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kriyātvajātisambandhakriyāyogān matir yadi / naṣṭakriye 'pi ca tayā dhurvahetūpalakṣaṇāt | If [you say] the cognition [arises] from connection with an action related to the universal 'actionness', and [persists] even when the action has ceased because the permanent cause is indicated by it |
tayeti kriyayā | "By it" means "by the action" |
na tvityādinā pratividhatte | [The opponent] replies with [words] beginning with "na tu" |
na tu naṣṭakriye tatra lakṣitāpi na vidyate | Even when observed, [the universal] does not exist there when the action has ceased |
gṛhyate yā dhruvā jātiḥ svādhāravinivṛttitaḥ | The permanent universal that is apprehended [persists even] after the removal of its substrate |
svasyā ādhāraḥ kriyātvajāteḥ saiva kriyā | The substrate of the universal 'action-ness' is that very action |
nahi jāter āśrayagrahaṇamantareṇa kevalāyā grahaṇamavasthitir vāsti, anāśritatvaprasaṅgāt | Indeed, there can be neither apprehension nor existence of a universal by itself without apprehension of its substrate, as [that would lead to] the undesirable conclusion of [its being] unsupported |
syād etat ekadā jāter lakṣitatvād uparate 'pi karmaṇi tadādhāre pravartata eva tannibandhanapratyaya ity āha daṇḍetyādi | [The opponent] states this beginning with "daṇḍa": "Since the universal has been observed once, even when the action has ceased in its substrate, the cognition based on that [universal] still occurs" |
daṇḍādgadādijātīnām ekadā na hi lakṣaṇe | Indeed, when the universals of stick, earring and so forth are observed once |
tadviyoge 'pi daṇḍyādimatis teṣu pravartate | Even in their absence, the cognition of [someone being] a stick-bearer etc. occurs regarding them |
athāpi pācakatvādijātiranyaiva vartate | Moreover, the universal 'cook-ness' etc. exists separately |
sadyojāte 'pi tadyogāt pācakādimatir bhavet | Due to its connection [with the substrate], the cognition of 'cook' etc. would occur even in a newborn |
sadādimativanno cet tadā sā samavāyinī | If [you say] it is not like the cognition of 'existent' etc., then that [universal] which inheres |
paścādapi na sā tatra tathā syād aviśeṣataḥ | Would likewise not be there even later, as there is no difference [in conditions] |
naca pācakatvādijātiratrāpyastīti yuktaṃ, sadyojāter 'pi jāter vidyamānatvāt pācakādibuddhiprasaṅgaḥ syāt | And it is not reasonable to say that the universal 'cook-ness' etc. exists here too, since [if that were the case], due to the universal being present even in a newborn, there would follow the undesirable consequence of the cognition of 'cook' etc. [in a newborn] |
evaṃ tarhi na kadācid api sā tat samavāyinī prāpnoti / | Thus then she [the universal] would never attain [the state of] being inherent in that. |
tathā hi prathamataraṃ tayor jātidravyayos tatsambaddhasvabhāvavaiguṇyān nasamavāyo jāteḥ paścādapi tadvaiguṇyaṃ tadavasthameveti kathaṃ sā samaveyāt nahi dravyaṃ bhavatāṃ matena kṣaṇikaṃ yena paścād viśiṣṭatā tasya bhavet / | For initially, due to the defect in the nature of connection between these two - the universal and the substance - there is no inherence; and since later too that defect remains in the same state, how could it [the universal] inhere? According to your view, the substance is not momentary, whereby it could have a different state later. |
tatheti samavāyinī / | 'That' means 'being inherent'. |
tayor iti jātidravyayoḥ / tādātmya iti aparityaktaprāktanaviguṇarūpatve // | 'Their' means 'of the universal and substance'. 'Identity' means 'in the state of not having abandoned the previous defective form'. |
athāpi dravyamanityamaṅgīkriyate tadāpi doṣa iti darśayann āha yadi nāmetyādi / | [The author] shows that even when the substance is accepted as non-eternal, the fault remains, saying "if indeed" etc. |
yadi nāmādhruvā vyaktir lābhetātiśayaṃ tadā / | If indeed the particular [object] is not permanent, it might obtain an excellence then; |
jātes tu viguṇaṃ rūpaṃ na kadācinnivartate // | but the defective nature of the universal never ceases. |
yadi nāmādhruvatayā vyaktir atiśayaṃ paścāllabhate, jātes tu dhruvatvāt prāgvtpaścād api tat samavāyaviguṇaṃ rūpam asti, katham iva paścād api samavāyinī bhavet / na cāpi paścāt kālabhāvidravyasamavāyāviguṇarūpaiva jātiḥ sarvadāvasthiteti śakyaṃ vaktum dravyasyāpi nityatvaprasaṅgāt, tat sambaddhasvabhāvāyā jāteḥ sadāvasthitatvāt / | Even if the particular, due to [its] impermanence, obtains an excellence later, yet since the universal is permanent, that nature [of being] unsuited for inherence exists both before and after - so how could it become inherent even later? And it cannot be said that "the universal always exists in a form not unsuited for inherence with a substance that will exist in future time", because that would result in the substance also being eternal, since the universal whose nature is connected [with it] would exist permanently. |
nahi dvitīyasambandhyabhāve tat sambaddhasvabhāvāvaiguṇyaṃ yuktam // | For in the absence of the second relatum, the absence of defect in the nature of being connected [with it] is not reasonable. |
pacanādītyādinodyotakaravihitaṃ parihāramāśaṅkate / | [The author] anticipates the solution provided by Uddyotakara beginning with "cooking" etc. |
pacanādikriyāyāś ca pradhānaṃ sādhanaṃ matam / pācakādīti taccāsti prādhānyaṃ pācakāntare // | [That which is] the principal instrument of the action of cooking and similar [actions] is understood [by the term] 'cook' and such [terms]; and this principal character exists in other cooks as well. |
sa hyāha hetvarthāparijñānādidamucyate / yathā pācakādiśabdā anuvṛttāś ca bhavanti, naca pācakatvaṃ nāma sāmānyamasti, tathā gavādiṣvanuvṛttipratyayā iti / | He indeed says this due to not understanding the meaning of [our] reason: "Just as the terms 'cook' etc. are recurring [in their application], and yet there exists no universal called 'cookness', similarly [there must be] recurring cognitions in [the case of] 'cow' etc." |
yasmād viśeṣapratyayānāmanākasmikatvādityasya hetor ayam arthaḥ / | For this is the meaning of the reason "because particular cognitions cannot be without cause." |
piṇḍapratyayavyatiriktapratyayasya nimittāntarād utpāda iti, na punaḥ sarvo 'nuvṛttipratyayaḥ sāmānyād eva bhavatīti / | [It means that] a cognition distinct from the cognition of an individual arises from a different cause - not that every recurring cognition must arise from a universal. |
evaṃ sati pacanakriyāyā yat pradhānaṃ sādhanaṃ tat pācakaśabdenocyate, tac ca prādhanyaṃ pācakāntare 'pyastīti na doṣa iti // | This being the case, that which is the principal instrument of the cooking action is expressed by the word 'cook', and that principal character exists in other cooks as well - hence there is no fault. |
tadetat prādhānyam ityādinā pratividhatte | This [argument about] principal character etc. is countered [in the following]. |
prādhānyaṃ kimidaṃ nāma na śaktirasamanvayāt / dravyakriyāguṇātmādi nāta evāvakalpyate // | What indeed is this so-called 'principal character'? It cannot be a potency, due to [its] non-inherence [in other instances]. For the same reason, it cannot be conceived as consisting in the nature of substance, action, quality, etc. |
kimidaṃ prādhānyaṃ, nāma yadi śaktiḥ, tadayuktam, tasyāḥ pratyādhāraniyatāyā vyaktyantarāsamanvayāt / | What is this 'principal character'? If it is a potency, that is not correct, because being restricted to each substratum, it cannot inhere in other individuals. |
nāpi dravyādīnām ātmā svabhāvaḥ svātantryamata evāsamanvayāt / | Nor [can it be] the essence, nature, or independence of substances etc., for the very same reason of non-inherence. |
ādiśabdena ṣaṭpadārthavyatirikta iṣṭo dharmo gṛhyate / | The term "ādi" [etc.] is meant to include any dharma [entity] that may be held to be distinct from the six categories. |
yat punar uktaṃ nimittāntarād utpāda ityasyāyam artha iti, tatra prativihitameva sāmānyena kiñcinnimittāntaram astīti sādhane siddhasādhyatā, saṅketamanaskārasya nimittatveneṣṭatvāt viśeṣeṇa tvanvayavaikalyaṃ vyabhicāraś ca pācakādipratyayair iti | As regards the explanation offered [by Uddyotakara] of the assertion that "the appearance of these notions is due to other causes," this has already been answered by pointing out that if some general kind of cause is meant, then the argument proves what is [already] established, since we accept conventional conception as being the cause; if, on the other hand, any particular cause is meant, then there is both absence of concomitance and deviation, as shown by such notions as those of "cook" and the like. |
tadvijātīyaviśleṣirūpamātrāvasāyinī / saṅketabhedasāpekṣā pācakādiṣu śemuṣī // | The notion that appears in regard to [terms like] "cook" depends on mere difference in convention, and apprehends only the form that distinguishes [it] from all unlike things. |
yathāsaṅketamevātaḥ śabdā buddhaya eva ca / vibhāge na pravartante vinaikenānugāminā // | Therefore, all words and notions proceed according to convention alone in their distinctions, without [requiring] any single pervading [universal]. |
tat tasmāt, yadyato nimittantaraṃ nirūpyamāṇaṃ pācakādidhiyo nopapadyate / tasmāt / vijātīyasya vyavacchinnavastumātrādhyavasāyinī yathāsamayaṃ pācakaḥ pācaka ityevam ākārānugatā bhinneṣvapi vastuṣvabhedena pācakādiṣu śemuṣī dhīrupajāyate, sarvatra vijātīyavyavacchedasya vidyamānatvāt | Thus, because no other cause is found upon examination for the notions of "cook" and similar [terms], therefore, even in connection with diverse objects, a comprehensive notion arises regarding [terms like] "cook" which apprehends only that which is distinguished from unlike things and proceeds according to convention, as this exclusion of the unlike is present in all cases. |
yat evaṃ gavādiṣvapi yathāsaṅketamabhinnākāravyavasāyinaḥ pratyayāḥ śabdāś ca pravartiṣyante vināpi sāmānyamityanaikāntikatā hetoḥ | Because this is so, in the case of "cow" and similar [terms] also, notions of uniform character and words proceed according to convention even without any universal, thus [showing] the inconclusiveness of [their] reason. |
tathā cābhāvavijñānaṃ nābhāveṣu virudhyate | Thus the cognition of absence is not contradictory with regard to absences; |
dhvanir vānugato 'narthasaṅketānugamāttayoḥ | And [their] comprehensive verbal expression [follows] from the following of convention without [requiring] additional entities. |
idam eva hi sāmānyapratyayasya nibandhanaṃ vyāpi yaduta saṅketābhogaḥ, anyathā hyabhāveṣvabhāva ityanugataḥ pratyayo dhvaniś ca kena na virudhyeta na hyatra jātir asti vastusamavāyinītvāt tasya / kasmān na virudhyata ityatra kāraṇam āha anarthasaṅketānugamāt tayor iti | For this alone - namely the scope of convention - is the pervasive basis of the general notion; otherwise, how would the comprehensive notion we have regarding absences as "absence" and its verbal expression not be contradictory, since there can be no universal here, as that [universal] inheres only in positive entities. The reason why it is not contradictory is stated by [the words] "from their following of convention without [additional] entities." |
śabdajñānayoḥ saṅketamātrānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitvād iti yāvat | That is to say, because both word and cognition follow only the presence and absence of convention. |
ghaṭasyetyādinā śaṅkarasvāmina uttaramāśaṅkate | Śaṅkarasvāmin raises an objection beginning with [the word] "ghaṭasya" |
ghaṭasya prāgabhāvo 'yaṃ ghaṭapradhvaṃsa ityayam | [Such notions as] "the prior non-existence of the jar" [and] "the destruction of the jar" |
tadvastūpādhikāneva dhīrabhāvān prapadyate | [The mind] apprehends negations only as qualified by those positive entities |
upādhigatasāmānyavaśād evānuvṛttatā | [Their] comprehensive character [exists] only due to the universal inherent in the qualifying adjuncts |
tasyāḥ sarvatra cennaivaṃ vailakṣaṇyātadāśrayāt | If [this is claimed] everywhere about that [notion], [we say] it cannot be so due to disparity and non-dependence on that |
ghaṭa ityādikā buddhis tebhyo yuktānugāminī | The notion [expressed by words] like "jar" properly follows from those [universals] |
nābhāvo bhāva ityeṣā tanmatis tu vilakṣaṇā | But this notion of "non-existence" is different from [the notion of] "existence" |
nahi sattāvaśād buddhir gauraś ca iti ceṣyate | The notion of "cow" etc. is indeed not accepted as being due to [mere] existence |
ekamevānyathā kalpyaṃ sāmānyaṃ sarvasādhanam | Otherwise, a single universal would have to be postulated as accomplishing everything |
sa hyāha na hi teṣvabhāveṣvanupādhikāḥ pratyayā dṛśyante, kiṃ tarhighaṭasya prāgabhāvaḥ ghaṭasya pradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ ityevaṃ sarvatrābhāvapratyayo vastūpādhikānevābhāvānavalambate | For he says: "Indeed, notions of those negations are never seen without qualifiers; rather, in every case the notion of negation, such as 'prior non-existence of the jar' [or] 'destruction of the jar', rests only upon negations qualified by positive entities" |
tasmāt sarvatraiva tasyā dhiya upādhigatasāmānyavaśād evānuvṛttiteti nāsti vyabhicāra iti | "Therefore, in all cases the comprehensive character of that notion [occurs] only due to the universal inherent in the qualifier, [and] thus there is no deviation [in our position]" |
tasyā iti dhiyaḥ prakṛtatvāt sambandhaḥ | The word "tasyāḥ" refers to [that] notion, since it is the topic under discussion |
naivamityādinā pratividhatte | [The author] replies with [the words] beginning with "naivam" |
vailakṣaṇyasahito 'tadāśraya iti vigrahaḥ / samāhāradvandvo vā | The compound can be analyzed either as "having disparity along with non-dependence on that" or as a collective dvandva compound |
vailakṣaṇyādatadāśrayāc ca naiva yuktam ity arthaḥ | The meaning is that it is not correct due to disparity and non-dependence on that |
tatra vailakṣaṇyād ityasya tāvad vistareṇa samarthanam āha ghaṭa ityādi / | [Now] the first reason "because of disparity" is explained in detail [beginning with] "the jar" etc. |
na hyekopādhinibandhanā bhinnākārā buddhayo yuktāḥ, ekanaiva sarvasāmānyakāryasādhanād anekasāmānyakalpanāvaiyarthyaprasaṅgāt / | For it is not reasonable that cognitions having different forms should be based on a single qualifier, since a single universal would accomplish all purposes, leading to the unwanted consequence that the postulation of multiple universals would be pointless. |
tasmād ghaṭatvādisāmānyavaśād ghaṭa ityādikā dhiyo bhavantu, abhāva ityādikās tu katham ivātyantavilakṣaṇās tannibandhanā yujyeran, nahi sattāvaśādgotvādidhīr bhavet // | Therefore while cognitions like "[this is] a jar" etc. may arise from universals like jarness etc., how could cognitions of absence etc., being completely different [from positive entities], reasonably be based on those [universals]? For the cognition of cowness etc. does not arise from [the universal of] existence. |
bhāviviktas tv āha nahi sarvatra nimittānurūpaḥ pratyaya ity arthaḥ / | But Bhāvivikta says that "it is not [the case] that in every instance the cognition corresponds exactly to its cause." |
tathā hi gajaturagadhavakhadirādisamavāyinī bahutvasaṅkhyā senāvanādibuddhīnāṃ nimittaṃ, pānakakāñjikādibuddhīnāṃ vijātīyadravyasaṃyogo nimittam, anyathāhi bahavaḥ saṃyuktā iti ca pratyayaḥ syād iti / | For instance, the number [called] plurality inherent in elephants, horses, dhava and khadira trees etc. is the cause of cognitions of "army," "forest" etc., [and] the conjunction of heterogeneous substances is the cause of cognitions of "drink," "fermented gruel" etc. - otherwise the cognition would be [simply] "many" and "conjoined." |
yatas senādibuddhīnāṃ saṅkhyādīṣṭaṃ nibandhanam // | Because number etc. is accepted as the basis for cognitions of army etc. |
iyam iti / sāmānyadhīḥ / | "This" [refers to] the generic cognition. |
saṅketasya bhedo viśeṣaḥ // | The "difference" [means] the particularity of the convention. |
kaḥ punar atrātiśayo yenaivamucyata ity āha bhedetyādi / | [Someone asks:] "What then is the distinction here on account of which this is stated thus?" [The author] states [the answer beginning with] "difference." |
bhedajñāne satīcchā hi saṅketakaraṇe tataḥ / | When there is cognition of difference, there is indeed desire to make a convention; then, |
tatkṛtistacchrutiścāsyā ābhogas tanmatistataḥ // | [there is] the making of that [convention], the hearing of it, its form, and from that the cognition of it. |
anvayavyatirekābhyām idam eva viniścitam / samarthaṃ kāraṇaṃ tasyāmanyeṣām anavasthitiḥ // | Through [positive and negative] concomitance it is definitely established that this alone is the capable cause; [if we were to look] for other [causes], there would be infinite regress. |
anvayavyatirekasamadhigamyaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ, sa ca sāmānyadhiyaṃ prati icchāracitasaṅketābhogamātrasya niścitaḥ / | The causal relationship is ascertainable only through [positive and negative] concomitance, and with respect to the generic cognition, only the mental impression of conventions established by desire has been ascertained [as the cause]. |
tathā hi prathamataraṃ tāvad bhedaviṣayam anubhavajñānam utpadyate, tasmin utpanne saṅketakaraṇecchā jāyate tataś cecchātas tasya saṅketasya kṛtiḥ karaṇam, tatas tasyaiva vyavahārakāle śrutiḥ śravaṇam, asyāś ca śruteḥ sakāśād uttarakālam ābhogo yathā śrutasaṅketaviṣayaḥ, tataś cābhogāt teṣv eva bhedeṣu tadadhyavasāyena pravṛtter ghaṭa ityādikā matir udayam āsādayati / | For first, there arises experiential knowledge having difference as its object; when that has arisen, the desire to make a convention is born; then from that desire comes the making of that convention; then at the time of usage [comes] the hearing of that very [convention]; and from that hearing [comes] subsequently the mental impression having the heard convention as its object; and then from that mental impression, through determination, arises the cognition "pot" etc. with respect to those very differences. |
āgopālam etāvan mātram evāsyāṃ buddhau kāraṇatvena niścitam / | From the cowherd onwards, this much alone is ascertained as the cause of this cognition. |
aparidṛṣṭasāmarthyasya tu sāmānyasya kāraṇatvopakalpane 'tiprasaṅgaḥ syāt tad api kalpayitvā param apy adṛṣṭasāmarthyena tulyatvāt kim iti na kalpyeta // | But if we were to assume causality for the universal whose capacity has not been observed, an absurd consequence would follow - for after assuming that [universal as cause], why couldn't another [cause] also be assumed, since it would be equal in having unobserved capacity? |
tatraivopacayam āha anurūpo hītyādi / | [The text] elaborates on that very [point] starting with "anurūpo hi." |
anurūpo hi saṃsargī syād ity anyārthakalpanā / vailakṣaṇye tu buddhīnām idam evāśritaṃ varam // sāmarthyaniyamo hy atra kalpanīyo varaṃ sa ca / anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ kalpito jñātaśaktiṣu // | The assumption of something else [as cause] is based on [the idea] that a correlate should be of similar nature. But given the distinctness of cognitions, it is better to accept just this [which we proposed]. For it is better to assume this restriction of capacity which has been ascertained through [positive and negative] concomitance in [cases where] capacities are known. |
tathā hi bhavadbhiḥ sāmānyabuddhīnām anurūpam ālambanākhyaṃ hetuṃ nirūpayadbhiḥ bhedanyarbuddhasya sāmānyam upakalpitam, yadi ca tad api kalpitaṃ sāmānyam anyākārā api buddhīr janayati tadā varam idam eva, yad eva yathopavarṇitaṃ dṛṣṭasāmarthyaṃ kalpitaṃ bhavet / | For when you, determining a cause called "basis" similar to generic cognitions, postulated a universal for millions of different cognitions, if that postulated universal also produces cognitions of different forms, then it is better [to accept] just this - namely that which has been described as having observed capacity should be assumed. |
evaṃ hy adṛṣṭārthakalpanā na kṛtā syāt / | For in this way, there would not be assumption of an unobserved entity. |
api ca katham abhinnaṃ sāmānyaṃ vilakṣaṇā buddhīr janayatīti pṛṣṭena satā vaktavyam idam avaśyaṃ, yaduta śaktipratiniyamo 'yaṃ padārthānāṃ yad ekam api sad anekākārapratyayopajananāyālam iti / | Moreover, when asked "How does an undifferentiated universal produce distinct cognitions?", one would necessarily have to say this: "This is the fixed capacity of entities, that even being one, [something] is capable of producing cognitions of many forms." |
yadyevaṃ, jñātaśaktiṣu niścitasāmarthyeṣu bhedādiṣveva sāmarthyaniyāmakam iti na kalpyeta | If such be the case, why should [one] not assume that the determining factors of capacity lie in the diverse things themselves whose powers are well-known and fully ascertained? |
syād etat sāmānyasyāpyanvayavyatirekābhyāṃ sāmarthyaṃ niścitam evetyāha anvayetyādi | It might be objected: "Even for the universal, the capacity is well-established through positive and negative concomitance." [To this, the author] states [the following beginning with] "anvaya-". |
anvayānuvidhānaṃ ca sāmānyeṣu na vidyate / sadāsattvān na nityānāṃ vyatirekastu sambhavī | In universals there is no positive concomitance, because [their cognitions] are not present at all times; and negative concomitance is not possible for eternal [entities]. |
sadā sadādipratyayānām asattvādanutpatter naiṣāṃ tadgatānvayānuvidhāyitvaṃ yuktam | Because the cognitions of "being" and other [universals] do not arise at all times, their positive concomitance with those [universals] cannot be correct. |
yadi hyete sāmānyānuvidhāyinaḥ syus tadā sarvadā sāmānyasyāvasthitatvāt kimiti sadā na bhaveyuḥ, nahi sāmānyasya kācid apekṣāsti, parais tasyānupādheyaviśeṣatvād ato na tadgatānvayānuvidhānam eṣām | If these [cognitions] were truly concomitant with universals, then since universals are always present, why would [the cognitions] not occur at all times? For the universal has no dependency [on anything else], since others cannot create any special properties in it. Therefore there is no positive concomitance of these [cognitions] with that [universal]. |
nāpi vyatirekānuvidhānam tathā hi yadāmī sadādipratyayā notpadyante tadā tatra sāmānyābhāvaḥ kāraṇam iti na śakyaṃ vaktum, nityānāṃ sadāvasthāyitayā vyatirekāsambhavāt, ato nāpi tadgatavyatirekānuvidhānam eṣām asti | Nor is there negative concomitance. For when these cognitions of "being" etc. do not arise, one cannot say that their non-existence is caused by the absence of the universal, because eternal [entities] are always present, making [their] absence impossible. Therefore there is also no negative concomitance of these [cognitions] with that [universal]. |
yataścaivaṃ nimittāntarābhyupagame sāmānyādidhiyāṃ doṣas tasmādyatparair ucyate guṇatvādireva sāmānyaviśeṣo guṇādiṣvadravyākarmādipratyayahetuḥ, sāmānyeṣu ca sattādiṣu sāmānyamityanugatapratyayasyānekārthasamavāyo nimittam iti, tadapāstaṃ bhavatītyetad āha adravyādītyādi | Since there are thus faults in accepting another cause for cognitions of universals etc., what others claim - that the particular universal "quality-hood" etc. is the cause of cognitions of "non-substance" etc. in qualities etc., and that inherence in multiple objects is the cause of the comprehensive cognition of "universal" in universals like "being" etc. - that [claim] is refuted. This is what [the author] states [in the verse] beginning with "adravyādi-". |
adravyādidhiyo hetur na guṇatvādi yuktimat / anekasamavāyaś ca na sāmānyadhiyas tataḥ | "Quality-hood" etc. cannot reasonably be the cause of cognitions of "non-substance" etc., and inherence in multiple [objects] cannot [be the cause] of the cognition of universal. |
atiprasaṅgaścāsyām api kalpanāyām iti darśayann āha aneketyādi | Showing that this theory too leads to overextension, [the author] states [the verse] beginning with "aneka-". |
yadyanekārthasamavāyaḥ sāmānyeṣu sāmānyadhiyo nibandhanaṃ syāt, tadā saṅkhyāsaṃyogavibhāgāvayavidravyādiṣvanekadravyāśritatvam astīti, teṣvapi sāmānyam iti dhiyaḥ syur nimittāviśeṣāt | If "inherence in several things" were the basis of the comprehensive notion in regard to universals, then—since "subsistence in several substances" is found in such things as number, conjunction, disjunction, composite substances and so forth—the notion of "universal" should appear in regard to these also, because the basis [for such notion] would be equally present [in this case also]. |
ekabuddhihetutvam api sattādīnāṃ sadādyākāreṇa svātmaniyatatvān na sāmānyāntaramāskandati, tataś ca tadbalenāpi na sāmānyeṣu sāmānyaṃ sāmānyamityanugataḥ pratyaya upapadyate | The character of "being the cause of a single cognition" is also restricted to universals like "being" etc. in their forms as "existent" etc. due to being confined to their own nature and does not extend to any other universal; therefore, on that basis also, the comprehensive notion of "universal [of] universal" cannot arise with regard to [all] universals. |
tataścāsambaddham idaṃ kumārilenoktam "tasmād ekasya bhinneṣu yā vṛttis tannibandhanaḥ / sāmānyaśabdaḥ sattādāvekadhīkaraṇena vā" | Therefore, this statement by Kumārila is entirely irrelevant: "Thus, either the occurrence of one [thing] in several different [things] or [their] being the basis of a single cognition is the ground for the term 'universal' as applied to 'being' etc." |
iti | [These are Kumārila's words from] Ślokavārtika-Ākṛtivāda, 24. |
ghaṭatvādi ca sāmānyaṃ ghaṭādāveva vartate | The universal "jarness" and similar [universals] subsist only in the jar and similar [things]. |
nābhāveṣvasya vṛttis tu tasmāt teṣu kathaṃ nu dhīḥ | It does not occur in negations; how then [could] the notion [of universal arise] with regard to these? |
nāśrayāntaravṛttāddhi yuktāvanyatra dhīdhvanī | Indeed, a notion and name pertaining to one thing cannot be justified based on what subsists in something else. |
hastitvādiva karkādāvatraikārthāśrayo 'pi na | Just as [the notion of] "elephantness" etc. [cannot arise] with regard to crabs etc., here too there is no subsistence in one thing. |
rasaḥ śīto guruśceti syād ekārthāśrayān matiḥ | Notions of "taste", "cold", and "heavy" might arise from [their] subsistence in one and the same thing. |
ihāyam api naivāsti nābhāvo vartate kvacit | But in this case [of negation], even this [subsistence] does not exist—negation does not occur anywhere. |
ghaṭādiṣveva sāmānyaṃ samavetaṃ nābhāveṣu tasyāvastutvāt | The universal is inherent only in jars and similar [things], [but] not in negations, because these [latter] are non-entities. |
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