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evaṃ hi guṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānām anirdeśaḥ syāt / nahyeṣāṃ dharmirūpatvam eva, kiṃ tarhi, dharmarūpatvam api, dravyāśritatvād eṣām / | For in this case, Quality, Action, Universal, Particularity and Inherence could not be included, since these are not exclusively of the nature of property-bearers; rather, [they are] also of the nature of properties, because they all inhere in Substance. |
asmādeveti / | [It is] for this very reason. |
anyadharmasamāveśāt / | Because of the incorporation of other properties. |
anyaḥ punar āha ṣaṇṇām astitvaṃ hi sadupalambhakapramāṇagamyatvam / gamyatvaṃ ca ṣaṭpadārthaviṣayaṃ vijñānaṃ, tasmin sati sadvyavahārapravartanāt / | Another [opponent] however says: "The existence of the six [categories] consists in their being cognizable by the means of cognition that apprehend existing things; and this cognizability is [in the form of] the cognition which has the six categories as its object, since it is only when this [cognition] exists that they are treated as 'existent'." |
tathā jñānajanitaṃ jñeyatvam, abhidhānajanitamabhidheyatvam iti / | Thus cognizability is produced by cognition, and nameability is produced by naming. |
ato vyatirekanibandhanā ṣaṣṭhī bhavatyeva / | Therefore, the genitive case ending based on difference becomes indeed possible. |
nacāpyanavasthā, nāpi ṣaṭpadārthāntaraprasaṅga iti / | "And there is neither an infinite regress, nor the unwanted consequence of [there being] categories beyond the six"—thus [says the opponent]. |
tasyāpīdaṃ kalpanāmātram eva / | This also is [merely] a figment of imagination. |
yadi hyarthakriyāsamarthapadārthātmakamātmatattvameṣāmastyeva tadā te 'rthakriyāsamarthāḥ padārthā eva bhedāntarapratikṣepamātrajijñāsāyāṃ teṣāmastitvamityevaṃ yadi vyatirekavibhaktyā vyapadiśyeraṃs tadā ko virodhaḥ / | If these [things] indeed have their essential nature as entities capable of effective action, and if they are designated by case endings expressing difference merely to address the question about rejection of other differences—as in [the expression] "the existence of these"—then what contradiction [is there]? |
tadavyatiriktam api hi svarūpaṃ buddhyā tato 'vakṛtya vyatiriktamivābhidhīyamānamavirodhyeva, vācāmicchāmātravṛttitvād utpādyakathoparaciteṣu bāhulyasaundaryādidharmaparikalpanavad iti yatkiñcid etat // | For even if their nature is non-different, when [that nature] is conceptually abstracted and spoken of as if different, there is no contradiction, since verbal usage depends merely on intention—just as [in the case of] assuming properties like extreme beauty in constructed stories. |
prathamebhyaś ca tantubhyaḥ paṭasya yadi sādhyate / bhedaḥ sādhanavaiphalyaṃ durnivāraṃ tadā bhavet // | If the difference of the cloth from the initial threads is what is being proved, then there would be an unavoidable defect of futility in the proof. |
prāptāvasthāviśeṣā hi ye jātās tantavo 'pare / viśiṣṭārthakriyāsaktāḥ prathamebhyo 'vilakṣaṇāḥ // | For those other threads that have arisen in a particular state, capable of specific effective action, are not different in character from the initial [threads]. |
yadi prathamāvasthābhāvibhyo 'samadhigatapaṭākhyānebhyastantubhyaḥ paṭasya bhedaḥ sādhyate tadā siddhaṃ sādhyate / | If what is being proved is the difference of the cloth from those threads in their initial state which have not yet acquired the designation "cloth," then [you] are proving what is [already] established. |
sarvabhāvānāṃ kṣaṇikatvena pūrvakebhyas tantubhyaḥ paṭaśabdavācyānāṃ tantūnāṃ tadvilakṣaṇapadārtha{rthatvā---}sambhave 'pyutpādasyāṅgīkaraṇāt // | Since all entities are momentary, we accept the production of threads designated by the word "cloth" from the prior threads, even though it is impossible for an entity completely different [from those prior threads] to arise. |
atha paṭasamānakālabhāvino ye tantavas tebhyaḥ paṭasyānyatvaṃ prasādhyate tadā hetūnām asiddhateti darśayann āha eketyādi / | If, on the other hand, what is being proved is the difference of the cloth from those threads that exist simultaneously with the cloth, then [the author] shows that the reasons are unestablished, saying "eka" etc. |
ekakāryopayogitvajñāpanāya pṛthakśrutau / gauravāśaktivaiphalyadoṣatyāgābhivāñchayā // sākalyenābhidhānena vyavahārasya lāghavam / manyamānaiḥ kṛtā yeṣu vāgekā vyavahartṛbhiḥ // tebhyaḥ samānakālastu paṭo naiva prasiddhyati / | To indicate their serving a single purpose, if [the threads] were mentioned separately, then desiring to avoid the defects of prolixity, inability and futility, thinking there would be simplicity of usage through collective designation, speakers have created a single word for them—but the cloth simultaneous with those [threads] is not established. |
yadi tadānīṃ tantuvyatiriktas tat samānakālabhāvī paṭaḥ prasiddho bhavet tadā tasya tantuvyapekṣayā vibhinnakartṛtvādayo dharmaḥ siddhyeyur yāvatā saevāyaṃ tantuvyatirekī paṭo na siddhaḥ / | If at that time the cloth existing simultaneously [with the threads] were established as different from the threads, then properties like having a different maker could be established for it in relation to the threads; however, this very cloth as different from the threads is not established. |
tadbhedasyaiva prasādhayituṃ prastutatvāt / | Because it is precisely this difference that is being undertaken to prove. |
na ca paṭas tantava iti saṃjñāmātrād vastūnāṃ bhedaḥ, prayojanāntaravaśenāpi saṃjñāntarasya niveśāt / | The mere existence of two different designations "paṭa" [cloth] and "tantavaḥ" [yarns] does not [establish] a difference between [these] entities, since different designations can be applied [to the same thing] due to various other purposes. |
tathā hi kecit tantavo viśiṣṭāvasthāprāptāḥ śītāpanodanādyekārthakriyāsamarthā bhavanti, nāpare ye yoṣitkartṛkāḥ / | For instance, some yarns, having reached a particular condition, become capable of accomplishing a single purpose such as warding off cold, [while] others, [such as those] made by women [spinners], are not [yet capable of this]. |
tatraikārthakriyopayoginas tantūn viśiṣṭān pratipādayituṃ paṭa ityekā śrutir viniveśyate vyavahartṛbhir asāṅkaryeṇa vyavahārāyāsatyapyarthāntaratve / | In this case, to indicate those specific yarns which are useful for [accomplishing] a single purpose, the single term "paṭa" is employed by speakers for practical usage without confusion, even though [the cloth] is not actually different [from the yarns]. |
kasmāt punar ekā śutir viniveśyata ity āha pṛthakśrutāvityādi / | [One might ask:] "Why then is a single term employed?" [The answer] is given [beginning with the words] "in case of separate mention." |
pṛthakpṛthak pratyekaṃ śrutau abhidhāne sati gauravadoṣaḥ / tathā hi tatra yāvantaḥ padārthā vivakṣitaikakāryasādhanayogyās tāvantaeva śabdāḥ prayoktavyā iti gauravadoṣaḥ / | When [the yarns] are mentioned separately, one by one, there is the fault of prolixity, for in that case, as many words would have to be used as there are objects capable of accomplishing the intended single purpose - this is the fault of prolixity. |
nacāpyeṣām asādhāraṇaṃ rūpaṃ śakyaṃ nirdeṣṭumityaśaktidoṣaḥ / | And it is not possible to specify the unique form of each of these [yarns] - this is the fault of inability. |
utprekṣitasāmānyākāreṇa ca nirdeśe varamekayaiva śrutyā pratipādanaṃ, na cāsya pṛthakpṛthakpratipādanaprayāsasya kiñcitphalamupalabhyata iti naiphalyadoṣaḥ / | And when referring [to them] through an imagined common form, it is better to express [them] by a single term, and since no purpose is achieved by the effort of expressing [them] individually, this is the fault of futility. |
sāmastyena tvabhidhāne kṛte sati vyavahāralāghavaṃ guṇaḥ / | However, when designation is made collectively, the advantage is simplicity of usage. |
samastavastuvivakṣāyāṃ jagattribhuvanaviśvādiśabdavad ekā vāgiti / | [It is] like [using] a single word such as "jagat" [world], "tribhuvana" [three worlds], "viśva" [universe], etc. when intending to express all things collectively. |
paṭa ityevaṃ vacanam ity arthaḥ / | The word "paṭa" is such an expression - this is the meaning. |
kartā ca sāmarthyaparimāṇādidharmaśceti tau tathoktau, tato vibhinnaśabdena viśeṣaṇasamāsaṃ kṛtvā matup kāryaḥ // | The word "kartṛ" and the properties like "sāmarthya" [capacity] etc. are [first] compounded into a copulative compound, then qualified by the word "vibhinna" [separated], and then [the suffix] matup is to be applied. |
yaccoktaṃ sthūlārthāsambhava ityādi tatrāha anyonyābhisarā iti / | Regarding what was said [earlier] about "the impossibility of gross objects," he now says [they are] "mutually dependent." |
asiddhamaṇūnām atīndriyatvaṃ viśiṣṭāvasthāprapatānām indriyagrāhyatvāt / | The imperceptibility of atoms is not established, because atoms that have attained specific states are perceptible to the senses. |
yasya hi nityāḥ paramāṇava iti pakṣas taṃ pratyaṇūnāṃ viśeṣābhāvāt sarvadaivātīndriyatvaṃ, syāt nāsmān prati / | For one who holds the view that atoms are eternal, atoms would always remain imperceptible due to their lack of specific qualities, [but] this is not [the case] for us. |
anyonyasahāyā ity arthaḥ // | The meaning [of anyonyābhisarāḥ] is "mutually supporting each other." |
nīlādir ityādinā tadevākṣagocaratvaṃ darśayati nīlādiḥ paramāṇūnām ākāraḥ kalpito nijaḥ / nīlādipratibhāsā ca vedyate cakṣurādidhīḥ // | Through [the words] "blue" etc., he shows their perceptibility to the senses [thus]: "The blue and other forms are inherent properties postulated for atoms, and visual and other cognitions manifest [these] blue and other appearances." |
nanu ca paurvāparyādidigbhedena paramāṇavo 'vasthitā iṣyante naca tena rūpeṇopalakṣyante / | [Question:] "Although atoms are accepted as existing with distinctions of sequence etc., they are not perceived in that form." |
tat katham eṣāṃ pratyakṣatetyāha paurvāparyavivekenetyādi / | [To the question] "How then can their perceptibility [be established]?" he responds with [the verse beginning with] "paurvāparyavivekena." |
paurvāparyavivekena yadyapyeṣām alakṣaṇam / tathāpyadhyakṣatābādhā pānakādāviva sthitā // adhyakṣatāyā abādhā adhyakṣatābādheti samāsaḥ / | "Although these [atoms] are not perceived with their sequential distinctions, nevertheless their perceptibility remains uncontradicted, just as in [the case of] drinks etc." The compound "adhyakṣatābādhā" [can be analyzed as] "non-contradiction of perceptibility." |
avidyamānabādhatvād abādhā / | [It is called] "abādhā" [non-contradiction] because there is no existing contradiction. |
pānakādiṣvivādhyakṣatāvasthitetyarthaḥ / tathā hi pānake taptopalesūtahemādau ca miśre paramāṇava eva tathopalabhyante / | [It means that] just as in [the case of] beverages and such [substances], [there is] perception [of atoms]. Thus indeed, in beverages, heated stones, mercury-gold [compounds] and other mixed [substances], the atoms themselves are perceived as such. |
nahi tatrāvayavidravyam asti, vijātīyānāṃ dravyārambhakatvāt / | For there is no composite substance there [in these cases], because [they are] produced from heterogeneous substances. |
nacāpi paramāṇuśodhyati{bhyovayavi---}bhede saṃyogo dṛśya upapadyate, adṛṣṭāśrayatvāt / yatra hyeko 'pi saṃyogī na dṛśyas tatra saṃyogo na dṛśyate / | Nor even if atoms were different [from their composites] would visible conjunction be possible, because [their] substrate is unseen. For where even one conjunct is not visible, there the conjunction is not seen. |
yathā piśācaghaṭasaṃyogaḥ sūryamaṇḍalākāśadigdeśasaṃyogaś ca / | As [in] the conjunction between a ghost and a pot, and the conjunction between the solar disc and spaces of the directions of ākāśa. |
yatra punaḥ sarva eva saṃyogī paramāṇvātmako na dṛśyate, tatra kathaṃ saṃyogastadāśrito dṛśyaḥ syāt / | Moreover, where every conjunct consisting of atoms is not visible, how could their conjunction which inheres in them be visible? |
sarveṣām eva vastūnāṃ sarvavyāvṛttirūpiṇām / dṛṣṭāvapi tathaiveti na sarvākāraniścayaḥ / | For all entities which exist in the form of mutual exclusion, even when perceived, there is just such uncertainty regarding all their forms. |
nahyaparadarśanānāṃ kvacid api vastuni pratyakṣeṇa gṛhīte 'pi sarvākāraniścayo 'sti / | For even according to other philosophical views, when any entity is grasped by perception, there is no certainty regarding all its forms. |
yāvatā tu rūpeṇārthāntaravyāvṛttikṛtena na niścīyate, tāvatā tat pratyakṣam iti vyavasthāpyate / na sarvākāreṇa / | However, it is established as perceptible to the extent that [its] form differentiates [it] from other things, not in all [its] forms. |
gṛthītasyāpo prakārāntarasya niścayānutpatter vyavahārāyogyatvenāgṛhītakalpatvāt / | Because even if another aspect of what is grasped [were perceived], due to the non-arising of certainty [about it] and its unsuitability for practical activity, it would be as good as non-grasped. |
tathaiveti / | "[There is] just such [uncertainty]." |
yathā tadvastvanubhūtam / | Just as [in the case of] that experienced entity. |
nanu ca niraṃśatayā sarvātmanaiva pratyakṣeṇānubhūtatvād vastunaḥ kasmāt sarvātmanā niścayo na bhavatītyāha akalpanākṣagamye 'pītyādi / akalpanākṣagamye 'pi niraṃśe 'rthasya lakṣaṇe / yadbhedavyavasāye 'sti kāraṇaṃ sa pratīyate // | "Since the object, being impartite, is experienced in its entirety through perception, why should there not be certainty regarding the whole object?" – [to this objection, he] speaks [the verse beginning with] "Even though apprehensible by indeterminate sense-perception..." |
akṣe bhavam akṣamindriyajñānam ity arthaḥ / | 'Ākṣa' means that which pertains to the senses, [i.e.] sensory cognition. |
akalpanamavidyamānakalpanaṃ ca tadākṣaṃ ceti vigrahaḥ / tena gamye 'pi nirvikalpendriyajñānagamye 'pītyarthaḥ / | The compound breaks down as: 'akalpana' [means] without conceptualization, and that [sensory cognition] is 'ākṣa'; thus [it means] "though apprehensible by indeterminate sense-perception." |
yadbhedavyavasāya iti / | [The phrase] "yadbhedavyavasāya" [refers to] certainty regarding its difference [from other things]. |
yasmād bhedo vyāvṛttir yadbhedas tatra vyavasāyo niścayas tasya kāraṇamabhyāsaḥ pratyāsattis tāratamyabuddhipāṭavaṃ cetyādi / | The cause of this certainty regarding difference [or] distinctness consists in repetition, proximity, gradual development of understanding, and so forth. |
tarhyanubhavamātram eva niścayakāraṇaṃ kiṃtvabhyāsādayo 'pi / | Therefore, mere experience alone is not the cause of certainty, but repetition and other [factors] are also [required]. |
tena yatra te santi tatra niścayaḥ prasūyata ity arthaḥ / etac ca sarvaṃ paramāṇūnāṃ siddhiṃ bāhyasya cārthasya pratyakṣatvasiddhimabhyupagamyoktam / | Hence where these [factors] are present, there certainty arises - this is the meaning. All this has been stated accepting [for argument's sake] the existence of atoms and the perceptibility of external objects. |
yasya tu vijñānavādino na bāhyo 'rtho nīlādirūpatayā pratyakṣāsiddhaḥ, svapnādau vināpi bāhyamarthaṃ tathāvidhanīlādipratibhāso 'palambhena saṃśayāt tasya ca nīlādi pratibhāsopalambhena tasya ca nīlādirūpasyaikānekasvabhāvaśūnyatvena bhrāntajñānapratibhāsātmakatvāt, nāpiparamāṇavaḥ siddhās teṣāṃ paurvāparyāvasthāyitayā digbhāgabhedinām ekatvāsiddheḥ / | For the Vijñānavādin, however, no external object like blue etc. is established by perception, because even without external objects, such appearances of blue etc. are experienced in dreams and such states, which creates doubt about [normal] perception of blue etc., and because the form of blue etc., being devoid of both unitary and multiple nature, must be of the nature of an illusory appearance; nor are atoms established, because being sequentially arranged and occupying different points in space, their unity cannot be established. |
taṃ prati kathaṃ nīlādirūpatayā paramāṇūnāṃ pratyakṣatvaṃ paurvāparyasyavānupalakṣaṇaṃ bhrāntinimittenārthāntarasamāropād iti śakyaṃ vaktum // | How can one claim to such [a Vijñānavādin] that atoms are perceptible as having the form of blue etc., and that their sequential arrangement is insignificant because it is superimposed through illusion? |
syād yedyavayavī na syāt tadā kathaṃ bahuṣu paramāṇuṣvekaḥ parvata iti vyavasāyo vyāpṛtākṣasya bhavatītyāha samānetyādi / samānajvālāsambhūter yathā dīpena vibhramaḥ / | [One might object:] "If there were no whole, then how does one with open eyes have the cognition of 'one mountain' with respect to many atoms?" [To this he] states [the verse beginning with] "samāna-" [which shows that] just as with a lamp [there appears to be] one flame arising from multiple [points]. |
nairantaryasthitānekasūkṣmavittau tathaikadhā | [When perceiving] numerous subtle [entities] situated in continuity, [there arises the illusion of] unity. |
yathāhi dīpādau nairantaryeṇa sadṛśāparāparajvālāpadārthasambhavāt satyapi bheda ekatvavibhramo bhavati | For example, in a lamp and similar [things], due to the continuous arising of similar successive flame-entities, an illusion of unity occurs even though difference [actually] exists. |
tathā nairantaryeṇānekasūkṣmatarapadārthasaṃvedano 'yam ekatvavibhrama ityadoṣaḥ | Similarly, this illusion of unity [arises from] the cognition of many extremely subtle entities in continuity, hence there is no fault. |
yadyevaṃ bhedenānupalakṣyamānāḥ katham aṇavaḥ pratyakṣāḥ sidhyantītyāha | [Question:] "If this is so, how are atoms established as perceptible when they are not observed as distinct?" |
vivekālakṣaṇāt teṣāṃ no cet pratyakṣateṣyate | "If their perceptibility is not admitted due to [their] non-differentiation..." |
yadi hi vivekenānavadhāryamāṇāṃ na pratyakṣamiṣyate, tadā dīpādau pūrvāparavibhāgenānupalabhyamāṇo sā pratyakṣatā kathaṃ dṛṣṭā | If what cannot be ascertained through differentiation is not accepted as perceptible, then how is perceptibility observed in a lamp etc., where [flames] are not apprehended through division into prior and posterior? |
avayavī vāvayavavivekenāgṛhyamāṇo 'pi kiṃ tathā pratyakṣatveneṣṭa ityanaikāntikametat | Or is the composite accepted as perceptible even though not grasped through differentiation of [its] parts? Thus this [argument] is inconclusive. |
etāvadityādinā paraṃ codayituṃ śikṣayati | [The text] instructs how to raise an objection through [the words] beginning with "this much." |
etāvat tu bhaved atra katham eṣāṃ na niścaye | "This much could be [said] here: why is there no certainty about these [atoms]?" |
nīlādiparamāṇūnām ākāra iti gamyate | "[Why] is the form of blue and other atoms not understood?" |
tadapyakāraṇaṃ yasmān naiva jñānamagocaram | That too is not a [valid] cause, because cognition is never without an object. |
nacaikasthūlaviṣayaṃ sthaulyaikatvavirodhataḥ | And [the cognition] cannot have a single gross object as its content, due to the contradiction between grossness and unity. |
eṣām iti paramāṇūnām | "These" means "of the atoms." |
tadapīti paramāṇūnāṃ vivekenālakṣaṇaṃ yat tadakāraṇam, paramāṇugatanīlādyagrahaṇasyānyato 'pi niścayotpatteḥ | "That too" means that the non-perception of atoms through differentiation is not the cause [of our not perceiving blue etc. in atoms], because certainty about the non-apprehension of blue etc. as belonging to atoms can arise from other [sources] as well. |
tathāhīdaṃ jñānamaviṣayaṃ tāvad bahirarthavādinā satā naiveṣṭavyamanyathā hi vijñānamātratādarśanam eva syāt | For indeed, this cognition cannot be accepted as objectless by one who maintains [the existence of] external objects, since otherwise it would amount to the view of mere consciousness [i.e., idealism]. |
sa cāyaṃ rūpādiviṣayaḥ sthūlarūpatayāvabhāsamāna eko vā syād aneko vāeko 'pi bhavannārabdho vā syād avayavairanārabdho vā | [Now] this object of color etc., appearing in gross form - is it one or many? And if it is one, is it composed of parts or not composed [of parts]? |
tatra na tāvad ubhayātmāpyayam eko yuktaḥ pratyakṣādivirodhāt | In this regard, it cannot be one in either form, as this would contradict perception and other [means of valid cognition]. |
ko 'sau virodha ity āha | [Someone] asks: "What is that contradiction?" |
sthūlasyaikasvabhāvattve makṣikāpadamātrataḥ / pidhāne pihitaṃ sarvamāsajyetāvibhāgataḥ | If the gross [object] were of a single nature, then when covered by [something as small as] a fly's foot, all of it would become covered, without distinction. |
rakte ca bhāga ekasmin sarvaṃ rajyeta raktavat | And if one part were colored red, all of it would become red-colored. |
viruddhadharmabhāve vā nānātvamanuṣajyate | Or alternatively, the presence of contradictory properties would necessarily imply multiplicity. |
yadi hi sthūlamekaṃ syāt tadaikadeśapidhāne sarvasya pidhānam, ekadeśarāge ca sarvasya rāgaḥ prasajyeta, pihitāpihitayo raktāraktayoś ca bhavan matenābhedāt | For if the gross [object] were one, then covering one part would mean covering all of it, and coloring one part would mean coloring all of it, since according to your view there would be no difference between covered and uncovered [parts] or between colored and uncolored [parts]. |
nacaikasya parasparaviruddhadharmādhyāso yuktaḥ, atiprasaṅgāt | And it is not logical for a single [entity] to possess mutually contradictory properties, as this would lead to [unwanted] over-extension. |
evaṃ hi viśvamekaṃ dravyaṃ syāt, tataś ca sahotpādādiprasaṅgaḥ | For thus the entire universe would be one substance, and this would lead to the [absurd] consequence of simultaneous production [of all things] and so forth. |
nacaikadeśapidhāne sarvaṃ pihitamīkṣyata iti pratyakṣavirodhaḥ | And when one part is covered, all [of it] is not seen to be covered - thus [there is] contradiction with perception. |
tathānumānavirodho 'pi | There is also contradiction with inference. |
tathā hi yatparasparaviruddhadharmādhyāsitaṃ na tadekaṃ bhavati, yathā gomahiṣam, upalabhyamānānupalabhyamānarūpaṃ pihitādirūpeṇa ca viruddhadharmādhyāsitaṃ sthūlam iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ | For what possesses mutually contradictory properties cannot be one - like [the compound] "cow-buffalo"; and the gross [object] possesses contradictory properties in the form of being perceived and not perceived, being covered and [uncovered] etc. - thus [there is] the perception of what contradicts the pervader [of oneness]. |
sarvasyaikatvaprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam | The unified nature of everything [would be] a refuting proof. |
udyotakarastvāha ekasmin bhedābhāvāt sarvaśabdaprayogānupapattir iti | Udyotakara says: "Because there is no difference in [what is] one, the use of the word 'sarva' is impossible." |
tadetannanu cetyādinā śaṅkate | This [objection] is raised beginning with "nanu ca." |
nanu caikasvabhāvatvāt sarvaśabdo 'tra kiṃkṛtaḥ | "Indeed, due to [its] having a single nature, what purpose does the word 'sarva' serve here?" |
tathā hi sarvaśabdo 'nekārthaviṣayaḥ, na cāvayavī nānātmeti, tat kathaṃ sarvaśabdaprayogo yenocyate sarvaṃ pihitamāsajyata iti | "For the word 'sarva' refers to multiple things, and the composite is not of multiple natures; so how can the word 'sarva' be used when it is said 'all [of it] would become covered'?" |
nanvityādinā pratividhatte | [This] is answered beginning with "nanu." |
nanu ye lokataḥ siddhā vāsodehanagādayaḥ / ta evāvayavitvena bhavadbhir upavarṇitāḥ | "Those things which are established in common experience, such as cloth, body, mountain, etc. - those very [things] have been described by you as having compositeness." |
raktaṃ vāso 'khilaṃ sarvaṃ niḥśeṣaṃ nikhilaṃ tathā / tatrecchāmātrasambhūtam iti sarve prayuñjate | "[The expressions] 'the cloth is red', 'entirely', 'wholly', 'completely', 'totally' - all [people] use these [expressions] which arise merely from their desire [to express something]." |
tathāvidhavivakṣāyām asmābhir api varṇyate / sarvaṃ syād raktamityādi nirnibandhā hi vācakāḥ | "When there is such an intention to express [something], we too describe [it thus]: 'all [of it] would become red' etc., for speakers are indeed unrestricted." |
ya eva hi loke vāsādehaprabhṛtayaḥ prasiddhās ta eva bhavadbhir avayavitvenāvakalpitāḥ | "For those very things which are well-known in the world, like cloth, body, etc. - those very [things] have been conceived by you as composites." |
tatra ca loke sarvaikadeśaśabdayoḥ pravṛttiḥ prasiddhaiva / tathā ca vaktāro bhavanti sarvaṃ vāso raktamityādeḥ | "And in the world, the usage of the words 'sarva' and 'ekadeśa' is indeed well-known; and thus speakers say 'all the cloth is red' etc." |
tathāvidhāyāṃ ca vivakṣāyāṃ yeyaṃ loke pṛthutaradeśavakrāntivyavasthitaśāṭakādipadārthagataraktādipratipādanecchā, tasyāṃ satyāmasmābhir api pratītimanusṛtya bhavato virodhapratipādanāya svarvādiśabdaprayogaḥ kriyate / | When there is such an intention to speak [on the part of speakers], namely the desire to express redness etc. pertaining to objects like cloth that occupy a larger space in the world, we too, following common understanding, employ terms like 'all' to demonstrate the inconsistency in your position. |
api ca bhavata evāyaṃ sthūlasyaikatvamabhyupagacchato doṣo nāsmākam, nahyasmābhiḥ sthūlasyaikatvamiṣyate / | Moreover, this fault belongs only to you who accept the unity of the gross object, not to us, for we do not accept the unity of the gross object. |
bhāktaṃ tadabhidhānaṃ ced vacobhedaḥ prasajyate / | If that designation is said to be figurative, then a difference in number would necessarily follow. |
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