buddhist-nlp/tatpa-cleaned · Datasets at Hugging Face

sanskrit stringlengths 2 508	english stringlengths 2 924 ⌀
tat kathaṃ teṣvabhāveṣu tasmād ghaṭatvāder anyasamavāyinaḥ sāmānyānukārānugataḥ pratyayo bhavet / nahi gajatvadi karkādiṣvekākārapratyayanibandhanaṃ bhavati /	How then could there appear, with regard to these Negations, any comprehensive cognition following the form of a Universal [occurring] on the basis of a Universal like 'jar-ness' which inheres in something else [than the Negations]? For instance, 'elephant-ness' does not become the basis of a unified cognition regarding crabs and such [things].
nanu cānyatra samavetādapyanyatra pratyayo dṛṣṭas tadyathā madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ śīto guruśceti /	[Objection:] But a cognition is actually found to appear in connection with one thing on the basis of something that inheres elsewhere - for example, [we have cognitions] such as "the sweet taste is viscid, cool and heavy."
yatraiva hi dravye mādhuryaṃ samavetaṃ tatraiva śītatvādayo 'pītyekārthasamavāyabalād atra bhavati sāmānādhikaraṇyam, na tu punar abhāvo ghaṭatvādisāmānyaiḥ saha kvacid apyekasmin dravye samavaiti /	For in whatever substance sweetness inheres, in that very [substance] coolness etc. also [inhere], thus there is co-location here due to the power of inherence in one and the same thing. However, Negation never inheres together with universals like 'jar-ness' in any single substance.
nīrūpasya kvacid api samavāyāyogāt //	Because that which has no form cannot inhere in anything whatsoever.
viśeṣaṇetyādinātrodyotakarasya parihāram āśaṅkate /	With [the words] beginning with "qualification" etc., [the text] anticipates Uddyotakara's response.
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvasambandho 'pyasti cediha / sambandhāntarasadbhāve nanu cāsau prakalpyate //	If [one argues] that "in this case there exists the relation of qualifier and qualified," [then we reply that] such [a relation] is postulated [only] when some other relation is [already] present.
tayor āsattimāśritya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā /	The relation of qualifier and qualified depends on the proximity of those two [things].
kalpyate tadabhāve tu sānimittā na siddhyati //	But in the absence of that [proximity], it cannot be established, as it would lack a foundation.
sa hyāha ghaṭavādīnāṃ sāmānyānāṃ ghaṭādibhiḥ samavāyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ, abhāvānāṃ tu viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvalakṣaṇas tataś ca sāmānyābhāvayor ekārthasambandho 'trāpi vyapadeśaheturastyeveti /	For he [Uddyotakara] says: "The relation of universals like 'jar-ness' with [particulars] like jars is characterized by inherence, while [the relation] of negations is characterized by the qualifier-qualified relation, and therefore here too there exists a relation-to-one-thing between universal and negation which serves as the basis for designation."
tadatra pratividhānam āha sambandhāntaretyādi /	The answer to this is stated [in the verse beginning with] "some other relation" etc.
sambandhāntaropajanito hi bhāvānāṃ parasparaṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ	The relation of qualifier and qualified between entities is indeed brought about by some other relation.
tadyathā daṇḍadevadattayo rājapuruṣayoś ca saṃyogasvasvamibhāvādikaṃ sambandhamāśritya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā	For example, the relation of qualifier and qualified between Devadatta and [his] stick depends on conjunction, and between king and officer depends on the master-servant relationship.
tasya tu sambandhāntarasya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaṃ prati nimittabhūtasyābhāve sā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā katham iva bhavet	However, in the absence of that other relation which serves as the basis for the qualifier-qualified relationship, how could that qualifier-qualified relationship exist?
anyathā hyatiprasaṅgaḥ syāt	Otherwise, there would indeed be an undesirable consequence.
evaṃ hi sarvaṃ sarvasya viśeṣaṇaṃ bhavet	For in that case, everything would be the qualifier of everything.
katham idānīṃ ghaṭasya prāgabhāva ityādiviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo loke sambandhamantareṇa pratīta ity āha ghaṭasyetyādi	[Someone] asks how expressions like "the prior absence of the pot" involving qualifier and qualified are commonly understood without [any other] relation, [to which he] responds with [the verse beginning with] "ghaṭasya."
ghaṭasya prāgabhāvo 'yam ityādi vacanaṃ punaḥ kalpanāmātranirmāṇaṃ kalpitaṃ śūratādivat	Such expressions as "this is the prior absence of the pot" are mere constructs of imagination, like [attributing] bravery and such [to an imaginary person].
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvaṃ yatra vastusamāśrayam sambandhāntarasadbhāvas tathāvaśyaṃ prakalpyate	Where the qualifier-qualified relationship is based on real entities, there another relation must necessarily be postulated.
prāgabhūtvābhavatītyetan mātrārthajijñāsāyāṃ buddhiriyaṃ kalpikā bhāvād arthāntarabhūtam iva sambandhena prāgabhāvamupadarśayantī prasūyate	When there is a desire to understand the mere fact that [something] "having not existed before, comes into existence," there arises this conceptual cognition which shows prior absence as if it were something different from the entity, related [to it].
tadabhiprāyavaśād atra viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ, natu vāstavaḥ	Based on this intention, the qualifier-qualified relationship [is spoken of] here, but it is not real.
yathā kalpanāśilpighaṭitasya śūratvādayo dharmā viśeṣaṇatvenopādīyante	Just as qualities like bravery are taken as qualifiers of [something] created by an imaginative artist.
yatra tu bhavadbhir vastusamāśrayo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo gṛhītas tatrāvaśyaṃ sambandhāntaramanveṣvaṇīyamanyathā vyavasthāniyamo na syāt	But where you accept a qualifier-qualified relationship based on real entities, another relation must necessarily be sought, otherwise there would be no fixed rule.
apicāyaṃ na navo{naśco}dyānurūpa eva parihāraḥ śaṅkarasvāminokta iti darśayannāha abhāvo 'bhāva ityādi	[The author] shows that the solution stated by Śaṅkarasvāmin is not even appropriate to the new objection by saying [the verse beginning with] "abhāvo 'bhāva."
abhāvo 'bhāva ityeva jñānamatrāvacoditam / upādhisthaṃ ca sāmānyaṃ svāśrayeṣveva vartate //	Our objection pertained [only] to notions such as "negation [is] negation", while [regarding] the universal subsisting in an adjunct, [that] subsists only in its own substrata.
yadidaṃ ghaṭābhāve paṭābhāve śaśaviṣāṇādyabhāve vābhāvo 'bhāva ityanugāmijñānaṃ pravṛttaṃ tatrāsmābhir asatyapi sāmānye 'nugatapratyayadarśanādvyarthānyatrāpi sāmānyakalpaneti coditam, na tu sajātīyānāṃ bahūnāṃ ghaṭādīnāṃ ye prāgabhāvādayas tatra yajjñānaṃ	What we had objected to was that: regarding the comprehensive cognition "negation [is] negation" occurring in [cases of] negation of a jar, negation of cloth, or negation of a hare's horn etc., since we observe a unified cognition even without a universal, the postulation of universals elsewhere too is pointless - but [we did] not [object to] the cognition regarding prior negations etc. of many homogeneous things like jars.
yadi nāmaivaṃ tataḥ kimityāha upādhisthaṃ cetyādi	[If someone asks:] "Even if this is so, what then?" - [the text] states "upādhisthaṃ ca" etc.
ghaṭādyupādhigataṃ yatsāmānyaṃ ghaṭatvādi tatsvāśrayeṣveva ghaṭādiṣu vartate nāśrayāntare paṭādau tat kathaṃ vijātīyapaṭādigataprāgabhāvādau tasmāt pratyayaḥ syād iti bhāvaḥ	The universal like jarness that inheres in adjuncts like jar subsists only in its own substrata like jars, not in other substrata like cloth - so how could there arise from that a cognition regarding prior negations etc. pertaining to heterogeneous things like cloth? - this is the meaning.
sarvatraikamanugāmi sāmānyamastīti cedāha nacetyādi	If [someone] says "there exists a single pervading universal in all [cases]", [the text] states "na ca" etc.
na ṣaḍarthātirekeṇa jāyante 'bhāvabuddhayaḥ	Because notions of negation do not arise apart from the six categories.
nahi sakalapaṭādivijātīyānekapadārthavyāpyaparaṃ sāmānyamasti, yato 'sau pratyayo bhavet	For there exists no other universal pervading multiple heterogeneous entities like cloth etc., from which that cognition could arise.
syān mataṃ sattākhyaṃ mahāsāmānyam asti tadbalād abhāvapratyayo bhaviṣyatīti tadayuktam vyabhicārāt	If it be thought "there exists the great universal called 'existence' and the cognition of negation will arise from its force" - that is incorrect due to deviation [from this rule].
tathā hi ṣaṭpadārthavyatirekeṇāparasya pratisaṃkhyānirodhādeḥ padārthasyābhāva iti bhavatāmabhāvabuddhayo yāḥ samudācaranti tathotpadyakathāracitānāṃ kapiñjalādīnām abhāvaḥ paramārthata iti matayas tāsu, katamad upādhigataṃ sāmānyaṃ, yattāsāṃ nimittaṃ syāt / na hyeṣāṃ pratisaṅkhyānirodhādīnāṃ sattvam asti bhavan matena	For in those cognitions of negation of yours that arise [regarding] the non-existence of entities like pratisaṃkhyānirodha apart from the six categories, and in those notions [regarding] the ultimate non-existence of [fictional characters] like Kapiñjala constructed in stories - which universal inhering in an adjunct could be their cause? For according to your view, these things like pratisaṃkhyānirodha do not have existence.
etenaitad api pratyuktaṃ yaduktaṃ kumārilena "nanu ca prāgabhāvādau sāmānyaṃ vastu neṣyate / sattaiva hyatra sāmānyamanutpattyādirūpatā"	By this same [argument] is refuted also what was said by Kumārila: "If it be objected that in prior non-existence etc. no universal entity is accepted, [the answer is that] existence itself qualified by non-origination etc. is the universal here."
anutpattyādirūpatā anutpādādiviśiṣṭatetyarthaḥ /	[The term] "having the nature of non-origination etc." means [that it is] qualified by non-origination etc.
atrāpi hyayam eva doṣaḥ /	Indeed, this very same defect applies here also.
nahi matāntarīyānāṃ padārthānām utpādyakathārthānāṃ ca sattāsti yenatadabhāvapratītiḥ syāt /	For there is no existence [possible] of objects [postulated] in other doctrinal systems or of objects created in fictional stories, by which there could be an understanding of their non-existence.
tadadhyavasāyivikalpasattā tatra bahirarthaśūnyā pratīyata iti cet /	If [you say] that "what is cognized there is a conceptually determined existence, which is devoid of external objects,"
yadyevaṃ nityaikasattārahito vikalpamātrātmaka eva sakalaśabdārthaḥ kiṃ neṣyate /	then why not accept that the meaning of all words consists in mere conceptual construction, devoid of any single eternal existence?
anyathā hi nityaikasattādirūpasāmānyābhyupagame sattāpuruṣatvādīnāṃ sarvatra svabhede niratiśayatvāt kathaṃ bhinnarūpā pratītiḥ syād iti codyaṃ duṣparihāram eva syād iti //	For otherwise, if a universal in the form of a single eternal existence is accepted, since [terms] like "existence" and "humanness" would be equally [applicable] everywhere in their own distinctness, how could there be different forms of cognition? This objection would indeed be impossible to counter.
icchāracitarūpādāvarthe jātir na vidyate /	In objects like forms created by will, no universal exists.
vyakter asambhavād eva sthitā tadvyabhicāritā //	Due to the very impossibility of [their] instantiation, their fallibility remains established.
atītānupajāteṣu nityasāmānyagocaram / jñānaṃ cet kevalaṃ cedaṃ sāmānyaṃ gṛhyate na tu //	If there is cognition of an eternal universal with respect to past and future [things], then this universal cannot be grasped in isolation.
kevalasyopalambhe vā na vyaktīnām idaṃ bhavet /	Or if there were apprehension of [the universal] in isolation, this could not be [a universal] of particulars.
sāmānyaṃ na ca tadvyaṅkyaṃ vindhyasyeva himālayaḥ //	And such a universal would not be manifestable by those [particulars], just as the Himālaya [is not manifestable] by the Vindhya.
notpattipāratantryeṇa pratibaddhaṃ hi tāsvidam / na jñānapāratantryaṃ ca nityatvāt kevalāgrahāt //	The universal cannot be dependent on particulars through [its] origination, nor can it be dependent on [them] for [its] cognition, because it is eternal and because it is apprehended purely by itself.
svāśrayendriyayogādi vyapekṣāyā asambhavāt /	Because there is no possibility of [its] depending on such things as the contact between its substratum and the sense organs.
tat sadaivopalabhyeta yadi vā na kadācana //	Therefore it would either be apprehended at all times, or never be apprehended at all.
svātmani jñānajanane yogyaṃ vāyogyam eva vā /	[The universal] must either be capable or incapable of producing cognition of itself;
yadyekadā tadā rūpaṃ sarvadaiva hi tadbhavet // tasya yogyamayogyaṃ vā rūpaṃ yatprakṛtisthitam /	whichever [capacity] it has at one time, that form must remain forever. Its natural form, whether capable or incapable [of producing cognition], remains fixed in its original state.
taddhrauvyādaprakampyaṃ hi ko nāma calayiṣyati //	Who indeed could shake that which is unshakeable due to its permanence?
icchāyā racitaṃ rūpaṃ svabhāvo yasya sa tathoktaḥ, sa ādir yasyeti vigrahaḥ / ādiśabdena naṣṭājātaparigrahaḥ /	[The compound] is analyzed as "that whose nature is a form created by imagination"; the word "ādi" includes what is destroyed and what is not yet born.
nahi tatra kalpitādiṣu sāmānyam asti, yena tannibandhanā teṣu matiḥ syāt /	Indeed, there is no universal present in such imagined things through which there could be cognition based on it.
syād etanmābhūt kalpiteṣu sāmānyam atītājāte tu tannibandhanā buddhir bhaviṣyatīti, tadetan mithyā, na hyāśritānām ayaṃ dharmo yadāśrayamantareṇāpi tathāpi doṣa eva, kevalasya sāmānyasya grahaṇānabhyupagamāt /	[If one says:] "Let there be no universal in imagined things; but in past and unborn things, cognition will be based on it" - this is false, for it is not the nature of dependent things to exist without their substrate, and even if [they could], the problem remains, since the apprehension of a universal by itself is not accepted.
tathācoktam "svāśrayendriyasannikarṣāpekṣapratipattikaṃ sāmānyam" iti /	Thus it has been stated: "A universal depends for its cognition on the contact between its substrate and the sense organs."
kevalasya sāmānyasya grahaṇe sāmānyadhiyo vyaktivyavasāyo na prāpnoti vyaktes tadānīm abhāvāt / vyaktīnām idaṃ sāmānyam iti sambandhaś ca na syāt, nibandhanābhāvāt /	When the Universal alone is apprehended through a cognition of the Universal, there can be no determination of the Particular, because the Particular does not exist at that time. And there could not be any connection [expressed as] "this is the Universal of these Particulars," due to the absence of any basis [for such connection].
tathā hi nibandhanaṃ bhavat sambandhasya tadvyaṅgyatvaṃ vā sāmānyasya bhavet tajjanyatā, vā tadgrahaṇāpekṣagrahaṇatā vā /	For if there were to be a basis for such connection, it would have to be either [a] the Universal's being manifested by them [the Particulars], or [b] its being produced by them, or [c] its cognition being dependent upon their cognition.
tatra na tāvat tābhir vyaṅgyatvāt tat sambaddhaṃ sāmānyaṃ, nityatayā parair anupakāryasya viśeṣābhāvād vyaṅgyatvānupapatteḥ /	First, the Universal cannot be connected [with the Particulars] through being manifested by them, because being eternal and thus not capable of being affected by others, it cannot have any specific features [produced in it], hence manifestation is impossible.
yo hi yasyānupakārakaḥ sa tasyābhivyañjako na bhavati, yathā vindhyasya himavān /	For that which does not benefit something cannot be its manifester, just as the Himālaya is not the manifester of the Vindhya.
tathā ca vyaktayaḥ sāmānyasyeti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdheḥ /	And thus [the proposition that] "the Particulars [manifest] the Universal" contradicts a more general principle.
anupakārakasyāpi vyañjakatve 'tiprasaṅgaḥ, sarvaḥ sarvasya vyañjakaḥ syāt /	If something that confers no benefit could be a manifester, the unwanted consequence would be that everything would be the manifester of everything else.
ata eva nityatayā tasyābhyupagatatvāt tāsu notpattipāratantryam iti tasya yuktam /	For this very reason, since it [the Universal] is accepted as being eternal, it cannot logically be dependent on them [the Particulars] for its production.
kevalasyāpi grahaṇān nāpi tajjñānapāratantryam iti, trayāṇām api pakṣāṇām asambhavaḥ /	And since even the pure [Universal] can be apprehended, it cannot be dependent on them for its cognition either. Thus all three alternatives are impossible.
tataś ca yadidam ucyate svāśrayendriyasannikarṣāpekṣapratipattikaṃ sāmānyam iti tadayuktam āśrayasyaivāyogāt, kuta stadgatendriyasannikarṣādyapekṣatā bhaviṣyati /	Therefore, when it is said that "the Universal's apprehension depends on the contact of the sense-organ with its substratum," this is incorrect because there cannot even be a substratum [for the Universal]. How then could there be any dependence on sense-organ contact with such a [non-existent] substratum?
ādigrahaṇenātmamanaḥsannikarṣādiparigrahaḥ /	By the term 'ādi' [in the above] is included the contact between Soul and Mind and so forth.
nityatayā parair anupādheyaviśeṣatvān nāpyasya kvacid apekṣāsti /	As [the Universal] is eternal and no specific qualities can be imposed upon it by others, it has no dependency on anything whatsoever.
tataś ca yadi tatsvaviṣayajñānotpādanasamarthaṃ tadā sarvadaiva tajjanayet,	Therefore, if it were capable of producing cognition of itself, then it would produce it at all times;
athāsamarthaṃ tadā na kadāpi janayet nahi tasya tadrūpaṃ samartham asamarthaṃvā tat kvacidanyathākartumīśate nityatvahāniprasaṅgāt /	And if it were incapable [of producing cognition], then it could never produce it at all; for its nature, whether capable or incapable, cannot be altered in any way, as [this would result in] the loss of its permanence.
"tasya śaktiraśaktir vā yā svabhāvena saṃsthitā / nityatvād acikitsyasya kastāṃ kṣapayituṃ kṣama" // iti //	"Its power or powerlessness, which is established in its very nature - who could destroy that? For being eternal, it is not amenable to treatment."
tasya pācakādibhir anaikānta iti darśayati gota ityādi / gotaścārthātnaraṃ gotvaṃ bhinnadhīviṣayatvataḥ / rūpasparśādivat tasyetyukteścaitraturaṅgavat // ityasmin vyabhicāroktiḥ pācakatvādibhis tathā /	[The author] shows its inconclusiveness through [examples like] "cook" etc., starting with "cow": "The universal 'cow-ness' is different from the cow because it is the object of a different cognition, like color and touch; and because it is spoken of as belonging to it, like Caitra's horse" - this statement is shown to be fallible through [examples like] "cook-ness" etc.
anayā ca diśānye 'pi sarve dūṣyāḥ kuhetavaḥ //	And in this same manner, all other fallacious arguments are to be refuted.
tathā hi pācakādibhyaḥ pācakatvāder asatyapyarthāntarabhāve pācakaḥ pācaka iti bhinnadhīviṣayatvaṃ bhavatyeva, devadattasya pācakatvam iti ca vyatirekavibhaktir bhavatītyataḥ sādhāraṇānaikāntikatā hetoḥ /	For even though there is no separate existence of "cook-ness" from cooks, there still occurs different cognitions [such as] "a cook is a cook," and there are expressions with different case endings like "Devadatta's cook-ness" - thus the reason [given by the opponent] is inconclusive because it is too general.
anye 'pi kuhetava iti /	[These are] "other fallacious arguments."
kumārilagaditāḥ /	[These are the arguments] stated by Kumārila.
tatrāmī tena kuhetava uktāḥ / gopiṇḍabhedeṣu yā gobuddhiriyamekagotvanibandhanā gavābhāsatvādekākāratvāc ca / ekagopiṇḍaviṣayabuddhivat /	These are the fallacious arguments stated by him: "The cognition of 'cow' which occurs in relation to different individual cows must be based on a single [universal] cow-ness, because it manifests cow-ness and has a single form, like the cognition of a single individual cow."
athavā yeyaṃ gobuddhiḥ sā sābaleyān na bhavati, yadvā tadvyatiriktārthālambanā, tadabhāve 'pi bhāvāt, yathā ghaṭe pārthivabuddhiḥ /	Or again, this notion of 'cow' cannot [arise] from [a particular cow like] the Sābaleya [cow], or [if it does arise, then] it must have as its object something different from that [particular cow], because it exists even in the absence of that [particular cow], just as [there exists] the notion of 'earthenness' with respect to a jar.
piṇḍābhedeṣu gobuddhirekagotvanibandhanā /	The notion of 'cow' with respect to different individuals is based on the single universal 'cowness'.
to 'nyālambanāpi vā / tadabhāve 'pi sadbhāvād ghaṭe pārthivabuddhivat //	Or [this notion] has a different object, because it exists even in [that particular cow's] absence, just like the notion of 'earthenness' with respect to a jar.
pratyekaṃ kṛtsnarūpatvāt pratyekavyaktibuddhivat // pratyekasamavetāpi jātir ekaikabuddhitaḥ /	Because [the universal] exists in its complete form in each [individual], like the notion [of cowness] with respect to each individual. Even though the universal inheres in each [individual], it is [known to be] one through the single cognition [of it].
naṭyukteṣviva vākyeṣu brāhmaṇādinivartanam // naikarūpāmatir gotve mithyā vaktuṃ ca śakyate / nātra kāraṇadoṣo 'sti bādhakapratyayo 'pi vā //	Just as there is exclusion of [the term] 'brāhmaṇa' etc. in negative expressions. And the single-form cognition regarding cowness cannot be declared false. There is neither any defect in the cause [of this cognition] nor any contradictory cognition.
iti / tadatra prathame sādhane tāvat sādhyavikalam udāharaṇam, ekasya gotvasyāsiddhes tannibandhanatvam ekagobuddher apyasiddham eva /	Thus. Here in the first proof, the example lacks the probandum, because since a single [universal] cowness is not established, the fact that the single cow-cognition is based on that [universal] is also not established.
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yadi tu sākṣād vastusadālambaneti sādhyate tadānaikāntikatā /	If it is being proved that [the cognition] has a direct real basis, then [the argument] is inconclusive.
na hyasya kiñcitparamārthato vastu sadālambanam astīti pratipāditatvāt /	Because it has [already] been established that this [cognition] does not have any real entity as its basis in the ultimate sense.
yac ca pratyekaparisamāptārthaviṣayatvasādhanam, tatrāpi sāmānyena sādhye siddhasādhyatā pratipadārthamatadrūpaparāvṛttavasturūpādhyavasāyena pravṛttatvāt /	As for the proof regarding [the cognition's] having each individual object as its content, here too when what is to be proved concerns the universal, it proves what is [already] proven, because [the cognition] proceeds through determination of the form of an entity that excludes what is not of that form for each particular thing.
atha nityaikapratyekaparisamāptavastubhūtasāmānyākhyapadārthaviṣayatvaṃ sādhyate tadā dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā hetoścānaikāntikatā, tathāvidhenadharmeṇa kvacid apyanvayāsiddheḥ /	If what is being proved is that [the cognition] has as its content a category called universal which is eternal, single and completely inherent in each [individual], then the example lacks what is to be proved and the reason is inconclusive, because such a property is not found to be present anywhere.
ekasya ca sarvātmanā bahuṣu parisamāptatve sarveṣāṃ vyaktibhedānāṃ parasparamekarūpatāpattiḥ, ekavyaktipariniṣṭhitasvabhāvasāmānyapadārthasaṃspṛṣṭatvād ekavyaktirūpatvāt /	And if one [universal] is completely inherent in many in its entirety, then all individual differences would become identical to each other, because they would be connected with a universal category whose nature is established in a single individual, [and thus] would have the form of a single individual.
sāmānyasya vānekatvāpattir yuktapadanekavastuparisamāptātmarūpatvāt, dūradeśāvasthitānekabhājanagatabilvādiphalavad ityanumānabādhā /	Or else the universal would become multiple because its nature would be completely inherent in many connected entities, like bilva and other fruits contained in many vessels located in distant places - thus [there is] contradiction through inference.
tena yaduktam na cātra bādhakaḥ pratyayo 'stīti tadasiddham /	Therefore, what was stated - that "there is no contradicting cognition here" - is not established.
pūrvaṃ coktatvād, vakṣyamāṇatvāc ca bādhakasya /	Because the contradiction has [already] been stated before and will also be stated later.
yaccaikatvasādhanaṃ jāteḥ, tatrāpi jāteḥ pratyekasamavetāyā asiddhatvād ekabuddhigrāhyatvamasiddhamithyāśrayāsiddho hetuḥ /	As for the proof of the oneness of the universal, there too, because it is not established that the universal inheres in each [individual], the reason that [the universal] is grasped by a single cognition has an unestablished basis and is therefore unestablished.
brāhmaṇādinivartanaṃ ca paramārthato naikamavastutvād iti sādhyavikalam udāharaṇam /	And the example of the exclusion of [the class] brāhmaṇa and others is devoid of what is to be proved, because it is not really one, being a non-entity.
kālpanike caikatve sādhye siddhasādhyatā kalpitasyāpoharūpatveneṣṭatvāt /	And if the oneness being proved is [merely] conceptual, then [the argument] proves what is [already] proven, because what is conceptual is accepted [by us] in the form of exclusion [apoha].
yaccāpyucyate na cātra kāraṇadoṣo 'stīti tadapyasiddhameva anāderavidyāvāsanālakṣaṇasya kāraṇadoṣasya vidyamānatvāt /	And what is also stated - that "there is no defect in the cause here" - that too is not established, because there exists a defect in the cause in the form of the beginningless impressions of ignorance.
tadevam anayā diśā kuhetavo 'mī dūṣyāḥ //	In this same manner, these false arguments are to be refuted.
apicānekavṛttitvaṃ sāmānyasya yaducyate /	Moreover, when it is said that a universal has [the property of] subsisting in many [things].
tatra keyaṃ matā vṛttiḥ sthitiḥ kiṃ vyaktireva vā //	What is meant by this [term] "subsistence"? Is it staying or manifestation?
svarūpāpracyutistāvasthitirasya svabhāvataḥ /	As regards "staying," [which means] non-deviation from its own form, this belongs to it [i.e., the universal] by its very nature.
nādhārastatkṛtau śakto yena sthāpakatā bhavet //	The substrate is not capable of producing this [staying] in it, by which it could have the property of making [it] stay.
gamanapratibandho 'pi na tasya badarādivat /	Also, prevention of movement does not [apply] to it [i.e., the universal], as [it does] to jujube fruits and such things.
vidyate niṣkriyatvena nādhāro 'taḥ prakalpyate //	Because it exists as [something] motionless, therefore no substrate can be postulated.

tat kathaṃ teṣvabhāveṣu tasmād ghaṭatvāder anyasamavāyinaḥ sāmānyānukārānugataḥ pratyayo bhavet / nahi gajatvadi karkādiṣvekākārapratyayanibandhanaṃ bhavati /

How then could there appear, with regard to these Negations, any comprehensive cognition following the form of a Universal [occurring] on the basis of a Universal like 'jar-ness' which inheres in something else [than the Negations]? For instance, 'elephant-ness' does not become the basis of a unified cognition regarding crabs and such [things].

nanu cānyatra samavetādapyanyatra pratyayo dṛṣṭas tadyathā madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ śīto guruśceti /

[Objection:] But a cognition is actually found to appear in connection with one thing on the basis of something that inheres elsewhere - for example, [we have cognitions] such as "the sweet taste is viscid, cool and heavy."

yatraiva hi dravye mādhuryaṃ samavetaṃ tatraiva śītatvādayo 'pītyekārthasamavāyabalād atra bhavati sāmānādhikaraṇyam, na tu punar abhāvo ghaṭatvādisāmānyaiḥ saha kvacid apyekasmin dravye samavaiti /

For in whatever substance sweetness inheres, in that very [substance] coolness etc. also [inhere], thus there is co-location here due to the power of inherence in one and the same thing. However, Negation never inheres together with universals like 'jar-ness' in any single substance.

nīrūpasya kvacid api samavāyāyogāt //

Because that which has no form cannot inhere in anything whatsoever.

viśeṣaṇetyādinātrodyotakarasya parihāram āśaṅkate /

With [the words] beginning with "qualification" etc., [the text] anticipates Uddyotakara's response.

viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvasambandho 'pyasti cediha / sambandhāntarasadbhāve nanu cāsau prakalpyate //

If [one argues] that "in this case there exists the relation of qualifier and qualified," [then we reply that] such [a relation] is postulated [only] when some other relation is [already] present.

tayor āsattimāśritya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā /

The relation of qualifier and qualified depends on the proximity of those two [things].

kalpyate tadabhāve tu sānimittā na siddhyati //

But in the absence of that [proximity], it cannot be established, as it would lack a foundation.

sa hyāha ghaṭavādīnāṃ sāmānyānāṃ ghaṭādibhiḥ samavāyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ, abhāvānāṃ tu viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvalakṣaṇas tataś ca sāmānyābhāvayor ekārthasambandho 'trāpi vyapadeśaheturastyeveti /

For he [Uddyotakara] says: "The relation of universals like 'jar-ness' with [particulars] like jars is characterized by inherence, while [the relation] of negations is characterized by the qualifier-qualified relation, and therefore here too there exists a relation-to-one-thing between universal and negation which serves as the basis for designation."

tadatra pratividhānam āha sambandhāntaretyādi /

The answer to this is stated [in the verse beginning with] "some other relation" etc.

sambandhāntaropajanito hi bhāvānāṃ parasparaṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ

The relation of qualifier and qualified between entities is indeed brought about by some other relation.

tadyathā daṇḍadevadattayo rājapuruṣayoś ca saṃyogasvasvamibhāvādikaṃ sambandhamāśritya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā

For example, the relation of qualifier and qualified between Devadatta and [his] stick depends on conjunction, and between king and officer depends on the master-servant relationship.

tasya tu sambandhāntarasya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaṃ prati nimittabhūtasyābhāve sā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā katham iva bhavet

However, in the absence of that other relation which serves as the basis for the qualifier-qualified relationship, how could that qualifier-qualified relationship exist?

anyathā hyatiprasaṅgaḥ syāt

Otherwise, there would indeed be an undesirable consequence.

evaṃ hi sarvaṃ sarvasya viśeṣaṇaṃ bhavet

For in that case, everything would be the qualifier of everything.

katham idānīṃ ghaṭasya prāgabhāva ityādiviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo loke sambandhamantareṇa pratīta ity āha ghaṭasyetyādi

[Someone] asks how expressions like "the prior absence of the pot" involving qualifier and qualified are commonly understood without [any other] relation, [to which he] responds with [the verse beginning with] "ghaṭasya."

ghaṭasya prāgabhāvo 'yam ityādi vacanaṃ punaḥ kalpanāmātranirmāṇaṃ kalpitaṃ śūratādivat

Such expressions as "this is the prior absence of the pot" are mere constructs of imagination, like [attributing] bravery and such [to an imaginary person].

viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvaṃ yatra vastusamāśrayam sambandhāntarasadbhāvas tathāvaśyaṃ prakalpyate

Where the qualifier-qualified relationship is based on real entities, there another relation must necessarily be postulated.

prāgabhūtvābhavatītyetan mātrārthajijñāsāyāṃ buddhiriyaṃ kalpikā bhāvād arthāntarabhūtam iva sambandhena prāgabhāvamupadarśayantī prasūyate

When there is a desire to understand the mere fact that [something] "having not existed before, comes into existence," there arises this conceptual cognition which shows prior absence as if it were something different from the entity, related [to it].

tadabhiprāyavaśād atra viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ, natu vāstavaḥ

Based on this intention, the qualifier-qualified relationship [is spoken of] here, but it is not real.

yathā kalpanāśilpighaṭitasya śūratvādayo dharmā viśeṣaṇatvenopādīyante

Just as qualities like bravery are taken as qualifiers of [something] created by an imaginative artist.

yatra tu bhavadbhir vastusamāśrayo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo gṛhītas tatrāvaśyaṃ sambandhāntaramanveṣvaṇīyamanyathā vyavasthāniyamo na syāt

But where you accept a qualifier-qualified relationship based on real entities, another relation must necessarily be sought, otherwise there would be no fixed rule.

apicāyaṃ na navo{naśco}dyānurūpa eva parihāraḥ śaṅkarasvāminokta iti darśayannāha abhāvo 'bhāva ityādi

[The author] shows that the solution stated by Śaṅkarasvāmin is not even appropriate to the new objection by saying [the verse beginning with] "abhāvo 'bhāva."

abhāvo 'bhāva ityeva jñānamatrāvacoditam / upādhisthaṃ ca sāmānyaṃ svāśrayeṣveva vartate //

Our objection pertained [only] to notions such as "negation [is] negation", while [regarding] the universal subsisting in an adjunct, [that] subsists only in its own substrata.

yadidaṃ ghaṭābhāve paṭābhāve śaśaviṣāṇādyabhāve vābhāvo 'bhāva ityanugāmijñānaṃ pravṛttaṃ tatrāsmābhir asatyapi sāmānye 'nugatapratyayadarśanādvyarthānyatrāpi sāmānyakalpaneti coditam, na tu sajātīyānāṃ bahūnāṃ ghaṭādīnāṃ ye prāgabhāvādayas tatra yajjñānaṃ

What we had objected to was that: regarding the comprehensive cognition "negation [is] negation" occurring in [cases of] negation of a jar, negation of cloth, or negation of a hare's horn etc., since we observe a unified cognition even without a universal, the postulation of universals elsewhere too is pointless - but [we did] not [object to] the cognition regarding prior negations etc. of many homogeneous things like jars.

yadi nāmaivaṃ tataḥ kimityāha upādhisthaṃ cetyādi

[If someone asks:] "Even if this is so, what then?" - [the text] states "upādhisthaṃ ca" etc.

ghaṭādyupādhigataṃ yatsāmānyaṃ ghaṭatvādi tatsvāśrayeṣveva ghaṭādiṣu vartate nāśrayāntare paṭādau tat kathaṃ vijātīyapaṭādigataprāgabhāvādau tasmāt pratyayaḥ syād iti bhāvaḥ

The universal like jarness that inheres in adjuncts like jar subsists only in its own substrata like jars, not in other substrata like cloth - so how could there arise from that a cognition regarding prior negations etc. pertaining to heterogeneous things like cloth? - this is the meaning.

sarvatraikamanugāmi sāmānyamastīti cedāha nacetyādi

If [someone] says "there exists a single pervading universal in all [cases]", [the text] states "na ca" etc.

na ṣaḍarthātirekeṇa jāyante 'bhāvabuddhayaḥ

Because notions of negation do not arise apart from the six categories.

nahi sakalapaṭādivijātīyānekapadārthavyāpyaparaṃ sāmānyamasti, yato 'sau pratyayo bhavet

For there exists no other universal pervading multiple heterogeneous entities like cloth etc., from which that cognition could arise.

syān mataṃ sattākhyaṃ mahāsāmānyam asti tadbalād abhāvapratyayo bhaviṣyatīti tadayuktam vyabhicārāt

If it be thought "there exists the great universal called 'existence' and the cognition of negation will arise from its force" - that is incorrect due to deviation [from this rule].

tathā hi ṣaṭpadārthavyatirekeṇāparasya pratisaṃkhyānirodhādeḥ padārthasyābhāva iti bhavatāmabhāvabuddhayo yāḥ samudācaranti tathotpadyakathāracitānāṃ kapiñjalādīnām abhāvaḥ paramārthata iti matayas tāsu, katamad upādhigataṃ sāmānyaṃ, yattāsāṃ nimittaṃ syāt / na hyeṣāṃ pratisaṅkhyānirodhādīnāṃ sattvam asti bhavan matena

For in those cognitions of negation of yours that arise [regarding] the non-existence of entities like pratisaṃkhyānirodha apart from the six categories, and in those notions [regarding] the ultimate non-existence of [fictional characters] like Kapiñjala constructed in stories - which universal inhering in an adjunct could be their cause? For according to your view, these things like pratisaṃkhyānirodha do not have existence.

etenaitad api pratyuktaṃ yaduktaṃ kumārilena "nanu ca prāgabhāvādau sāmānyaṃ vastu neṣyate / sattaiva hyatra sāmānyamanutpattyādirūpatā"

By this same [argument] is refuted also what was said by Kumārila: "If it be objected that in prior non-existence etc. no universal entity is accepted, [the answer is that] existence itself qualified by non-origination etc. is the universal here."

anutpattyādirūpatā anutpādādiviśiṣṭatetyarthaḥ /

[The term] "having the nature of non-origination etc." means [that it is] qualified by non-origination etc.

atrāpi hyayam eva doṣaḥ /

Indeed, this very same defect applies here also.

nahi matāntarīyānāṃ padārthānām utpādyakathārthānāṃ ca sattāsti yenatadabhāvapratītiḥ syāt /

For there is no existence [possible] of objects [postulated] in other doctrinal systems or of objects created in fictional stories, by which there could be an understanding of their non-existence.

tadadhyavasāyivikalpasattā tatra bahirarthaśūnyā pratīyata iti cet /

If [you say] that "what is cognized there is a conceptually determined existence, which is devoid of external objects,"

yadyevaṃ nityaikasattārahito vikalpamātrātmaka eva sakalaśabdārthaḥ kiṃ neṣyate /

then why not accept that the meaning of all words consists in mere conceptual construction, devoid of any single eternal existence?

anyathā hi nityaikasattādirūpasāmānyābhyupagame sattāpuruṣatvādīnāṃ sarvatra svabhede niratiśayatvāt kathaṃ bhinnarūpā pratītiḥ syād iti codyaṃ duṣparihāram eva syād iti //

For otherwise, if a universal in the form of a single eternal existence is accepted, since [terms] like "existence" and "humanness" would be equally [applicable] everywhere in their own distinctness, how could there be different forms of cognition? This objection would indeed be impossible to counter.

icchāracitarūpādāvarthe jātir na vidyate /

In objects like forms created by will, no universal exists.

vyakter asambhavād eva sthitā tadvyabhicāritā //

Due to the very impossibility of [their] instantiation, their fallibility remains established.

atītānupajāteṣu nityasāmānyagocaram / jñānaṃ cet kevalaṃ cedaṃ sāmānyaṃ gṛhyate na tu //

If there is cognition of an eternal universal with respect to past and future [things], then this universal cannot be grasped in isolation.

kevalasyopalambhe vā na vyaktīnām idaṃ bhavet /

Or if there were apprehension of [the universal] in isolation, this could not be [a universal] of particulars.

sāmānyaṃ na ca tadvyaṅkyaṃ vindhyasyeva himālayaḥ //

And such a universal would not be manifestable by those [particulars], just as the Himālaya [is not manifestable] by the Vindhya.

notpattipāratantryeṇa pratibaddhaṃ hi tāsvidam / na jñānapāratantryaṃ ca nityatvāt kevalāgrahāt //

The universal cannot be dependent on particulars through [its] origination, nor can it be dependent on [them] for [its] cognition, because it is eternal and because it is apprehended purely by itself.

svāśrayendriyayogādi vyapekṣāyā asambhavāt /

Because there is no possibility of [its] depending on such things as the contact between its substratum and the sense organs.

tat sadaivopalabhyeta yadi vā na kadācana //

Therefore it would either be apprehended at all times, or never be apprehended at all.

svātmani jñānajanane yogyaṃ vāyogyam eva vā /

[The universal] must either be capable or incapable of producing cognition of itself;

yadyekadā tadā rūpaṃ sarvadaiva hi tadbhavet // tasya yogyamayogyaṃ vā rūpaṃ yatprakṛtisthitam /

whichever [capacity] it has at one time, that form must remain forever. Its natural form, whether capable or incapable [of producing cognition], remains fixed in its original state.

taddhrauvyādaprakampyaṃ hi ko nāma calayiṣyati //

Who indeed could shake that which is unshakeable due to its permanence?

icchāyā racitaṃ rūpaṃ svabhāvo yasya sa tathoktaḥ, sa ādir yasyeti vigrahaḥ / ādiśabdena naṣṭājātaparigrahaḥ /

[The compound] is analyzed as "that whose nature is a form created by imagination"; the word "ādi" includes what is destroyed and what is not yet born.

nahi tatra kalpitādiṣu sāmānyam asti, yena tannibandhanā teṣu matiḥ syāt /

Indeed, there is no universal present in such imagined things through which there could be cognition based on it.

syād etanmābhūt kalpiteṣu sāmānyam atītājāte tu tannibandhanā buddhir bhaviṣyatīti, tadetan mithyā, na hyāśritānām ayaṃ dharmo yadāśrayamantareṇāpi tathāpi doṣa eva, kevalasya sāmānyasya grahaṇānabhyupagamāt /

[If one says:] "Let there be no universal in imagined things; but in past and unborn things, cognition will be based on it" - this is false, for it is not the nature of dependent things to exist without their substrate, and even if [they could], the problem remains, since the apprehension of a universal by itself is not accepted.

tathācoktam "svāśrayendriyasannikarṣāpekṣapratipattikaṃ sāmānyam" iti /

Thus it has been stated: "A universal depends for its cognition on the contact between its substrate and the sense organs."

kevalasya sāmānyasya grahaṇe sāmānyadhiyo vyaktivyavasāyo na prāpnoti vyaktes tadānīm abhāvāt / vyaktīnām idaṃ sāmānyam iti sambandhaś ca na syāt, nibandhanābhāvāt /

When the Universal alone is apprehended through a cognition of the Universal, there can be no determination of the Particular, because the Particular does not exist at that time. And there could not be any connection [expressed as] "this is the Universal of these Particulars," due to the absence of any basis [for such connection].

tathā hi nibandhanaṃ bhavat sambandhasya tadvyaṅgyatvaṃ vā sāmānyasya bhavet tajjanyatā, vā tadgrahaṇāpekṣagrahaṇatā vā /

For if there were to be a basis for such connection, it would have to be either [a] the Universal's being manifested by them [the Particulars], or [b] its being produced by them, or [c] its cognition being dependent upon their cognition.

tatra na tāvat tābhir vyaṅgyatvāt tat sambaddhaṃ sāmānyaṃ, nityatayā parair anupakāryasya viśeṣābhāvād vyaṅgyatvānupapatteḥ /

First, the Universal cannot be connected [with the Particulars] through being manifested by them, because being eternal and thus not capable of being affected by others, it cannot have any specific features [produced in it], hence manifestation is impossible.

yo hi yasyānupakārakaḥ sa tasyābhivyañjako na bhavati, yathā vindhyasya himavān /

For that which does not benefit something cannot be its manifester, just as the Himālaya is not the manifester of the Vindhya.

tathā ca vyaktayaḥ sāmānyasyeti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdheḥ /

And thus [the proposition that] "the Particulars [manifest] the Universal" contradicts a more general principle.

anupakārakasyāpi vyañjakatve 'tiprasaṅgaḥ, sarvaḥ sarvasya vyañjakaḥ syāt /

If something that confers no benefit could be a manifester, the unwanted consequence would be that everything would be the manifester of everything else.

ata eva nityatayā tasyābhyupagatatvāt tāsu notpattipāratantryam iti tasya yuktam /

For this very reason, since it [the Universal] is accepted as being eternal, it cannot logically be dependent on them [the Particulars] for its production.

kevalasyāpi grahaṇān nāpi tajjñānapāratantryam iti, trayāṇām api pakṣāṇām asambhavaḥ /

And since even the pure [Universal] can be apprehended, it cannot be dependent on them for its cognition either. Thus all three alternatives are impossible.

tataś ca yadidam ucyate svāśrayendriyasannikarṣāpekṣapratipattikaṃ sāmānyam iti tadayuktam āśrayasyaivāyogāt, kuta stadgatendriyasannikarṣādyapekṣatā bhaviṣyati /

Therefore, when it is said that "the Universal's apprehension depends on the contact of the sense-organ with its substratum," this is incorrect because there cannot even be a substratum [for the Universal]. How then could there be any dependence on sense-organ contact with such a [non-existent] substratum?

ādigrahaṇenātmamanaḥsannikarṣādiparigrahaḥ /

By the term 'ādi' [in the above] is included the contact between Soul and Mind and so forth.

nityatayā parair anupādheyaviśeṣatvān nāpyasya kvacid apekṣāsti /

As [the Universal] is eternal and no specific qualities can be imposed upon it by others, it has no dependency on anything whatsoever.

tataś ca yadi tatsvaviṣayajñānotpādanasamarthaṃ tadā sarvadaiva tajjanayet,

Therefore, if it were capable of producing cognition of itself, then it would produce it at all times;

athāsamarthaṃ tadā na kadāpi janayet nahi tasya tadrūpaṃ samartham asamarthaṃvā tat kvacidanyathākartumīśate nityatvahāniprasaṅgāt /

And if it were incapable [of producing cognition], then it could never produce it at all; for its nature, whether capable or incapable, cannot be altered in any way, as [this would result in] the loss of its permanence.

"tasya śaktiraśaktir vā yā svabhāvena saṃsthitā / nityatvād acikitsyasya kastāṃ kṣapayituṃ kṣama" // iti //

"Its power or powerlessness, which is established in its very nature - who could destroy that? For being eternal, it is not amenable to treatment."

tasya pācakādibhir anaikānta iti darśayati gota ityādi / gotaścārthātnaraṃ gotvaṃ bhinnadhīviṣayatvataḥ / rūpasparśādivat tasyetyukteścaitraturaṅgavat // ityasmin vyabhicāroktiḥ pācakatvādibhis tathā /

[The author] shows its inconclusiveness through [examples like] "cook" etc., starting with "cow": "The universal 'cow-ness' is different from the cow because it is the object of a different cognition, like color and touch; and because it is spoken of as belonging to it, like Caitra's horse" - this statement is shown to be fallible through [examples like] "cook-ness" etc.

anayā ca diśānye 'pi sarve dūṣyāḥ kuhetavaḥ //

And in this same manner, all other fallacious arguments are to be refuted.

tathā hi pācakādibhyaḥ pācakatvāder asatyapyarthāntarabhāve pācakaḥ pācaka iti bhinnadhīviṣayatvaṃ bhavatyeva, devadattasya pācakatvam iti ca vyatirekavibhaktir bhavatītyataḥ sādhāraṇānaikāntikatā hetoḥ /

For even though there is no separate existence of "cook-ness" from cooks, there still occurs different cognitions [such as] "a cook is a cook," and there are expressions with different case endings like "Devadatta's cook-ness" - thus the reason [given by the opponent] is inconclusive because it is too general.

anye 'pi kuhetava iti /

[These are] "other fallacious arguments."

kumārilagaditāḥ /

[These are the arguments] stated by Kumārila.

tatrāmī tena kuhetava uktāḥ / gopiṇḍabhedeṣu yā gobuddhiriyamekagotvanibandhanā gavābhāsatvādekākāratvāc ca / ekagopiṇḍaviṣayabuddhivat /

These are the fallacious arguments stated by him: "The cognition of 'cow' which occurs in relation to different individual cows must be based on a single [universal] cow-ness, because it manifests cow-ness and has a single form, like the cognition of a single individual cow."

athavā yeyaṃ gobuddhiḥ sā sābaleyān na bhavati, yadvā tadvyatiriktārthālambanā, tadabhāve 'pi bhāvāt, yathā ghaṭe pārthivabuddhiḥ /

Or again, this notion of 'cow' cannot [arise] from [a particular cow like] the Sābaleya [cow], or [if it does arise, then] it must have as its object something different from that [particular cow], because it exists even in the absence of that [particular cow], just as [there exists] the notion of 'earthenness' with respect to a jar.

piṇḍābhedeṣu gobuddhirekagotvanibandhanā /

The notion of 'cow' with respect to different individuals is based on the single universal 'cowness'.

to 'nyālambanāpi vā / tadabhāve 'pi sadbhāvād ghaṭe pārthivabuddhivat //

Or [this notion] has a different object, because it exists even in [that particular cow's] absence, just like the notion of 'earthenness' with respect to a jar.

pratyekaṃ kṛtsnarūpatvāt pratyekavyaktibuddhivat // pratyekasamavetāpi jātir ekaikabuddhitaḥ /

Because [the universal] exists in its complete form in each [individual], like the notion [of cowness] with respect to each individual. Even though the universal inheres in each [individual], it is [known to be] one through the single cognition [of it].

naṭyukteṣviva vākyeṣu brāhmaṇādinivartanam // naikarūpāmatir gotve mithyā vaktuṃ ca śakyate / nātra kāraṇadoṣo 'sti bādhakapratyayo 'pi vā //

Just as there is exclusion of [the term] 'brāhmaṇa' etc. in negative expressions. And the single-form cognition regarding cowness cannot be declared false. There is neither any defect in the cause [of this cognition] nor any contradictory cognition.

iti / tadatra prathame sādhane tāvat sādhyavikalam udāharaṇam, ekasya gotvasyāsiddhes tannibandhanatvam ekagobuddher apyasiddham eva /

Thus. Here in the first proof, the example lacks the probandum, because since a single [universal] cowness is not established, the fact that the single cow-cognition is based on that [universal] is also not established.

[remaining sentences omitted for length limit - can continue if needed]

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yadi tu sākṣād vastusadālambaneti sādhyate tadānaikāntikatā /

If it is being proved that [the cognition] has a direct real basis, then [the argument] is inconclusive.

na hyasya kiñcitparamārthato vastu sadālambanam astīti pratipāditatvāt /

Because it has [already] been established that this [cognition] does not have any real entity as its basis in the ultimate sense.

yac ca pratyekaparisamāptārthaviṣayatvasādhanam, tatrāpi sāmānyena sādhye siddhasādhyatā pratipadārthamatadrūpaparāvṛttavasturūpādhyavasāyena pravṛttatvāt /

As for the proof regarding [the cognition's] having each individual object as its content, here too when what is to be proved concerns the universal, it proves what is [already] proven, because [the cognition] proceeds through determination of the form of an entity that excludes what is not of that form for each particular thing.

atha nityaikapratyekaparisamāptavastubhūtasāmānyākhyapadārthaviṣayatvaṃ sādhyate tadā dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā hetoścānaikāntikatā, tathāvidhenadharmeṇa kvacid apyanvayāsiddheḥ /

If what is being proved is that [the cognition] has as its content a category called universal which is eternal, single and completely inherent in each [individual], then the example lacks what is to be proved and the reason is inconclusive, because such a property is not found to be present anywhere.

ekasya ca sarvātmanā bahuṣu parisamāptatve sarveṣāṃ vyaktibhedānāṃ parasparamekarūpatāpattiḥ, ekavyaktipariniṣṭhitasvabhāvasāmānyapadārthasaṃspṛṣṭatvād ekavyaktirūpatvāt /

And if one [universal] is completely inherent in many in its entirety, then all individual differences would become identical to each other, because they would be connected with a universal category whose nature is established in a single individual, [and thus] would have the form of a single individual.

sāmānyasya vānekatvāpattir yuktapadanekavastuparisamāptātmarūpatvāt, dūradeśāvasthitānekabhājanagatabilvādiphalavad ityanumānabādhā /

Or else the universal would become multiple because its nature would be completely inherent in many connected entities, like bilva and other fruits contained in many vessels located in distant places - thus [there is] contradiction through inference.

tena yaduktam na cātra bādhakaḥ pratyayo 'stīti tadasiddham /

Therefore, what was stated - that "there is no contradicting cognition here" - is not established.

pūrvaṃ coktatvād, vakṣyamāṇatvāc ca bādhakasya /

Because the contradiction has [already] been stated before and will also be stated later.

yaccaikatvasādhanaṃ jāteḥ, tatrāpi jāteḥ pratyekasamavetāyā asiddhatvād ekabuddhigrāhyatvamasiddhamithyāśrayāsiddho hetuḥ /

As for the proof of the oneness of the universal, there too, because it is not established that the universal inheres in each [individual], the reason that [the universal] is grasped by a single cognition has an unestablished basis and is therefore unestablished.

brāhmaṇādinivartanaṃ ca paramārthato naikamavastutvād iti sādhyavikalam udāharaṇam /

And the example of the exclusion of [the class] brāhmaṇa and others is devoid of what is to be proved, because it is not really one, being a non-entity.

kālpanike caikatve sādhye siddhasādhyatā kalpitasyāpoharūpatveneṣṭatvāt /

And if the oneness being proved is [merely] conceptual, then [the argument] proves what is [already] proven, because what is conceptual is accepted [by us] in the form of exclusion [apoha].

yaccāpyucyate na cātra kāraṇadoṣo 'stīti tadapyasiddhameva anāderavidyāvāsanālakṣaṇasya kāraṇadoṣasya vidyamānatvāt /

And what is also stated - that "there is no defect in the cause here" - that too is not established, because there exists a defect in the cause in the form of the beginningless impressions of ignorance.

tadevam anayā diśā kuhetavo 'mī dūṣyāḥ //

In this same manner, these false arguments are to be refuted.

apicānekavṛttitvaṃ sāmānyasya yaducyate /

Moreover, when it is said that a universal has [the property of] subsisting in many [things].

tatra keyaṃ matā vṛttiḥ sthitiḥ kiṃ vyaktireva vā //

What is meant by this [term] "subsistence"? Is it staying or manifestation?

svarūpāpracyutistāvasthitirasya svabhāvataḥ /

As regards "staying," [which means] non-deviation from its own form, this belongs to it [i.e., the universal] by its very nature.

nādhārastatkṛtau śakto yena sthāpakatā bhavet //

The substrate is not capable of producing this [staying] in it, by which it could have the property of making [it] stay.

gamanapratibandho 'pi na tasya badarādivat /

Also, prevention of movement does not [apply] to it [i.e., the universal], as [it does] to jujube fruits and such things.

vidyate niṣkriyatvena nādhāro 'taḥ prakalpyate //

Because it exists as [something] motionless, therefore no substrate can be postulated.