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naca buddher vibhedo 'sti gauṇamukhyatayeṣṭayoḥ // | And there is no difference in cognition between what is accepted as primary and secondary. |
na ca bhavanto bahuṣvekavacanam icchanti / | And you [plural] do not accept the singular number for plural objects. |
athāpi syād avayavigatāṃ saṃkhyāmādāyāvayaveṣu vastrādiśabdo 'parityaktātmababhidheyagataliṅgasaṃkhya eva vartata iti / | It might be argued that "the word 'cloth' etc., while retaining its own gender and number pertaining to what it denotes, applies to the parts by taking on the number belonging to the whole." |
tadapyayuktam iti darśayann āha nacetyādi / | Showing that this too is incorrect, [the author] says "na ca" etc. |
yadi hi bhākto 'yaṃ vyapadeśaḥ syāt tadā gauṇamukhyārthaviṣayāyā buddher vibhedo vailakṣaṇyaṃ skhaladgatitvena prāpnoti, naca bhedo 'sti / | For if this designation were figurative, then the distinction of cognition regarding the primary and secondary meanings would necessarily be halting in nature, but there is no [such] distinction. |
tathā hi sarvaṃ vāso raktamityatra naivaṃ buddhiḥ pravartate "na ca vastraṃ raktaṃ kiṃtu tat kāraṇabhūtās tantavo raktā" iti / | For instance, when [one says] "the entire cloth is red," the cognition does not occur as "the cloth is not red, but rather the threads that are its cause are red." |
cakārān na ca sarvaśabdavācyaṃ vāso yuṣmābhir iṣyate tasyaikatvāt, tat kathaṃ tat saṃkhyāmādāya sarvasabdo vastradishabdarahitovayaveṣu vartate/ | [As indicated] by the particle 'ca': you do not accept that cloth, being one, is denoted by the word 'all'; how then can the word 'all', without the word 'cloth', apply to the parts by taking on its number? |
athavā buddherbhedo nānātvaṃ sosmin gauṇamukhyatveneṣṭayor na vidyate / | Or, the difference of cognition, [that is] diversity, does not exist in what are accepted as secondary and primary in this case. |
nahi tantuvastrayor bhinnaṃ rūpaṃ samupalabhyate rūparasādivat, nacānupalabdhibhinnarūpayor gauṇamukhyabhāvaḥ sambhavati // | Different forms are not perceived between the threads and cloth as [they are] between color, taste, etc.; and when different forms of the two are not perceived, there cannot be a relationship of primary and secondary [between them]. |
nanu cetyādinā śaṅkarasvāminaḥ parihāramāśaṅkate | With [the words] "nanu ca" etc., [the author] anticipates the response of Śaṅkarasvāmin. |
nanu cāvyāpyavṛttitvāt saṃyogasya na raktatā / | "Since conjunction has a non-pervasive occurrence, the redness [of color] |
sarvasyāsajyate nāpi sarvamāvṛtamīkṣyate // | does not adhere to the whole [cloth], nor is the whole [body] seen to be covered." |
sa hyāha rāga ucyate vāsasaḥ kaṣāyakuṅkumādidravyeṇa saṃyogaḥ / | For he says: "What is called the color of cloth is [its] conjunction with substances like red dye, saffron, etc.; |
saṃyogaś cāvyāpyavṛttis tato na rakta ekasmin sarvasya rāgo bhavati / naca vastrādibhiḥ śarīraikadeśasyāvaraṇe sarvasyāvaraṇam iti // | and conjunction is non-pervasive in occurrence; therefore when one [part] is colored, the coloring does not occur in the whole; and similarly when one part of the body is covered by cloth etc., there is not covering of the whole." |
tadetad ayuktam ityādarśayati nanu cānaṃśaka ityādi / | [The author] shows that this [explanation] is incorrect with [the verse] beginning "nanu cānaṃśaka." |
nanu cānaṃśake dravye kimavyāptaṃ vyavasthitam / svarūpaṃ tadavasthāne bhedaḥ siddho 'ta eva vā // | "In a partless substance, what [form] could remain that is not pervaded [by conjunction]? If such a [non-pervaded] nature were to remain, then difference would be established from that very [fact]." |
bahudeśasthitistena naivaikasmin kṛtāspadā / | "Therefore existence in many places is not possible for a single [entity]; |
tataḥ siddhā paṭādīnām aṇubhyo 'nekarūpatā // | hence it is established that things like cloth have multiple forms different from [their constituent] atoms." |
yadi hi paṭādirekam eva dravyaṃ, tadā kiṃ tatra niraṃśake dravye kaṣāyādibhiravyāptaṃ, yenāvyāpyavṛttiḥ saṃyogaḥ syāt | If [there is] indeed a cloth [that is] a single substance, then what in that impartite substance would not be pervaded by the red color [and] by virtue of which the conjunction would be non-pervasive? |
athāvyāptasvarūpasyāvasthānamaṅgīkriyate tadā tadavasthāne bhedo 'ta evasiddhaḥ vyāptāvyāptayor virodhenaikasvabhāvatvāyogāt | If the existence of something unpervaded is accepted, then [the] difference in that state is established by that very fact, because it is impossible for [something] pervaded and unpervaded to have the same nature due to [their] mutual contradiction. |
nacaikasya pṛthutaradeśāvasthānaṃ yuktam anaṃśatvāt | And it is not possible for a single [entity] to occupy a larger space, due to [its] being partless. |
alpabahutarāvayavārambhānārambhādikṛto viśeṣa iti cet avayavā eva tarhyalpabahutarās tathātathotpadyamānāḥ sthūlasūkṣmādivyavasthānibandhanaṃ santu kiṃ tadārabdhenāvayavinā tasyādṛṣṭasāmarthyāt | If [you say] the difference is due to [the thing] being made up of fewer or more parts, then let those parts themselves, appearing as fewer or more, be the basis of the determinations of 'gross', 'subtle' etc. - what [use] is there of the composite made up of those [parts], given that its efficacy is not observed? |
sthūlasūkṣmādipyavayavālpabahutve 'vayavināṃ niraṃśatayā parasparaṃ kaścid viśeṣo 'sti yena sthūlasūkṣmādibhedo bhavet | Even when [there are] fewer or more parts [that are] gross, subtle etc., there cannot be any mutual distinction among the composites due to [their] being partless, by which [there] could be a distinction of gross, subtle etc. |
teṣām avayavālpabahutvagrahaṇakṛte viśeṣe 'vayavamātramevābhyupagataṃ syāt tatraiva sthūlādivyavahārāt tataścāṇumātram eva dṛśyatvenābhyupetaṃ syāt | If the distinction is held to be based on the apprehension of fewer or more parts, then only the parts would be admitted [to exist], since the usage of [terms like] 'gross' etc. [would apply] only there, and consequently only atoms would be accepted as perceptible. |
sthūlasūkṣmāvyatirekeṇānyasya dṛśyamānatvāt | Because nothing other than [what is] gross or subtle is perceived. |
api cāvyāpyavṛttiḥ saṃyoga iti ko 'rthaḥ | Moreover, what is the meaning of [saying] "conjunction is non-pervasive"? |
yadi sarvaṃ dravyaṃ na vyāpnotīyarthaḥ tadayuktam | If the meaning is that it does not pervade the entire substance, that is not correct. |
dravyasya sarvaśabdāviṣayatvābhyupagamāt | Because it is accepted that the word 'entire' cannot apply to a substance. |
athāśrayasyaikadeśe vartata iti tadapyayuktaṃ tasyaikadeśāsambhavāt | If [it means] that it exists in one part of its substratum, that too is not correct, because it cannot have one part. |
tadārambhake 'vayave vartata iti cet yadyevam avayavānām eva raktatvād avayavirūpamaraktam iti raktāraktaṃ samaṃ dṛśyeta | If [you say] it exists in the component that makes it up, if that is so, then since only the components would be red, the form of the composite would not be red, [and thus] red and non-red would appear equal. |
kiṃ ca yo 'pyasau tadārambhako 'vayavaḥ sa yadyavayavirūpas tadā tatrāpyekadeśavṛttitvaṃ saṃyogasyeti tulyaḥ paryanuyogaḥ | Moreover, if that component which makes it up has the same form as the composite, then there too the conjunction would exist in [only] one part - thus the same question [applies]. |
athāṇurūpas tadātīndriyatvād aṇūnāṃ tadāśrito 'pi saṃyogo 'tīndriya eveti raktopalambho na syāt | If [you say] it has the form of an atom, then because atoms are beyond the senses, the conjunction residing in it would also be beyond the senses, [and thus] the perception of red would not occur. |
syān mataṃ yathā vyāptiraṅgulirūpasyāśrayopalabdhāvevopalabdhirucyate naivaṃ saṃyogasyāśrayopalabdhāvevopalabdhir iti tato 'sāvavyāpyavṛttir ucyata iti / | One might argue thus: "Pervasiveness [vyāpti] means that the form of a finger is perceived only when its substratum is perceived; similarly, when conjunction [saṃyoga] is said to be non-pervasive, it means that it is not perceived only when its substratum is perceived." |
tadetad asamyak / | This [argument] is not correct. |
na hi saṃyogasyāśrayānupalabdhāvupalabdhirasti / | For indeed, conjunction cannot be perceived when its substratum is not perceived. |
yathā ghaṭapiśācasaṃyogasya, tataś ca rāgasyāpyadṛṣṭāśrayasyānupalabdher āśrayopalabdhāvevopalabdhir iti so 'pyevaṃ vyāpyavṛttir bhavet / | For example, [consider] the conjunction between a jar and a ghost - [it is not perceived because the ghost is not perceived]. Therefore, since color too is not perceived when its substratum is unseen, it would [by this reasoning] also have to be considered pervasive. |
syād etat avayavāntareṣvarakteṣu samavetasya dravyasyopalabdhāv api na saṃyogātmakasya rāgasyopalabdhis tena nāsyāśrayopalabdhir iti tadapyayuktam / | [The opponent] might say: "Even when a substance inhering in other uncolored parts is perceived, there is no perception of color which is of the nature of conjunction; therefore [conjunction] is not perceived even when its substratum is perceived." This too is incorrect. |
evaṃ hi raktāraktasamavetasyāvayavina ekatvād rakte 'pyavayave rāgasya taddvāreṇānupalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ, āśrayopalambhe 'pi tasyānupalambhāt / | For in this way, since the whole that inheres in both colored and uncolored parts is one, even when a part is colored, the color would [absurdly] not be perceived through it, because it would not be perceived even when its substratum is perceived. |
na cāśrayopalambhād anyasaṃyogagrahaṇābhyupāyo 'sti / | And there is no other means of apprehending conjunction apart from the perception of its substratum. |
tasmān naikarūpo viṣayo yuktaḥ / | Therefore, an object of single form is not logically possible. |
anekarūpo 'pi bhavanasāmarthyādaṇusañcayātmaka evāvabhidyate / sambhavadavayavasyaikatvāyogāt / | Even when [an object] has multiple forms, by virtue of its existence, it is differentiated only as an aggregate of atoms, since unity of possible parts is impossible. |
ataḥ siddhā ghaṭādīnām aṇurūpatā tena nīlādi paramāṇūnām ākāra iti siddham / | Thus it is established that jars and similar [objects] exist only in atomic form, and therefore blue and other [qualities] are [merely] the form of atoms - this is established. |
anyasyaikarūpasya viṣayasyāsambhavāt // | [This is so] due to the impossibility of there being any other single-formed object. |
yaccoktaṃ "na cāṇu vacanaṃ bhaved" iti tatrāha avijñātārthatattva ityādi / | Regarding what was said [earlier] that "there could not be any word [denoting] atom", to this [the author] responds with "those who do not know the true nature" etc. |
lokas tatkalpitāpekṣaḥ paramāṇurihocyate // tatkalpitāpekṣa iti / | The atom spoken of here [depends on] people's reliance on what has been assumed [by them]. "Dependent on what has been assumed" means this. |
parihārāntaram āha nimittetyādi / | [The author] states another refutation beginning with "nimitte" etc. |
nimittanirapekṣā vā saṃjñeyaṃ tādṛśi sthitā / saṅketānvayinī yadvannirvitte 'pīśvaraśrutiḥ // | Or this designation, as applied to such [an entity], may exist without any basis, following mere convention, just as the term "lord" [is applied] even to one who has no wealth. |
tādṛśīti / anaṃśe 'pratighe / | "To such" means to what is partless and non-resistant. |
yathā daridre 'pīśvaraśrutiḥ saṅketavaśād aiśvaryākhyaṃ nimittamantareṇa pravartate, tadvadiyamapyaṇuśrutir ityadoṣaḥ // | Just as the term "lord" applies even to a poor person by force of convention without any [actual] basis of lordship, similarly this term "atom" [may apply] - thus there is no fault. |
evaṃ tāvat sāmānyenaivāvayavair ārabdhamānārabdhaṃ vā sthūlamekaṃ dravyaṃ na yujyata iti pratipāditam / | Thus far it has been established in general that a single gross substance, whether produced or not produced from parts, is not logically possible. |
idānīṃ yenāvayavī prārabdha iṣyate, tasya viśeṣeṇa dūṣaṇam āha eketyādi / | Now [the author] states the specific refutation of that from which the composite whole is claimed to be produced, beginning with "eka" etc. |
ekāvayavyanugatā naiva tantukarādayaḥ / | Threads, [pieces of] straw and such things are indeed not pervaded by a single composite whole. |
anekatvādyathāsiddhāḥ kaṭakuṭyakuṭādayaḥ // | The [alleged] components, such as kaṭa, kuṭī, and kuṭa [and so forth], are established as being multiple. |
athavā yadekaṃ tadekadravyāśritaṃ yathaikaḥ paramāṇuḥ ekaṃ cāvayavisaṃjñitaṃ dravyam iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ / | Or, what is one must reside in a single substance, like a single atom, and the substance called "composite" is one; thus there follows a perception contradicting the pervader. |
prasaṅgasādhanaṃ caitat / | And this is a prasaṅga-type proof. |
prayogadvaye 'pi viparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇam āha vṛtter ayuktir bādhikā prameti / | For both applications [of the argument], [the author] states the annulling proof that invalidates the opposite [view]: "The impossibility of occurrence is the annulling proof." |
avayaveṣu yāvayavino vṛttis tasyā ayogaḥ pramāṇair aghaṭanaṃ tadatra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam // | The impossibility—[i.e.,] the non-establishment through valid means of cognition—of the whole's occurrence in [its] parts is here the annulling proof. |
kathaṃ punar ayoga ity āha taddhītyādi / | [Someone asks:] "How [is there] this impossibility?" [The author] states [in response] "For that..." etc. |
taddhyekavṛttibhājaiva rūpeṇāvayavāntare / varteta yadi vānyena na prakārāntaraṃ yataḥ // | For it would occur in another part either with the very same form in which it shares occurrence [in one part], or with another [form], since there is no other way. |
tatra tenaiva nānyatra vṛttir asyāvakalpate / | In this [matter], its occurrence in another [part] is not possible with that very same [form]. |
tena kroḍīkṛtatvena nānyathā tatra vṛttimat // | And [if it occurred] otherwise than with that encompassed form, it would not have occurrence there [at all]. |
tadekaṃ dravyam ekavayavakroḍīkṛtaṃ yat tasya rūpaṃ tenaivāvayavāntareṣu vartate, yadvānyeneti pakṣadvayaṃ, nahi vastutastattvānyatvābhyāmanyatprakārāntaram asti / | That one substance which is encompassed by one part—does its form occur in other parts with that very [form], or with another? [These are] the two alternatives, for in reality there is no other way besides identity and difference. |
tatra na tāvadādyaḥ pakṣas tenaivāvayavena tasya kroḍīkṛtatvāt kuto 'vayavāntare vartitum asyāvasaras tadānīm eva syāt | The first alternative cannot be accepted, for since it [the substance] is entirely embraced by that very [first] component, how could it have any opportunity to subsist in another component at that same time? |
anyathā hi yadyanyatrāpi varteta, tadātrābhimate dravye tasya vṛtti sarvātmanā na bhavet | For otherwise, if it were to subsist elsewhere too, then its existence in this intended substance could not be with its complete nature. |
nahi tasyāparaḥ svabhāvo 'sti, yenānyatrāpi varteta, ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt | Indeed it cannot have another nature by which it could subsist elsewhere too, because that would result in the loss of [its] unity. |
pramāṇaṃ racayannāha naivetyādi | [The author], constructing the proof, states [the verse beginning with] "naiva." |
naiva dhātryantarakroḍamadhyās te hi yathā śiśuḥ | Just as a baby indeed does not sit in the lap of another nurse... |
ekakroḍīkṛtaṃ dravyaṃ nāśrayeta tathāparam | ...similarly, a substance embraced by one [component] cannot resort to another. |
prayogaḥ yadekavastukroḍīkṛtaṃ vastu na tat tadānīm evānyatra vartate | [Here is] the application: That which is embraced by one entity does not exist elsewhere at that very time. |
yathaikadhātrīkroḍīkṛtaḥ śiśur na dhātryantarakroḍamadhyāste ekāvayavakroḍīkṛtaṃ ca dravyam iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ | Just as a baby embraced in one nurse's lap does not sit in another nurse's lap, so too [it is with] a substance embraced by one component - this is the perception of contradiction with the pervader. |
tatsambaddhasvabhāvasya hyataddeśe 'pi vṛttitaḥ | Because of the existence of that which has a nature connected with that [first component] even in a place not belonging to that [component]... |
anyenaivātmanā vṛttau naiko 'nekavyavasthitaḥ | ...when existing with a different nature, one [entity] cannot be established as many. |
abhimatāvayavasambaddhasvabhāvasya hi dravyasyātaddeśe 'pyavayavāntare yadi vṛttiḥ syāt, tadā teṣām avayavānām ekadeśatā syāt, tataścaikātmyamekasvabhāvatāvayavānāṃ prāptā | For if a substance whose nature is connected with the intended component were to exist in another component, in a different location, then those components would have one location, and consequently the components would obtain oneness of self [and] oneness of nature. |
kasmātavibhāgataḥ avibhaktarūpatayāvasthitatvāt | Why? Because of [their] non-separation, [that is,] because of [their] existing in an undivided form. |
udyotakarastvāha āśrayāśritadharmanirdeśamātram etat, avayavyavayaveṣu pravartata, iti āśritabhāvalakṣaṇā hi samavāyarūpā prāptirucyata iti tatrāha samavāyātmiketyādi | Udyotakara has said: "This is merely a statement about the substratum and the subsistent - [namely that] the composite operates in the components - for what is called 'inherence' is a presence characterized by the state of being subsistent, which is of the nature of inherence." |
tasyām api vicāro 'yaṃ kopenaiva pradhāvati | This investigation proceeds with regard to that [inherence] also, as if with fury. |
tasyām apyevaṃrūpāyāṃ vṛttāvayavamanantaroditaḥ kimekāvayavasamavetenaiva svabhāvenāvayavāntareṣu vartate, athānyeneti vicāraḥ kumatiracitadoṣajālamasahamānakopādivābhidhāvati | With regard to this kind of presence also, the following investigation rushes forth like anger not tolerating the web of faults created by poor reasoning: "Does [the composite] exist in other components with the same nature as that inherent in one component, or with a different [nature]?" |
yadvā sarvātmanā vṛttāvanekatvaṃ prasajyate | Or else, if [it exists] in its entirety, plurality would follow. |
ekadeśena cāniṣṭā naiko vā na kvacic ca saḥ | And [if it exists] partially, [that is] undesirable; or [in that case] it would not be one, nor would it exist anywhere. |
kadācit taddravyaṃ pratyekamavayaveṣu sarvātmanā vartate, ekadeśena vā | Does that substance exist in each of the components in its entirety, or partially? |
yadi sarvātmanā tadā yāvanto 'vayavās tāvantas tasyātmānaḥ prāpnuvanti, nahi pratyavayavaṃ tasya svabhāvābhede 'sati sarvātmanā vṛttir asti | If [it exists] in its entirety, then it would have as many forms as there are components, for there cannot be existence in entirety in each component unless it has the same nature [in each]. |
asaṃvidyamānenātmanā vṛttyasambhavāt | Because existence is impossible with an unrecognized nature. |
tataś ca sarvātmanā vṛtter yugapadanekakuṇḍādivyavasthitakuvalayādivad anekatvamayavinaḥ prāpnoti | And therefore, due to existing in entirety [in each component], the composite would become multiple, like lotuses situated simultaneously in several ponds. |
athaikadeśeti pakṣas tadānavasthā syād ekadeśānām | If the position is taken that [it exists] partially, then there would be infinite regress of the parts. |
tathā hi yair ekadeśais taddravyamavayaveṣu vartate te 'pi tasyaikadeśā iti, teṣvapyanena vartitavayam, tathaivāpareṣvityaniṣṭhā | For those parts by which that substance exists in the components would also be its parts, in which it would have to exist [partially], and likewise in others - thus [leading to] endlessness. |
athāpi syād yairasāvekadeśair avayaveṣu vartate / | [It might be objected:] "By which parts that [composite whole] exists in [its] components..." |
te tasya svātmabhūtā eva nārthāntarabhūtās tadvyatirekeṇa cāpareṣām ekadeśānām abhāvādato nāniṣṭhā bhaviṣyatītyāśaṅkyāha naiko veti / | "Those [parts] are indeed its own self-nature, not different things, and apart from that [whole] there cannot be other parts" - [anticipating] this objection, [the author] states "it would not be one." |
evaṃ hi satyeko 'vayavī na syād avayavapracayamātrarūpatvāt tasya / | For if this were so, the composite whole would not be one, since it would have the nature of merely an aggregation of parts. |
tathāca sati dṛṣṭapāṇyādisamudāyamātrātmaka evāstāṃ vastu kimaparais tasya svātmabhūtairavayavaiḥ parikalpitaiḥ / | And in that case, let the thing just be what consists of the visible aggregation of hands etc. - what need is there for other imagined parts [supposed to be] its own nature? |
doṣāntaramapyāha na kvacic ca sa iti / | [The author] states another fault [in the opponent's view]: "And it would not exist anywhere." |
vṛttaḥ syād iti śeṣaḥ / | The phrase "would subsist" is to be supplied. |
etaduktaṃ bhavati yadyekadeśāḥ pratyekāvayavinaḥ syus tadāvayave hyavayavī vṛttaḥ syāt / yāvatā naikadeśāḥ pratyekamavayavinaḥ, teṣām ekadeśatvahāniprasaṅgāt / | The meaning is this: If the parts were each [occupied by] the whole, then the whole would subsist in [each] part. However, the parts are not each [occupied by] the whole, because that would result in the loss of their nature as parts. |
nacāparo 'vayavī svarūpeṇāsti / | And there is no other whole [existing] in its own form. |
tat katham avayaveṣvasau vṛtto nāma // | How then could that [whole] be said to subsist in [its] parts? |
svātantryeṇetyādinā śaṅkarasvāminaḥ parihāram āśaṅkate / | With [the phrase] beginning "independently," [the author] anticipates Śaṅkarasvāmin's response. |
svātantryeṇa prasaṅgena sādhanaṃ yat pravartate / svayaṃ tadupalabdhau hi satyaṃ saṅgacchate na tu // | When a reason is adduced, whether directly or as a reductio ad absurdum, it becomes truly applicable only when it is itself apprehended, [and] not otherwise. |
dṛṣṭau vā kvacid etasyā dravyādāvanivāraṇam / atha tasminnadṛṣṭau tu bhede praśnau na yujyate // | If such [subsistence] has been perceived somewhere, [then] it cannot be denied in substances and so forth; if, however, it has not been perceived, then questions about [its] distinction [into parts] are not appropriate. |
etāvat tu bhaved vācyaṃ vṛttir nāstīti tacca na / | All that could be stated [in that case] would be "there is no subsistence," but that [statement] would not be [correct]. |
yuktaṃ pratyakṣataḥ siddher ihedam iti buddhitaḥ // | [This is] because [subsistence] is established through direct perception, as [shown] in cognitions such as "this [exists] here." |
pratyakṣaṃ na tadiṣṭaṃ ced bādhakaṃ kiñciducyatām / | If one does not accept that this is directly perceived, then some refuting argument should be stated. |
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