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ke punas ta ity āha nityetyādi / | [To the question] "Which are these?", [the text] says "...eternal [substances]" etc. |
tathācoktam nityadravyavṛttayo 'ntyā viśeṣā iti / | Thus it has been declared [in the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra]: "The ultimate Viśeṣas are those subsisting in eternal substances." |
nityadravyavṛttaya iti / paramāṇvākāśakālādigātmamanaḥsu vṛtteḥ / | [The phrase] "subsisting in eternal substances" [means] subsisting in atoms, ākāśa, time, space, souls, and minds. |
paramāṇūnāṃ jagadvināśārambhakoṭibhūtatvāt muktātmanāṃ muktamanasāṃ casaṃsāraparyantarūpatvād antatvam atasteṣu bhavā antyā ityucyante / | Since atoms constitute the limits at both the creation and destruction of the universe, and since liberated souls and liberated minds persist until the end of saṃsāra, therefore the [individuators] residing in them are called "ultimate." |
teṣu sphuṭataramālakṣyamāṇatvāt / | Because [these individuators] are more clearly perceived in these [substances]. |
vṛttis tu punareṣāṃ sarvasminneva paramāṇvādau nitye dravye / | Their subsistence, moreover, is in every eternal substance, beginning with atoms. |
ata eva nityadravyavṛttayo 'ntyā ityubhayorupādānam / tatra parasparamatyantavyāvṛttabuddhihetutvāt svāśrayamanyato viśeṣayantīti viśeṣā ucyante // | This is precisely why both terms - "ultimate" and "subsisting in eternal substances" - are used. These are called "viśeṣas" because they cause the cognition of absolute mutual exclusion and thus distinguish their substrata from everything else. |
kutaḥ punar amī siddhā ity āha yadbalādityādi / | [To the question] "How are these [viśeṣas] established?" [the text] states "By the force of which..." etc. |
yadbalātparamāṇvādau jāyante yogināṃ dhiyaḥ / vilakṣaṇo 'yametasmād iti pratyekamāśritāḥ // | [That] by the force of which yogins' cognitions arise regarding atoms and other [eternal substances, thinking] "this is distinct from that" - [these cognitions being] dependent on each [substance individually]. |
yathā hyasmadādīnāṃ gavādiṣvākṛtiguṇakriyāvayavasaṃyoganimitto 'śvādibuddhivyāvṛttaḥ pratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ tadyathā gauḥ śuklaḥ śīghragatiḥ pīnakakudo mahāghaṇṭa iti yathākramam | Just as ordinary people like us have cognitions of cows as distinct from horses based on [their] shape, qualities, actions, parts and conjunctions - such as "the cow is white, swift-moving, fat-humped, [and has] a large bell" in sequence. |
tathāsmadviśiṣṭānāṃ yogināṃ nityeṣu tulyākṛtiguṇakriyeṣu paramāṇuṣu muktātmanaḥsu cānyanimittāsambhavādyadbalāt pratyekaṃ vilakṣaṇo 'yam iti pratyayavyāvṛttir deśakālaviprakarṣadṛṣṭe ca sa evāyāmiti pratyabhijñānaṃ yato bhavati te yogināṃ viśeṣapratyayonnītasattvā antyā viśeṣāḥ siddhāḥ / | Similarly, since yogins who are superior to us have, regarding eternal substances like atoms and liberated souls (which have similar shape, qualities and actions), the discriminative cognition "this is distinct [from that]" for each [substance] and the recognition "this is indeed the same [one]" even when seen at different times and places - and since there can be no other cause [for these cognitions] - these ultimate viśeṣas are established, their existence being inferred from the yogins' specific cognitions. |
te ca yathāsvaṃ pratyekamāśrayamāśritāḥ yogināṃ pratyakṣata eva siddhāḥ // | And these [viśeṣas], each residing in their respective substrata, are established directly through the perception of yogins. |
pratyakṣata ity āha pratyakṣata ityādi | [He answers] "How are the jātis established?" by saying "By perception" etc. |
pratyakṣataḥ prasiddhās tu sattvagotvādi jātayaḥ / akṣavyāpārasadbhāve sadādipratyayodayāt | The jātis like sattva (existence) and gotva (cowness) are established through perception, due to the arising of notions like "being" etc. when the sense organs are functioning. |
yadgatānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyi yadbhavati tat tato bhavatīti vyavasthāpyate | It is established that when something follows the presence and absence of something else, the former arises from the latter. |
dravyādiṣu ca sadādipratyayaprasūtirakṣagatānvayavyatirekāvanuvidadhatī kimitīndriyajanyatāvyapadeśaṃ nāśnuvīta, tadanyendriyajñānavat, anyathātiprasaṅgaḥ syāt | And why should the production of notions like "being" etc. in substances etc., which follows the presence and absence of sense organ operation, not be designated as sense-organ generated, just like other sense-organ cognitions? Otherwise there would be an unwanted consequence. |
anumānato 'pi sattvamāsāṃ pratipādayann āha anumānetyādi | [Now] explaining their existence through inference also, he says "Through inference" etc. |
viśeṣapratyayo yena nimittāntarabhāvikaḥ | [A distinctive notion arises] because [it has] a different cause. |
dravyādivastuvilakṣaṇākāraḥ pratyayaḥ | [It is] a notion having a form distinct from substances etc. |
nimittāntarabhāvikaḥ nimittāntarād bhāva utpādaḥ so 'syāstīti kṛtvā | "Having a different cause" means: it has an origination from a different cause. |
enam eva pramāṇārthaṃ gavādītyādinā bhāviviktādiracitapramāṇopanyāsenadarśayati | He shows this same logical point through presenting the proofs composed by Bhāvivikta and others, [beginning with] "gavādi" etc. |
gavādiśabdaprajñānaviśeṣā gogajādiṣu samayākṛtipiṇḍādivyatiriktārthahetavaḥ | The distinctive words and cognitions like "cow" etc. regarding cows, elephants etc. must have causes different from convention, shape, body etc. |
gavādiviṣayatve hi sati tacchabdabuddhitaḥ anyatvāt tadyathaiṣveva savatsāṅkuśadhīdhvanī | Because while pertaining to cows etc., they are different from those words and cognitions, just as the words and cognitions "having a calf" and "having a goad" [are different] in these very [cases]. |
śaśaśṛṅgādivijñānair vyabhicārād viśeṣaṇam | The qualification [is given] because of the deviation in cognitions of hare's horns etc. |
tat svarūpābhidhānaṃ ca vaidharmyeṇa nidarśanam | And that indication of [their] own nature is an example through dissimilarity. |
gavādiṣvanuvṛttaṃ ca vijñānaṃ piṇḍato 'nyataḥ / viśeṣakatvānnīlādivijñānam iva jāyate // | The cognition that pervades all cows proceeds from something different from [their individual] body, because it appears as a differentiator, just like the cognition of blue and similar [qualities]. |
gotattvārthāntara gotvaṃ bhinnadhīviṣayatvataḥ / | The universal 'cowness' is different from the real cow because it forms the object of a different cognition. |
rūpasparśādivat tasyetyukteścaiva turaṅgavat // | [This is] like [the difference of] color, touch and other [qualities] of that [cow], and also because it [the universal] is spoken of as belonging to that [individual], just as a horse [is spoken of as belonging to someone]. |
tatra bhāviviktaḥ prāha gavāśvamahiṣavarāhamātaṅgādiṣu gavādyabhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣāḥ samayākṛtipiṇḍādivyatiriktasvarūpānurūpasaṃsarginimittāntaranibandhanā ityavaghoṣaṇā / | Regarding this, Bhāvivikta declares: "In the case of cows, horses, buffaloes, boars, elephants and other [animals], the specific names like 'cow' etc. and [their corresponding] cognitions must be based on causes that are related to the form of each [animal] but different from convention, shape, body and similar [factors]." |
gavādiviṣayatve sati piṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānavyatiritābhidhānajñānatvāt, teṣveva gavādiṣu savatsā gaurbhārākrānto mahiṣaḥ saśalyo varāhaḥsāṅkuśo mātaṅga ityādyabhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣavat / | Because while pertaining to cows and other [animals], they are names and cognitions different from the names and cognitions of [their] bodies etc., just like the specific names and cognitions relating to these same animals such as 'cow with calf', 'load-bearing buffalo', 'boar with dart', 'elephant with goad' and so forth. |
vaidharmyeṇa piṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣāḥ / | The dissimilar examples are the specific names and cognitions of the forms of bodies and other [things]. |
yāni ca tāni nimittāntarāṇi tāni gotvādīnīti siddham / | Thus it is established that these other causes are the universals such as 'cowness' and others. |
tatrābhidhānam śabdaḥ, prajñānam pratyayo jñānam ity arthaḥ / | Here, 'abhidhāna' means word, 'prajñāna' means notion [or] cognition. |
abhidhānaprajñānānyeva viśeṣā iti viśeṣaṇasamāsaḥ / | The compound 'abhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣāḥ' means the specific forms of these two [i.e., names and cognitions]. |
samayaḥ saṅketaḥ, ākṛtiḥ saṃsthānaṃ, piṇḍo dravyam, ādiśabdena rūpādiparigrahaḥ, ebhyo vyatiriktaṃ svarūpaṃ yeṣāṃ svābhidhānapratyayaṃ pratyanurūpāṇām upādhitvāt saṃsargiṇāṃ nimittāntarāṇāṃ tāni nibandhanaṃ yeṣām iti vigrahaḥ / | 'Samaya' means convention, 'ākṛti' means configuration, 'piṇḍa' means substance, and by the word 'ādi' [we include] color and other [qualities]; [these are] different from those whose own form is suitable as limiting conditions for their respective names and notions - this is the analysis [of the compound]. |
athavā samayādivyatiriktāni ca tāni sadādipratyayābhidhānaṃ pratisvarūpānurūpasaṃsargīṇi ceti vigrahaḥ kāryaḥ / | Alternatively, the compound should be analyzed as: those [causes] which are different from convention etc. and are related to and conforming to the individual forms with respect to names and notions of 'being' etc. |
śeṣaṃ pūrvavat / | [Let] the rest [be understood] as before. |
avaghoṣaṇeti pratijñā / | "Avaghoṣaṇa" [is] the proposition. |
śaśaviṣāṇādipratyayair vyabhicāraśaṅkyā tat parihārārthaṃ gavādiviṣayatve satīti viśeṣaṇam / | To avoid the doubt of deviation due to notions like [that of] a hare's horn, the qualification "while pertaining to cows etc." has been added. |
piṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānavyatirikte abhidhānaprajñāne yeṣāṃ tadbhāvas tattvam iti vigrahaḥ / | The compound is to be analyzed as: "because they have names and cognitions distinct from the names and cognitions pertaining to the essential nature of the body etc." |
vaidharmyeṇa piṇḍādisvarūpābhidhānaprajñānaviśeṣā iti / | The names and cognitions of the nature of the body [serve as] the heterogeneous example. |
tatra hi piṇḍādivyatiriktanimittāntaranibandhanatvābhāve hetor api yathoktasyābhāvāt / | For in that case, due to the absence of dependence on any other cause distinct from the body etc., the reason as stated is also absent. |
udyotakarastvāha gavādiṣvanuvṛttipratyayaḥ piṇḍādivyatiriktānnimittādbhavati, viśeṣakatvān nīlādipratyayavat / tathā goto 'rthāntaraṃ gotvaṃ, bhinnapratyayaviṣayatvād rūpasparśādivat, tasyeti ca vyapadeśaviṣayatvādyathā caitrasyāśva iti caitrādvyatirekeṇa vyapadiśyamāna iti / | But Udyotakara says: "The notion that persists in all cows arises from a cause distinct from the body etc., because it is a differentiator, like the notion of blue etc. Similarly, cowness is something different from a cow, because it is the object of a different notion, like color and touch etc., and because it is designated as 'of that [cow]', just as a horse is designated as 'Caitra's horse' [and is] distinct from Caitra." |
tadetad darśayati gavādiṣvityādi / | This is what [the text] shows with "in cows" etc. |
subodham / | [This is] easily understood. |
asāram ityādinā pratividhatte / | [The author] responds [to this] with [the words] beginning with "asāram" ["without substance"]. |
sadādipratyayāsiddhāḥ saṅketābhogatas tu te | [The notions of] existence etc. arise from familiarity with conventions. |
na tu tajjñāpakaṃ kiñcit pramāṇam iha vidyate // akṣavyāpārasadbhāvān nahyanantarabhāvinaḥ | There exists no means of knowledge that could establish this [theory], since [these cognitions] do not immediately follow from the operation of sense organs. |
yaduktamakṣavyāpārasadbhāvāt sadādipratyayānām akṣāśritatvam iti | What has been claimed [is] that the perceptual nature of notions of existence etc. [follows] from the presence of sense organ operation. |
tatra yadi sākṣād akṣavyāpārāntarabhāvitvād iti hetvartho 'bhipretas tadāhetur asiddhaḥ, savikalpatvena saṅketābhogasmaraṇādivyavahitatvāt | If the meaning of the reason here is intended to be that [these notions] directly follow after sense organ operation, then this reason is unestablished, because being determinate cognitions, they are mediated by remembrance of conventional associations etc. |
yathā dhātryabhayādīnāṃ nānāroganivartane / pratyekaṃ saha vā śaktir nānātve 'pyupalabhyate | Just as dhātrī, abhayā and other [medicines] are observed to have the power to cure various diseases, either individually or together, even though they are different [from each other] |
na teṣu vidyate kiñcit sāmānyaṃ tatra śaktimat | There exists no universal in them that possesses this power |
cirakṣiprādibhedena rogaśāntyupalambhataḥ | Because cures of diseases are observed to differ in being quick or slow etc. |
sāmānye 'tiśayaḥ kaścinnahi kṣetrādibhedataḥ / ekarūpatayā nityaṃ dhātryādes tu sa vidyate | No variation can [arise] in the universal due to differences of soil etc., since it eternally maintains one form, but [such variation] exists in dhātrī etc. |
evamatyantabhede 'pi kecinniyataśaktitaḥ / tulyapratyavamarśāder hetutvaṃ yānti nāpare | Thus even though [things] are completely different, some become causes for similar recognition etc. due to their fixed powers, while others do not. |
yathā hyāmalakyādayaḥ parasparamatyantavibhinnamūrtayo 'pi pratyekaṃ samuditā vā nānāvidhavyādhivyāvartanasāmarthyādhyāsitā bhavantyantareṇāpyanugāminam, nahitatra sāmānyam eva tathāvidhāmarthakriyāṃ sampādayatīti yuktaṃ vaktum | For just as āmalakī and other [fruits], though having completely different forms from each other, are endowed with the capacity to cure various diseases either individually or collectively even without anything comprehensive [uniting them], for it would not be reasonable to say that only a universal accomplishes such purposeful action in this case. |
yatas teṣu vividhārthakriyāsampādanayogyaṃ na sāmānyamasti / | For in them [i.e. entities] there exists no universal that is capable of accomplishing various purposeful actions. |
yadi syāt tadā yeyaṃ kvacit kadācit kāsāñciddhātryādīnāṃ cirakṣiprarogādyupaśamanasāmarthyopalabdhiḥ sā na syāt, sāmānyasyaikarūpatvāt / | If such [a universal] existed, then there could not be this observation of the capacity for quick or slow disease-curing that is found in only some dhātrī plants etc., [and] only at certain times, because a universal has a single form. |
naca kṣetrakṣīrāvasekādisaṃskāraviśeṣavaśād āsāditātiśayaṃ sāmānyamevaitāmarthakriyāṃ vicitrāṃ sampādayatīti yuktam / | Nor is it reasonable [to say] that "the universal itself, having acquired excellence through the specific preparations of watering the soil with milk etc., accomplishes these varied purposeful actions." |
tasya nityatayā parair anādheyavikārasya kṣetrādibhedato 'pi nātiśayaḥ kaścid ekarūpatvāt / | Because it [the universal], being eternal and thus incapable of modifications produced by other things, cannot acquire any excellence even from differences in soil etc., as it has a single form. |
dhātryādīnāṃ tvanityānāṃ so 'tiśayaḥ kṣetrādibhedato bhidyata ityatasta eva rogādyupaśamanasāmarthyopetāḥ / | But for non-eternal things like dhātrī etc., that excellence varies due to differences in soil etc., and therefore they alone possess the capacity to cure diseases etc. |
tataś ca tadvadevānye 'pi ghaṭādayo bhāvāḥ svahetupratyayebhyas tathotpatteḥ prakṛtyaivaikākārapratyavamarśādihetavo bhaviṣyantītyadoṣaḥ / | And likewise other entities too, such as jars, being produced from their causal cognitions in such a way, will by their very nature become the basis for recognition as having one form etc., so there is no fault [in this position]. |
tulyapratyavamarśāder ityādiśabdena salilasaṃdhāraṇādyarthakryāsāmarthyaparigrahaḥ / | By the word "etc." in the expression "similar recognition etc." is meant the inclusion of the capacity for purposeful actions such as holding water etc. |
kāryamātropayogitvavivakṣāyāṃ ca sacchruteḥ / samayaḥ kriyate teṣu yadvānyasyā yathāruci // | And when one wishes to express mere utility for an effect through the word "being," the convention is established for these [things] or for anything else according to preference. |
vāhadohādirūpeṇa kāryabhedopayogini / gavādiśrutisaṅketaḥ kriyate vyavahartṛbhiḥ // | The convention regarding terms like "cow" etc. is established by users [of language] with reference to [things] that are useful for different purposes like carrying loads, giving milk etc. |
tat saṅketamanaskārāt sadādipratyayā ime / jāyamānās tu lakṣyante nākṣavyāpṛtyanantaram // | These cognitions of "being" etc. are observed to arise from mental attention to those conventions, not immediately after the operation of sense organs. |
nahyagṛhītasamayānāṃ sadādipratyayaprasūtiranyathā saṅketakaraṇavaiyarthyaṃ syāt / | For those who have not grasped the conventions cannot have cognitions of "being" etc.; otherwise, the making of conventions would be pointless. |
tasmād yasminnekākāraparāmarśavyavasthitārthakriyāsāmarthyamātrapratipāditamevābhedaṃ parāmṛśya saditi śrutiṃ viniveśayanti samayakṛtaḥ | Therefore the makers of convention apply the term "sat" ["existent"] after observing the identity [of things] that is established merely through the apprehension of their uniform capacity to perform purposeful actions. |
yadvānyasyā iti | Or [it refers] to any other [thing]. |
vastvityasyāḥ śruteḥ | [It refers to] this expression "vastu" ["entity"]. |
evaṃ gavādiviśeṣaśruter api vāhādisāmarthyaviśeṣajijñāsāyāṃ samayaḥ kriyata iti yojyam | Similarly, in the case of specific terms like "go" ["cow"] and others, the convention is established based on the inquiry into their specific capacities like carrying loads and such. |
tataś ca saṅketottarakālaṃ vyavahārakāle gavādiṣu dṛṣṭeṣvapi pūrvakṛtasaṇketābhogas tatastannāmasmaraṇaṃ tataḥ paścāt sadādipratyayodaya iti sphuṭataramālakṣyata eva | And thus, after the convention has been established, at the time of usage, even when cows and such are seen, [first] there is the recollection of the previously made convention, then the remembrance of that name, and only afterwards does the notion of "existence" and such arise - this is clearly observed. |
kvacidatyabhyāsata āśutarotpādādamīṣāṃ kramo nāvadhāryate | In some cases, due to excessive practice and faster arising [of these notions], their sequence is not noticed. |
mandābhyāsās tu sphuṭataradhārayantyeva tat | However, those with little practice perceive this [sequence] very clearly. |
tat tasmāt tadevaṃ samayābhogādivyavahitatvāt sākṣād anutpatteḥ pratyakṣatvam eṣāmasiddham, na cāpi pāramparyeṇotpadyamānasya pratyakṣatvaṃ nyāyyamatiprasaṅgād iti bhāvaḥ | Therefore, because of the intervention of convention-recollection and such, these [notions] cannot be established as perceptual due to their not arising directly, nor is it reasonable [to consider] something arising through a sequence as perceptual, as this would lead to unwanted consequences. |
ajalpākāramevādau vijñānaṃ tu prajāyate | In the beginning, cognition arises only in a form free from verbal expression. |
tatas tu samayābhogas tasmāt smārtaṃ tato 'pi te | After that [comes] the recollection of convention, and therefore these [notions] are of the nature of memory for that reason too. |
svalakṣaṇe saṅketasyākaraṇād dṛṣṭvā ca vikalpanāt prathamataraṃ vastusvalakṣaṇaviṣayatayābhilāpasaṃsargaviveki vijñānamakṣāśritamupajāyate / | First there arises a sense-organ-based cognition which has as its object the unique particular [and is] free from connection with verbal expression, [this happens] because of not making any convention regarding the unique particular and after seeing [it] prior to conceptualization. |
tataḥ paścāt tasminneva paridṛṣṭe vastuni samayābhogas tadanantaraṃ yathāsamayaṃ paridṛṣṭārthaviṣayās tadavyavasāyitayā sadādipratyayās tamevārthaṃ paridṛṣṭamabhilapantaḥ samutpadyamānāḥ katham iva smārtatāṃ nāsādayeyuḥ / | After that, when that very object has been perceived, [there arises] the experience of convention; immediately after that, in accordance with convention, the cognitions of "being" etc. arise which have as their object that perceived thing, which determine it, [and] which express verbally that very perceived object - how could they not attain the nature of memory? |
tato 'pīti / yathā paridṛṣṭāvyavasāyāt / | "For that reason also" means: because they determine [something] as [already] perceived. |
ta iti / sadādipratyayāḥ // | "They" means: the cognitions of "being" etc. |
kutaḥ punar ayam utpattikramo vijñānānām ālakṣita ity āha anyatretyādi / | [Someone asks:] "From where has this sequence of arising of cognitions been observed?" [The author] answers by stating "anyatra" etc. |
anyatra gatacittasya vastumātropalambhanam / sarvopādhivivekena tata eva pravartate // | For one whose mind has gone elsewhere, the apprehension of the mere thing proceeds from that very [sequence], through separation from all qualifications. |
yatas te sadādipratyayā amunā krameṇopajāyante tata evānyatra viṣayāntare gatacittasya vyāsaktamanasaḥ puro 'vasthitaṃ vastu paśyataḥ saṃmukhībhūtavastusaṅketamanaskārādyapravṛtteḥ prathamataraḥ sarvopādhiviviktavastumātradarśanaṃ pravartate / | Because those cognitions of "being" etc. arise in this sequence, therefore when someone whose mind has gone elsewhere to another object, whose mind is distracted, sees an object situated before [him], before the operation of attention to conventions etc. regarding the object that has come into view, the very first perception that proceeds is that of the mere thing separated from all qualifications. |
anyathā hi yadi sarvam eva sābhijalpaṃ vijñānaṃ syāt tadā puro 'vasthitam vastu sarvopādhiśūnyamanyatra gatamanāḥ kathamīkṣeta / na hyekasmin kāle yugapad abhilāpadvayaṃ saṃvedyate / | For if it were otherwise, if every cognition were accompanied by verbal expression, then how could one whose mind has gone elsewhere perceive an object situated before [him] as devoid of all qualifications? For two verbal expressions cannot be cognized simultaneously at the same time. |
tadevaṃ sākṣād akṣagatānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvam asiddham // | Thus it is not established that [these cognitions] directly follow the presence and absence of sense-organ operation. |
tatra yaduktaṃ gavādītyādi tatrāha hetāvityādi / hetāvādye 'pi vaiphalyaṃ samayābhogabhāvitā / | Regarding what was said about "cow" etc., [the author] states "hetau" etc.: "Even in [the case of] cause etc., [there is] futility [because they are] brought about by the experience of convention." |
teṣām iṣṭaiva saṃsargī so 'nvayavyatirekavat // | This [cause] is indeed admitted as connected [with the effect], being endowed with positive and negative concomitance. |
yadi sāmānyenānurūpasaṃsarginimittāntaramātranibandhanatvam eṣāṃ prasādhyate tadā siddhasādhyatā, yato gavādisaṅketābhoga eva gavādipratyayavyapadeśānām anurūpasambandhī / | If all that is sought to be proved is the mere fact that these [notions] are based on other causes related to [their] corresponding associates, then it is proving what is already proven, because the collection of conventions regarding cows etc. is itself the corresponding associate of notions and designations regarding cows etc. |
tathā hi tasmin sati bhavanti vijātīyamanaskāre, {asati} ca na bhavanti / | For indeed, when that [collection of conventions] exists, [the notions] arise, and when there is a heterogeneous mental impression, they do not arise. |
ataḥ sa evānvayavyatirekavān hetureṣāṃ siddhaḥ, tadgatānvayavyatirekasyaivānuvidhānāt ato vaiphalyaṃ hetuprayogaprayāsasya // | Therefore that alone is established as their cause possessing positive and negative concomitance, since [the notions] follow only the positive and negative concomitance inherent in that [collection of conventions]. Hence the effort of applying [other] reasons is futile. |
naivaṃ taddhetavaḥ sākṣād bāhyavatsāṅkuśādayaḥ // | External things like calves, goads etc. are not direct causes of those [notions] in this way. |
nābhidhānavikalpānāṃ vṛttirasti svalakṣaṇe / | Verbal expressions and conceptual constructs have no operation in regard to the unique particular. |
sarvaṃ vāggocarātītamūrtiryena svalakṣaṇam // | Because of which the unique particular has a form that is entirely beyond the scope of words. |
athainaṃ saṅketamanaskāraṃ pakṣa evāntarbhāvya tadvyatiriktanityaikānugāmisāmānyākhyasaṃsarginibandhanatvam eṣāṃ sādhyate tadā dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā, na hyevambhūtena kvacidanvayaḥ siddhaḥ / | If after including this conventional mental impression in the subject [itself], it is sought to be proved that these [notions] are based on connection with something called a universal—which is eternal, all-pervading and distinct from that [conventional impression]—then the example lacks the probandum, for concomitance with such a thing has never been established anywhere. |
ye cāmī vatsāṅkuśādayaḥ savatsādyabhidhānaprajñānahetutvena varṇitāste 'pi taddhetutvena na siddhāḥ na hyeṣāmāsāditasvalakṣaṇabhāvānāṃ sākṣādabhidhānaprajñānahetutvam asti sarvāvāgvikalpagocarātītarūpatvāt svalakṣaṇasyetyataḥ sādhyavikalatā dṛṣṭāntasya / | And these things like calves and goads that have been described as causes of the cognition and verbal expression of "having a calf" etc. are also not established as being such causes, because when these attain the state of unique particulars, they have no direct causality for verbal expression and cognition, since the unique particular has a nature entirely beyond the scope of words and conceptual constructs. Therefore the example lacks the probandum. |
pāramparyeṇa tu hetutvakalpanāyām atiprasaṅgaḥ syāt, sarvasyaiva sarvatra pāramaparyeṇopayogasya vidyamānatvāt // | If indirect causality were to be assumed, an undesirable consequence would follow, because everything has an indirect utility for everything else. |
yadyevaṃ kathaṃ tarhi loko 'ṅkuśādi bāhyam eva taddhetutvenādhyavasyatītyāha antarmātretyādi / | [Question:] "If this is so, then how does the world determine external things like goads etc. as being their causes?" The answer to this begins with "internal only" [in the next verse]. |
antarmātrāsamārūḍhaṃ sāṃvṛtaṃ tvavalambya te / bahīrūpādhyavasitaṃ pravartante 'ṅkuśādikam // | These [notions] proceed on the basis of goad and similar [things] which, while being based on mere internal [mental content] and being illusory, have externality superimposed upon [them]. |
yattāvad aṅkuśādiprajñaptyupādānaṃ svalakṣaṇaṃ na tadvikalpaiḥ spṛśyata ityuktam / | It has been stated that the unique particular which is the basis for the conceptual construction of goad etc. is not touched by conceptual constructs. |
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