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vibhinna ātmā svabhāvo yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | Those whose nature [and] essence is distinct are called thus. |
sādhyavipakṣe 'pi hetor vṛttir dṛśyeteti darśayann āha parasparavibhinnā hītyādi / | [The author] shows that the reason exists even in the counter-example of what is to be proved, saying "parasparavibhinnā hi" etc. |
parasparavibhinnā hi yathā buddhisukhādayaḥ / pṛthagvācyās tadaṅgaṃ ca vinānyena tathāpare // | Just as cognition, pleasure, and other [qualities], being mutually distinct, are spoken of as 'separate' and become the basis of that [separateness] without [reference to] anything else, so [are] other [things]. |
nahi sukhādiṣu guṇeṣu pṛthaktvaṃ guṇo 'sti, nirguṇatvād guṇānām / | Indeed, in qualities like pleasure etc., the quality of separateness cannot exist, because qualities are devoid of qualities. |
atha ca parasparavyāvṛttātmatayā te pṛthag iti vācyā bhavanti / | And yet they are spoken of as 'separate' due to their nature of mutual exclusion. |
tasyāścāpoddhāravyavahṛteraṅgaṃ nimittatāṃ pratipadyante / | And they become the basis [and] cause of that notion of separation. |
tathāpare 'pi ghaṭādayo dravyābhimatā vinānyena svavyatiriktena pṛthaktvanāmnā guṇena bhaviṣyantīti / | Similarly, other [things] like jars etc., which are considered substances, will be without any quality named 'separateness' that is distinct from themselves. |
nacāpi teṣu bhākto 'yaṃ pratyayo mukhyapratyayāviśiṣṭatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | Nor is this notion figurative in them, as it is not different from the primary notion - this is the meaning. |
yadvā apoddhāravyavahṛtiṃ vibhinnātmapadārthanibandhanāṃ darśayan pratijñāyā anumānabādhāmāha parasparetyādi / | Or, showing that the notion of separation is based on things whose nature is distinct, [the author] states the refutation of [their] thesis by inference, beginning with "paraspara" etc. |
prayogaḥ ye parasparavyāvṛttātmānas te na svavyatiriktapṛthaktvasamāśrayāḥ, yathā sukhādayaḥ / | [This] inference may be formulated thus: Those things which have mutually exclusive natures are not substrata of separateness distinct from themselves, like pleasure and [other such qualities]. |
parasparavyāvṛttātmānaś ca ghaṭādaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | And [since] jars and other [things] have mutually exclusive natures, this is [therefore] a natural reason. |
ekasyānekavṛttyasambhavaḥ, samavāyasya niṣetsyamānatvāt sambandhānupapattiḥsukhādiṣu tadvyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgaś ca bādhakaṃ pramāṇam // | [There is] impossibility of one [relation] having multiple occurrences, and because inherence will be refuted, [there is] impossibility of relation, and [the fact that] there would be no such usage regarding pleasure etc. is the annulling proof. |
yau saṃyogavibhāgau ca dravyeṣu niyatau paraiḥ / saṃyuktādidhiyo hetū kalpitau tāvanarthakau // | Those two, conjunction and disjunction, which others have posited as restricted to substances [and] as causes of cognitions of "conjoined" etc., those two are useless. |
yathākramaṃ dravyeṣu saṃyuktavibhaktapratyayahetū aprāptaprāptānāṃ prāptyaprāptisvabhāvāvanyatarobhayakarmajau ca saṃyogavibhāgajau ca saṃyogavibhāgāviti paraprakriyā / | [This is] the opponent's scheme: conjunction and disjunction are causes of the cognitions of "conjoined" and "separated" respectively in substances, [they] have the nature of obtaining what is not obtained and non-obtaining [what was obtained], and arise from the motion of either [one] or both [substances], and also from conjunction and disjunction. |
etac ca prakriyāmātram eva / | And this is merely a scheme. |
na tv anayor vastusattvasiddhau kiñcana pramāṇamastītyato 'narthakāvetau kalpitau paraiḥ / | But there is no proof for establishing the real existence of these two, therefore these two have been needlessly posited by others. |
prayogaḥ yasya na kiñcit sādhakaṃ pramāṇam asti na tat prekṣāvatāṃ sadvyavahāraviṣayo yathā vandhyāsutādi nāsti ca saṃyogavibhāgayoḥ sādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ pareṣām iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ // | [This] inference [is]: That for which there exists no proving means of valid cognition is not an object of usage as real by discerning people, like the son of a barren woman; and others have no proving means of valid cognition for conjunction and disjunction - thus [this is] non-perception of the pervader. |
bījodakapṛthivyādi sarvadā kāryakārakam / | [If conjunction did not exist, then] seed, water, earth etc. would always be producing [their] effects. |
prasaktaṃ nirviśeṣatvāt saṃyogāsambhavena tu // | [This would be] inevitable due to [their] lack of distinction, as conjunction would be impossible. |
kṣetrabījajalādīni sāpekṣāṇīti gamyate / svakāryakāraṇān nityaṃ daṇḍacakrodakādivat // | The field, seed, water and such things are understood to be dependent [on other factors] for their effects, just like the stick, wheel, water and so forth [in pot-making]. |
yastair apekṣyate bhāvaḥ sa saṃyogo bhaviṣyati / | That entity which is required by them is conjunction. |
saviśeṣaṇabhāvāc ca bhinna eveti gamyate // | And because it has the nature of being a qualifier, it is understood to be distinct [from other things]. |
saṃyukte āharetyukte saṃyogaṃ prekṣate yayoḥ / tadanyaparihāreṇa te evāharati hyayam // | When told "bring [things that are] conjoined," one looks for those two things in which one perceives conjunction, and excluding everything else, one brings precisely those [two things]. |
sa hyāha yadi saṃyogo nārthāntaraṃ bhavet tadā kṣetrabījādayo nirviśiṣṭatvāt sarvadaivāṅkurādi kuryuḥ, na caivam / | For he says: "If conjunction were not a separate entity, then the field, seed and so forth, being undifferentiated, would always produce sprouts and such things - but this is not the case." |
tasmāt sarvadā kāryānārambhāt kṣetrādīnyaṅkurādikāryotpattau kāryāntarasāpekṣāṇi, yathā mṛpiṇḍadaṇḍasalilasūtrādayo ghaṭādikaraṇe kumbhakārādisāpekṣāḥ / | Therefore, from the fact that effects are not always produced, [it follows that] the field and other [factors] depend on something else for the production of effects like sprouts, just as the clay lump, stick, water, thread and so forth depend on the potter and others for the production of pots and such things. |
yo 'sāvapekṣyaḥ sa saṃyoga iti siddham / | It is thus established that this required [factor] is conjunction. |
kiṃ ca yo 'sau saṃyogo dravyayoḥ sa viśeṣaṇabhāvena pratīyamānatvāt tato 'rthāntaratvena pratyakṣata eva siddhaḥ / | Moreover, that conjunction between two substances, being cognized as having the nature of a qualifier, is directly established as being different from them. |
tathā hi kaścit kenacitsaṃyukte dravye āharetyukte yayoreva dravyayoḥ saṃyogamupalabhate / ta evāharati na dravyamātram anyathā yatkiñcidāharet / | For indeed, when someone is told by another to "bring conjoined substances," one brings only those two substances in which one perceives conjunction, not just any substance - otherwise one might bring anything whatsoever. |
etac ca sarvaṃ viparyayādvibhāgasādhane 'pi yojyam // | All these [arguments], when reversed, are also to be applied to proving [the existence of] vibhāga [disjunction]. |
nirantaramidaṃ vastu sāntaraṃ cedamityayam / buddhibhedaś ca kenaiṣa vidyate tau ca cediha // | How could these distinct cognitions exist [such as] "this thing is in contact" and "this [thing] has intervals," if those two [conjunction and disjunction] did not exist here? |
api cāviśiṣṭe 'pi nirantaramidaṃ vastu sāntaramidam iti buddhibhedaḥ kathaṃ yujyate, yadyetau saṃyogavibhāgāviha vastunyarthāntarabhūtau na syātāṃ, nahiviśeṣapratyayo vastuviśeṣamantareṇa sambhavī bhavitum arhati, sarvadā sarvatra bhāvaprasaṅgāt // | Moreover, even when [things are] not different, how could there be distinct cognitions [such as] "this thing is in contact" [and] "this has intervals," if these two, conjunction and disjunction, did not exist here as distinct entities in the things? For a particular cognition cannot possibly exist without a particular [feature] in the thing, as [otherwise] everything would occur always and everywhere. |
nirantare 'pi yā cānyā mithyābuddhiriyaṃ dvidhā // | And there are these two types of false cognitions even regarding [things that are] in contact. |
mithyābuddhiś ca sarvaiva pradhānārthānukāriṇī / | And every false cognition follows [some] primary object. |
pradhānaṃ ceha vaktavyaṃ taduktau tau ca siddhyataḥ // | And here the primary [object] must be stated; when that is stated, those two [conjunction and disjunction] are established. |
kiṃ ca yeyaṃ dūratarāvasthite 'pi dhavakhadirādau vidūradeśavartinaḥ puṃso niratantarāvasāyinī buddhirudayamāsādayati, yā ceyamīṣattaruśikharāvalagne balākādau nirantare 'pi sāntaratvamivāvasyantī jāyate 'nyā seyaṃ dvividhāpyatasmiṃs tathārūpeṇa pravṛttatvān mithyābuddhiḥ na ca mithyādhīr mukhyapadārthānubhavamantareṇa kvacid upajāyate / | Moreover, when there is this cognition arising in a person standing at a distance that [appears as] "in contact" even though the Dhava and Khadira trees [etc.] are situated far apart, and when there is this other [cognition] that arises perceiving as if there were intervals even though the cranes [etc.] perched on the thin treetop are in contact - both these are false cognitions because they operate by [attributing] such a form to what does not [really] have it. And a false cognition never arises anywhere without the experience of a primary object. |
nahyananubhūtagodarśanasya gavayapadārthadarśanād gaurayam iti vibhramo bhavati / | For one who has not experienced seeing a cow does not have the misconception "this is a cow" upon seeing a gavaya. |
tasmād avaśyaṃ kaścin mukhyaḥ padārtho 'syā vibhramadhiyo nibandhanam abhidhānīyaḥ / | Therefore some primary object must necessarily be stated as the basis of this misconceived cognition. |
tasyābhidhāne ca tau saṃyogavibhāgau sidhyataḥ / | And when that [primary object] is stated, those two, conjunction and disjunction, are established. |
nahi tadvyatirekeṇānyad asyā buddher nibandhanamupapādayituṃ śakyate // | For apart from those [two], no other basis for this cognition can possibly be established. |
kuṇḍalīti matiśceyaṃ kinnimittopajāyate / narakuṇḍalabhāvānno sarvadā tat prasaṅgataḥ // | On what basis does this cognition "wearing earrings" arise? [It cannot arise] from the mere existence of the man and earrings, because then it would follow [that the cognition would exist] always. |
anyatra dṛṣṭabhāvasya niṣedho 'nyatra yujyate | The negation of something is appropriate [only] when its presence has been perceived elsewhere. |
saṃyogaś ca bhaved dṛṣṭaḥ sa kathaṃ pratiṣidhyate | How can conjunction be denied if it has [never] been perceived? |
caitro 'kuṇḍala ityevaṃ tasmād astyeva vāstavaḥ yanniṣedhavidhānādi vibhāgena pravartate | Therefore, in [expressions] like "Caitra is without earrings," there must indeed exist something real through which affirmation and negation proceed distinctly. |
apica kuṇḍalī devadatta iti matiriyamupajāyamānā kiṃnibandhanopajāyata itivacanīyam | Moreover, it must be explained on what basis this notion "Devadatta is wearing earrings" arises. |
naca puruṣakuṇḍalabhāvamātrabhāvinī bhavitum arhati | And this [notion] cannot arise from the mere existence of the person and the earrings. |
sarvadā tatra devadattakuṇḍalayos tasyāḥ sadbhāvaprasaṅgāt | Because [if it did], that [notion] would exist constantly when Devadatta and the earrings [exist]. |
kiṃ ca yadeva kenacit kvacid upalabdhasattvaṃ tasyaivānyatra vidhipratiṣedhamukhena lokavyavahārapravṛttir dṛṣṭā | Furthermore, worldly usage through affirmation and negation is observed [only] with respect to something whose existence has been perceived somewhere by someone. |
yadi bhavatā saṃyogo na kadācid upalabdhas tat katham asya caitro 'kuṇḍalaḥ kuṇḍalī cetyevaṃvibhāgena vyavahāro bhavet | If you have never perceived conjunction, then how could there be distinct usage [of expressions] like "Caitra is without earrings" and "Caitra is with earrings"? |
tathāhyatra caitro 'kuṇḍalīnyanena na kuṇḍalaṃ pratiṣidhyate tasya deśakālabhedena sattvādhyāsitamūrteḥ pratiṣeddhumaśakyatvāt | For here, by [the expression] "Caitra is without earrings," the earring is not denied, because being a substantial entity assumed to exist in different places and times, it cannot be [completely] denied. |
nāpi caitrasya, tat tulyayogakṣematvāt | Nor [is it a denial] of Caitra, since he has the same status [as the earring]. |
tasmāccaitrasya kuṇḍalasaṃyogaḥ pratiṣidhyate | Therefore, what is denied is Caitra's conjunction with the earring. |
tathā caitraḥ kuṇḍalītyanenāpi vidhivākyena caitrakuṇḍalayor nānyatarasya vidher jñāyate tayoḥ siddhatvāt | Similarly, by the affirmative statement "Caitra [is] with earrings," neither Caitra nor the earring is affirmed, since both are [already] established. |
pāriśeṣyāt saṃyogasyaivāpratītasya vidher jñāyate | By the process of elimination, only the previously uncognized conjunction is known to be affirmed. |
tasmād astyeva saṃyogādir vāstavo yadvaśāstraitraḥ kuṇḍalī na bhavatīyādiniṣedhavidhānādi pravibhaktam eva pratīyate | Therefore, conjunction and similar [relations] must indeed exist as real things, by virtue of which distinct affirmations and negations like "Caitra is with earrings" and "Caitra is without earrings" are cognized. |
ādiśabdena viśeṣaṇatvenopādānamityādi pūrvoktaparigrahaḥ // | By the term "ādi" [here], [there is] inclusion of [such things] as "qualification," as mentioned before. |
ucyate kṣaṇikatvena nāviśeṣā jalādayaḥ / | It is [hereby] stated: Water and other [things] are not undifferentiated, due to [their] momentariness. |
sattve 'py avyavadhānādi te 'pekṣante daśāntaram // | Even while existing, they [i.e., water etc.] depend upon another condition, [namely] the absence of intervening [obstacles] and so forth. |
yaduktamaviśeṣād bījādayaḥ sadaiva kāryaṃ kuryur iti, tasyāviśiṣṭatvaṃ bījādīnām asiddham, kṣaṇabhaṅgitayā sarvabhāvānāṃ viśiṣṭāvasthānām eva janakatvāt / | What has been stated [namely] that "due to [their] being undifferentiated, seeds etc. would always produce [their] effect" - that undifferentiatedness of seeds etc. is not established, because all entities, due to [their] momentariness, are productive [of effects] only in [their] specific conditions. |
yaccoktaṃ kṣetrabījādītyādi tatrāpi sāmānyena sāpekṣatvamātre sādhye siddhasādhyateti darśayati sattve 'pītyādi / | What has been stated [beginning with] "field, seed, etc." - regarding that also, when [only] general dependence is being proved, [there is] proving of what is [already] established - this is what [the text] shows by [the words] "even while existing" etc. |
iṣyanta evāsmābhir avyavadhānādyavasthāntaram apekṣā bījādayo 'ṅkurādikāryanirvartanasamarthā vidyamānatve 'pīti siddhasādhyatā / | [There is] proving of what is [already] established [since] it is indeed accepted by us that seeds etc., even while existing, depend on another condition characterized by absence of intervention etc. [in order to be] capable of producing effects such as sprouts. |
tatrāvidyamānā vyavadhānādayo yatra deśāntare 'vasthāviśeṣe tat tathoktam / ādiśabdena virodhipratyayapratighātādiparigrahaḥ / | That condition in which intervening [obstacles] etc. are absent in another place is called thus. By the term "ādi" [there is] inclusion of [such things as] the warding off of opposing factors etc. |
yatrāvasthāntare vyavadhānaṃ dūradeśāvasthānaṃ virodhinā pratihatirityādikāryotpattipratibandhakaṃ nāstītyarthaḥ / | The meaning is that [it refers to] that particular condition where there is no obstacle to the arising of the effect, such as intervention, location in a distant place, obstruction by an opposing [force], etc. |
avasthāyāś ca svabhāvāvyatirekānnārthāntarabhūtasaṃyogasiddhiḥ / atha bhavadabhimatasaṃyogākhyapadārthāntarasāpekṣatvaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭaṃ tadā tathāvidhena dharmeṇa hetor anvayāsiddher anaikāntikatā dṛṣṭāntasya ca sādhyavikalateti bhāvaḥ // | And since a condition is not different from [its own] nature, conjunction as a separate entity is not established. If then what is intended to be proved is dependence on something different called "conjunction" as accepted by you, then [your argument fails] because [there is] inconclusiveness due to the reason not being concomitant with such a property, and the example lacks what is to be proved. |
syād etat katham idam avagamyate 'vasthāntaraviśeṣasāpekṣāḥ kṣityādayo 'ṅkurādikāryaprasavahetavo na punar arthāntarabhūtasaṃyogasāpekṣā yena sāmānyena sāpekṣatvamātre sādhye siddhasādhyatā bhaved bhavata ityāśaṅkhyāha ---saṃyogamātretyādi / | [Someone] might raise this [objection]: "How is it known that earth etc. as causes producing effects like sprouts depend on a particular different condition [of their own] and not rather on conjunction with something different [from themselves], by which [knowledge your claim that] when mere general dependence is being proved there would be proving of what is [already] established by you [would be valid]?" - having considered this [objection, the author] states [beginning with] "mere conjunction" etc. |
saṃyogamātrasāpekṣā yadi tu syur jalādayaḥ / yogānantaram eva syāt kāryam etena vā bhavet // | If the water and other [elements] were dependent only on conjunction, then the effect would either appear immediately after their conjunction or would not [appear] at all. |
yadi hi saṃyogamātrasāpekṣāḥ syus tadā prathamopanipāta eva kṣityādibhyo 'ṅkurādikāryodayaprasaṅgaḥ paścād vadavikalakāraṇatvāt / | If [these elements] were dependent only on conjunction, then from the soil and other [elements] the sprout and other effects would arise at their very first contact, because the cause would be as complete then as it is later. |
atha prathamopanipāte na bhavati paścādapyanutpattiprasaṅgaḥ / | If [the effect] does not arise at the first contact, then it would follow that it should not arise later either. |
pūrvavadajanakāvasthāyāṃ vikalakāraṇatāyā nirviśiṣṭatvāt / | Because the defectiveness of the cause would be no different from [what it was] in its previous non-productive state. |
naca kṣityādīnām anupakāriṇi saṃyoge 'pekṣā yuktimatī, atiprasaṅgāt / | And it would not be logical for the soil and other [elements] to depend on conjunction which provides no assistance [to them], as this would lead to unwarranted consequences. |
nacāpi saṃyogānāṃ kādācitkatvaṃ yuktaṃ tat kāraṇānāṃ kṣityādīnāṃ nityaṃ sannihitatvāt / | Nor is it reasonable [to maintain] the occasional nature of conjunctions, since their causes—the soil and other [elements]—are eternally present. |
atha tatrāpi saṃyoge janye kṣityādīnāṃ karmādisāpekṣatvam iṣyate / na / | If it is claimed that even in the production of conjunction, the soil and other [elements] depend on karma and other [factors]—[we say] no. |
tatrāpi tulyaparyanuyogatvāt / | Because the same counter-question applies there as well. |
tathā hi tadapi karma kasmān na janayatīti paryanuyoge kiṃ vaktavyaṃ syāt / tatkāraṇanodanābhāvād iti cet tasyāpi kasmād abhāva iti nityakāraṇābhyupagame sarvatra tulyaḥ paryanuyogaḥ / | For what could be said in response to the question "Why does that karma not produce [the effect]?" If [one says] "because there is no impetus from its cause," [we ask] "Why is there no such [impetus]?"—Under the acceptance of eternal causes, such counter-questions apply everywhere equally. |
yasya tu sarvam evānityaṃ vastu tasyānāditvāddhetuparamparāyāḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ sakṛdutpattiprasaṅgo na bhavati / | However, for one who [maintains] that all things are impermanent, there is no possibility of all entities arising simultaneously, because the chain of causes is beginningless. |
pūrvapūrvakāraṇapratibaddhatvād uttareṣām / teṣāṃ ca sarveṣāṃ yugapat kāraṇavaikalyenāsannidhānāt / | Because the later [effects] would be restricted by [their] previous causes, and because all of these [causes] cannot be present simultaneously due to the deficiency of [their own] causes. |
tasmād bhavata eva darśane 'ṅkurādikāryaprasavahetutvaṃ kṣityādīnāṃ sarvadā prasajyata iti na saṃyogārthāntarasāpekṣāḥ kṣityādaya iti siddham // | Therefore, it is only in your view that earth and other [elements] would necessarily be causes producing sprouts and other effects at all times; hence it is established that earth and other [elements] do not depend on any separate entity [called] "conjunction." |
yaccoktaṃ saviśeṣaṇabhāvāccetyādi tatrāha prāptāvasthetyādi / | Regarding what was said about [conjunction] "having a particular characteristic," the following is stated. |
ye paśyatyāharatyeṣa vastunī te tathāvidhe // | He perceives and brings forth these two substances that are of such a nature. |
nahi saṃyuktapadārthāntarabhūtaḥ saṃyogaḥ pratipattur darśanapathamavatarati yena taddarśanād{tta} viśiṣṭe dravye āharati / | Indeed, conjunction as a separate entity distinct from conjoined things does not enter the perceiver's range of vision, by seeing which he would bring forth the qualified substances. |
kiṃ tarhi prāgbhāvinī ye sāntarajātāvasthe tato viśiṣṭe ye nirantarotpannevastunī te eva saṃyuktaśabdavācye avasthāviśeṣe prasādhitatvāt saṃyogaśabdasya / | Rather, those two substances which were previously in a state separated by an interval, [and] which then became qualified by arising in contact, those very [substances] are denoted by the word "conjoined," since the word "conjunction" has been established [to refer to] that particular state. |
tena yatra tathāvidhaṃ vastunī saṃyogaśabdaviṣayabhāvāpanne paśyati, te evāharati nānye, na hi śabdenābodhite 'rthe śabdāt pravartate prekṣāvān // | Therefore, when one sees two substances of such a nature that have become the objects of the word "conjunction," one brings forth those very [substances] and not others, for an intelligent person does not act based on words regarding something not conveyed by those words. |
vicchinnamanyathā caiva jātam eti nimittatām / | What is produced in a separated state becomes the cause [for the cognition of being separated], and conversely [what is produced otherwise becomes the cause for the cognition of being connected]. |
sāntarānantarajñāne gehavindhyahimādrivat // | [This is] like the cognition of [things being] separated or contiguous, as in the case of a house, the Vindhya [mountains], and the Himālaya [mountains]. |
vastvantaram eva tathotpadyamānaṃ buddhibhedanibandhanamato 'naikam etad iti samudāyārthaḥ / | A distinct object being produced in such a manner becomes the basis for the difference in cognition; therefore this [reason] is inconclusive—this is the combined meaning. |
tatra vicchinnaṃ yajjātaṃ vastu tat sāntarabuddher nimittatām etīti sambandhaḥ | That thing which is produced [as] detached becomes the cause of the notion of separation—this is the syntactical connection. |
anyathā ceti / avicchinnam yajjātam iti sambandhaḥ | And "otherwise" means: that which is produced [as] undetached—this is the syntactical connection. |
gehavindhyāhimādrivad iti | Like [in the case of] a house, the Vindhya [mountains], and the Himālaya [mountains]. |
anayor eva yathāyogam udāharaṇam | These are respectively the examples of these two [cases]. |
na hyavicchedenotpannayoḥ svayaṃ saṃyogātmanor gehayoraparaḥ saṃyogo nirantarabuddher nibandhanam asti paramate 'pi, nāpi vicchedenotpannayos tayor eva vibhāgaḥ sāntarapratyayanimittam asti, nirguṇatvād guṇānām ityuktam etat | For even according to the opponent's view, when two houses are produced without separation [and are thus] of the nature of conjunction itself, there is no other conjunction that serves as the basis for the notion of being without intervals; nor is there, when they are produced with separation, any disjunction that serves as the cause of the notion of having intervals between them—for qualities have no qualities, as has been stated. |
nahi himavindhyayor eva vibhāgaḥ sāntarabuddher heturasti | For there is no disjunction between the Himālaya and Vindhya [mountains] that could be the cause of the notion of separation. |
prāptipūrvikā hyāprāptir vibhāga iti samayāt | Because according to convention, disjunction is non-contact preceded by contact. |
mithyābuddhir na sarvaiva pradhānārthānusāriṇī | Not every misconception follows [or depends upon] a primary object. |
sādharmyanirapekṣāpi kācid antarupaplavāt | Some [misconceptions arise] independently of similarity, due to internal disturbance. |
anyatra gatacittasya dvicandrādimatir yathā | As [in the case of] the notion of two moons etc. [arising] in one whose mind has gone elsewhere. |
avicchinnādijātaṃ vā pradhānam iha vidyate | Or [perhaps] there exists here a primary [notion] that has arisen as undetached, etc. |
sarvā mithyābuddhiḥ sādharmyagrahaṇād upajāyata ityasiddham etat | The [claim] that "every misconception arises from the grasping of similarity" is not established. |
kasyāścitsādharmyamanapekṣyāpīndriyavaiguṇyamātreṇotpattidarśanāt | Because some [misconceptions] are seen to arise merely through defect of the sense organs, without depending on any similarity. |
yathānyatragatavikalpacetaso 'pi puro 'vasthitaikacandrāvipatya{dipratyaya}mātreṇa timiropapāditendriyavaiguṇyāccandradvayākārānusyūtā viśadatarapravibhāsinī kalpanākalaṅkānaṅkitaiva dhīrupajāyate | For example, even when one's conceptual mind has gone elsewhere, although a single moon is present before [the eyes], due to a defect in the sense organs caused by [the disease] timira, there arises a cognition that is clearly manifesting, connected with the form of two moons, and unmarked by the stain of [mere] imagination. |
anyatra gatacittasyetyanena nirvikalpatvaṃ dvicandradhiyo darśayati / | With the phrase "[of one] whose mind has gone elsewhere," [the text] shows the non-conceptual nature of the cognition of two moons. |
nahi nirvikalpacetasi sādharmyagrahaṇam asti / | For in a non-conceptual cognition, there is no apprehension of similarity. |
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