntargate puṃsi ityādi, tat api na pratyakṣaṃ sābhijalpatvāt asphuṭākāratvāt ca | And what was said about [the cognition of] a man covered by a cloak [etc.], that too is not perception, because it involves conceptual construction and because [its] form is unclear. |
kiṃ tarhyanumānikam etajjñānaṃ rūpādisaṃhatimātralakṣaṇapuruṣaviṣayam ityato nāvayavisiddhir iti darśayati kañceketyādi | [The opponent asks:] "Is this cognition then inferential, having as its object the person characterized merely by the aggregate of color etc.?" Thus [showing that] there is no proof of a composite whole, [the author] states [the verse beginning with] "kañceke." |
kañcukāntargate puṃsi na jñānaṃ tvānumānikam | In [the case of] a person covered by a cloak, the cognition is not inferential, |
taddhetusanniveśasya kañcukasyopalambhanāt | Because of the perception of the cloak which has its arrangement caused by that [person]. |
sa puruṣo rūpādipracayamātrātmako hetur yasya sanniveśasya sa tathoktaḥ taddhetuḥ sanniveśaḥ saṃsthānaviśeṣo yasya kañcukasya tat tathoktam | That person, who consists merely of an aggregate of color etc., is the cause of which arrangement - that is what is meant. [The compound means] 'the cloak which has that arrangement caused by that [person].' |
kaṣāyakuṅkumādibhyo vastre rūpāntarodayaḥ | From [substances] like red dye and saffron, a different color arises in the cloth, |
pūrvarūpavināśe hi vāsasaḥ kṣaṇikatvataḥ | Because of the destruction of the previous color, since the cloth is momentary. |
tatra hi kṣaṇikatvād vāsasaḥ pūrvaśuklādirūpavināśe satyapūrvameva rūpādi sāmagryantarabalādupajāyate | For in that case, due to the cloth being momentary, when the previous white or other color is destroyed, a new color arises from the force of different causal conditions, |
tasmiṃś ca gṛhīte paścād yathā samayāditabhedaṃ samudāyaviṣayaṃ vāso vāsa iti pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvi sāṃvṛtaṃ paramārthato nirviṣayam eva pratyavamarśajñānamutpadyate | And when that [color] is apprehended, afterwards there arises a reflective cognition following perception, pertaining to the aggregate with appropriate distinctions [thinking] "cloth, cloth" - [which is] conventional [and] ultimately without a real object. |
nāpyetad anumānaṃ pūrvapratyakṣagṛhītaviṣayatvād alaiṅgikatvāc ca | Nor is this an inference, because its object has been previously apprehended by perception and because it lacks an inferential mark. |
tasmān na kiñcid abhibhūtaṃ rūpam asti | Therefore there is no color that is [actually] suppressed. |
punarjalādisāpekṣāt tasmād evopajāyate | [A new color] arises again from that very [cause] dependent on water etc. |
tādavasthye tu rūpasya nānyenābhibhavo bhavet | If the color remained in the same state, there could not be suppression by another [color]. |
prāktanānabhibhūtasya svarūpasyānuvartanāt // | Because the inherent nature of the previously unsuppressed [color] would continue [to exist]. |
prayogaḥ yadaparityaktānabhibhūtasvabhāvaṃ na tasya pareṇābhibhavo 'sti / yathā tasyaiva prāktanāvasthāyām aparityaktānabhibhūtasvabhāvaṃ ca rūpam abhibhavāvasthāyām iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | The argument [can be stated thus]: That which has not abandoned [its] unsuppressed nature cannot be suppressed by another [thing], just as [that very same thing] in its previous state; and the color in [its] suppressed state has not abandoned [its] unsuppressed nature - [this constitutes] a cognition contradicting the pervader. |
parityaktānabhibhūtasvabhāvatve 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe siddham asyānyatvam // | If it is accepted that [the color] has abandoned [its] unsuppressed nature, then its difference [from the original] is established. |
ṣaṣṭhīvacanabhedādi vivakṣāmātrasambhavi / | The genitive case, number differences, and so forth arise merely from intended expression. |
tato na yuktā vastūnāṃ tat svarūpavyavasthitiḥ // | Therefore, determining the true nature of things from that [usage] is not proper. |
yadi hi yathāvastu ṣaṣṭhyādīnāṃ pravṛttiḥ siddhā syāt tadā bhavet tato vastusiddhiḥ / | If indeed the use of the genitive and other [cases] were established according to reality, then the establishment of reality could follow from that. |
yāvatā svatantrecchāmātrabhāvina ete, na bāhyavastugatabhedādyapekṣiṇaḥ, tat katham etebhyo vastusiddhiḥ / | However, since these [usages] arise merely from independent will [and] do not depend on differences etc. in external objects, how can the establishment of reality [come] from these? |
tatra ṣaṣṭhī paṭasya rūpādaya iti paṭo rūpādaya iti, vacanabhedaḥ / | In this context, [there is] the genitive [in] "paṭasya rūpādayaḥ" ["colors of the cloth"] [and] "paṭo rūpādayaḥ" ["cloth [and its] colors"], [showing] difference in expression. |
ādigrahaṇādiha paṭe rūpādaya iti saptamī, paṭasya bhāvaḥ paṭatvam iti taddhitotpattir ityādiparigrahaḥ // | By [the word] "ādi" here [are] included the locative [as in] "paṭe rūpādayaḥ" ["colors in the cloth"] [and] the formation of secondary derivatives [as in] "paṭasya bhāvaḥ paṭatvam" ["cloth-ness is the state of cloth"]. |
tathā hi bhinnaṃ naivānyaiḥ ṣaṇṇāmastitvam iṣyate / | For indeed, existence is not considered by others to be different from the six [categories]. |
teṣāṃ vargaś ca naivaikaḥ kaścid artho 'yupeyate // | Nor is any single "group" of them [i.e. the Categories] admitted [as separate]. |
tathā hi ṣaṇṇāṃ padārthānām astitvaṃ teṣāṃ ca ṣaṇṇāṃ varga ityādāvasatyapi vāstave bhede ṣaṣṭhyādi bhavatyeva / | For example, in expressions like "ṣaṇṇāṃ padārthānām astitvam" ["the existence of the six categories"] and "teṣāṃ ṣaṇṇāṃ vargaḥ" ["the group of those six"], genitive forms are used even though there is no real difference [between the categories and their existence/group]. |
nahi bhavadbhiḥ ṣaṭpadārthavyatiriktamastitvādiṣyate / | For you [opponents] do not admit any "existence" as separate from the six categories themselves. |
upalakṣaṇam etat / | This is merely an illustration. |
tathā dārāḥ sikatā ityādau satyapi bahuvacane nārthabhedaṃ paśyāmaḥ / | Similarly, in words like "dārāḥ" ["wife"] and "sikatāḥ" ["sand"], even though the plural form is used, we do not perceive any real multiplicity of objects. |
svasya bhāvaḥ svatvam iti na bhāvo 'nya iṣyate // | The "svatva" ["self-hood"] of a thing, being its own nature, is not accepted as something different [from the thing itself]. |
saṃjñāpakapramāṇasya viṣaye tattvam iṣyate / ṣaṇṇāmastitvam iti cetsaḍbhyo 'nyas te prasajyate // | If you say that "the existence of the six [categories] is held to be the property subsisting in what is an object made known by a means of valid cognition," then this [existence] would have to be something different from your six [categories]. |
saṃjñāpakapramāṇaviṣasya bhāvatattvaṃ sadupalambhakapramāṇaviṣayatvaṃ nāma dharmāntaraṃ ṣaṇṇām astitvam iṣyata ity arthaḥ / | The meaning is that "the existence of the six [categories] is claimed to be a distinct property consisting in their being objects of such means of valid cognition as apprehend existing things." |
ato nāsti vyabhicāra iti bhāvaḥ / | Therefore there is no deviation [from our position] - this is the intended meaning. |
saptamaḥ padārthaḥ prāpnoti / | [This would mean that] a seventh category would result. |
tataś ca ṣaṭpadārthābhyupagamo hīyata iti bhāvaḥ // | And thus [this] would militate against the acceptance of the Six Categories. |
yadyevaṃ kathaṃ ṣaṭpadārthā iti proktam ityāha ṣaḍeta iti | [Someone] says "If this is so, how [can we explain that] the Six Categories have been declared [as such]?" |
ṣaḍete dharmiṇaḥ proktā dharmās tebhyo 'tirekiṇaḥ | [It is replied:] "These six are declared to be property-bearers, and the properties are distinct from them." |
iṣtā eveti cetko 'yaṃ sambandhastasya tairmataḥ | If this is accepted, then what is this relation between those [Categories and properties] that is held [to exist]? |
samavāyosti nānyaś ca sambandho 'ṅgīkṛtaḥ paraiḥ | There is no [possibility of] inherence, and no other relation is accepted by the opponents. |
dharmirūpā eva ye bhāvās te ṣaṭpadārthā iti proktāḥ, dharmarūpās tu ṣaṭpadārthā vyatiriktā iṣṭā eva | The Six Categories that have been declared are only those entities that are property-bearers, while the Six Categories in the form of properties are accepted as distinct [from them]. |
tathā hi padārthapraveśake granthaḥ "evaṃ dharmair vinā dharmiṇām eṣa nirdeśaḥ kṛta" iti | Indeed, [as] the text in the Padārthapraveśaka [states]: "Thus this exposition has been made of the property-bearers without [mention of] the properties." |
koyam ityādinottaram āha tasya astitvāder dharmasya | [He] gives the answer [beginning with] "What is this" regarding that property beginning with existence. |
kaḥ sambandho yena teṣām asau dharmo bhavati | What is that relation by which that [existence] becomes their property? |
nahi sambandhamantareṇa dharmidharmabhāvo yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt | Indeed, without a relation, the state of property-bearer and property is not possible, due to [unwanted] over-extension. |
evaṃ hi sarvasya sarvadhrmatvaṃ syāt, nahi kaścit taiḥ saha sambandho 'sti | For thus everything would be the property of everything, [but] indeed there is no relation with them. |
tathā hi dvividha evas sambandhaḥ saṃyogalakṣaṇaḥ samavāyalakṣaṇaś ca | For indeed relation is only of two kinds: characterized by conjunction and characterized by inherence. |
tatra na tāvat saṃyogalakṣaṇas tasya guṇatvena dravyeṣveva niyatatvāt | Of these, [the relation] is not characterized by conjunction, because being a quality it is restricted to substances only. |
na ca samavāyātmakas tasya bhāvavadekatveneṣṭatvāt | Nor [can it be] of the nature of inherence, because it is accepted to be one only, like existence. |
samavāyena ca samavāyātmake sambandhe sati dvitīyaḥ samavāyo 'ṅgīkṛtaḥ syāt // | If [we accept that] a relation [exists] by inherence in the inherence-nature, then a second inherence would have to be accepted. |
vinaiva sambandhaṃ dharmadharmibhāvo bhaviṣyatīti cet prāha sambandhānupapattāvityādi / | If it is argued that "the property-possessor relation could exist without any relation," [the author] responds with [the verse beginning with] "in the absence of a relation..." |
sambandhānupapattau ca teṣāṃ dharmo bhavet katham / tadutpādanamātrāccedanye 'pi syus tathāvidhāḥ // | In the absence of a relation, how could they [the categories] possess a property? If [it is claimed to be] merely due to their producing it, then others would also be of the same nature. |
evaṃ hyatiprasaṅgaḥ syād ityuktam / | Thus it has been stated that an unwanted consequence would follow. |
atha taiḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ padārthair dharmasyotpādanāt teṣām ayaṃ dharmaḥ sambandhītyucyate / | If it is said that this property is related to those six categories because of being produced by them, |
yadyevam anye 'pi tarhi jalādayas tadutpattilakṣaṇasambandhamātrād eva tathāvidhāḥ kuṇḍādisambandhinaḥ syuḥ bhaveyuḥ / | then other things like water would also be related to things like pots merely by virtue of being produced by them. |
tataś ca saṃyogasamavāyākhyasambandhāntarakalpanā teṣu vyarthā syāt // | And consequently, the postulation of other relations named conjunction and inherence would be pointless in these cases. |
tasyāpyastitvam ityevaṃ vartate vyatirekiṇī / vibhaktis tasya cānyasya bhāve 'niṣṭhā prasajyate // | Since existence would also have existence, the genitive case ending [which indicates] difference occurs, and if that [existence] and others have existence, an infinite regress would follow. |
kiṃ ca bhavatu nāma ṣaṇām astitvaṃ nāma dharmāntaraṃ tathāpi vyabhicāra eva / | Moreover, even if it be granted that existence is indeed a separate property of the six [categories], still there would be deviation [in your argument]. |
tathā hi tasyāpyastitvam astyeva vastutvāt / | For that [existence] itself must have existence, because it is an entity. |
tataś ca tatra vyatirekanibandhanā vibhaktiḥ kathaṃ bhavet / | So how could there be a case ending based on difference in that case? |
atha tatrāpyaparamastitvamaṅgīkriyate tadānavasthā syāt // | If another existence is accepted even there, then there would be an infinite regress. |
dravyāder api dharmitvam asmādeva ca saṃmatam // | And the property-possessing nature of substance and others is accepted for this very reason. |
sarveṣām eva hyuttarottaradharmasamāveśād dharmitvaṃ syāt / | Indeed, in every case, the property of 'being a property-bearer' would arise from the incorporation of successive properties. |
tataś ca ṣaḍete dharmiṇa eva proktā ityetannopapadyate, ṣaṭpadārthavyatirekeṇānyeṣām api dharmiṇāṃ vidyamānatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | Therefore, the statement that "these six alone are property-bearers" is not tenable, because there would be other property-bearers existing apart from the six categories—this is the intended meaning. |
athāpi syāt ye dharmirūpa eva ta eva ṣaḍtvenāvadhāritāḥ, ityetadapyasāram / | Even if one were to argue that "only those which are exclusively of the nature of property-bearers are determined as being six [in number]"—this too is without substance. |
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