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utkṣepaṇādikaṃ catuḥprakāraṃ karma niyatadigdeśair ākāśair āśādibhiḥ saṃyogavibhāgakāraṇam / gamanaṃ tu aniyatadigbhiḥ sarvatodikkaiḥ pradeśaiḥ saṃyogavibhāgau karoti / | The four types of action beginning with throwing upward are causes of conjunctions and disjunctions with fixed spatial directions and spaces [and] regions, while movement produces conjunctions and disjunctions with points [in space] in unlimited directions from all sides. |
ata eva pañcaiva karmāṇi sambhavanti / | Therefore there exist only five kinds of action. |
bhramaṇasyandarecanādīnāṃ gamana evāntarbhāvāt / | Because [actions] such as rotating, flowing, and evacuating are included within movement itself. |
etac ca pañcavidham api karma mūrtimadravyavṛttisaṃyogavibhāgakāryonnītasattvatayā siddham / | And these five types of action are established as having their existence inferred from effects [such as] conjunctions and disjunctions inhering in corporeal substances. |
sarvasyaiva saṃyogavibhāgaviśeṣaḥ sādhāraṇaṃ kāryam ataḥ kāryataḥ siddhir asya / | A particular conjunction and disjunction is the common effect of every [action], hence its establishment [comes] from [its] effect. |
tathā pratyakṣato 'pi / | [It is established] likewise from direct perception also. |
yathoktam ---"saṅkhyāparimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpisamavāyāccākṣuṣāṇī"ti / | As has been stated: "Number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority and action are perceptible to the eye due to [their] inherence in colored [substances]." |
tadeṣā saṅkṣepāt paraprakriyoktā / | This is the system of the other [school] stated in brief. |
tadatra saṃyogavibhāgayoḥ pūrvaṃ niṣiddhatvāt kāryasiddham / | In this regard, since conjunction and disjunction have been previously refuted, [what is claimed to be] the effect [of action] is not established. |
atha nairantaryeṇotpādādimātralakṣaṇau saṃyogavibhāgau tat kāryatayā hetutvenocyate, evam apyanaikāntikatā hetoḥ / | If conjunction and disjunction [which are] characterized merely by continuous production etc. are stated as [being] a reason due to [their being] the effect of that [action], even then the reason is inconclusive; |
tathāvidhena karmaṇā tayoḥ kvacid apyanvayāsiddheḥ / | Because the concomitance of those two [conjunction and disjunction] with action of that kind is not established anywhere; |
sādhyaviparyayeṇa ca hetor vyāpter viruddhatāpi / | And [there is] also contradictoriness due to the reason's pervasion by the opposite of what is to be proved; |
kāraṇamātrāstitve ca sādhye siddhasādhyatā, vāyvādīnāṃ tathāvidhasaṃyogavibhāgakāraṇatvenābhīṣṭatvāt / | And if merely the existence of a cause is to be proved, [there is] proving what is [already] proved, because air etc. are accepted as being causes of conjunction and disjunction of that kind; |
viśeṣaṃ ca sādhye pratijñāyā apyanumānabādhā / | And if a particular [characteristic] is to be proved, [there is] invalidation of the proposition even by inference; |
tathā hi ---kriyāsamāveśo bhavan padārthasya kṣaṇikasya vā{aksaṇikasya vā} / | For thus -- when the inherence of action occurs, [does it occur] in a momentary substance or in a non-momentary [substance]? |
na tāvat kṣaṇikasya tasya janmadeśa eva cyuteḥ nāśāddeśāntaraprāptyasambhavāt / | [It cannot occur] in a momentary [substance], because due to [its] destruction through ceasing at the very place of [its] birth, obtaining another place is impossible; |
prayogaḥ yo yatra deśe cyavate na sa taduttarakālaṃ tadanyadeśamāpnoti yathā pradīpādiḥ / | The formulation [is]: Whatever ceases in a certain place does not obtain another place at a subsequent time, like a lamp etc.; |
janmadeśa eva cyavante ca sarve bhāvā vivakṣitā iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | And all intended entities cease at the very place of [their] birth - thus [there is] an apprehension contrary to what pervades; |
janmātiriktakālaṃ hi kriyākālaṃ pare jaguḥ / iṣṭāśutaranāśeṣu dīpādiṣvapi vastuṣu // | For others have declared that the time of action is different from the time of birth, even in things like lamps etc. which are accepted to have quick destruction; |
iṣṭa āśutaro vināśo yeṣāṃ te tathā / | Those which are accepted to have quick destruction [are called] such; |
pradīpāder api hi śīghratarakālavināśitayābhīṣṭasyāpi janmottarakālabhāvinyeva kriyā, ṣaṭkṣaṇasthāyitvenāsyākṣaṇikatvāt // | Even in the case of a lamp-flame, which is admitted to cease very quickly, the action appears only after [its] birth, as it is non-momentary due to lasting for six moments. |
katham ityādi tathāhītyādi / | How [is this so]? It is as follows. |
tathā hi kāraṇāśleṣaḥ sāmānyasyābhivyañjanam / svāvayave tataḥ karma vibhāgas tadanantaram // saṃyogasya vināśaś ca tato dravyasya saṃkṣayaḥ / | Thus indeed: [1] contact with the cause, [2] manifestation of the universal, [3] motion in [its] own parts, [4] separation immediately after that, [5] destruction of the conjunction, and then [6] destruction of the substance. |
ṣaṭkṣaṇasthāyitaiveṣṭā dīpādāv api vastuni // | Even in the case of things like a lamp-flame, [their duration] is accepted to be exactly six moments. |
tathā hi svakāraṇasambandhakālas tāvat prathamaṃ bhavati / tataḥ paścāt svasāmānyābhivyaktikālas tato 'vayavakarmakālas tadanantaram avayavavibhāgakālas tataḥ svārambhakāvayavasaṃyogavināśas tato dravyavināśaiti ṣaṭkṣaṇasthāyitaiva dīpāder api vastuno 'bhīṣṭā / | Thus indeed: first comes [1] the moment of connection with its own cause, then after that [2] the moment of manifestation of its own universal, then [3] the moment of motion in the parts, immediately after that [4] the moment of separation of parts, then [5] destruction of the conjunction of constituent parts that produced it, then [6] destruction of the substance - thus even for things like a lamp-flame, [their duration] is accepted to be exactly six moments. |
ataḥ kṣaṇikasya kasyacid gatimataḥ padārthasyābhāvāt sarveṣām eva kriyāvatāṃ janmottarakālabhāvinyeva kriyā / | Therefore, since there exists no momentary entity that could have motion, the action of all active entities must appear only after their birth. |
nāpyasiddhatā hetor anyasya kṣaṇikatvāyogāt // | Nor is [our] reason unestablished, as nothing else could be momentary [for the opponent]. |
athāpi syād yadi nāma kṣaṇikatā bhāvānām asmābhir iṣyate / tathāpyamīṣāṃ janmakālabhāvinyeva kriyā kasmān na bhavatītyāha paścimetyādi / | Now it might be said: "Even if we accept the momentariness of entities, why can't their action appear at the very time of their birth?" To this [the author] says [in the following]. |
paścimāgrimadeśābhyāṃ viśleṣāśleṣasambhave / gantāparo vā sarvaś ca karmādhāraḥ prakalpitaḥ // | Only when separation from the posterior location and contact with the anterior location are possible can [something] be considered to be "going" or to be the substratum of any other action. |
yo janaḥ kṣaṇamadhyās te naiva jātu calātmakaḥ / tasyāṇvantaramātre 'pi deśasaṃkrāntyasambhavaḥ // | That which does not last even for a moment can never have the nature of motion, as for such [an entity] there is no possibility of transition even to a location separated by the smallest point. |
yasya hi pāścāttyadeśaviśleṣaḥ sambhavati, purovartinā deśenāśleṣaḥ sa gantā bhavatyaparo vā prasāraṇādyādhāraḥ, natvanyo yathākāśādi / | When for something separation from a posterior place is possible and contact with an anterior place [occurs], then it becomes either a "goer" or [becomes] a substratum for [actions] like expansion and so forth – but not [something] else like ākāśa and so on. |
nacaikakṣaṇamātrabhāvina iyān parilambo 'sti yena pūrvadeśaparihārapūrvakamaparadeśamākramet / sattākāla evāstamayavaśīkṛtatvād aparyāpto deśāntaramākramitum / | For that which exists for just a single moment, there is not sufficient duration by which it could abandon the prior place and then occupy another place, because at the very moment of [its] existence it is under the control of destruction [and is thus] unable to occupy another place. |
tasmājjanmakālabhāvinyapi kriyā na yuktā / | Therefore an action is not possible even at the time of [its] origination. |
nāpi pūrvottarayoḥ koṭyos tadānīṃ tasyānupākhyatvāt / | Nor [is it possible] at either of the two extremes [i.e. before or after], because at that time it cannot be determined. |
ato yaḥ kṣaṇam api nāste tasyāstāṃ tāvad vidūrataradeśāntarāvakramaṇasambhavaḥ / | Therefore, for that which does not last even a moment, let alone the possibility of reaching a more distant place. |
apitu paramāṇumātrapadeśasaṃkramaṇam api nāstīti kutaḥ kṣaṇikasya kriyā // | Even the traversing of the space of a single atom is not [possible] - so how can there be action for what is momentary? |
nāpyakṣaṇikasyeti darśayati sthairye tvityādi / | [The text] shows that [action is] not [possible] for the non-momentary either, [beginning with the words] "but in the case of permanence..." |
sthairye tu vastunaḥ sarve durghaṭā gamanādayaḥ / | But in the case of permanence of an entity, all [actions] like going etc. are impossible. |
ekarūpaṃ hi sadā vastvakṣaṇikam ucyate, tasya sutarām eva kriyāsamāveśo na sambhavati, ākāśavat sarvadā nirviśiṣṭatvāt / | For a non-momentary entity is said to be that which always maintains one form; for it, the inclusion of action is even more impossible, because like space it is always undifferentiated. |
syād etad yadi nāmāviśiṣṭamakṣaṇikaṃ vastu, tathāpi prakṛtyaiva tasya gantrādirūpatvāt kriyāvattvaṃ bhaviṣyatītyato 'naikāntikatā hetor ityāśaṅkhyāha yadītyādi / | [One might think:] "Let this be so – even if a non-momentary entity is undifferentiated, nevertheless, because it is by nature itself in the form of a goer etc., it will possess action" – thinking thus of the inconclusiveness of the reason, [the author] says "if..." [in the next verse]. |
yadi gantrādirūpaṃ tat prakṛtyā gamanādayaḥ / sadā syuḥ kṣaṇamapyevaṃ nāvatiṣṭheta niścalam // | If [something] were by nature of the form of a 'goer' etc., [then] movements would always be [present and] thus it could not remain motionless even for a moment. |
yasmād gatyādyasattve 'pi prāpnuvantyasya te ghruvam / atyaktapūrvarūpatvād gatyādyudayakālavat // | Because even in the absence of motion etc., these [motions] would necessarily belong to it, since [it] has not given up [its] previous form, just as at the time when motion etc. arose. |
yadi hyamī devadattādayaḥ kṣaṇikatvenābhimatāḥ prakṛtyā gamanotkṣepaṇādiyoginas tadā na kadācid api niścalamavatiṣṭheran, sarvadā gantrādirūpatvāt | If indeed these [entities] like Devadatta, which are considered non-momentary, were by nature connected with actions like going and throwing upward, then they could never remain motionless, because [they would] always [have] the nature of a goer etc. |
tataścāsya devadattāder gatyādimato gatyādyasattve 'pi niścalāvasthāyām api, te gamanādayaḥ prāpnuvanti | And consequently, for such [entities] as Devadatta that possess motion etc., even in the absence of motion etc., even in [their] motionless state, these motions etc. would [have to] exist. |
gatyādyutpattikāla ivātyaktapūrvarūpatvāt | [This is] because [they] have not abandoned [their] previous form, just as at the time when motion etc. arose. |
athāgantrādirūpaṃ tat prakṛtyāgamanādayaḥ / sadā syuḥ kṣaṇamapyekaṃ naiva praspandavadbhavet // | If, on the other hand, it were by nature of the form of a 'non-goer' etc., then non-motions would always exist [and] there could not be even a single moment with movement. |
yasmād gatyādibhāve 'pi niścalātmakam eva tat / atyaktapūrvarūpatvān niścalātmakakālavat // | Because even when motion etc. might exist, it would still have an immobile nature, since [it] has not abandoned [its] previous form, just as at the time when [it] had an immobile nature. |
athaitad doṣabhayād agantrādirūpatvam asyāṅgīkriyate / tathāsatyagamanādayaḥ sarvadā syurekarūpatvād ākāśavat | If, from fear of this fault, it is accepted that it has the nature of a non-goer, then non-motions etc. would always exist, because it has a single form, like space. |
ādiśabdād utkṣepaṇādiparigrahaḥ | By the word "ādi" [is meant] the inclusion of [actions like] throwing upward etc. |
tataś ca gatyādibhāve 'pi tasya niścalatvam eva prāpnoti, aparityaktāgatyādirūpatvād yathā niścalāvasthāyām | And consequently, even when motion etc. exists, it would necessarily be motionless, because [it] has not abandoned [its] nature of non-motion etc., just as in [its] motionless state. |
praspandaḥ karma so 'syāstīti praspandavat | [The term] 'praspandavat' [means that] 'praspanda' [which is] movement exists in it. |
niścalātmakakālavad iti saptamyantādvatiḥ | In [the compound] 'niścalātmakakālavat', the suffix 'vati' is [added] to [a stem] ending in the locative case. |
yadi tu syād agantāyam ekadā cānyathā punaḥ / parasparavibhinnātmasaṃgater bhinnatā bhavet | If this [entity] were non-moving at one time and different [i.e., moving] at another time, it would become different [entities] due to the conjunction of mutually different natures. |
ekadā ceti | [One might say] "at one time and..." |
cakāro vibhinnakramaḥ, punar ityasyānantaraṃ draṣṭavyaḥ | The [particle] 'ca' has a different sequence [here]; it should be seen [as coming] immediately after 'punaḥ'. |
punaś ca anyatheti arthaḥ | The meaning is "and again otherwise". |
evaṃ hi gantṛtvāgantṛtvādiviruddhadharmādhyāsādekatvahāniprasaṅgaḥ | For thus, due to the superimposition of mutually contradictory properties such as mobility and immobility, [there would be] the undesirable consequence of loss of unity. |
ata eva tasya kṣaṇikatvaṃ siddham iti darśayann āha atyantabhinnāv ityādi | Showing that precisely for this reason its momentariness is established, [the author] states "atyantabhinnau" etc. |
atyantabhinnāvātmānau tāviti vyavasīyate / viruddhadharmavṛttitvāc calaniścalavastuvat | It is ascertained that those two natures are entirely different, due to the occurrence of contradictory properties, like [the difference between] a moving thing and a motionless thing. |
tāviti calācalāvasthābhāvinau | "Those two" [means] existing in the states of motion and motionlessness. |
calaniścalavastuvad iti / latāparvatādivad ity arthaḥ // | [It is] like moving and non-moving things, i.e. such as the creeper [which is moving] and the mountain [which is not moving]. |
dṛśyatvābhimataṃ karma na vastuvyatireki ca / | The action that is regarded as visible is not different from the object. |
dṛśyate sopi naivāsya sattā yuktyanupātinī // | Even its existence, which would be compatible with reason, is never actually perceived. |
yadupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ sannopalabhyate tat prekṣāvatāmasadvyavahāramavatarati, yathā kasmiṃścit pradeśe paṭo 'nupalabhyamānaḥ, nopalabhyate ca rūpādivastuvyatirekeṇa karmeti svabhāvānupalabdhiḥ / | If something that has obtained the characteristics of perceptibility is not perceived, it comes to be regarded by intelligent people as "non-existent" - like cloth not perceived in a certain place; and action is never perceived as separate from things like color - [this is] non-perception of essential nature. |
nahi rūpādes tathā deśāntarāvaṣṭambhenotpadyamānasya vyatirekeṇa kvacid indriyajñāne pratibhāsamānamālakṣyate karma / | Indeed, action is never observed manifesting in any sense-perception as separate from color etc. that is produced in a different location. |
yā ceyam utkṣepaṇamavakṣepaṇam iti jalpānuṣaṅgiṇī dhīrupajāyate sā sābhijalpatvān na pratyakṣaṃ nacāpyeṣā karmapadārthānubhavabhāvinī yuktā rūpāder eva tathātathotpadyamānasya darśanāt, yathāsaṅketaṃ teṣvevādhyavasāyena vṛtteḥ / | And this cognition that arises associated with verbal expressions such as "throwing up" [and] "throwing down" is not perception because it is accompanied by verbal expression, nor is it reasonable [to consider it] as involving the experience of action as a separate category, because what is seen is only color etc. being produced in various ways, and conventional usage applies only to these through determination. |
etaccānantaram eva pratipāditaṃ "nityānityayor gatyādyabhāvād" iti / | This has just been explained [by stating] that "due to the absence of motion etc. in permanent and impermanent [things]." |
ato 'siddhametad uktaṃ pratyakṣata eva karma siddham iti // | Therefore this statement that "action is established by perception itself" is unproven. |
yathoktam evārtham upasaṃharann āha asthire vetyādi / | Summarizing the meaning as stated above, [the author] says "in impermanent or" etc. |
asthire vā sthire vaivaṃ gatyādīnām asambhavaḥ / | Thus motion and other [actions] are impossible either in impermanent or permanent [things]. |
prāktanāparadeśābhyāṃ vibhāgaprāptyayogataḥ // evam iti anantaroktābhyāṃ pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ nirākṛtatvāt / | "Thus," [it is rejected] because it has been discarded by the direct perception and inference just mentioned above, [and] because separation from the previous place and connection with another place are not possible. |
vibhāgaprāptyayogata iti / | [The compound] "vibhāgaprāptyayogataḥ" [should be understood as follows:] |
prāktanena vibhāgāyogāt, aparadeśena prāptyayogād iti yathākramaṃ sambandhaḥ // | [It means] in sequence: because separation from the previous [place] is impossible, and because connection with another place is impossible. |
yadyevaṃ kathaṃ tarhi gativyavahāro loke bhavatītyāha deśāntaretyādi / | [Question:] "If this is so, then how is it that people in the world speak of motion?" [The answer] is stated [in the words] beginning with "deśāntara." |
deśāntaropalabdhes tu nairantaryeṇa janmanaḥ / samānāparavastūnāṃ gatibhrāntiḥ pradīpavat // | The illusion of motion arises, just as in [the case of] a lamp[-flame], from the consecutive arising of similar but different things perceived in different places. |
samānāparavastūnām iti / | [Regarding the compound] "samānāparavastūnām" [it means "of similar and different things"]. |
teṣāṃ samānāparavastūnāṃ yannairantaryeṇa svopādānakāraṇadeśaparihāreṇa janma sadbhāvaḥ, tasya janmana upalabdheḥ kāraṇāt sa evāyaṃ gacchatītiyathā pradīpasya kenacinnīyamānasya deśāntaraṃ gacchatīti buddhihetutvaṃ | When these similar but different things arise consecutively in places other than [that of] their material cause, the perception of this arising produces the notion "this [same thing] is moving," just as when someone carries a lamp, [it produces] the notion "the lamp[-flame] is moving to another place." |
nahi pradipaḥ sa eva deśāntaramākrāmati / | For indeed the same lamp[-flame] does not [actually] move to another place. |
tasya ṣaṭkṣaṇasthāyitvenābhimatatvāt / | Because it is accepted [by the opponent] to last for only six moments. |
bhāvasvabhāva eva hi pūrvāparakoṭiśūnyo janmetyabhidhīyate / tena tasyopalabdhir yujyata eva / | For what is called "arising" is merely the nature of existence, completely devoid of prior and posterior limits; therefore its perception is entirely reasonable. |
athavā janmana iti pañcamyantam etat | Or [the word] "janmanaḥ" may be construed as an ablative case-ending |
nairantaryeṇotpādāt samānāparavastūnāṃ deśāntaropalabdher iti sambandhaḥ | [This is] because similar and different things are perceived in different places due to their continuous production |
iti karmapadārthaparīkṣā | Thus ends the examination of the category of Action |
dravyādiṣvityādinā sāmānyaviśeṣadūṣaṇam ārabhate | With [the words] "dravyādiṣu" etc., [the author] begins the refutation of universals and particulars |
dravyādiṣu niṣiddheṣu jātayo 'pi nirākṛtāḥ / padārthatrayavṛttā hi sarvās tāḥ parikalpitāḥ | When substances etc. are refuted, the universals too are refuted, for they are all conceived as subsisting in the three categories |
jātaya iti / sāmānyāni | "Jātayaḥ" means the universals |
tāś ca dravyaguṇakarmātmakapadārthatrayāśritatvāt tannirākaranād evāpāstāḥ | And these [universals] are rejected simply through the refutation of those [three categories], because they depend on the three categories consisting of substance, quality and action |
nahyāśrayamantareṇāśritānāṃ kvacid avasthitir asti, anāśritatvaprasaṅgāt | For dependent entities cannot exist anywhere without their substrate, as [if they did] they would not be dependent at all |
jātigrahaṇamupalakṣaṇam viśeṣā apyantyadravyavṛttitvād āśritā eveṣṭāḥ ataste 'pyāśrayanirākaraṇād evāpāstāḥ | The mention of universals is illustrative [of particulars too]; the particulars too are accepted as dependent since they inhere in ultimate substances, therefore they too are rejected simply through the refutation of their substrate |
tatreyaṃ dvividhā jātiḥ parair abhyupagamyate | In this regard, a twofold universal is accepted by our opponents |
sāmānyam eva sattākhyaṃ samasteṣvanuvṛttitaḥ // dravyatvādi tu sāmānyaṃ sadviśeṣo 'bhidhīyate / | Only Being [sattā] is a pure universal due to its occurrence in all [things], while universals like substanceness [dravyatva] etc. are called particulars-cum-universals. |
svāśrayeṣvanuvṛttasya cetaso hetubhāvataḥ // vijātibhyaś ca sarvebhyaḥ svāśrayasya viśeṣaṇāt / vyāvṛttibuddhihetutvaṃ teṣām eva tataḥ sthitam // | [This is] because they are causes of the cognition pervading their substrates and because they differentiate their substrates from all heterogeneous things - therefore their being causes of differentiating cognition is established. |
tatra sāmānyaṃ dvividhaṃ paramaparaṃ ca, paraṃ sattākhyaṃ, tac ca samasteṣu triṣu dravyaguṇakarmasvanuvṛttipratyayasyaiva kāraṇatvāt sāmānyam eva na viśeṣaḥ / | Here, the universal is of two kinds - higher and lower. The higher [universal] is called Being, and it is only a universal, not a particular, because it is the cause only of the cognition of pervasion in all three [categories] - substance, quality and action. |
aparaṃ tu dravyatvakarmatvādilakṣaṇaṃ tac ca svāśrayeṣu dravyādiṣvanuvṛttipratyayahetutvāt sāmānyam ity ucyate svāśrayasya ca vijātīyebhyo vyāvṛttipratyayahetutayā viśeṣaṇāt sāmānyam api sadviśeṣa ityabhidhīyate / | The lower [universal], characterized as substanceness, actionness etc., is called a universal because it is the cause of the cognition of pervasion in its substrates like substances etc., and although [being] a universal, it is called a particular-cum-universal because it differentiates its substrate by being the cause of the cognition of exclusion from heterogeneous things. |
tathā hi guṇādiṣvadravyamaguṇa ityādikā yeyaṃ vyāvṛttabuddhirudayamāsādayati tāṃ prati hetutvam eṣām eva guṇatvadravyatvādīnāṃ vyavasthitaṃ nānyasya na hyadravyatvādikamaparam asti / | For instance, [when] such differentiating cognitions arise regarding qualities etc. as "it is not a substance", "it has no qualities" etc., the causality for these is established only for [universals] like qualityness, substanceness etc., not for anything else, because there is nothing else like non-substanceness etc. |
apekṣābhedāccaikasya sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvo na virudhyata eveti bhāvaḥ // | The meaning is that there is no contradiction in something being both universal and particular due to different relative standpoints. |
viśeṣā eva kecit tu vyāvṛttereva hetavaḥ / | But some particulars are causes of exclusion only. |
nityadravyasthitā ye 'ntyā viśeṣā iti varṇitāḥ // | These are described as the ultimate particulars residing in eternal substances. |
kecid viśeṣā eveṣyante na sāmānyāni / | Some are considered to be only particulars, not universals. |
vyāvṛttereva vyāvṛttipratyayasyaiva hetutvād ity arthaḥ / | The meaning is that [this is] because they are causes of exclusion only, i.e., of differentiating cognition only. |
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