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tat kathaṃ teṣvabhāveṣu tasmād ghaṭatvāder anyasamavāyinaḥ sāmānyānukārānugataḥ pratyayo bhavet / nahi gajatvadi karkādiṣvekākārapratyayanibandhanaṃ bhavati / | How then could there appear, with regard to these Negations, any comprehensive cognition following the form of a Universal [occurring] on the basis of a Universal like 'jar-ness' which inheres in something else [than the Negations]? For instance, 'elephant-ness' does not become the basis of a unified cognition regarding crabs and such [things]. |
nanu cānyatra samavetādapyanyatra pratyayo dṛṣṭas tadyathā madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ śīto guruśceti / | [Objection:] But a cognition is actually found to appear in connection with one thing on the basis of something that inheres elsewhere - for example, [we have cognitions] such as "the sweet taste is viscid, cool and heavy." |
yatraiva hi dravye mādhuryaṃ samavetaṃ tatraiva śītatvādayo 'pītyekārthasamavāyabalād atra bhavati sāmānādhikaraṇyam, na tu punar abhāvo ghaṭatvādisāmānyaiḥ saha kvacid apyekasmin dravye samavaiti / | For in whatever substance sweetness inheres, in that very [substance] coolness etc. also [inhere], thus there is co-location here due to the power of inherence in one and the same thing. However, Negation never inheres together with universals like 'jar-ness' in any single substance. |
nīrūpasya kvacid api samavāyāyogāt // | Because that which has no form cannot inhere in anything whatsoever. |
viśeṣaṇetyādinātrodyotakarasya parihāram āśaṅkate / | With [the words] beginning with "qualification" etc., [the text] anticipates Uddyotakara's response. |
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvasambandho 'pyasti cediha / sambandhāntarasadbhāve nanu cāsau prakalpyate // | If [one argues] that "in this case there exists the relation of qualifier and qualified," [then we reply that] such [a relation] is postulated [only] when some other relation is [already] present. |
tayor āsattimāśritya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā / | The relation of qualifier and qualified depends on the proximity of those two [things]. |
kalpyate tadabhāve tu sānimittā na siddhyati // | But in the absence of that [proximity], it cannot be established, as it would lack a foundation. |
sa hyāha ghaṭavādīnāṃ sāmānyānāṃ ghaṭādibhiḥ samavāyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ, abhāvānāṃ tu viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvalakṣaṇas tataś ca sāmānyābhāvayor ekārthasambandho 'trāpi vyapadeśaheturastyeveti / | For he [Uddyotakara] says: "The relation of universals like 'jar-ness' with [particulars] like jars is characterized by inherence, while [the relation] of negations is characterized by the qualifier-qualified relation, and therefore here too there exists a relation-to-one-thing between universal and negation which serves as the basis for designation." |
tadatra pratividhānam āha sambandhāntaretyādi / | The answer to this is stated [in the verse beginning with] "some other relation" etc. |
sambandhāntaropajanito hi bhāvānāṃ parasparaṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ | The relation of qualifier and qualified between entities is indeed brought about by some other relation. |
tadyathā daṇḍadevadattayo rājapuruṣayoś ca saṃyogasvasvamibhāvādikaṃ sambandhamāśritya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā | For example, the relation of qualifier and qualified between Devadatta and [his] stick depends on conjunction, and between king and officer depends on the master-servant relationship. |
tasya tu sambandhāntarasya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaṃ prati nimittabhūtasyābhāve sā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā katham iva bhavet | However, in the absence of that other relation which serves as the basis for the qualifier-qualified relationship, how could that qualifier-qualified relationship exist? |
anyathā hyatiprasaṅgaḥ syāt | Otherwise, there would indeed be an undesirable consequence. |
evaṃ hi sarvaṃ sarvasya viśeṣaṇaṃ bhavet | For in that case, everything would be the qualifier of everything. |
katham idānīṃ ghaṭasya prāgabhāva ityādiviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo loke sambandhamantareṇa pratīta ity āha ghaṭasyetyādi | [Someone] asks how expressions like "the prior absence of the pot" involving qualifier and qualified are commonly understood without [any other] relation, [to which he] responds with [the verse beginning with] "ghaṭasya." |
ghaṭasya prāgabhāvo 'yam ityādi vacanaṃ punaḥ kalpanāmātranirmāṇaṃ kalpitaṃ śūratādivat | Such expressions as "this is the prior absence of the pot" are mere constructs of imagination, like [attributing] bravery and such [to an imaginary person]. |
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvaṃ yatra vastusamāśrayam sambandhāntarasadbhāvas tathāvaśyaṃ prakalpyate | Where the qualifier-qualified relationship is based on real entities, there another relation must necessarily be postulated. |
prāgabhūtvābhavatītyetan mātrārthajijñāsāyāṃ buddhiriyaṃ kalpikā bhāvād arthāntarabhūtam iva sambandhena prāgabhāvamupadarśayantī prasūyate | When there is a desire to understand the mere fact that [something] "having not existed before, comes into existence," there arises this conceptual cognition which shows prior absence as if it were something different from the entity, related [to it]. |
tadabhiprāyavaśād atra viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ, natu vāstavaḥ | Based on this intention, the qualifier-qualified relationship [is spoken of] here, but it is not real. |
yathā kalpanāśilpighaṭitasya śūratvādayo dharmā viśeṣaṇatvenopādīyante | Just as qualities like bravery are taken as qualifiers of [something] created by an imaginative artist. |
yatra tu bhavadbhir vastusamāśrayo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo gṛhītas tatrāvaśyaṃ sambandhāntaramanveṣvaṇīyamanyathā vyavasthāniyamo na syāt | But where you accept a qualifier-qualified relationship based on real entities, another relation must necessarily be sought, otherwise there would be no fixed rule. |
apicāyaṃ na navo{naśco}dyānurūpa eva parihāraḥ śaṅkarasvāminokta iti darśayannāha abhāvo 'bhāva ityādi | [The author] shows that the solution stated by Śaṅkarasvāmin is not even appropriate to the new objection by saying [the verse beginning with] "abhāvo 'bhāva." |
abhāvo 'bhāva ityeva jñānamatrāvacoditam / upādhisthaṃ ca sāmānyaṃ svāśrayeṣveva vartate // | Our objection pertained [only] to notions such as "negation [is] negation", while [regarding] the universal subsisting in an adjunct, [that] subsists only in its own substrata. |
yadidaṃ ghaṭābhāve paṭābhāve śaśaviṣāṇādyabhāve vābhāvo 'bhāva ityanugāmijñānaṃ pravṛttaṃ tatrāsmābhir asatyapi sāmānye 'nugatapratyayadarśanādvyarthānyatrāpi sāmānyakalpaneti coditam, na tu sajātīyānāṃ bahūnāṃ ghaṭādīnāṃ ye prāgabhāvādayas tatra yajjñānaṃ | What we had objected to was that: regarding the comprehensive cognition "negation [is] negation" occurring in [cases of] negation of a jar, negation of cloth, or negation of a hare's horn etc., since we observe a unified cognition even without a universal, the postulation of universals elsewhere too is pointless - but [we did] not [object to] the cognition regarding prior negations etc. of many homogeneous things like jars. |
yadi nāmaivaṃ tataḥ kimityāha upādhisthaṃ cetyādi | [If someone asks:] "Even if this is so, what then?" - [the text] states "upādhisthaṃ ca" etc. |
ghaṭādyupādhigataṃ yatsāmānyaṃ ghaṭatvādi tatsvāśrayeṣveva ghaṭādiṣu vartate nāśrayāntare paṭādau tat kathaṃ vijātīyapaṭādigataprāgabhāvādau tasmāt pratyayaḥ syād iti bhāvaḥ | The universal like jarness that inheres in adjuncts like jar subsists only in its own substrata like jars, not in other substrata like cloth - so how could there arise from that a cognition regarding prior negations etc. pertaining to heterogeneous things like cloth? - this is the meaning. |
sarvatraikamanugāmi sāmānyamastīti cedāha nacetyādi | If [someone] says "there exists a single pervading universal in all [cases]", [the text] states "na ca" etc. |
na ṣaḍarthātirekeṇa jāyante 'bhāvabuddhayaḥ | Because notions of negation do not arise apart from the six categories. |
nahi sakalapaṭādivijātīyānekapadārthavyāpyaparaṃ sāmānyamasti, yato 'sau pratyayo bhavet | For there exists no other universal pervading multiple heterogeneous entities like cloth etc., from which that cognition could arise. |
syān mataṃ sattākhyaṃ mahāsāmānyam asti tadbalād abhāvapratyayo bhaviṣyatīti tadayuktam vyabhicārāt | If it be thought "there exists the great universal called 'existence' and the cognition of negation will arise from its force" - that is incorrect due to deviation [from this rule]. |
tathā hi ṣaṭpadārthavyatirekeṇāparasya pratisaṃkhyānirodhādeḥ padārthasyābhāva iti bhavatāmabhāvabuddhayo yāḥ samudācaranti tathotpadyakathāracitānāṃ kapiñjalādīnām abhāvaḥ paramārthata iti matayas tāsu, katamad upādhigataṃ sāmānyaṃ, yattāsāṃ nimittaṃ syāt / na hyeṣāṃ pratisaṅkhyānirodhādīnāṃ sattvam asti bhavan matena | For in those cognitions of negation of yours that arise [regarding] the non-existence of entities like pratisaṃkhyānirodha apart from the six categories, and in those notions [regarding] the ultimate non-existence of [fictional characters] like Kapiñjala constructed in stories - which universal inhering in an adjunct could be their cause? For according to your view, these things like pratisaṃkhyānirodha do not have existence. |
etenaitad api pratyuktaṃ yaduktaṃ kumārilena "nanu ca prāgabhāvādau sāmānyaṃ vastu neṣyate / sattaiva hyatra sāmānyamanutpattyādirūpatā" | By this same [argument] is refuted also what was said by Kumārila: "If it be objected that in prior non-existence etc. no universal entity is accepted, [the answer is that] existence itself qualified by non-origination etc. is the universal here." |
anutpattyādirūpatā anutpādādiviśiṣṭatetyarthaḥ / | [The term] "having the nature of non-origination etc." means [that it is] qualified by non-origination etc. |
atrāpi hyayam eva doṣaḥ / | Indeed, this very same defect applies here also. |
nahi matāntarīyānāṃ padārthānām utpādyakathārthānāṃ ca sattāsti yenatadabhāvapratītiḥ syāt / | For there is no existence [possible] of objects [postulated] in other doctrinal systems or of objects created in fictional stories, by which there could be an understanding of their non-existence. |
tadadhyavasāyivikalpasattā tatra bahirarthaśūnyā pratīyata iti cet / | If [you say] that "what is cognized there is a conceptually determined existence, which is devoid of external objects," |
yadyevaṃ nityaikasattārahito vikalpamātrātmaka eva sakalaśabdārthaḥ kiṃ neṣyate / | then why not accept that the meaning of all words consists in mere conceptual construction, devoid of any single eternal existence? |
anyathā hi nityaikasattādirūpasāmānyābhyupagame sattāpuruṣatvādīnāṃ sarvatra svabhede niratiśayatvāt kathaṃ bhinnarūpā pratītiḥ syād iti codyaṃ duṣparihāram eva syād iti // | For otherwise, if a universal in the form of a single eternal existence is accepted, since [terms] like "existence" and "humanness" would be equally [applicable] everywhere in their own distinctness, how could there be different forms of cognition? This objection would indeed be impossible to counter. |
icchāracitarūpādāvarthe jātir na vidyate / | In objects like forms created by will, no universal exists. |
vyakter asambhavād eva sthitā tadvyabhicāritā // | Due to the very impossibility of [their] instantiation, their fallibility remains established. |
atītānupajāteṣu nityasāmānyagocaram / jñānaṃ cet kevalaṃ cedaṃ sāmānyaṃ gṛhyate na tu // | If there is cognition of an eternal universal with respect to past and future [things], then this universal cannot be grasped in isolation. |
kevalasyopalambhe vā na vyaktīnām idaṃ bhavet / | Or if there were apprehension of [the universal] in isolation, this could not be [a universal] of particulars. |
sāmānyaṃ na ca tadvyaṅkyaṃ vindhyasyeva himālayaḥ // | And such a universal would not be manifestable by those [particulars], just as the Himālaya [is not manifestable] by the Vindhya. |
notpattipāratantryeṇa pratibaddhaṃ hi tāsvidam / na jñānapāratantryaṃ ca nityatvāt kevalāgrahāt // | The universal cannot be dependent on particulars through [its] origination, nor can it be dependent on [them] for [its] cognition, because it is eternal and because it is apprehended purely by itself. |
svāśrayendriyayogādi vyapekṣāyā asambhavāt / | Because there is no possibility of [its] depending on such things as the contact between its substratum and the sense organs. |
tat sadaivopalabhyeta yadi vā na kadācana // | Therefore it would either be apprehended at all times, or never be apprehended at all. |
svātmani jñānajanane yogyaṃ vāyogyam eva vā / | [The universal] must either be capable or incapable of producing cognition of itself; |
yadyekadā tadā rūpaṃ sarvadaiva hi tadbhavet // tasya yogyamayogyaṃ vā rūpaṃ yatprakṛtisthitam / | whichever [capacity] it has at one time, that form must remain forever. Its natural form, whether capable or incapable [of producing cognition], remains fixed in its original state. |
taddhrauvyādaprakampyaṃ hi ko nāma calayiṣyati // | Who indeed could shake that which is unshakeable due to its permanence? |
icchāyā racitaṃ rūpaṃ svabhāvo yasya sa tathoktaḥ, sa ādir yasyeti vigrahaḥ / ādiśabdena naṣṭājātaparigrahaḥ / | [The compound] is analyzed as "that whose nature is a form created by imagination"; the word "ādi" includes what is destroyed and what is not yet born. |
nahi tatra kalpitādiṣu sāmānyam asti, yena tannibandhanā teṣu matiḥ syāt / | Indeed, there is no universal present in such imagined things through which there could be cognition based on it. |
syād etanmābhūt kalpiteṣu sāmānyam atītājāte tu tannibandhanā buddhir bhaviṣyatīti, tadetan mithyā, na hyāśritānām ayaṃ dharmo yadāśrayamantareṇāpi tathāpi doṣa eva, kevalasya sāmānyasya grahaṇānabhyupagamāt / | [If one says:] "Let there be no universal in imagined things; but in past and unborn things, cognition will be based on it" - this is false, for it is not the nature of dependent things to exist without their substrate, and even if [they could], the problem remains, since the apprehension of a universal by itself is not accepted. |
tathācoktam "svāśrayendriyasannikarṣāpekṣapratipattikaṃ sāmānyam" iti / | Thus it has been stated: "A universal depends for its cognition on the contact between its substrate and the sense organs." |
kevalasya sāmānyasya grahaṇe sāmānyadhiyo vyaktivyavasāyo na prāpnoti vyaktes tadānīm abhāvāt / vyaktīnām idaṃ sāmānyam iti sambandhaś ca na syāt, nibandhanābhāvāt / | When the Universal alone is apprehended through a cognition of the Universal, there can be no determination of the Particular, because the Particular does not exist at that time. And there could not be any connection [expressed as] "this is the Universal of these Particulars," due to the absence of any basis [for such connection]. |
tathā hi nibandhanaṃ bhavat sambandhasya tadvyaṅgyatvaṃ vā sāmānyasya bhavet tajjanyatā, vā tadgrahaṇāpekṣagrahaṇatā vā / | For if there were to be a basis for such connection, it would have to be either [a] the Universal's being manifested by them [the Particulars], or [b] its being produced by them, or [c] its cognition being dependent upon their cognition. |
tatra na tāvat tābhir vyaṅgyatvāt tat sambaddhaṃ sāmānyaṃ, nityatayā parair anupakāryasya viśeṣābhāvād vyaṅgyatvānupapatteḥ / | First, the Universal cannot be connected [with the Particulars] through being manifested by them, because being eternal and thus not capable of being affected by others, it cannot have any specific features [produced in it], hence manifestation is impossible. |
yo hi yasyānupakārakaḥ sa tasyābhivyañjako na bhavati, yathā vindhyasya himavān / | For that which does not benefit something cannot be its manifester, just as the Himālaya is not the manifester of the Vindhya. |
tathā ca vyaktayaḥ sāmānyasyeti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdheḥ / | And thus [the proposition that] "the Particulars [manifest] the Universal" contradicts a more general principle. |
anupakārakasyāpi vyañjakatve 'tiprasaṅgaḥ, sarvaḥ sarvasya vyañjakaḥ syāt / | If something that confers no benefit could be a manifester, the unwanted consequence would be that everything would be the manifester of everything else. |
ata eva nityatayā tasyābhyupagatatvāt tāsu notpattipāratantryam iti tasya yuktam / | For this very reason, since it [the Universal] is accepted as being eternal, it cannot logically be dependent on them [the Particulars] for its production. |
kevalasyāpi grahaṇān nāpi tajjñānapāratantryam iti, trayāṇām api pakṣāṇām asambhavaḥ / | And since even the pure [Universal] can be apprehended, it cannot be dependent on them for its cognition either. Thus all three alternatives are impossible. |
tataś ca yadidam ucyate svāśrayendriyasannikarṣāpekṣapratipattikaṃ sāmānyam iti tadayuktam āśrayasyaivāyogāt, kuta stadgatendriyasannikarṣādyapekṣatā bhaviṣyati / | Therefore, when it is said that "the Universal's apprehension depends on the contact of the sense-organ with its substratum," this is incorrect because there cannot even be a substratum [for the Universal]. How then could there be any dependence on sense-organ contact with such a [non-existent] substratum? |
ādigrahaṇenātmamanaḥsannikarṣādiparigrahaḥ / | By the term 'ādi' [in the above] is included the contact between Soul and Mind and so forth. |
nityatayā parair anupādheyaviśeṣatvān nāpyasya kvacid apekṣāsti / | As [the Universal] is eternal and no specific qualities can be imposed upon it by others, it has no dependency on anything whatsoever. |
tataś ca yadi tatsvaviṣayajñānotpādanasamarthaṃ tadā sarvadaiva tajjanayet, | Therefore, if it were capable of producing cognition of itself, then it would produce it at all times; |
athāsamarthaṃ tadā na kadāpi janayet nahi tasya tadrūpaṃ samartham asamarthaṃvā tat kvacidanyathākartumīśate nityatvahāniprasaṅgāt / | And if it were incapable [of producing cognition], then it could never produce it at all; for its nature, whether capable or incapable, cannot be altered in any way, as [this would result in] the loss of its permanence. |
"tasya śaktiraśaktir vā yā svabhāvena saṃsthitā / nityatvād acikitsyasya kastāṃ kṣapayituṃ kṣama" // iti // | "Its power or powerlessness, which is established in its very nature - who could destroy that? For being eternal, it is not amenable to treatment." |
tasya pācakādibhir anaikānta iti darśayati gota ityādi / gotaścārthātnaraṃ gotvaṃ bhinnadhīviṣayatvataḥ / rūpasparśādivat tasyetyukteścaitraturaṅgavat // ityasmin vyabhicāroktiḥ pācakatvādibhis tathā / | [The author] shows its inconclusiveness through [examples like] "cook" etc., starting with "cow": "The universal 'cow-ness' is different from the cow because it is the object of a different cognition, like color and touch; and because it is spoken of as belonging to it, like Caitra's horse" - this statement is shown to be fallible through [examples like] "cook-ness" etc. |
anayā ca diśānye 'pi sarve dūṣyāḥ kuhetavaḥ // | And in this same manner, all other fallacious arguments are to be refuted. |
tathā hi pācakādibhyaḥ pācakatvāder asatyapyarthāntarabhāve pācakaḥ pācaka iti bhinnadhīviṣayatvaṃ bhavatyeva, devadattasya pācakatvam iti ca vyatirekavibhaktir bhavatītyataḥ sādhāraṇānaikāntikatā hetoḥ / | For even though there is no separate existence of "cook-ness" from cooks, there still occurs different cognitions [such as] "a cook is a cook," and there are expressions with different case endings like "Devadatta's cook-ness" - thus the reason [given by the opponent] is inconclusive because it is too general. |
anye 'pi kuhetava iti / | [These are] "other fallacious arguments." |
kumārilagaditāḥ / | [These are the arguments] stated by Kumārila. |
tatrāmī tena kuhetava uktāḥ / gopiṇḍabhedeṣu yā gobuddhiriyamekagotvanibandhanā gavābhāsatvādekākāratvāc ca / ekagopiṇḍaviṣayabuddhivat / | These are the fallacious arguments stated by him: "The cognition of 'cow' which occurs in relation to different individual cows must be based on a single [universal] cow-ness, because it manifests cow-ness and has a single form, like the cognition of a single individual cow." |
athavā yeyaṃ gobuddhiḥ sā sābaleyān na bhavati, yadvā tadvyatiriktārthālambanā, tadabhāve 'pi bhāvāt, yathā ghaṭe pārthivabuddhiḥ / | Or again, this notion of 'cow' cannot [arise] from [a particular cow like] the Sābaleya [cow], or [if it does arise, then] it must have as its object something different from that [particular cow], because it exists even in the absence of that [particular cow], just as [there exists] the notion of 'earthenness' with respect to a jar. |
piṇḍābhedeṣu gobuddhirekagotvanibandhanā / | The notion of 'cow' with respect to different individuals is based on the single universal 'cowness'. |
to 'nyālambanāpi vā / tadabhāve 'pi sadbhāvād ghaṭe pārthivabuddhivat // | Or [this notion] has a different object, because it exists even in [that particular cow's] absence, just like the notion of 'earthenness' with respect to a jar. |
pratyekaṃ kṛtsnarūpatvāt pratyekavyaktibuddhivat // pratyekasamavetāpi jātir ekaikabuddhitaḥ / | Because [the universal] exists in its complete form in each [individual], like the notion [of cowness] with respect to each individual. Even though the universal inheres in each [individual], it is [known to be] one through the single cognition [of it]. |
naṭyukteṣviva vākyeṣu brāhmaṇādinivartanam // naikarūpāmatir gotve mithyā vaktuṃ ca śakyate / nātra kāraṇadoṣo 'sti bādhakapratyayo 'pi vā // | Just as there is exclusion of [the term] 'brāhmaṇa' etc. in negative expressions. And the single-form cognition regarding cowness cannot be declared false. There is neither any defect in the cause [of this cognition] nor any contradictory cognition. |
iti / tadatra prathame sādhane tāvat sādhyavikalam udāharaṇam, ekasya gotvasyāsiddhes tannibandhanatvam ekagobuddher apyasiddham eva / | Thus. Here in the first proof, the example lacks the probandum, because since a single [universal] cowness is not established, the fact that the single cow-cognition is based on that [universal] is also not established. |
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yadi tu sākṣād vastusadālambaneti sādhyate tadānaikāntikatā / | If it is being proved that [the cognition] has a direct real basis, then [the argument] is inconclusive. |
na hyasya kiñcitparamārthato vastu sadālambanam astīti pratipāditatvāt / | Because it has [already] been established that this [cognition] does not have any real entity as its basis in the ultimate sense. |
yac ca pratyekaparisamāptārthaviṣayatvasādhanam, tatrāpi sāmānyena sādhye siddhasādhyatā pratipadārthamatadrūpaparāvṛttavasturūpādhyavasāyena pravṛttatvāt / | As for the proof regarding [the cognition's] having each individual object as its content, here too when what is to be proved concerns the universal, it proves what is [already] proven, because [the cognition] proceeds through determination of the form of an entity that excludes what is not of that form for each particular thing. |
atha nityaikapratyekaparisamāptavastubhūtasāmānyākhyapadārthaviṣayatvaṃ sādhyate tadā dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā hetoścānaikāntikatā, tathāvidhenadharmeṇa kvacid apyanvayāsiddheḥ / | If what is being proved is that [the cognition] has as its content a category called universal which is eternal, single and completely inherent in each [individual], then the example lacks what is to be proved and the reason is inconclusive, because such a property is not found to be present anywhere. |
ekasya ca sarvātmanā bahuṣu parisamāptatve sarveṣāṃ vyaktibhedānāṃ parasparamekarūpatāpattiḥ, ekavyaktipariniṣṭhitasvabhāvasāmānyapadārthasaṃspṛṣṭatvād ekavyaktirūpatvāt / | And if one [universal] is completely inherent in many in its entirety, then all individual differences would become identical to each other, because they would be connected with a universal category whose nature is established in a single individual, [and thus] would have the form of a single individual. |
sāmānyasya vānekatvāpattir yuktapadanekavastuparisamāptātmarūpatvāt, dūradeśāvasthitānekabhājanagatabilvādiphalavad ityanumānabādhā / | Or else the universal would become multiple because its nature would be completely inherent in many connected entities, like bilva and other fruits contained in many vessels located in distant places - thus [there is] contradiction through inference. |
tena yaduktam na cātra bādhakaḥ pratyayo 'stīti tadasiddham / | Therefore, what was stated - that "there is no contradicting cognition here" - is not established. |
pūrvaṃ coktatvād, vakṣyamāṇatvāc ca bādhakasya / | Because the contradiction has [already] been stated before and will also be stated later. |
yaccaikatvasādhanaṃ jāteḥ, tatrāpi jāteḥ pratyekasamavetāyā asiddhatvād ekabuddhigrāhyatvamasiddhamithyāśrayāsiddho hetuḥ / | As for the proof of the oneness of the universal, there too, because it is not established that the universal inheres in each [individual], the reason that [the universal] is grasped by a single cognition has an unestablished basis and is therefore unestablished. |
brāhmaṇādinivartanaṃ ca paramārthato naikamavastutvād iti sādhyavikalam udāharaṇam / | And the example of the exclusion of [the class] brāhmaṇa and others is devoid of what is to be proved, because it is not really one, being a non-entity. |
kālpanike caikatve sādhye siddhasādhyatā kalpitasyāpoharūpatveneṣṭatvāt / | And if the oneness being proved is [merely] conceptual, then [the argument] proves what is [already] proven, because what is conceptual is accepted [by us] in the form of exclusion [apoha]. |
yaccāpyucyate na cātra kāraṇadoṣo 'stīti tadapyasiddhameva anāderavidyāvāsanālakṣaṇasya kāraṇadoṣasya vidyamānatvāt / | And what is also stated - that "there is no defect in the cause here" - that too is not established, because there exists a defect in the cause in the form of the beginningless impressions of ignorance. |
tadevam anayā diśā kuhetavo 'mī dūṣyāḥ // | In this same manner, these false arguments are to be refuted. |
apicānekavṛttitvaṃ sāmānyasya yaducyate / | Moreover, when it is said that a universal has [the property of] subsisting in many [things]. |
tatra keyaṃ matā vṛttiḥ sthitiḥ kiṃ vyaktireva vā // | What is meant by this [term] "subsistence"? Is it staying or manifestation? |
svarūpāpracyutistāvasthitirasya svabhāvataḥ / | As regards "staying," [which means] non-deviation from its own form, this belongs to it [i.e., the universal] by its very nature. |
nādhārastatkṛtau śakto yena sthāpakatā bhavet // | The substrate is not capable of producing this [staying] in it, by which it could have the property of making [it] stay. |
gamanapratibandho 'pi na tasya badarādivat / | Also, prevention of movement does not [apply] to it [i.e., the universal], as [it does] to jujube fruits and such things. |
vidyate niṣkriyatvena nādhāro 'taḥ prakalpyate // | Because it exists as [something] motionless, therefore no substrate can be postulated. |
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