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rūpādicetaso 'pi syān naiva pratyakṣatānyathā // | Otherwise, even cognitions of color and such things would cease to be perceptual. |
sa hyāha svātantryeṇa prasaṅgamukhena vā yat sādhanaṃ kriyate tat svayam upalabdhau satyāṃ saṃgacchate anyathā hyasiddhatā doṣaḥ syāt, naca bhavatā kvacid apyekasyānekasmin kārtsnyaikadeśābhyāṃ vṛttir upalabdhaiua yasyā vṛtterasambhavād, avayavidravyamasat syāt / | For he says: "When a reason is adduced, whether directly or through reductio ad absurdum, it becomes applicable only when it is itself apprehended; otherwise there would be the fault of being unproven. And you have not perceived anywhere the subsistence of one thing in many, either wholly or partially, due to the impossibility of which subsistence [you claim] the composite substance would be non-existent." |
sati sambhave 'paropi vā bhaved avayavo 'navayavī ceti / | Or if [such subsistence] were possible, there would be yet another part and non-composite. |
atha kvacid evambhūtā vṛttir upalakṣitā bhavet tadā tadvadeva dravyādāvapisā bhaviṣyatītyapratiṣedhaḥ / atha na dṛṣṭā sā vṛttis tadā kimekadeśenāhosvit sarvātmanetyevaṃ bhedapraśno na yujyate, siddhe hi dharmiṇi viśeṣapratiṣedho yuktaḥ / | If such subsistence has been observed somewhere, then it would exist similarly in substances and so forth, thus [making] denial [impossible]. If, however, that subsistence has not been observed, then the question of distinction—whether [it exists] partially or wholly—is not appropriate, for denial of a specific property is proper only when the property-bearer is established. |
yadā tu dharmyevāsiddhas tadā tasyaiva pratiṣedhā jyāyān, tenaitāvadeva vaktavyaṃ vṛttir eva nāstīti natu viśeṣapratiṣedhaḥ tac ca na yuktaṃ pratyakṣata evāvayaveṣvayavavino vṛttisiddheḥ / | When, however, the substratum itself is not admitted, then it is better to deny that [substratum] itself, so one should only state that "there is no subsistence" and not [make] a denial of any particular characteristic; yet this [denial] is not correct, since the subsistence of the whole in [its] parts is established by direct perception. |
kimbhūtātpratyakṣādityāha ihedam iti buddhita iti / | [Someone] asks: "From what kind of perception [is this established]?" [Answer:] From the cognition [in the form] "this [is] here." |
iha tantuṣvidaṃ vastrādītyevambhūtātpratyakṣād ity arthaḥ / | The meaning is: from perception of the form "this cloth [exists] here in these threads" and so forth. |
athāpi syāt pratyakṣatvamasyā buddher asiddham iti / yadyevaṃ kiñcidatra bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ vaktavyam / | If it should be argued that "the perceptual nature of this cognition is not established," then in that case some invalidating means of knowledge must be stated here. |
yato 'pratyakṣatā syāt / | By which [its] non-perceptual nature would be [established]. |
athāsatyapi bādhake pramāṇe pratyakṣatvam asyā na bhaved evaṃ tarhi rūpādivijñānasyāpi bhavadīyasya pratyakṣatvaṃ na bhaved viśeṣābhāvāt // | If, even in the absence of an invalidating means of knowledge, this [cognition's] perceptual nature would not be [accepted], then your cognition of color and other [qualities] would also not be perceptual, due to [there being] no difference [between the cases]. |
tadatretyādinā pratividhatte | [The author] responds to this with [the words] beginning with "tadatra." |
tadatra vṛttir nāstīti prāgabhedena sādhitam / | That "there is no subsistence here" has been established previously in a general way. |
ihetyasti naca jñānaṃ tadrūpāpratibhāsanāt // | There is no cognition [of the form] "here [it is]" because that form does not appear [in cognition]. |
tadvyekavṛttibhājaivetyādinā prāk sāmānyenaivānekasminnekasya vṛttir apāstā / | By [the passage] beginning with "tadvyekavṛttibhājai," the subsistence of one [thing] in many has previously been rejected in a general way. |
yaccedam ucyate pratyakṣata eva vṛttiḥ siddhā"ihedam iti buddhita" iti, tadapyalaukikam / | As regards the assertion that "the notion [that] 'this [subsists] herein' is established by direct perception alone", this too is extraordinary. |
nahīha śṛṅge gauriha tantuṣu paṭa ityeva loke vikalpikāpi dhīḥ pravartate / | For in ordinary experience, not even an imaginative cognition occurs [in the form] "the cow [subsists] in this horn" or "the cloth [subsists] in these threads". |
kiṃ tarhi iha gavi śṛṅgaṃ paṭe tantava iti / | Rather, [the cognition is that] "the horn [is] in the cow" [and] "the threads [are] in the cloth". |
nāpyadhyakṣacetasi tantvādisamavetaṃ tadvyatireki vastrādirūpamābhāsate / | Nor does the form of the cloth etc., as distinct from and inherent in the threads etc., appear in perceptual consciousness. |
naca vivekenāpratibhāsite satīdam iha vartata iti dhīr bhavet / | And when [two things] are not manifested as distinct, there cannot be the cognition that "this subsists in that". |
nahi kuṇḍādau vivekināmapratibhāsamāne payasi bhavati salilamiheti pratyayaḥ // | For when the water is not manifested to discriminating persons as distinct from the pond etc., there is no cognition [of the form] "water is here". |
kṛtsnaikadeśaśabdābhyāmayaṃ cārthaḥ prakāśyate / | And this meaning is expressed by the words "in entirety" and "in part": |
nairaṃśyenāsya kiṃ vṛttiḥ kiṃ vā tasyānyathaiva sā // | [Does] its subsistence [occur] as an impartite whole, or does that [subsistence occur] in some other way? |
yathā pātrādisaṃsthasya śrīphalāder yathāthavā / | Like [the subsistence] of a bilva fruit etc. situated in a dish etc., or like |
anekāsanasaṃsthasya caitrāder upalakṣitā // | [the subsistence] of Caitra etc. observed [when] situated on multiple seats. |
kṛtsnaśabdena hi yādṛśaṃ svarūpamanaṃśaṃ kiṃ tathaiva nairaṃśyena sarvāvayaveṣu tasya vṛttir yathā kvacid bhājanāvasthitasya śrīphalāder upalakṣitetyayam arthaḥ prakāśyate, āhosvid anyathā yathānekapīṭhādhiśayitasya caitrāder upalakṣitetyayam ekadeśaśabdena prakāśyata iti / | By the word "entirety" this meaning is expressed: whether its nature as impartite [subsists] in that very way in all components through partlessness, as observed in the case of a bilva fruit etc. situated in some vessel; or differently, as observed in the case of Caitra etc. lying on multiple seats—this is what is expressed by the word "part". |
yatkiñcidetat / | Be that as it may. |
yadapyudyotakāreṇoktam ekasminnavayavini kṛtsnaikadeśaśabdapravṛttyasambhavādayukto 'yaṃ praśnaḥ kimekadeśena vartetātha kṛtsno vartata iti / | Moreover, what Uddyotakara has said—that this question "does it subsist in part or in entirety?" is improper due to the impossibility of applying the words "entirety" and "part" to a single composite whole. |
kṛtsnam iti khalvaśeṣābhidhānam, ekadeśa iti cānekatve sati kasyacidabhidhānam, tāvimau kṛtsnaikadeśaśabdāvekasminnavayavinyanupapannāviti tadapyanenaiva pratyuktam / | For "entirety" indeed refers to [something] complete, and "part" refers to something [particular] when there is multiplicity—these two words "entirety" and "part" being impossible [to apply] to a single composite whole—that too is refuted by this very [argument]. |
tathā ca loke kṛtsnaḥ padaḥ kuṇḍe vartate ekadeśena vetyevaṃ padādiṣu kṛtsnaikadeśaśabdapravṛttir dṛśyata eva / | And thus, in common usage, [expressions like] "the whole foot is in the pot" or "part [of the foot] is [in the pot]" – in such cases involving feet and other [things], the application of terms denoting whole and part is indeed observed. |
naceyam upacariteti yuktam, askhalad gatitvād iti prāgabhihitam etat // | This [usage] cannot properly be [considered] figurative, as has been stated before, because of [its] unhindered application. |
evaṃ vāyuparyantaṃ caturvidhaṃ dravyam apāstam / | Thus the four kinds of substance up to [and including] Air have been rejected. |
ātmākhyaṃ tu prāg evātmaparīkṣāyāṃ nirastam / | The substance called "Soul," however, has already been rejected in the examination of Soul. |
idānīm ākāśakāladiṅmanasāṃ pratiṣedhārtham āha samāśritā ityādi / | Now, for the purpose of refuting Ākāśa, Time, Space and Mind, he states "samāśritā" etc. |
samāśritāḥ kvacicchabdā vināśitvādihetutaḥ / | "Sounds must reside somewhere because of [their] perishability and other [such characteristics]." |
tatrākāśākhyaṃ tāvad dravyaṃ pareṇa sādhyate astyākāśākhyaṃ dravyaṃ nityam ekaṃ bhuviśabdaliṅgaṃ, śabdo 'sya guṇatvaliṅgam / | Among these, first the substance called Ākāśa is established by the opponent [thus]: "There exists a substance called Ākāśa, [which is] permanent, one, all-pervading, having sound as its indicator, and sound is the indicator of its being a quality." |
prayogaḥ ye ye vināśitvotpattimattvādidharmopetās te kvacid āśritāḥ yathā ghaṭadīpādayaḥ tathācāmī śabdāḥ, tasmāt kvacidāśritari ebhir bhavitavyam yo 'sāvāśrayo 'mīṣāṃ sa sāmarthyādvyoma ākāśaṃ bhaviṣyati / | The argument [goes]: "Whatever things possess the properties of perishability, producibility and such, they reside somewhere, like jars, lamps and such things; and these sounds [are such]; therefore they must have some substratum, and that substratum of these [sounds] must, by [force of] capability, be Ākāśa." |
tathā hyayaṃśabdo na pṛthivyādīnāṃ caturṇāṃ guṇo yuktaḥ, pratyakṣatve satyakāraṇaguṇapūrvakatvāt, ayāvad dravyabhāvitvāt, āśrayādanyatropalabdheś ca / | For this sound cannot reasonably be a quality of the four [substances] beginning with Earth, because while being perceptible, [it is] not preceded by qualities in [its] cause, because [it does] not last as long as [its] substance [lasts], and because [it is] perceived elsewhere than [in its] substratum. |
yathoktadharmaviparītā hi sparśavatāṃ guṇā dṛṣṭāḥ / | For the qualities of tangible things are observed to be opposite to the aforementioned properties. |
pratyakṣatve satīti viśeṣaṇaṃ pākajaiḥ paramāṇugatair anekāntatvaparihārārtham / | The qualification "while being perceptible" is [given] for the purpose of avoiding the uncertainty regarding [qualities] produced by heating [and] residing in atoms. |
bāhyendriyapratyakṣatvād ātmāntaragrāhyatvād ahaṅkāreṇa vibhaktagrahaṇāc ca nātmano guṇaḥ / | Sound cannot be a quality of the Soul, [for three reasons]: because it is perceptible by external sense-organs, because it is perceptible by other Souls, [and] because it is perceived as distinct from the 'I-notion'. |
ātmaguṇānāṃ hi sukhādīnām etad vaiparītyadarśanāt / | For [all] qualities of the Soul, such as pleasure and so forth, are seen to be contrary to these [characteristics]. |
śrotragrāhyatvāc ca na dekkālamanasām / | And [Sound] cannot be a quality of Space, Time and Mind, because it is apprehensible by the Auditory Organ. |
ataḥ pāriśeṣyād guṇo bhūtvākāśasya liṅgam / | Therefore, by the method of elimination, [Sound] must be a quality [of Ākāśa] and [hence] becomes the indicative of Ākāśa. |
taccākāśaṃ śabdaliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvād ekaṃ sarvatropalabhyamānaguṇatvāt vibhuguṇavattvāt / | This Ākāśa must be one, since it has Sound as its only general indicative and lacks specific indicatives; [and] being that whose quality is perceived everywhere, [and] having an all-pervading quality. |
anāśritatvāc ca dravyam / akṛtakatvān nityam ityeṣā prakriyā pareṣām // | And being unsupported [by anything else], it must be a substance; and being uncreated, it must be eternal - such is the reasoning process of others. |
ādityādītyādinā kālasādhanamāha | By [the verse beginning with] "āditya" etc., he states the proof of Time. |
ādityādikriyādravyavyatirekanibandhanam / parāparādivijñānaṃ ghaṭādipratyayo yathā // valīpalitakārkaśyagatyādipratyayādidam / | The cognition of 'prior', 'posterior' and so forth must have as its basis something different from substances with motion like the sun etc., just like the notion of jar and such things, [and different from] this notion of wrinkles, grey hair, roughness, movement and so forth. |
yato vilakṣaṇaṃ hetuḥ sa ca kālaḥ kileṣyate // | Because it is distinct [from these], that cause which is accepted is indeed Time. |
dravyaśabdena valīpalitādayo grahītavyāḥ / | By the term "substance" [here], wrinkles, grey hair and so forth should be understood. |
paraḥ pitā, aparaḥ putraḥ, yugapat, ciraṃ, kṣipraṃ, kriyate, kṛtaṃ, kariṣyate ceti yadetat parāprādijñānaṃ tadādityādikriyādravyavyatiriktapadārthanibandhanam, alīpalitādipratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt, ghaṭādipratyayavat | [The notions of] "posterior father," "prior son," "simultaneous," "for a long time," "soon," "is being done," "was done," "will be done" — all such knowledge of priority and posteriority must be based on some entity different from substances with motion like the sun, because these [notions] are different in character from notions of wrinkles, grey hair and the like, just like notions of jars and similar [things] |
yo hetur asya sa sāmarthyātkālaḥ | That which is the cause of this [knowledge] must be Time, due to [its] capacity [to produce such knowledge] |
tathā hi na tāvad deśakṛto 'yaṃ parāparādipratyayaḥ | For this notion of priority and posteriority is certainly not produced by Space |
paradigbhāgāvasthite 'pi sthavire para iti jñānotpatteḥ | Because even when an old man is standing in the posterior direction, [we have] the arising of the knowledge [that he is] "posterior" |
tathāparadigbhāgāvasthāyinyapi putre 'para iti | And similarly, even when a son is standing in the anterior direction, [we say he is] "prior" |
nāpi valīpalitādikṛtaḥ, tat pratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt | Nor is it produced by wrinkles, grey hair and such [things], because it is different in character from the notion of these |
nāpi kriyākṛtaḥ, tajjñānavilakṣaṇatvād eva | Nor is it produced by action, precisely because it is different in character from the knowledge of that |
tathā ca sūtram | And thus [states] the sūtra |
aparaṃ paraṃ yugapad ayugapacciraṃ kṣipram iti kālaliṅgānīti | "Prior, posterior, simultaneous, non-simultaneous, long time, and soon — these are the indicators of Time" |
nityatvaikatvādayo dharmā ākāśavad evāsya boddhavyāḥ | The properties [of Time] such as eternality and unity are to be understood just as [they are] in the case of Space |
pūrvāparādibuddhibhyo digevamanumīyate | Space is inferred from cognitions of "front," "back" and so forth in this way |
krameṇa jñānajātyā ca manaso 'numitir mama | The mind is inferred by me from the succession and generic character of cognitions |
cakṣurādivibhinnaṃ ca kāraṇaṃ samapekṣate | And [cognition] requires a cause distinct from the eyes and other [sense organs] |
krameṇa jātā rūpādipratipattī rathādivat | Cognitions of form and other [qualities] arise successively, just like [the perception of] a chariot and other [objects]. |
mūrttaṃ darvyam avadhiṃ kṛtvā mūrteṣveva dravyeṣu tasmād idaṃ pūrveṇa, dakṣiṇena, paścimena uttareṇa, pūrvadakṣiṇena, dakṣiṇāpareṇa, aparottareṇa uttarapūrveṇa, adhastād upariṣṭād iti daśa pratyayā amī yato bhavanti sa digiti | Taking a corporeal substance as the reference point, there arise with respect to [other] corporeal substances these ten notions [such as] "this [is] to the east, to the south, to the west, to the north, to the southeast, to the southwest, to the northwest, to the northeast, below [and] above of that" - that [entity] from which [these arise] is Space. |
tathāca sūtram ita idam iti yatas taddiśo liṅgam iti | Thus says the Sūtra: "That from which [arises] the notion 'this [is] from there' is the mark of Space." |
yata ete viśeṣapratyayāḥ, naca viśeṣapratyayā ākasmikā yuktāḥ naca, paramparaṃ mūrtadravyavyapekṣā, itaretarāśrayatvenobhayābhāvaprasaṅgāt, tasmād anyanimittāsambhavād diśa etāni liṅgāni | Since these are specific notions, and specific notions cannot arise randomly, nor can they depend mutually on corporeal substances (as that would lead to mutual dependence and thus the non-existence of both), therefore, due to the impossibility of any other cause, these are the marks of Space. |
tasyāś ca diśaḥ kālavadekatvavibhutvādayo guṇā boddhavyāḥ | And of this Space, qualities like unity, all-pervasiveness and others should be understood [to be] like [those] of Time. |
ekatve 'pi diśaḥ kāryaviśeṣaṇāt prācyādibhedena nānātvam | Though Space is one, [its apparent] diversity through distinctions like 'east' etc. [arises] from the specification of [its] effects. |
prayogaḥ yaditat pūrvaparādijñānaṃ tan mūrtadravya{bhinna---}padārthanibandhanam, tatpratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt sukhādijñānavad iti | The formal argument [is]: This knowledge of 'before', 'after' etc. must be based on a substance different from corporeal substances, because it is distinct from the cognition of those [corporeal substances], like the knowledge of pleasure etc. |
manaso liṅgam āha krameṇetyādi | [The text] states the mark of Mind [beginning with] "successively" etc. |
yugapad anekendriyārthasannikarṣasānnidhye 'pi krameṇa jñānotpattidarśanādād astīndriyārthavyatiriktaṃ kāraṇāntaraṃ yasya sannidhānāsannidhānābhyāṃ jñānasyotpattyanutpattī bhavata iti | Even when contact between multiple sense-organs and [their] objects is simultaneously present, because cognitions are seen to arise successively, there exists some other cause distinct from sense-organs and objects, through whose presence and absence the arising and non-arising of cognition occurs. |
tasmāt krameṇa jñānajātyā jñānotpattyā manaso 'numitiḥ kriyate | Therefore, from the successive arising of cognitions of [the same] type, the inference of Mind is made. |
tathāca sūtram yugapajjñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam iti | Thus says the Sūtra: "The non-arising of simultaneous cognitions is the mark of Mind." |
prayogaḥ yeyaṃ rūpādipratipattiḥ sā cakṣurādivyatiriktakāraṇāpekṣiṇī krameṇa jāyamānatvāt, rathādivad iti | The formal argument [is]: This cognition of form etc. depends on a cause distinct from the eye etc., because it arises successively, like [the perception of] a chariot etc. |
upāttādītyādinā pratividhatte upāttādimahābhūtahetutvāṅgīkṛter dhvaniḥ / siddhā evāśritāḥ śabdās teṣvityādyamasādhanam // | Since sound is already accepted as having its cause in the acknowledged and [other] great elements, [and since] sounds are already established as subsisting in them, the first [logical] reason is not a [valid] proof. |
yadi sāmānyenāśritatvamātrameṣāṃ sādhyate śabdānāṃ tadā siddhasādhyatā hetoḥ / tathā hi śabdā upāttānupāttamahābhūtahetukā iṣyante / | If only the mere subsistence of these sounds in something in general is sought to be proved, then the reason proves what is already established. For sounds are indeed accepted as having their cause in the acknowledged and unacknowledged great elements. |
teṣu ca bhūteṣu tatkāryatayā samāśritā eva / | And [sounds] certainly subsist in these elements as being their effects. |
tat pratibaddhātmalābhatayā kāryāṇāṃ kāraṇāśritatvāt / | Because effects subsist in their causes due to their nature being inseparably connected [with them]. |
upāttāni cittacaittaiḥ svīkṛtāni / | The "acknowledged" [elements] are those accepted along with citta and caitta. |
ādiśabdenānupāttamahābhūtahetukatvaparigrahaḥ / | By the word "ādi", the causality of unacknowledged great elements is included. |
teṣviti / | [The word] "teṣu" [means] "in those [elements]." |
itīti / tasmād ity arthaḥ / | [The word] "iti" means "therefore." |
ādyam iti "samāśritāḥ kvacicchabdā" ityādinā yaduktaṃ tadasādhanaṃ siddhisādhyatādoṣād iti bhāvaḥ // | "The first [reason]" refers to what was stated beginning with "sounds subsist somewhere" - [this] is not a [valid] proof due to the fault of proving what is [already] established - this is the meaning. |
ekavyāpidhruvavyomasamavāyastu siddhyati / | But the inherence [of sounds] in ākāśa, which is one, all-pervading and eternal, is [not] established. |
naiṣāmanvayavaikalyād akramādyāptitas tathā // | And also because there would be [in their case] absence of succession and so forth, as also [because of] universal contact. |
naiṣām iti / | "[The word] 'naiṣām' [connects with what was said before]." |
pratijñāyāścānumānavirodhitvam iti darśayati akramādyāptitastatheti / | [The text] shows that the opponent's thesis contradicts inference through the words "and also because of absence of succession and so forth." |
yathoktaṃ nabhaḥsamavāyitvam eṣaṃ na siddhyatīti sambandhaḥ / | This connects with what was said before that "their inherence in ākāśa is not established." |
yadi hi nityaikanabhodravyasamavetā amī syuḥ, tadā sakṛdutpannānekaśabdavadatatkālā api śabdā abhimata eva kāle syuḥ, avikālakāraṇatvāt, ekāśrayatvācca / | For if these [sounds] were inherent in the eternal, single substance ākāśa, then just like multiple sounds produced simultaneously, even sounds [produced] at different times would exist at the intended time, because their cause would be unchanging and because they would have the same substrate. |
naca nityasya parāpekṣāstīti pratipāditam etat / | And it has been established that what is eternal cannot depend on anything else. |
nacāpyanupakāriṇaḥ samavāyitvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | Nor is it logical for something non-beneficial to have inherence, as this would lead to unwanted consequences. |
tadevamakramatvaprasaṅgaḥ / | Thus there would follow the absence of sequence. |
ādiśabdena sarvapuruṣair grahaṇādidoṣaprasaṅgaś ca / | And by the word "ādi" [is meant] the unwanted consequence of perception by all persons and so forth. |
tathāhyākāśātmakam eva śrotraṃ nabhaścaikam eva, tataś ca tat prāptānāṃ sarveṣām api śabdānāṃ śravaṇaṃ bhavet, nahi nirvibhāgatvena tasyāyaṃ pratiniyamo yuktaḥ, idam ātmīyaṃ śrotram idaṃ parakīyam iti / | For the auditory organ consists of ākāśa and ākāśa is indeed one only, therefore all sounds reaching it would be heard, since due to its partless nature, the restriction "this is my auditory organ, this belongs to another" would not be possible. |
syān matam tadīyādṛṣṭābhisaṃskṛtā yā karṇaśaṣkulī tat paricchinnasyaivākāśasya śrotratvam ata eva na mukhanāsikādivivarāntareṇa śabdopalambho jāyate, tasyā eva ca karṇaśaṣkulyā upaghātād bādhiryādir vyavasthāpyata iti / | One might think: "The portion of ākāśa delimited by the ear-cavity that has been affected by one's unseen merit [constitutes] one's auditory organ, which is why sound-perception does not occur through other openings like the mouth and nostrils, and deafness etc. are established through damage to that very ear-cavity." |
etad ayuktam eva niraṃśatayākāśasyaivaṃvidhavibhāgasyāyogāt / | This is certainly incorrect because such division is impossible for ākāśa due to its being partless. |
naca parikalpitā avayavavibhāgā bhāvikavastuvibhāgasaṃsādhyām arthakriyāmāropavaśāt sampādayitum īśate | Imagined component parts cannot bring about, through mere superimposition, any effective action that can only be accomplished by real physical divisions |
nahi jalamanala ityupacaryamāṇaṃ jvalati dahati vā | For indeed, water that is metaphorically referred to as "fire" neither burns nor blazes |
atha matamākāśasya deśa iti saṃyogasyāvyāpyavṛttitvam ucyata iti | [If] it is claimed that "what is meant by [speaking of] a 'part' of ākāśa is that contact with it is non-pervasive" |
etad api pratyuktam eva | This too has already been answered |
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