sanskrit
stringlengths 2
508
| english
stringlengths 2
924
⌀ |
|---|---|
kiṃ ca ghaṭakarṇaśaṣkulyādayo 'pyabhinnaikavyomasaṃsargitayā samānadeśā bhaveyuḥ | Moreover, the jar, ear-drum and similar [objects], by virtue of being in contact with one undivided ākāśa, would [have to] occupy the same location |
yenaiva hi vyomasvabhāvenaikaḥ saṃyujyate tenaivāpare 'pīti, tataścābhimatadeśabhāvina evāpare 'pi ghaṭādayaḥ syuḥ, tat saṃyuktasvabhāvākāśasaṃyogitvāt, taddeśāvasthitaghaṭādivat | For indeed, when one [thing] is conjoined with ākāśa in one form, others are conjoined with it in that same form, and thus other jars etc. would [have to] exist in the intended location, because they are in contact with ākāśa which has the nature of being conjoined [with the first object], like the jar etc. that is situated in that location |
ata eva śabdānām apyekadeśatvaṃ bhavet, tataś ca dūrāsannataradeśabhdeāvasthātipratītā yeyaṃ padārthānāṃ keṣāñcit sā virodhinī syādityevam ādayo doṣā bahavaḥ prasarpanti | For this very reason, sounds too would [have to] be in one location, and consequently the well-known perception that certain things are situated in locations far and near would be contradicted - these and many other such faults arise |
kālādiksādhanayor api sāmānyena siddhasādhyatā viśeṣeṇānvayāsiddhir hetoḥ pratijñāyāś cānumānabādheti darśayati viśiṣṭetyādi | [The author] shows that regarding time and direction, there is both the fallacy of proving what is [already] proven in general and the non-establishment of the connection in particular, as well as inferential contradiction of the thesis |
parāparādivijñānaṃ na kālān na diśaś ca tat | The cognition of [things as] prior, posterior etc. does not [arise] from time nor from direction |
niraṃśaikasvabhāvatvāt paurvāparyādyasambhavaḥ | Because [time and direction] are of a single impartite nature, priority, posteriority etc. are impossible [in them] |
tayoḥ sambandhibhedāccedevaṃ tau niṣphalau nanu // | If [the notions] are said to be based upon differences in [things] related to these two [Space and Time], then these two would become useless, would they not? |
viśiṣṭasamayaḥ paurvāparyādinotpanneṣvevārtheṣu pūrvāparādisaṅketaḥ, tadudbhūto manaskāraḥ ābhogaḥ sa nibandhanamasyeti tathoktam / | "Particular convention" means the understanding that designations like "prior" and "posterior" apply to things produced [in sequence], and the mental attention (ābhoga) arising from that [convention] is said to be the basis for this [notion]. |
ata eva netaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ, viśiṣṭapadārthasaṅketanibandhanatvādasya jñānasyeti / | Therefore there is no fallacy of mutual interdependence, since this cognition is based on convention regarding specific entities. |
ataḥ kāraṇamātre sādhye siddhasādhyatā viśeṣeṇa sādhane 'numānabādhā, ananvayadoṣaś ca pūrvavad iti sūcayan hetośceṣṭaviparītasādhanād viruddhatetidarśayati niraṃśetyādi / | Thus when merely establishing a cause, there is redundancy; when establishing a specific [cause], there is (1) invalidation by inference, (2) lack of concomitance as before, and [the author] shows that (3) the reason is contradictory since it proves the opposite of what is intended, [beginning with] "niraṃśa" [in the base text]. |
tayor iti dikkālayoḥ / | "Of these two" refers to Space and Time. |
parāparādijñānasya niraṃśaikadikkālākhyapadārthanibandhanatvaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭaṃ, tac ca na sidhyati / | What is desired to be proved is that the notion of "prior and posterior" etc. is based on the partless, single entities called Space and Time, but this is not proved. |
tathā hi svākārānurūpaṃ pratyayamutpādayan viṣayo bhavati / | For an object [of cognition] becomes [such] by producing a cognition conforming to its own form. |
na ca niraṃśasya paurvāparyādivibhāgaḥ sambhavati, yena tatkṛtaṃ paurvāparyādijñānaṃ bhavet / | And for something partless, there cannot be any division into "prior" and "posterior" etc., by which there could be a cognition of "prior" and "posterior" produced by it. |
ata iṣṭaviparītasādhanād viruddho hetuḥ / | Therefore, the reason is contradictory because it proves the opposite of what is desired. |
sambandhibhedācced ityanena parasyottaramāśaṅkate / | With "if [the notions] are said to be based on differences in related things," he anticipates the opponent's answer. |
atha matam dikkālasambandhino bhāvā bāhyādhyātmikāḥ pradīpaśarīrādayaḥ, teṣāṃ paurvāparyādi vidyate | [It might be argued that] external and internal entities such as lamps and bodies are related to space and time, [and] among these there exists priority and posteriority |
tatas tayor api dikkālayoḥ sambandhigatametat paurvāparyādi nirdiśyate, tasmān na viruddhatā hetor iti bhāvaḥ | Therefore this priority and posteriority pertaining to [their] relatives is attributed to space and time, [and] hence there is no contradiction in the reason |
evaṃ hi kalpyamāne tau dikkālau niṣphalu syātām | If this is assumed, then these space and time would become useless |
tat sādhyābhimatasya kāryasya tair eva sambandhibhir niṣpāditatvāt | Because what is intended to be accomplished [by space and time] would [already] have been accomplished by those related [entities] themselves |
tathā hi kālaḥ pūrvāparakṣaṇalavanimeṣakāṣṭhākalāmuhūrtāhorātrārddhamāsādipratyayaprasavahetuḥ | For time is held to be the cause of producing notions of priority and posteriority [expressed in units] such as kṣaṇa, lava, nimeṣa, kāṣṭhā, kalā, muhūrta, ahorātra, half-month and so forth |
dik ca pūrvottarādivyavasthāheturiṣyate | And space is considered to be the cause of the arrangement of east, north and so forth |
ayaṃ ca bhedaḥ sakalastayor na svātmani vidyate | And all this differentiation does not exist in their own nature |
bhedeṣu punar astīti vyarthaiva tat parikalpanā | [Since] it exists in the divisions [themselves], therefore that assumption [of space and time] is indeed useless |
cakṣurādyatiriktaṃ tu mano 'smābhir apīṣyate | But mind, as distinct from the eye and other [sense organs], is accepted by us also |
ṣaṇṇāmanantarodbhūtapratyayo yo hi tan manaḥ | For that which is the cognition arising immediately after the six [sense-cognitions] is mind |
nitye tu manasi prāptāḥ pratyayāḥ yaugapadyataḥ | However, if mind is permanent, cognitions would occur simultaneously |
tena hetur iha prokto bhavatīṣṭavighātakṛt | Therefore the reason stated here becomes destructive of what you desire |
viśeṣeṇa tu nityaikamanassādhane 'nanvayaḥ pratijñāyā anumānabādhā viruddhatā ca hetor darśayati nitye tvityādi | But specifically, in proving [the existence of] a permanent and unitary mind, [there is] non-concomitance of the thesis, invalidation by inference, and contradiction of the reason, [which is what] is shown by [the words] beginning with "if permanent" |
iṣṭavidhātakṛd iti | [This is] destructive of what is desired. |
cakṣurādivyatiriktānityakāraṇasāpekṣatvasādhanāt anyathā nityakāraṇatve satyavikalakāraṇatvāt kramotpattir viruddhyeta cetasām | Because it proves [only] the dependence upon an impermanent cause distinct from the eye and other [sense] organs; otherwise, if they had an eternal cause, since the cause would [always] be complete, the successive arising of cognitions would be contradicted. |
tāmeva ca viruddhatāṃ hetor upahāsapūrvakaṃ dṛḍhīkurvann āha saugatetyādi | [The author], confirming with mockery this very contradictory nature of the reason, speaks [beginning with] "saugate-." |
saugatāparanirdiṣṭamanaḥsaṃsiddhyasiddhaye | For the purpose of proving and disproving the mind as postulated by the Buddhists and others. |
sākāramanyathāvṛttaṃ manye sūtram idaṃ kṛtam | I think this sūtra has been composed [to be read] both with and without [the negative prefix]. |
etadevaṃ manye saugatatīrthikayor abhīṣṭasya manasaḥ siddhyasiddhyartham idaṃ "yugapat jñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam" iti sūtraṃ | I think this sūtra stating "the non-simultaneous arising of cognitions is the mark of mind" [serves] for the purpose of proving and disproving the mind as desired by the Buddhist and [other] philosophers. |
ekasmin pakṣe 'kārapraśleṣād iti samudāyārthaḥ | The meaning of the whole is that in one case there is the addition of the letter 'a'. |
avayavārthas tūcyate saugatāścāpare ca tīrthikāstair nirdiṣṭe ca te manasī ceti vigrahaḥ | The meaning of the parts is explained [thus]: the compound means "the Buddhists and other philosophers, and the minds postulated by them." |
tayor yathākramaṃ saṃsiddhyasiddhī, saṃsiddhisahitā vāsiddhiḥ tadarthaṃ tannimittam | For them respectively [there is] proving and disproving, or disproving along with proving - for that purpose, for that reason. |
kathaṃ punar ekaṃ sūtraṃ viruddhamarthadvayaṃ gamayatītyāha sākāramityādi | [To the question] "how then does one sūtra convey two contradictory meanings?" he says [beginning with] "sākāram." |
sahakāreṇa vartata iti | [It] proceeds with [the word] "saha" ("with") |
parakīyamano'siddhyarthamaliṅgam iti praśliṣṭākāro nirdeśaḥ / saugatamanassiddhaye 'nyathā bhavati anakāram ity arthaḥ | The compound contains a conjoined 'a' [which is meant] for disproving the mind [postulated by] others; that is, [when analyzed] differently, [it means] "having no form" for the purpose of disproving the Buddhist [conception of] mind |
sākāratvānakāratve katham ekasya siddhyata ity āha āvṛttam iti | [When asked] "How can the same [term] be established as both having form and formless?", [he] answers "[It is] repeated" |
āvṛttis tatra nyāyyeti yāvat | That is to say, repetition in this case is logical |
iti dravyapadārthaparīkṣā | Thus [ends] the examination of the category of substance |
guṇādīnāṃ niṣedham āha dravyāṇām ityādi / dravyāṇāṃ pratiṣedhena sarva eva tadāśritāḥ | [He] states the rejection of qualities etc. beginning with "of substances"; by the rejection of substances, indeed all those dependent on them [are rejected] |
guṇakarmādayo 'pāstā bhavantyeva tathā matāḥ | Qualities, actions, and the rest are thus considered to be rejected |
guṇakarmādayo viśeṣaparyantā dravyāṇāṃ pratiṣedhād evāpāstāḥ, tadāśritatvād eṣām | Qualities, actions, and the others up to particulars are rejected due to the rejection of substances alone, because these [qualities etc.] are dependent on them [substances] |
āśrayābhāve cāśritānāṃ paratantratayāvasthānupapatteḥ | And because when there is no substratum, the existence of dependent [entities] cannot be established due to [their] dependent nature |
tathā matā iti | Thus it is held [to be]. |
tathā sākṣātpāramaparyeṇa vā dravyāśritatveneṣṭāḥ | They are accepted as being dependent on substance, either directly or mediately. |
tathā hi guṇakarmaṇī sākṣād eva dravyāśritatvenābhīṣṭe | For quality and action are indeed accepted as being directly dependent on substance. |
"ekadravyamaguṇaṃ saṃyogavighāgeṣvanapekṣaṃ kāraṇam" iti karmalakṣaṇam | "[That which] subsists in one substance, is devoid of qualities, [and is] the independent cause of conjunctions and disjunctions" - this is the definition of action. |
ekadravyam iti ekadravyāśritam ity arthaḥ | The term "ekadravyam" means "subsisting in one substance." |
guṇās tu kecidanekadravyavartino bhavanti, yathā saṃyogavibhāgādayaḥ | Some qualities, however, subsist in multiple substances, such as conjunction, disjunction, and others. |
sāmānyaviśeṣāś ca kecid dravyavṛttaya eva, yathā pṛthivītvādayaḥ | And some generalities and particularities subsist only in substances, such as earthness and others. |
guṇatvakarmatvādayaś ca dravyasambaddhaguṇakarmapadārthavṛttayaḥ | And [the universals] quality-hood, action-hood, etc. subsist in the categories of qualities and actions that are related to substances. |
mahāsāmānyaṃ tu sattākhyaṃ dravyādipadārthatrayavṛtti | But the highest universal, known as "being," subsists in the three categories beginning with substance. |
tasmād dravye pratiṣiddhe satyayatnenaiva guṇādayo 'pi niṣiddhā bhavanti | Therefore, when substance is rejected, qualities and the rest become rejected without any effort. |
pariśiṣṭapadārthaparīkṣāphalaṃ dravyaparīkṣāyām eva samāptam iti darśitam bhavati | It is thus shown that the result of examining the remaining categories is accomplished in the examination of substance itself. |
samavāyapratiṣedhas tarhi pṛthagārabdhavya iti cedāha kva kasyetyādi | If [someone] says that "then the rejection of inherence should be undertaken separately," [the author] responds with "whose [inherence] and where," etc. |
kva kasya samavāyaś ca sambandhinyapahastite / viśeṣapratiṣedho 'yaṃ tathāpi punar ucyate | When the relata have been discarded, whose inherence could it be and where? Nevertheless, a specific rejection [of each category] will be stated again. |
pañcapadārthavṛttirūpo hi samavāyo varṇyate / | [The concept of] samavāya is described as [having the] form of inherence in the five categories. |
dravyādau ca sambandhini pañcaprakāre 'pahastite kva kasya samavāyo naiva kasyacit kvacid ity arthaḥ / | When the five types of relata beginning with substance have been rejected, whose inherence [could it be] and where? [The answer is:] no one's [inherence] anywhere. |
sarveṣām āśrayāśritānāṃ pratiṣiddhatvāt tatra guṇānāṃ tāvad viśeṣapratiṣedha ucyate // | Because all [possible] substrata and inherents have been rejected, now the specific refutation of the qualities is stated. |
"tatra rūparasagandhasparśāḥ saṭkhyāparimāṇāni pṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś ca guṇāḥ"iti sūtram / | The sūtra states: "The qualities are color, taste, odor, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, cognitions, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort." |
caśabdād gurutvadravatvasnehatvasaṃskāradharmādharmaśabdāś ca parigṛhyante / | By [the word] 'ca' [in the sūtra], gravity, fluidity, viscidity, disposition, merit, demerit, and sound are also included. |
tatra rūpaṃ cakṣur grāhyaṃ pṛthivyādakajvalanavṛtti / | Among these, color is apprehendable by the eye and inheres in earth, water, and fire. |
gandho ghrāṇagrāhyaḥ pṛthivīvṛttiḥ / sparśastvagindriyagrāhyaḥ kṣityudakajvalanavāyuvṛttiḥ / | Odor is apprehendable by the nose and inheres in earth. Touch is apprehendable by the skin-sense and inheres in earth, water, fire, and air. |
eṣāṃ caturṇām ādyānāṃ rūpādīnāṃ pratiṣedhamāha dravye mahatītyādi / | [The text] states the refutation of these first four [qualities] beginning with color, starting with [the words] "dravye mahati." |
dravye mahati nīlādireka eva yadīṣyate / randhrālokena tadvyaktau vyaktir dṛṣṭiś ca nāsya kim // | If blue and other [colors] are maintained to be single [entities] in a large substance, why is there no manifestation and perception of it when [viewed] through light [coming] through an aperture? |
mahatyena hi dravye samavetānām upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvam ato mahatītyāha/tatra ca dravye yadyekamevānavayavaṃ nīlādi caturvidhamiṣyate, tadā sūkṣmeṇāpi kuñcikādivivaravartinā pradīpādyālokena tvapavarakādisthitapṛthutaraghaṭādidravyasamavetasya nīlādirūpasyābhivyaktau satyāṃ sakalasyaiva yāvad dravyavartino rūpāderabhivyaktirupalabdhiś ca prāpnoti niravayavatvāt / | [These qualities] that inhere in a substance are perceptible only in a large [substance], hence [the text] says "mahati." And if blue and other [colors] of four types are maintained to be single [and] partless in that substance, then when there is manifestation of blue and other colors inhering in a large substance like a jar situated in a room through lamplight coming through a small aperture like a keyhole, the manifestation and perception of the entire color extending throughout the substance would follow, because [the color] is partless. |
nahyekasyāvayavāḥ santi yenaikadeśābhivyaktir bhavet / | [It is] not [possible that] a single entity has parts, by virtue of which there could be manifestation of [only] one part. |
randhrālokenetyupalakṣaṇam / | [The example of] "light coming through an aperture" is [mentioned] merely as an illustration. |
bhuva ekadeśe jalena gandhasyābhivyaktau pradeśāntarepyabhivyaktyupalabdhyoḥ | When odor in one part of the earth is manifested by water, [then] manifestation and perception [of that odor should occur] in other locations as well. |
jvālāder āmraphalādeścaikadeśasya spṛṣṭāvāsvādane ca taddravyasamavāyinas tāvataḥ sparśasya rasasya copalabdhiḥ syāt // | Similarly, when touching or tasting one part of flames or mangoes and other [fruits], there should be perception of the touch and taste inherent in that entire substance. |
na ca deśavibhāgena sthito nīlādir iṣyate / | And blue and other [colors] are not accepted as existing in spatially divided parts. |
vyajyate yas tadā tena tasya bhedo 'ṇuśastataḥ // | That which is manifested then by that [light], must therefore vary according to [each] atom. |
tadeti tasmin kāle. | "Then" [means] at that time. |
tasyeti nīlādeḥ. | "That" [refers to] blue and other [colors]. |
aṇuśaḥ svabhede 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe pṛthivyādiparamāṇudravyavad aṇuparimāṇayogitvena guṇavattvād dravyarūpataiva syāt, na guṇatvam / evambhūtānāṃ cāṇuśo bhinnānāṃ guṇa iti saṃjñākaraṇena nāmni vivādaḥ / | If variation according to atoms is accepted in its own differentiation, then due to having atomic dimension like earth and other atomic substances, [and thus] possessing qualities, it would have the nature of substance, not of quality. And if such things differentiated according to atoms are called "qualities", then the dispute would be merely about names. |
na cāṇutve 'pyāśritatvād guṇatvaṃ yuktam / | And even with atomic dimension, [its] being a quality is not justified merely because of [its] being dependent [on something else]. |
sadasatorāśrayānupapatter atiprasaṅgāt / | [The property of being the substratum cannot belong to both existent and non-existent things], as it would lead to absurdities. |
tathā hyaviyavidravyamavayavadravyāśritam iti tadapi guṇaḥ syād iti bhāvaḥ // | That is to say, if [this were accepted], then the composite substance, being dependent on component substances, would also have to be [classified as] a quality. |
tatraikadivyavahāraheturekatvādilakṣaṇā saṅkhyā sā punar ekadravyā cānekadravyā ca tatraikasaṅkhyaikadravyā / | Number, which is defined as the basis of notions like "one" etc., resides in both single substances and multiple substances; [of these], the number "one" resides in a single substance. |
anekadravyā tu dvitvādisaṅkhyā / | The numbers beginning with "two," however, reside in multiple substances. |
tatraikadravyāyāḥ salilādiparamāṇvādigatarūpādīnām iva nityatvaniṣpattayo boddhavyāḥ / | For numbers residing in a single substance, [their] eternality and manifestation should be understood as being like those of color and other [qualities] residing in atoms of water and other [substances]. |
anekadravyāyās tu ekatvebhyo 'nekaviṣayabuddhisahitebhyo niṣpattirapekṣābuddhivināśād vināśaḥ kvacid āśrayavināśād iti / | For numbers residing in multiple substances, [their] manifestation arises from unities associated with the cognition of multiple objects; [their] destruction occurs due to the destruction of the relational cognition, and in some cases due to the destruction of [their] substrate. |
iyaṃ ca dvividhāpi saṅkhyā kila pratyakṣata eva siddhā / | And this number of both kinds is supposedly established through direct perception alone. |
viśeṣabuddheś ca nimittāntarāpekṣatvād anumānatopīti paro manyate / | Others think [it is] also [established] through inference, because specific cognitions depend on other causes. |
tatrāsyāḥ pratiṣedham āha atadrūpetyādi / | The refutation of this [concept of number] is stated in [the verse beginning with] "atadrūpa." |
yeṣu hi samuccayādivyāvṛtteṣu gajādiṣu saṃjñā niveśitā na tadvyatirekeṇopalabdhir lakṣaṇaprāptā saṅkhyā khyātāstīti sā śaśaviṣāṇavad asadvyavahāraviṣayā / | Names like "elephant" are applied to things distinguished from aggregates and such by being their negation; apart from these [names], there exists no perceptible number possessing [the claimed] characteristics; therefore it is, like a hare's horn, merely the object of statements about non-existents. |
tathāhyasau dṛśyatveneṣṭā / tathā ca sūtram ---"saṅkhyāparimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpisamavāyāccākṣuṣāṇi" iti // | For thus [number] is accepted as being perceptible, as [declared] in the following sūtra: "Number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, and motion, [all] subsisting in colored things, are perceptible by the eye." |
icchāracitasaṅketamanaskārānvayaṃ tvidam / ghaṭeṣvekādivijñānaṃ jñānādāviva vartate // | This cognition of [being] 'one' etc. in jars proceeds, just as in cognition etc., only following a mental attention based on a convention constructed by desire. |
adravyatvān na saṅkhyāsti teṣu kācid vibhedinī / tajjñānaṃ naiva yuktaṃ tu bhāktamaskhalitatvataḥ // | Due to [their] not being substances, there cannot be any differentiating number in these [cognitions], nor can that cognition be figurative, because it is unfailing. |
yathā hyekaṃ jñānaṃ dve jñāne ityādau saṅkhyāmantareṇāpyekādibuddhir bhavatyevaṃ ghaṭādiṣvapyasahāyādiṣu padārtheṣveka ityādiḥ svecchayā yaḥ saṅketo vihitas tatra yo manaskāra ābhogas tadanvayamekādijñānaṃ bhaviṣyatītyanaikāntikam etat / | Just as in [expressions like] 'one cognition', 'two cognitions' etc., the notion of 'one' etc. occurs even without [actual] numbers, similarly regarding jars and other unaccompanied entities, [when] a convention has been established by one's own will, the cognition of 'one' etc. follows that mental attention [and] reflection - thus this [argument] is inconclusive. |
nahi teṣu jñānādiṣu saṅkhyāsti eṣām adravyatvāt / | For there is no number in these cognitions etc., because they are not substances. |
saṅkhyāyāś ca guṇatvena dravyāśritatvāt / atha mataṃ gauṇamidaṃ teṣu jñānamekamivaikaṃ sādharmyaṃ cātrāsahāyatvādi {tatraha---} tajjñānam iti / | And because number, being a quality, must reside in a substance. If it is thought that "this [cognition] in these [cases] is secondary [meaning] 'cognition is as if one', and the similarity here is [its] being unaccompanied etc." - [regarding] that cognition... |
naiva hyetajjñānaṃ bhāktaṃ yuktamaskhalad gatitvād asya pratyayasya / | This cognition indeed cannot be figurative, because this awareness has an unfailing operation. |
nahi yathā vāhīko gaur iti skhalati pratyayaḥ, gauriva gaur natu gaureva sāsnādyabhāvād iti, na tathāyaṃskhalati, ekam ivaikaṃ jñānādi natvekam eveti / | For just as the awareness 'a ploughman is an ox' fails [to be literal, meaning] 'like an ox' not 'actually an ox' due to absence of dewlap etc., this [awareness] does not fail thus [meaning] 'cognition etc. is as if one' rather than 'actually one'. |
kiṃ tarhi yādṛśī ghaṭādiṣvaskalitā buddhir bhavati tādṛśī jñānādiṣvapi // | Rather, just as the understanding regarding jars etc. is unfailing, so it is regarding cognitions etc. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.