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syād etan na sādṛśyāpekṣametajjñānamupavarṇyate / kintu yat teṣām āśrayabhūtaṃ dravyaṃ tadgataikatvādikādekārthasamavāyitvād etadguṇakarmasamavāyādiṣvekādijñānaṃ bhavatīti tadetad āśaṅkayann āha taddravyetyādi / taddravyasamavetāc ced ekatvāt parikalpyate / guṇādiṣvekavijñānam ekārthasamavāyataḥ // | [Someone] might say: "This cognition is not described as dependent on similarity, but rather the cognition of 'one' etc. regarding qualities, actions, inherence etc. occurs because they inhere in the same [thing] as the oneness etc. residing in that substance which is their substrate." Anticipating this [objection, the author] states "from that substance" etc.: "If the cognition of oneness regarding qualities etc. is imagined [to arise] from the oneness inherent in that substance, due to [their] inherence in one thing..." |
astuttram āha astunāmetyādi / | The answer [to this objection] is given [in the words] beginning with "astu nāma." |
astunāmaivam ekatra jñāne vyāpti{dvyāhi---}matistu kam / eteṣvapekṣate hetuṃ ṣaṭpadārthādikeṣu vā // | Let it be granted that oneness exists in a single cognition; but what cause determines the notion of twoness with respect to [multiple] cognitions or with respect to the six categories and so forth? |
ekārthasamavāyāder gauṇo 'yaṃ pratyayo bhavan / | This notion arising from [the concept of] inherence in a single object would [only] be secondary [i.e., figurative]. |
yadi hi tad dravyasamavetād ekatvāder etajjñānaṃ tadāstu nāmaikatra jñāne sukhādau caikātmadravyasamavāyinyekamekam iti jñānam / | If this cognition of oneness etc. comes from inherence in that substance, then let there be a cognition of "one" with respect to a single cognition and pleasure etc., which inhere in the single substance [called] ātman. |
dve trīṇi catvāri jñānānītyādijñānasya tu ko hetuḥ, nahi tatraikātmagataṃ dvitvādyasti / | But what is the cause of cognitions [of plurality] such as "two cognitions," "three cognitions," "four cognitions"? For duality etc. does not inhere in that single ātman. |
yaccaitad ucyate ṣaṭpadārthāḥ, sukhaduḥkhe, icchādveṣau, pañcavidhaṃ karma, sāmānyaṃ dvividhaṃ paramaparaṃ ca, eko bhāvaḥ, ekaḥ samavāya iti, tatra ko hetuḥ / | And what is the cause when it is said "six categories," "pleasure and pain [are two]," "desire and aversion [are two]," "action is fivefold," "universality is twofold - higher and lower," "existence is one," "inherence is one"? |
nahi tatraikārthasamavāyinī saṅkhyāsti, tasmād avyāpinītvādiyam api kalpanā na yuktā / | For in these cases there is no number inhering in a single object; therefore this conception too is incorrect due to its non-pervasiveness. |
tathāpyekārthasamavāyāder ayaṃ bhavan pratyayo gauṇaḥ syāt dvastvantarābhāvāt / | Moreover, even if this notion arising from inherence in a single object etc. occurs, it would [only] be secondary due to the absence of other [real] twoness. |
tatas tu skhalitaḥ syād yathā māṇavake 'nalapratyayas tat pravṛttinimittābhāvāt, nacaivaṃ bhavati tasmāt pūrvoktadoṣānivṛttir eva // | Therefore it would be erroneous, just like the notion of "fire" with respect to a boy, due to the absence of a cause for such application; but it is not like this, hence the previously stated fault remains. |
gajādityādināviddhakarṇoktaṃ saṅkhyāsiddhaye pramāṇam āśaṅkate gajādipratyayebhyaś ca vailakṣaṇyāt prasādhyate / | [The opponent] considers the proof for establishing number stated by Aviddhakarṇa beginning with [the words] "gajādi": "It is established from its difference from notions of 'elephant' etc." |
saṅkhyābuddhis tadanyotthā nīlavastrādibuddhivat // | The cognition of number arises from something other than those [objects], just like the cognition of blue cloth etc. |
sa hyāha saṅkhyāpratyayo gajaturaṅgasyandanādivyatiriktanibandhano gajādipratyayavilakṣaṇatvān nīlapaṭapratyayavad iti / | He [the opponent] says thus: "The cognition of number must have a basis distinct from elephant, horse, chariot and such things, because it differs from the cognitions of elephant etc., just like the cognition of blue cloth." |
tadanyottheti / | [The expression] "arising from something else" [refers to the following]. |
icchetyādinā pratividhatte icchāracitasaṅketamanaskārādyupāyataḥ / | [The author] responds with "icchā" etc.: [it can be explained] through means such as mentally constructed conventions arising from mere desire. |
tatreṣṭasiddhir buddhyādau saṅkhyaitenaiva vā bhavet // | Therefore, the establishment of what is desired [to be proved] regarding number in cognition etc. could be due to this very [cause]. |
gajādivyatiriktasya saṅketamanaskārāder āntarasya nimittatveneṣṭatvāt siddhasādhyataiva / | Since causes distinct from elephant etc., such as mental conventions and other internal [factors], are already accepted as causes, [your argument] merely proves what is already established. |
ādiśabdena saṅketamaraṇādiparigrahaḥ / | By the word "ādi" [and so forth], the remembrance of conventions and such things are included. |
atha saṅketābhogādivyatiriktapadārthanibandhanaṃ sādhayitum abhipretaṃ tadānaikāntikateti prasaṅgodbhāvanavyājena darśayati buddhyādau saṅkhyaitenaiva vā bhaved iti / | If, however, what is intended to be proved is [the existence of] a basis in things distinct from conventional experience etc., then [the reason] is inconclusive - this is shown through a reductio ad absurdum: "the [existence of] number in cognition etc. would be due to this very [cause]." |
etenaiva tat pratyayavilakṣaṇatvād ityanena / | "By this very [cause]" means "by being different from those cognitions." |
ekā buddhir dve buddhī pañca karmāṇītyādāvapi saṅkhyā bhavet prāpnoti / | It would follow that number would exist in [expressions] such as "one cognition," "two cognitions," "five actions." |
tatrāpyekādibuddhes tat pratyayavilakṣaṇatvāt na ca bhavati, tasmād anaikāntika iti bhāvaḥ // | Since even there the cognition of "one" etc. differs from those cognitions, yet [number] does not [arise] from that [difference], therefore [the reason] is inconclusive - this is the meaning. |
kiṃ ca yānekadravyā dvitvādisaṅkhyā tasyā ye 'yam ekatvebhyo 'nekabuddhisahitebhyo niṣpattir varṇyate bhavadbhiḥ sā nirnibandhaneti darśayati buddhyapekṣā cetyādi / | Moreover, you explain that the number "two" etc. which subsists in multiple substances is produced from multiple unities associated with multiple cognitions, [but] this is baseless, as [shown by the phrase] "buddhyapekṣā" etc. |
saṅketābhogamātreṇa tadbuddhiḥ kiṃ na saṃmatā // | Why is that cognition not accepted [as arising] from mere conventional usage? |
mātragrahaṇamekatva dvitvāditat sāmānyatat sambandhajñānavyavacchedārtham / | The word "mātra" [mere] is meant to exclude [the notions of] oneness, twoness etc., their universal, and the knowledge of their relation. |
tadbuddhir iti / | [The phrase] "that cognition" [means the following]: |
saṅkhyeyeṣu dve trīṇi catvārītyādikā buddhiḥ saṅketādbhogamātreṇa kim na saṃmatā / | Why is the cognition of "two", "three", "four" etc. in countable things not accepted [as arising] from mere conventional usage? |
evaṃ hyadṛṣṭasāmarthyasya hetutvaṃ na kalpitaṃ syād anyathā hi hetūnām anavasthā bhavet / | For thus the causality of something whose potency is not perceived would not need to be assumed, otherwise there would be an infinite regress of causes. |
tathāhyapekṣā buddhisadbhāve tadgatānvayavyatirekānuvidhānāt saiva kalpayituṃ yuktā / | Thus indeed, given the presence of the cognition of requirement [apekṣābuddhi], it is reasonable to postulate that very [cognition] due to its following positive and negative concomitance. |
anyathā hi harītakīṃ prāpya devatā virecayantītyapi kalpanīyaṃ bhavet / | For otherwise one might have to assume that "deities, having obtained harītakī, cause purging" [rather than the harītakī itself causing it]. |
nāpi samuccayādivyāvṛttapadārthavyatirekeṇopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptābhimatādvitvādayo dṛśyante saṃgacchante vā, ekasyānekasmin vṛtteḥ pratiṣiddhatvāt / | Nor are duality etc., which are claimed to be perceptible apart from things excluded from aggregates etc., ever perceived or compatible [with reason], because the occurrence of one [thing] in many has been refuted. |
sāmānyasamavāyayoś ca niṣetsyamānatvād iti bhāvaḥ // | And because universals and inherence are going to be refuted - this is the meaning. |
mahaddīrghādibhedena parimāṇaṃ yaducyate / | That which is called dimension through the distinctions of "large", "long", etc., |
tadapyarthe tathā rūpabhdeād eva na kiṃ matam // | why is that too not considered [to arise] from the very diversity of forms in the thing itself? |
parimāṇavyavahārakāraṇaṃ parimāṇaṃ taccaturvidhaṃ mahadaṇu dīrghaṃ hrasvam iti / | Dimension is the cause of [all] dimensional usage [and] it is of four kinds: [1] large, [2] small, [3] long, [and] [4] short. |
tatra mahaddvividhaṃ nityam anityaṃ ca / | Among these, the large [dimension] is of two kinds: eternal and non-eternal. |
nityamākāśakāladigātmasu paramamahattvaṃ / | The eternal [large dimension], which is the supreme largeness, [subsists] in ākāśa, time, directions, and souls. |
anityaṃ tryaṇukādidravyeṣu / | The non-eternal [large dimension subsists] in triads and other substances. |
tathāvapi dvividhaṃ nityam anityaṃ ca / | Similarly, the small [dimension] too is of two kinds: eternal and non-eternal. |
nityaṃ paramāṇu manaḥ suparima[p.215]ṇḍalalakṣaṇam / | The eternal [small dimension], which is characterized by perfect sphericity, [subsists] in atoms and minds. |
anityaṃ dvyaṇuka eva / | The non-eternal [small dimension subsists] in dyads only. |
kuvalāmalabilvādiṣu ca mahatsvapi tat prakarṣābhāvamapekṣya bhāktoyaṃ vyavahāraḥ / yādṛśaṃ hyāmalake mahatparimāṇaṃ na tādṛśaṃ kuvala iti / | In jujubes, āmalakas, bilva fruits and such, though [they are] large, this usage [of largeness] is figurative, considering the absence of excellence [of largeness] in them; for the large dimension in an āmalaka is not the same as [that] in a jujube. |
evam anyatrāpi yojyam / | This should be applied similarly in other cases too. |
atra tryaṇukādiṣu vartamānayor mahattvadīrghatvayor dvyaṇuke cāṇutvahrasvatvayoḥ ko viśeṣaḥ/ | What is the difference between largeness and length residing in triads etc., and [between] smallness and shortness residing in dyads? |
ucyate tatrāsti mahattvadīrghatvayoḥ parasparato viśeṣaḥ | It is said that there is a mutual distinction between largeness and length. |
mahatsu dīrghamānīyatāṃ dīrgheṣu ca mahadānīyatām iti vyavahārabhedadarśanāt | [This is evident] from observing different linguistic usages such as "bring [something] long from among large [things]" and "bring [something] large from among long [things]." |
etac ca mahadādi rūpādibhyo 'rthāntaratvena siddhaṃ tat pratyayavilakṣaṇabuddhigrāhyatvāt sukhādivad iti paro manyate | The opponent thinks that largeness and similar [qualities] are established as different entities from color and other [qualities], because they are apprehended by cognitions distinct from the cognitions of those [colors etc.], like pleasure and so forth. |
tatra yadi tāvad rūpādiviṣayendriyabuddhivilakṣaṇapratyakṣapratyayagrāhyatvād iti hetvartho 'bhipretas tadā hetor asiddhatā | If in this [argument] the intended meaning of the reason is that "[largeness etc.] are apprehended by sense-perceptions distinct from the sense-cognitions that have color etc. as their objects," then the reason is unestablished. |
nahi tathātathāsthitarūpādipadārthavyatirekeṇa mahadādiparimāṇam indriyabuddhau pratibhāsamānam upalakṣyate | For no dimension such as largeness etc. is observed appearing in sense-cognition separate from colors and other entities as they exist in various states. |
atha aṇu mahadādītyevaṃ yā vikalpikā buddhiḥ sā tat pratyayavilakṣaṇā buddhir abhipretā | If then what is meant is that the conceptual cognition which [thinks] "small," "large" etc. is the cognition distinct from those [perceptions of color etc.], |
evam apyanaikāntikatā hetor vipakṣe bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt | Even in this case the reason is inconclusive, because there is no evidence invalidating [its presence] in the counter-instance. |
nahyasyāḥ paramārthataḥ kiñcidapi grāhyam asti sābhijalpatvāt | For this [conceptual cognition] has no real object whatsoever, because it involves verbal expression. |
kevalaṃ teṣvevaṃ rūpādiṣvekadiṅmukhādipravṛtteṣu dṛṣṭeṣu tadvilakṣaṇebhyo rūpādibhyo bhedapratipādanāya kṛtasamayānurodhān mahadityadhyavasyantī jāyate iti nāto vastvantarasiddhiḥ | Rather, when those colors etc. are seen proceeding in one direction etc., the determining cognition "[this is] large" arises in accordance with established convention for the purpose of showing difference from other distinct colors etc., and hence there is no establishment of a separate entity from this. |
ata eva cāsyā na rūpādivyatiriktamavaseyam astītyasiddhatāpi hetoḥ | For this very reason there is nothing cognizable by this [conceptual cognition] separate from color etc., and thus the reason is also unestablished. |
pratijñāyāś ca pratyakṣabādhā pratyakṣatveneṣṭasya mahadāde rūpatvādivyatirekeṇānupalambhāt | And the thesis is contradicted by perception, because largeness etc., which are accepted as perceptible, are not observed separate from coloredness etc. |
tasmāt tadapi parimāṇam arthe rūpādāvekadiṅmukhādipravṛtte tasyārthasyātathodbhūtādbhedamāśritya kiṃ na tādātmyeneṣṭam / | Therefore, why should dimension not be accepted as identical in nature with color and other [qualities], based on the difference [arising] from [their] appearing in objects that turn towards one direction? |
evaṃ hyadṛṣṭāyuktapadārthakalpanā na kṛtā syād ityevakāreṇa darśayati / | Thus, through the particle "eva" it is shown that there would be no postulation of unseen and unreasonable entities. |
tathāhyekadiṅmukhapravṛtte bhūyasi rūpādike dṛṣṭe spṛṣṭe vā dīrgham iti vyavaharanti / tadapekṣayā cālpīyasi samutpanne hrasvam iti / | Thus, when many colors etc. turning towards one direction are seen or touched, [people] speak of [it as] "long"; and when fewer [colors etc.] arise in comparison to that, [they speak of it as] "short." |
evaṃ mahadādiṣvapi yojyam / rūpādiniṣedhavaccaikānekavikalpābhyāṃ mahadādiniṣedho vācyaḥ // | The same applies also to "large" and other [dimensions]. Like the denial of color etc., the denial of "large" etc. should be stated through the alternatives of [being] one or many. |
api ca sādhyābhāve 'pi hetor vṛttidarśanād anaikāntikā sphuṭatareti darśayann āha dīrghetyādi / | Moreover, showing that [the reason] is more clearly inconclusive because the reason is observed even in the absence of what is to be proved, he states [the verses] beginning with "dīrgha" etc. |
dīrghā prāsādamāleti mahatī vedyate yathā / | A row of mansions is perceived as "long" and "large"; |
nahi tatra yathārūpaṃ parimāṇaṃ prakalpitam // | yet there no dimension proportionate to [its] form is postulated. |
ekārthasamavāyena tathā cedvyapadiśyate / na mahattvaṃ na dairghyaṃ ca dhāmasvasti vivakṣitam // | If it is said that it is designated thus due to inherence in the same object, [then we reply that] neither largeness nor length is meant to exist in [individual] mansions. |
tathāhyasatyapi bhavatparikalpite mahattvādau prāsādamālādiṣu mahadādipratyayaprasūtiranubhūyate / | For thus, even without your postulated largeness etc., the occurrence of the cognition of "large" etc. is experienced in rows of mansions etc. |
nacetthaṃ śakyaṃ vaktum / | And it cannot be stated in this way. |
yatraiva prāsādādiṣu mālākhyo guṇaḥ samavetas tatra mahattvādikam api tenaikārthasamavāyāvalāt tathā mahatītyevaṃ tanmālādi vyapadiśyata iti | Even where the quality termed 'line' [mālā] inheres in palaces and such things, [and] where due to inherence in the same substratum, [something] is designated as "large line" and so forth |
dhāmasu iti prāsādeṣu | [The term] 'dhāmasu' [refers to] palaces |
krośārdhakrośādi parimāṇam | [There is] dimension extending to half a krośa or [full] krośa and so forth |
kasmān nāstītyāha prāsādaśceṣyata iti | [To the question] "Why does it not exist?", [the answer] is stated: "Because the palace is accepted [as follows]" |
prāsādaśceṣyate yogo guṇaḥ so 'parimāṇavān | The palace is accepted [by you] as conjunction, [which is] a quality, [and] that [quality] is without dimension |
na tasyāstyaparā mālā nopacārasya cāśrayaḥ | Neither can it have another 'line', nor can [it] be the substrate of a metaphorical [usage] |
tathā hi bhavadbhiḥ prāsādaḥ saṃyogātmako guṇa iṣyate nāvayavidravyaṃ vijātīyadravyānarambhāt | For indeed, by you the palace is accepted as a quality consisting of conjunction, not as a composite substance, because it does not produce heterogeneous substances |
sa ca guṇaḥ parimāṇavān na bhavati nirguṇā guṇā iti samayāt | And that quality cannot possess dimension, because [your] doctrine [states that] "qualities are without qualities" |
tataś ca guṇānāṃ prāsādādīnāṃ mālākhyasyāparasya guṇasyābhāvāt prāsādamāletyetadeva na syāt | And therefore, due to the absence of another quality called 'line' in qualities such as palaces, even the expression "line of palaces" would not be possible |
kuto mahatī hrasvetyādi bhaviṣyati | How then could [expressions like] "large," "small," etc. be possible? |
tathā hi mālā samkhyāsvabhāveṣṭā saṃkhyā ca guṇatvād dravyam evāśritā na guṇam | For indeed, 'line' is accepted as having the nature of number, and number, being a quality, inheres only in substance, not in [another] quality |
yadāpyavayavisvabhāvā māleṣyate tathāpi dravyasya dravyamevāśrayo na guṇā iti na mālāyāḥ prāsādāśrayatvaṃ yuktam | Even if 'line' is accepted as having the nature of a composite, still, since a substance has only a substance as its substrate, not qualities, it is not reasonable for a palace to be the substrate of a line |
jātisvabhāvā mālāṅgīkriyate | [If] the Line [were to] be considered as having the nature of a genus |
evam api jātessarvātmanā pratyāśrayaparisamāptatvād eko 'pi prāsādo māletyucyeta vṛkṣavat | Even so, since a genus exists completely in each of its substrates, even a single palace would have to be called a "Line," just like [we use the word] "tree" [for a single tree] |
"geho yadyapi saṃyogas tanmālā kinnu tadbhavet / jātiścedgeha eko 'pi māletyucyeta vṛkṣavat" | "Though a house is [merely] a conjunction, how could it be a line? If [line] were a genus, then even a single house would be called a line, just like [we say] 'tree'" |
ekā dīrghā mahatītyādivyapadeśānupapattiś ca tadavasthaiva mālāyām tadāśraye ca prāsādādāvekatvādiguṇābhāvāt | And [there would be] the impossibility of designations such as "one," "long," "large" etc., since in both the line and its substrate, the palace etc., the qualities of unity etc. are absent |
kāṣṭhādiṣu ca vivakṣitadairghyādyasadbhāvāt | And because in wood and other [materials], the intended length etc. are not present |
bahvīṣu ca prāsādamālāsu mālāmāletyanugāmī vyapadeśo na syāt | And in [the case of] many palace-lines, the recurring designation "line and line" would not be possible |
jāter ajātitaḥ | Because a genus cannot [have] another genus |
yadāha "mālā bahutve tacchabdaḥ kathaṃ jāter ajātitaḥ" | As it is said: "When there are many lines, how can that word [apply], since a genus cannot [have] another genus?" |
ata upacārasyāśrayaḥ parigraho yadvāśrayo 'dhiṣṭhānaṃ na yuktam | Therefore taking recourse to figurative usage or [taking] a substrate [or] basis [for such usage] is not reasonable |
na cāpyayaṃ skhaladgatir mālādiṣu mahattvādipratyayaḥ | And this notion of largeness etc. with respect to lines etc. is not erroneous |
tasmānnaupacāriko yuktaḥ | Therefore [the usage] cannot reasonably be [considered] figurative |
nahi mukhyapratyayāviśiṣṭo gauṇo yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt / | [That which is] not distinct from the primary cognition cannot be figurative, as [this would] lead to overextension. |
yadāha | As has been said: |
"mālādau ca mahattvādiriṣṭo yaścaupacārikaḥ / mukhyāviśiṣṭavijñānagrāhyatvānnaupacārikaḥ" // | "The notion of largeness in [things like] a line, which was considered figurative, cannot be figurative since it is grasped by a cognition not distinct from the primary [meaning]." |
tatra idam asmāt pṛthag iti yadvaśāt saṃyuktam api dravyamapoddhriyate | There is [the notion] "this is separate from that," by force of which even a conjoined substance is differentiated. |
tadapoddhārakāraṇaṃ pṛthaktvaṃ nāma tacca ghaṭādibhyo 'rthāntaraṃ tat pratyayavilakṣaṇabuddhigrāhyatvād iti pūrvavat parasya abhiprāyaḥ / | That which is the cause of this differentiation is called "separateness," and it is something different from jars etc., because it is grasped by a distinct cognition - this is the opponent's view, as [discussed] before. |
tadatrāpi parimāṇavadasiddhatvam anaikāntikatvaṃ ca hetor iti hṛdi kṛtvāha | Here too, keeping in mind that the reason has both unestablishedness and inconclusiveness as in the case of dimension, [the author] says: |
tathāhyatrāpi rūpādibhyo vivekena nāparam arthāntaraṃ pṛthaktvaṃ nāma pratyakṣabuddhau pratibhāsata iti na siddham asya tat pratyayavilakṣaṇabuddhigrāhyatvam / | For here too, no separate entity called "separateness" distinct from color etc. appears in perceptual cognition, hence its being grasped by a cognition distinct from that [perception] is not established. |
ata eva ca tasyopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvenābhimatasyānulambhād asattvam eva / | And precisely because of this, since what is accepted as meeting the criteria of perception is not apprehended, [we can conclude] its non-existence. |
na cāpi pṛthag iti vikalpapratyayavaśāt tasya siddhiḥ / | Nor is it established through the conceptual cognition "separate." |
ta eva hi rūpādayo bhāvāḥ svasvabhāvasthiteḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛttātmatayāpekṣyamāṇāḥ pṛthag iti vyavahāranibandhanaṃ bhaviṣyantīti nāto vastvantarasiddhiḥ / | For those very entities like color, existing in their own nature, when considered as having the nature of being distinguished from homogeneous and heterogeneous things, will be the basis for the usage "separate" - hence no separate entity is established from this. |
tasmādyeyam apoddhāravyavahṛtiḥ vyavahāraḥ pṛthaktvātkāraṇādvarṇyate sā kimiti samānāsamānajātīyavibhinnasvabhāvaniṣṭhā na matā / | Therefore, why should this usage of differentiation, which is described as caused by separateness, not be considered as based on the distinct natures of homogeneous and heterogeneous [things]? |
etenānaikāntikatvaṃ hetor darśitam / | By this, the non-conclusiveness of [their] reason is shown. |
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