sanskrit
stringlengths 2
508
| english
stringlengths 2
924
⌀ |
|---|---|
tasya pūrvāparadṛṣṭapadārthaikatvādhyavasāyātmakatvena pūrvānubhūtārthābhijalpātmakatvāt / | Because it [i.e. similarity cognition] has the nature of determining the unity of things seen before and after, and consists of verbal expression regarding previously experienced objects. |
athavā bhavatu nāma pūrvasyā mithyābuddheḥ pradhānārthānusāritvaṃ tathāpi neṣṭasiddhir bhavata iti darśayati avicchinnādijātaṃ vetyādi / | Or else, even if we grant that the previous false cognition follows a primary cognition, still what you desire is not established - this is what [the text] shows with the words "or that which arises as undetached, etc." |
tadeva hi vastu vicchinnam avicchinnaṃ copajāyamānamatajjātīyaparihāreṇa pravṛttyarthaṃ prathamataraṃ viniveśitavibhaktādyabhidhānatayā mukhyam astīti neṣṭasiddhir bhavataḥ // | For that very thing, arising as either detached or undetached, when excluding things of a different kind, is primary due to having a designation of case endings etc. assigned according to what was perceived first - thus what you desire is not established. |
yad uktaṃ kuṇḍalīti matiśceyam ityādi tatrāha kuṇḍalītyādi / kuṇḍalīti matiśceyaṃ jātāvasthāviśeṣayoḥ / | Regarding what was said about "this cognition '[he is] wearing earrings'," [the text] states: "This cognition '[he is] wearing earrings' [occurs] in relation to the two [things] in which a particular state has arisen." |
caitrakuṇḍalayor eva saṃyoga iva jāyate // | It appears as if [there is] conjunction between Caitra and the earring only. |
yathaiva hi saṃyogāścaitrakuṇḍalayor viśiṣṭāvasthāprāptau satyām upajāyatenahi sarvadā, tadvadiyam api kuṇḍalīti matiravasthāviśeṣanibandhanā bhavantīkimiti sarvadā bhavet / | Just as conjunction between Caitra and the earring arises only when a particular state is obtained, [and] not always, similarly why should this cognition "wearing earrings," which depends on a particular state, occur always? |
jāto 'vasthāviśeṣo yayoścaitrakuṇḍalayos te tathokte // | The two, Caitra and the earring, in which a particular state has arisen, are referred to thus [in the compound jātāvasthāviśeṣayoḥ]. |
so 'vasthātiśayastādṛgdṛṣṭo 'nyatra niṣidhyate / | That particular condition which is seen in one case is denied in another. |
caitre kuṇḍala ityādau na saṃyogastvadṛṣṭitaḥ // | In [expressions] like "Caitra [is] without the earring," it is not conjunction that is denied, because it was never seen. |
yadavasthāviśeṣanibandhaneyaṃ matirupavarṇitā tasyopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānyasyāmavasthāyām anupalambhe sati pratiṣedho vidhīyate na tu bhavat parikalpitasya saṃyogasya tasya saṃyogipadārthavivekena kvacid api buddhāv apratibhāsanāt / | The notion [under discussion] has been explained as being based upon a specific state [of things]; and when that [state], which should be perceptible, is not perceived in another state, then there is its denial [with regard to this latter state]; and what is denied is not the Conjunction that you assume, for the reason that such 'Conjunction' has never appeared in any cognition as separate from the things conjoined. |
tasmān nāsiddhatā hetoḥ // | Therefore our reason is not open to the charge of being "unproven." |
na parābhimatādyogājjāyate yuktavastudhīḥ / yuktabuddhitayā yadvat prāsādādiṣu yuktadhīḥ // | The notion of things being "conjunct" cannot arise from the conjunction postulated by the other party, because it is [simply] the notion of "being conjunct," just like the notion of "being conjunct" with regard to mansions and such things. |
anekavastusadbhāve jāyamānatayāthavā / vibhaktānekatantvādiviṣayā iva buddhayaḥ // | Or [it cannot arise from the postulated conjunction] because it appears only when there are multiple things, just like the cognitions of several separate threads and such things. |
vibhāge 'pi yathāyogaṃ vācyametat pramādvayam / | These same two proofs may be stated, as appropriate, with regard to disjunction also. |
ekasyānekavṛttiś ca na yukteti prabādhakam // | And the refuting argument is that it cannot be correct for one thing to subsist in multiple things. |
prayogaḥ yā saṃyuktabuddhiḥ sā bhavat parikalpitasaṃyogānāspadavastuviśeṣamātrabhāvinī yathā saṃyuktau prāsādāvityādau saṃyuktabuddhiśceyaṃ caitraḥ kuṇḍalītyādāviti svabhāvahetuḥ / | The application [is as follows]: The notion of "being conjunct" is based merely on the specific object which has nothing to do with the Conjunction postulated by you, just as [we see] in expressions like "the conjunct houses," and this notion of "being conjunct" [appears] in [expressions] like "Caitra with the earring" - this is a natural reason. |
athavā yānekavastusannipāte satyupajāyate sā bhavat parikalpitasaṃyogarahitānekavastuviṣayamātrabhāvinī yathā praviralāvasthitānekatantuviṣayāḥ pratyayās tathā ceyaṃ saṃyuktadhīr iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | Or, that [notion] which arises when multiple things come together is based merely on multiple objects completely devoid of the Conjunction postulated by you, just as [there are] cognitions of multiple threads lying separately; and this notion of "being conjunct" is like that - this is a natural reason. |
saṃyuktabuddhir ity arthaḥ / | This is the meaning of the notion of "being conjunct." |
etad eva pramāṇadvayaṃ vibhāgapratiṣedhe vācyam / | These same two proofs should be stated in the refutation of disjunction. |
vibhaktabuddhitvād anekapadārthāsannidhānāyattodayatvād vā parābhimatavibhāgarahitapadārthaviśeṣamātranibandhanā meṣādiṣu vibhāgabuddhiḥ yathā dūratarāvasthitameṣadvayaviṣayā vindhyahimavad viṣayā vā dhīr iti | Because [it is] the cognition of being separated, or because its appearance depends on the absence of multiple entities, the cognition of separation regarding rams and such [things] must be based solely on the particular entities themselves without [any] separation postulated by others, just like the cognition regarding two rams situated far apart, or [the cognition] regarding the Vindhya and Himalaya [mountains]. |
atha kimatra sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ yena hetor vipakṣe pracārāśaṅkā nivartata ity āha ekasyetyādi | "What is the annulling evidence here against the opposite of what is to be proven, by which the suspicion of the reason's occurrence in the counter-instance is removed?" Thus [he] speaks [beginning with] "ekasya" etc. |
yathaikasyānekatra vṛttir na yuktā tathā taddhyekavṛttibhājaiva rūpeṇetyādināvayaviniṣedhe pratānitam iti neha punaḥ pratāyate | Just as the occurrence of one [thing] in many [places] is not logical, so this has been elaborated in the refutation of the whole under [the text beginning with] "for it shares the nature of having a single occurrence" etc., hence it is not elaborated here again. |
parāparābhidhānādinimittaṃ yac ca kalpyate / paratvam aparatvaṃ ca dikkālāvadhikaṃ na tat | That which is postulated as the basis of the designation etc. of "prior" and "posterior" - [namely] priority and posteriority - is not determined with reference to space and time. |
yathā nīlādirūpāṇi kramabhāvavyavasthiteḥ / anyopādhiviveke 'pi tathocyante tathāpare | Just as blue and other colors, due to their established sequential existence, are spoken of [as prior and posterior] even without distinction of other conditions, so too are other [things] spoken of. |
idaṃ param idam aparam iti yato 'bhidhānapratyayau bhavatas tatparatvam aparatvaṃ ca yathākramaṃ parāparābhidhyānanimittaṃ siddham | From which arise the verbal expressions and cognitions "this is prior" and "this is posterior" - those [qualities of] priority and posteriority are established as the basis of the conception of prior and posterior respectively. |
ādiśabdena pratyayo gṛhyate / prayogaḥ yeyaṃ paramaparam iti saṃvitsā ghaṭādivyatiriktārthāntaranibandhanā tat pratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt sukhādibuddhivad iti | By the word "ādi" the cognition is meant. The application [is]: This awareness of "prior" and "posterior" must be based on something other than jar etc., because it is different in character from the cognition of those [things], like the cognition of pleasure etc. |
tathā hyekasyāṃ diśi sthitayoḥ piṇḍayoḥ param aparam iti buddhipravṛttir na tāvadiyaṃ diṅnibandhanā | For when two objects are situated in the same direction, the occurrence of the cognition "prior" and "posterior" is not based on direction. |
nāpi kālanibandhanā ekasminnapi pravartamāne kāle vartamānayor aniyatadigdeśasaṃyuktayor yuvasthavirayor vibhāgena parāparabuddhipravṛttes tadaviśeṣe 'piviśeṣād iti bhāvaḥ / nacānyadasyā buddher nibandhanam abhidhātuṃ pāryate | Nor is it based on time, because even when two [people], young and old, existing at the same time but connected to uncertain directions and places, [there is] the occurrence of the distinct cognition of prior and posterior, [showing] distinction even when there is no distinction [in time] - this is the meaning. And nothing else can be stated as the basis of this cognition. |
tasmād yannibandhaneyaṃ tat paratvam aparatvam iti siddham / dikkālāvadhikaṃ na taditi / dikkālapradeśasaṃyuktasannikṛṣṭaviprakṛṣṭapadārthāvadhikaṃ na bhavatītyarthaḥ | Therefore it is established that that on which these [cognitions] are based are [the qualities of] priority and posteriority. [The statement] "it is not determined with reference to space and time" means: it is not determined with reference to near and far objects connected to points in space and time. |
dikkālaśabdābhyāṃ hyupacārād dikkālapradeśasaṃyuktayor nirdeśaḥ / | The terms "dik" [space] and "kāla" [time] are used figuratively here [to refer to] objects in contact with points of space and time. |
tathā hyetat paratvam aparatvaṃ ca dvividham api dikkṛtaṃ kālakṛtaṃ ceti varṇitaṃ pareṇa / | Thus, these two [qualities of] priority and posteriority have both been explained by others as being produced by space and time. |
ekasyāṃ diśyavasthitayoḥ piṇḍayorekasya draṣṭuḥ saṃnikṛṣṭam avadhiṃ kṛtvaitasmād viprakṛṣṭo 'yam iti paratvādhāre buddhir utpadyate tatas tām apekṣya pareṇadikpradeśena saṃyogāt paratvam upajāyate / | When two objects are situated in the same direction, taking the near point as the standard for one observer, there arises the cognition "this [object] is far from that [point]" in the substratum of priority, and then, with reference to that [cognition], priority arises from contact with the farther spatial point. |
viprakṛṣṭaṃ cāvadhiṃ kṛtvaitasmāt sannikṛṣṭo 'yam ityaparatvādhāre buddhir utpadyate tāmapekṣyāpareṇa dikpradeśena saṃyogād aparatvasyotpattiḥ / | And taking the far point as the standard, there arises the cognition "this [object] is near to that [point]" in the substratum of posteriority, and with reference to that [cognition], posteriority arises from contact with the nearer spatial point. |
kālakṛtayostvayam utpattikramaḥ / | This is the sequence of production of those [qualities] produced by time. |
tathā hi vartamānakālayor aniyatadigdeśasaṃyuktayor yuvasthavirayor madhye yasya valīpalitarūḍhaśmaśrutādinānumitamādityodayāstamayānāṃ bahutvaṃ tatraikasya draṣṭur yavānam avadhiṃ kṛtvā viprakṛṣṭā buddhir utpadyate tāmapekṣya pareṇa kālapradeśena saṃyogāt paratvasyotpattiḥ / | Thus, between a young and old person existing in the present time, situated in different directions, with respect to the one whose numerous contacts with sunrises and sunsets are inferred from [his] wrinkles, grey hair, grown beard and so forth, taking the young man as the standard for one observer, there arises the cognition of [temporal] distance, and with reference to that [cognition], priority arises from contact with the farther temporal point. |
sthaviraṃ cāvadhiṃ kṛtvā yasyārūḍhaśmaśrutādinānumitamādityodayāstamayānām alpatvaṃ tatra yūni sannikṛṣṭabuddhir utpadyate tām apekṣyāpareṇa kālapradeśena saṃyogād aparasyotpattir iti / | And taking the old man as the standard, with respect to the one whose fewer contacts with sunrises and sunsets are inferred from [his] lack of beard and so forth, there arises the cognition of [temporal] proximity regarding the young man, and with reference to that [cognition], posteriority arises from contact with the nearer temporal point. |
tadetat paratvāparatvasādhanamanaikāntikaṃ sādhyaviparkṣe 'pi hetor vṛttir iti darśayati yathā nīlādirūpāṇītyādi / | [The text] shows that this proof of priority and posteriority is inconclusive, since the reason occurs even in the opposite of what is to be proved, as in [the case of] blue and other colors. |
bhāva utpādas tatsahitā vyavasthitiḥ krameṇa bhāvavyavasthitir iti vigrahaḥ / | The analysis is: "bhāva" means coming into existence, and "vyavasthiti" qualified by that means sequential existence. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yathā nīlādiṣu krameṇotpādāt kālopādheḥ krameṇa vyavasthā na guṇopādheḥ paraṃ nīlam aparaṃ nīlam iti parāparavyapadeśo bhavatyasatyapi paratvāparatvalakṣaṇe guṇe nirguṇatvād guṇānāṃ tathā ghaṭādiṣvapi kiṃ neṣyate / | This means that just as in the case of blue and other [colors], due to sequential production, there is temporal succession but not qualitative succession, [and] there is designation of prior and posterior as in "this is the prior blue" and "that is the posterior blue" even without the qualities of priority and posteriority (since qualities cannot possess qualities), why should this not be accepted for jars and other [things] as well? |
etenaitaddarśayati yadyarthāntaranimittatvamātramiha sādhayitum iṣṭaṃ tadāanaikāntikatā hetoḥ sādhyaviparyaye 'pi tasya vṛtteḥ / | By this [the text] shows that if what is intended to be proved here is merely dependence on something else, then there is inconclusiveness of the reason because it occurs even in the opposite of what is to be proved. |
atha nityabhūtadikkālapadārthahetuko yo guṇaviśeṣas tannibandhanatvam asyā buddheḥ sādhayitumiṣṭaṃ tadā dṛṣṭāntābhāvaḥ / | If what is intended to be proved is that this cognition is based on the specific quality caused by the eternal substances space and time, then there is absence of an example. |
pratijñāyāścānumānabādhā / | The thesis is also invalidated by inference. |
tathā hi śakyam idaṃ kartuṃ yā parāparabuddhiḥ sā paraparikalpitaguṇarahitārthamātrakṛtakramotpādavyavasthānibandhanā parāparabuddhitvāt yathā rūpādiṣu parāparabuddhiḥ parāparabuddhiśceyaṃ ghaṭādiṣviti svabhāvahetuḥ / | For instance, one can make [the following inference]: The notion of prior and posterior is based solely on the regularity of successive appearances of things without [any] qualities postulated by the opponent, because it is a notion of prior and posterior, like the notion of prior and posterior with regard to color and other [qualities]; and this [same] notion [applies] to jars and other [things] – this is the nature-based reason. |
nīlādiṣvekārthasamavāyād upacariteyaṃ paratvādibuddhirato 'naikāntikatā hetoḥ pāramparyeṇa nīlādiṣvapi paratvāder nimittabhāvopagamāt sādhyavikalatā ca dṛṣṭāntasyeti cen na / | [If it is objected] that "in the case of blue and other [qualities], this notion of priority etc. is figurative due to inherence in one object, and therefore the reason is not inconclusive, and since priority etc. are accepted as causes even in blue etc. through succession, the example lacks the probandum" – [we say] no. |
prativihitametad askhaladgatitvānnaupacārikatvaṃ yuktam iti / | This has already been answered [by stating] that since [the notion] is unfailing in its operation, it cannot reasonably be figurative. |
svāśraye 'pi tayor upalabdhyabhāvāc ca na tadbalena pratyayo yuktaḥ / | And since those two [qualities] are not perceived even in their own substrate, a cognition based on their force is not reasonable. |
sukhādiṣu vā pūrvottarakālabhāviṣu kiṃ kalpyeta nahi tatraikārthasamavāyo 'sti / | Or what could be postulated in the case of pleasure and other [things] occurring in prior and later times, since there is no inherence in one object there? |
apica dikkālayoḥ pūrvaṃ pratiṣiddhatvenābhāvāt taddhetukayor api paratvāparatvayor abhāva iti kutastannimittatvāśaṅkā / | Moreover, since space and time have been previously refuted and thus do not exist, the priority and posteriority caused by them also do not exist - so how could there be any suspicion of [the notion] being caused by them? |
yena hetor anaikāntikatā bhavet / | Because of which the reason would be inconclusive. |
nacāpi dikkālayor bhavataḥ pradeśāḥ santi yatsaṃyogād apekṣābuddhisahitāt paratvāder utpattiḥ syāt tayor ekātmatayā niravayavatvāt / | Nor do space and time according to you have parts, from contact with which, combined with relative cognition, priority etc. could arise, because they are essentially one and partless. |
na copacarito 'vayavabhedo 'thakriyānurodhī yuktaḥ vastusvabhāvapratibaddhatvāt tasyāḥ upacaritasyācālīkatvād iti nānaikāntikatā / | Nor is it reasonable [to assume] a figurative division of parts conforming to practical efficacy, because that [efficacy] is bound by the nature of real things, and because what is figurative is unreal - thus there is no inconclusiveness. |
parakīyasya ca hetoḥ pūrvavad asiddhatvaṃ vācyam / | And regarding the opponent's reason, it should be stated that it is unproven, as [explained] before. |
saṅkhyāyogādayaḥ sarve na dravyāvyatirekiṇaḥ / tadvyavacchedakatvena daṇḍādir iva cen matam // | If it is held that "number, conjunction and the rest cannot be non-different from substance, because they serve to characterize [substance] and differentiate it, like a stick [differentiates something]" |
teṣāṃ saṃvṛtisattvena varṇanādiṣṭasādhanam / | [Then our reply is that] by [accepting] their conventional existence, [you are merely] proving what we already admit |
tattvānyatvena nirvācyaṃ naiva saṃvṛtisadyataḥ // | Because what is conventionally existent cannot be defined either as identical [with something] or different [from it] |
sarva evāmī yathoktāḥ saṅkhyādayo guṇā na dravyādavyatirekiṇas tasya dravyasya teṣāṃ vyavacchedahetutvāt yo hi yadvyavacchedako nāsau tadavyatirekī yathā daṇḍādir devadattasyeti / | [The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika says:] "All these aforementioned qualities like number etc. cannot be non-different from substance, because they serve as causes for differentiating that substance; for whatever differentiates something cannot be non-different from it, just as a stick [which differentiates] Devadatta [cannot be non-different from him]." |
tadatra dravyādavyatirekitvaniṣedhamātre sādhye siddhasādhyatā doṣaḥ pratijñāyāḥ / | In this case, when merely the denial of non-difference from substance is to be proved, the thesis suffers from the fault of proving what is [already] established |
saṃvṛtisatāṃ sarveṣām avastutayā tattvānyatvābhyām avācyatayābhīṣṭatvāt // | Because all conventionally existent things, being unreal entities, are accepted as being indescribable either as identical [with something] or different [from it] |
athetyādinātrāviddhakarṇasyottaramāśaṅkate | Here, with [the words] beginning with "atha", [the text] anticipates Aviddhakarṇa's reply |
athānirvacanīyatvaṃ samūhāder niṣidhyata / | If the indefinability of the group and other [such things] is denied |
yasmānniyatadharmatvaṃ rūpaśabdarasādivat // | Because [they have] fixed properties like color, sound, taste etc. |
sa hyāha samūhasantānāvasthāviśeṣās tattvānyatvābhyām avacanīyā na bhavanti pratiniyatadharmayogitvād rūparasādivad iti // | For he says: "The particular states of groups and series are not indescribable in terms of identity and difference, because they possess fixed properties, just like color, taste, etc." |
tadetanniḥsvabhāvatayetyādinā pratividhatte | [The text] answers this with [the words] beginning with "by [virtue of its] lack of intrinsic nature" |
niḥsvabhāvatayā tasya tattvato 'mbarapadmavat / na siddhā niyatā dharmāḥ kalpanāropitās tu te // | Because it lacks intrinsic nature, its fixed properties are not established in reality, like [those of] a sky-lotus; rather, they are merely superimposed by conceptual construction |
tathaivoktāvanekānto viyatpadmādibhir yataḥ / abhedo vyatirekaś ca vastunyeva vyavasthitaḥ // | Even when stated thus, [the reasoning] would be inconclusive because of [examples] like the sky-lotus; for both non-difference and difference are established only in real entities |
saṃkhyāder āśrayasyāsiddhatvaṃ | [The proof] has the fallacy of having no substratum for Number and the rest. |
yadi hi pāramārthikaniyatadharmatvaṃ hetur iṣṭatas tadā hetor asiddhatā | If what is meant to be the Reason is the presence of real specific properties, then [there is] the invalidity of the reason. |
nahi bauddhaṃ prati santānādīnāṃ saṃvṛtisatāṃ pāramārthikaniyatadharmayogitvaṃ siddham | For the Buddhist, it is not established that the Chain and other [things] which have merely conventional existence are endowed with real specific properties. |
atha sāmānyena hetus tadā viyatpadmādīnām apy abhāvatvāmūrtatvādayaḥ kalpitā niyatadharmāḥ santy eva iti anaikāntikatā hetoḥ | If however the Reason is [meant] in a general way, then such imagined specific properties as non-existence, incorporeality etc. are indeed present also in sky-lotus and similar [things]; hence [there is] inconclusiveness of the reason. |
sāmānyena vikalpitānupākhyavṛttidharmaparityāgenoktau satyām ity arthaḥ | The meaning is: even when [it is] stated in this general way, abandoning reference to well-determined specific properties. |
itaś cānaikāntikatvam asya hetoḥ | And for this [following] reason also [there is] inconclusiveness of this reason: |
yasmād abhedo 'nanyatvaṃ vyatireko 'nyatvam etau vastuny eva vyavasthitau nānyatra | Because non-difference [means] sameness [and] difference [means] being something else, these two rest only in real entities, not elsewhere. |
santānādayaś ca prajñaptisattvenāvastusantas tat katham eṣāṃ vastunaḥ sakāśād bhedābhedau siddhyataḥ | And [since] the Chain and other [things] having mere conceptual existence are not real entities, how could their difference or non-difference from a real entity be established? |
tad evaṃ prathame prayoge saṅkhyādīnāṃ dravyād avyatirekapratiṣedhamātre sādhye siddhasādhyatā iti pratipāditam | Thus then, it has been shown that in the first argument, if what is to be proved is merely the denial of non-difference of Number etc. from Substance, then [there is] the fallacy of proving what is [already] established. |
athāpi syān na avyatirekapratiṣedhamātraṃ sādhyate kiṃ tarhi dvau pratiṣedhau vidhim eva gamayata iti pratiṣedhadvayena dravyād vyatirekitvam eva sādhyata iti | [If] it might be argued: "What is to be proved is not merely the denial of non-difference; rather, since two negatives make an affirmative, through the two negatives what is to be proved is precisely the difference from Substance." |
tad etat saṅkhyāder ityādinā āśrayāsiddhatetyādinā pratiṣedhati | This [objection] is refuted by [the statement] beginning with "of Number etc." [and] by [the argument about] having no substratum. |
na dravyāvyatirekiṇaḥ kiṃ tarhi vyatirekiṇa ity arthaḥ | The meaning is: [they are] not non-different from Substance, but rather different [from it]. |
tad eva saṅkhyāder āśrayasyāsiddhatvaṃ darśayati samuccayādi bhinnaṃ tu dravyam eva tathocyate svarūpād eva bhedaś ca vyāhataḥ sādhito bhavet | This shows the lack of substratum for Number etc.: if what is spoken of as such is merely Substance itself as differentiated by collection etc., then what would be proved would be a difference from its own nature, [which would be] self-contradictory. |
tathocyata iti / | [It] is spoken of as such. |
eko dvau bahava ityevam ādiḥ / | [Terms] like "one," "two," "many," and so forth. |
syād etat dravyātmakasyāpi sataḥ saṅkhyāder bhedaḥ prasādhyata ity āha ---svarūpādevetyādi / | One might object: "The difference of number etc., though being of the nature of substance, is what is to be proved." [To this, he] responds with [the words] beginning with "from [its] essential nature." |
nahi vastutaḥ svarūpād bhedo 'sti tasya niḥsvabhāvatvaprasaṅgāt / | Indeed, no real entity can be different from its essential nature, as this would lead to [that entity] having no nature of its own. |
vyāhata iti / parasparaviruddhaḥ / | "Self-contradictory" means mutually contradictory. |
bhedābhedayoḥ parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatayā yugapadekatra viruddhatvāt / | Because difference and non-difference, having characteristics that mutually exclude each other, cannot exist simultaneously in one [thing]. |
evaṃ tāvat paratvāntā guṇāḥ pratiṣiddhāḥ / | Thus far, all qualities up to posteriority have been refuted. |
buddhyādayas tu prayatnāntā ātmāśritatvena tadguṇā iṣṭāḥ / | The qualities beginning with cognition and ending with effort are accepted [by them] as qualities of the soul by virtue of residing in the soul. |
te cātmaniṣedhādeva niṣiddhā draṣṭavyāḥ / | And these should be considered refuted by the very refutation of the soul [itself]. |
nacaiṣāmātmāśrayo yuktaḥ, tathā hi utpattihetutayā cāmīṣāmātmāśrayo bhavetsthitihetutayā vā / | Moreover, their residing in the soul is not logical, for the soul would have to be their substrate either as the cause of their origination or as the cause of their persistence. |
sarvadaivāvikalakāraṇatayā sukhādīnām utpattiprasaṅgāt na tāvad utpattihetutayā | [The Soul] cannot be the cause of [qualities'] production, because pleasure and other [qualities] would [have to] arise continuously due to the cause being always present without deficiency |
na ca parair anādheyātiśayasya sahakārivyapekṣā kācid astīti śataśaścarcitam etat | And it has been discussed hundreds of times that something in which no excellence can be produced by others cannot have any dependence on auxiliary causes |
na cāpi nityasya kāryotpādanasāmarthyam asti tasya kramayaugapadyābhyāṃ vyāptatvāt | Nor does an eternal [entity] have the capacity to produce effects, as such [production] must be pervaded by either succession or simultaneity |
nityasya ca kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhasya pratipāditatvāt | And it has been established that for an eternal [entity], productive activity is contradicted by both succession and simultaneity |
nāpi sthitihetutayā yuktaḥ, sthiteḥ sthātuvyatiricyamānarūpatvāt | Nor is [the Soul] logically possible as the cause of subsistence, because subsistence has no form distinct from the subsistent |
taddhetutve sthātṛhetutvamevoktaṃ syāt | If [the Soul] were the cause of that [subsistence], it would amount to saying it is the cause of the subsistent itself |
taccānantaram eva niṣiddham | And that has just been rejected |
tasya ca sthātuḥ pariniṣṭhitātmasvarūpatvān na kaściddhetuḥ sambhavati | And because the subsistent has a fully established essential nature, no cause of it is possible |
tasya tatrakiñcitkaratvāt | Because [the cause] could do nothing in it |
vyatireke 'pi sthiteḥ sthātus tena na kiñcitkṛtam arthāntarabhūtāyāḥ sthiteḥ karaṇāt | Even if subsistence were different from the subsistent, nothing would be done by that [cause] in [the subsistent], because it would [only] produce the subsistence which is [ex hypothesi] something different |
tataścākiñcitkaraḥ kathaṃ tasyāśrayo bhavet | And therefore how could [something] that produces nothing [in it] be its substratum? |
nāpi tat sambandhinyāḥ sthiteḥ karaṇāt tasyāyam upakārako yuktas tatsambandhitvāsiddheḥ | Nor is it logical that [the Soul] would be its helper by producing a subsistence related to it, because that relationship is not established |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.