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sthitistatsamavāyaścen na tathaiva vicāryate / | If "staying" means inherence in that [substrate], [this] cannot be accepted thus, since that [inherence] itself is being examined. |
avaśyaṃ sāmānyasya bhedeṣu vṛttireṣṭavyā / | The subsistence of the universal in different [particulars] must necessarily be accepted. |
anyathā kathaṃ teṣu pratiniyamenaikākārā buddhis tannibandhanā setsyati / | Otherwise, how could there arise in regard to these [particulars] a cognition of one and the same form specifically based on that [universal]? |
tatra ca vṛttirasya bhavantī sthitilakṣaṇā vā bhavet, tadabhivyaktilakṣaṇā vā | And there, this subsistence, when it exists, would either have the characteristic of staying or the characteristic of manifestation of that [universal]. |
sthitir api dvidhā svabhāvāpracyutilakṣaṇā vā yadvādhogatipratibandhalakṣaṇā / | Moreover, staying is of two kinds: either characterized by non-deviation from its own nature, or characterized by prevention of downward movement. |
tatra na tāvad ādyā nītyatvāt svata eva svabhāvāpracyuteḥ siddhatvāt / | Of these, the first [kind of staying] is not [applicable] because, being eternal, non-deviation from its own nature is established by itself alone. |
nāpi dvitīyā amūrttasarvagatatvābhyāṃ niṣkriyatayādhogamanāsambhavādato na tat pratibandhakatvasādhāraṇaṃ yuktam / | Nor [is] the second [applicable], because due to being incorporeal and all-pervading, downward movement is impossible due to [its] motionlessness; therefore it is not reasonable to assume any prevention [of movement]. |
bhedeṣu yaḥ sāmānyasya samavāyaḥ sā sthitirityetadapyanuttaram eva, tasyaiva samavāyasya vicāryamāṇatvāt / | [The claim] that "the inherence which the universal has in different [things] is [what we mean by] staying" is also not an answer at all, because that very inherence is what is being examined. |
tathā hi apṛthaksiddhānām āśrayāśrayibhāvalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ samavāya ucyate, taccāśritatvaṃ sāmānyasya tat pratibaddhasthititayā vā bhavet, tadabhivyaṅgitayā vā itīdam eva nirūpayitumārabdham | For instance, 'inherence' (samavāya) is defined as the relation characterized by [the relationship between] sustainer and sustained that [exists] between things never found separate [from each other]; and what is being examined here is whether this being-sustained of the universal exists either through its staying being restricted [to particulars] or through its being manifested [by them]. |
nahi parasparāsaṅkīrṇātmanāmakiñcitkaram arthāntaraṃ samavāyo yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt | Indeed, in the case of things with entirely distinct natures, it is not reasonable [to postulate] 'inherence' as a separate entity that serves no purpose, as [this would lead to] an undesired consequence. |
evaṃ hi sarvaḥ sarvasya samavāyaḥ syāt, tathā hi parasparavyāvṛttaśarīrān bhāvānyaḥ saṃśleṣayati sa samavāyaḥ kalpitaḥ | For in this way, everything would inhere in everything else, since this 'inherence' has been postulated as that which combines entities that have forms distinct from each other. |
na cārthāntarasadbhāve 'pi svātmani vyavasthitāḥ parasparasvabhāvamanvāviśanti, svarūpahāniprasaṅgāt | And even when such a separate entity [i.e., inherence] exists, things established in their own nature do not enter into each other's essential nature, as [this would lead to] the consequence of losing their own form. |
tasya cārthāntarasya samavāya iti nāmakaraṇe na vivāda ityayuktam arthāntaraṃ sthitir iti | While there may be no dispute about naming that separate entity as 'inherence', it is incorrect [to say that] the 'staying' [of universals in particulars] is something separate. |
syād ādhāro jalādīnāṃ gamanapratibandhakaḥ | There may be a receptacle that prevents the downward movement of water and such things. |
agatīnāṃ kimādhāraiḥ sāmānyānāṃ prakalpitaḥ | [But] what is the use of postulating receptacles for universals, which are immobile? |
svajñānotpattiyogyatve kimabhivyaktikāraṇaiḥ | If [something] is capable of producing its own cognition, what is the use of causes of manifestation? |
svajñānotpattyayogyatve kimabhivyaktikāraṇaiḥ | If [something] is incapable of producing its own cognition, what is the use of causes of manifestation? |
hyaḥ samarthaḥ samarthātmā vyañjakaiḥ kriyate yadi / bhāvo 'sthiro bhavedevaṃ dīpavyaṅgyaghaṭādivat | If what was incapable yesterday is made capable [today] by manifesters, then the entity would become impermanent, like a jar manifested by a lamp. |
agatīnām iti / gatirahitānām | [The word] "agatīnām" [means] "of those devoid of movement." |
amūrtasarvagatatvābhyāṃ gaterabhāvāt | Due to [their] being incorporeal and all-pervading, [universals] lack movement. |
tadabhivyaktilakṣaṇāpi sthirirayuktā tathā hi tadviṣayajñānotpādanam eva tasyābhivyaktir na tu svabhāvaparipoṣaṇalakṣaṇā nityasya svabhāvānyathākranāsambhavāt, tataś ca tasya yadi svata eva jñānotpādanasāmarthyaṃ tadā kimityabhivyaktikāraṇamapekṣate / athāsāmarthyaṃ tadā parair anādheyaviṣayatvān na tadapekṣā yuktimatī | Even the staying [of universals] characterized by manifestation is unreasonable; for its manifestation is merely the production of cognition regarding it, not the characteristic of strengthening its nature, since it is impossible to alter the nature of what is eternal. Therefore, if it has the capacity to produce cognition by itself, why would it depend on a cause of manifestation? And if it lacks this capacity, then, being something into which nothing can be introduced by others, such dependence would not be reasonable. |
parair ādheyaviśeṣatve cāṅgīkriyamāṇe satyanityatvaprasaṅgaḥ, tataś ca vyaktivadevāsādhāraṇatvān na sāmānyaṃ syāt / | If [it] is accepted that specific features are introduced by others [into the Universal], then [there would be] the unwanted consequence of non-eternality, and thus, like an individual, due to [its] becoming specific, it would not be a Universal. |
bhāva iti / | [The word] "bhāva" [means the Universal]. |
bhavato 'smād abhidhānapratyayāviti kṛtvā kṛtsnā eva sāmānyapadārtha ucyate / | Since the name and notion [arise] from this [word] "bhava", the entire category of Universal is thus denoted. |
prayogaḥ yasya yasmin vṛttinibandhanaṃ na kiñcid asti na tat tasmin vartate, yathā vindhye himavān, nāsti ca sāmānyasya bhedeṣu vṛttinibandhanaṃ kiñcid itivyāpakānupalabdhiḥ // | The syllogism [is this]: Whatever has no basis for subsistence in something does not subsist in that [thing], just as the Himālaya [does not subsist] in the Vindhya; and the Universal has no basis for subsistence in the particulars - [this constitutes] the non-apprehension of the pervader. |
ghaṭādijātibhedāś ca svāśrayeṣveva bhāvinaḥ / sarvatra vṛttibhājo vā bhaveyuḥ parajātivat // | The different species-universals like 'jar' etc. must either exist only in their own substrates, or they must be present everywhere like the highest universal. |
ghaṭavādijātibhedādi / | [The phrase] "ghaṭādi" [refers to] the different species-universals like 'jar' and so forth. |
ghaṭatvapārthivatvādayaḥ sarvagatatvena varṇyamānāḥ kadācit svāśrayamātravyāpitayā varṇyeran, yad vā vyaktiśūnye 'pi deśe sarvatra bhāvād iti pakṣadvayam / | The universals like 'jarness', 'earthenness', etc., which are described as all-pervading, would either be described as pervading only their own substrates, or [they would be described] as existing everywhere, even in places devoid of individuals - these are the two alternatives. |
parajātivad iti / | [The phrase] "like the highest universal" [means the following]: |
mahāviṣayatayā sattā pare 'tyabhidhīyate / | 'Being' is called the highest [universal] because of [its] having the greatest scope. |
iyaṃ ca mahāviṣayatvamātrasāmyenaiva dṛṣṭāntīkṛtā / natu vyaktyantarālavartideśavyāpitayā, tasyā api taddharmāpratīteḥ // | And this [highest universal] is cited as an example only due to the similarity of having the greatest scope, not because [it] pervades the space occurring between individuals, as that characteristic is not perceived even in that [highest universal]. |
tatra prathame pakṣe doṣamāha tatretyādi / | With regard to the first alternative [out of the two], [the Author] sets forth the fault [by saying] "tatra" etc. |
tatra deśāntare vastuprādurbhāve kathaṃ nu te / dṛśyante vṛttibhājo vā tasminniti na gamyate // | When a thing comes into existence in another place, it is not understood how those [universals] are perceived there or how they obtain subsistence therein. |
ghaṭādivyaktiśūnye deśe ghaṭādivastuprādurbhāve sati te jātibhedā ghaṭatvādayaḥ kathaṃ tatra ghaṭādau dṛśyante vartante ceti na gamyate nāvabudhyataiti yāvat // | When in a place entirely devoid of individual jars etc., a jar or similar thing comes into existence, it is not understood – that is, it is not comprehended – how those different universals like jarness etc. come to be perceived in that jar etc. or [how they] subsist [in it]. |
kathamityāha nahītyādi / | [The Author] explains "how" [this is so by saying] "na hi" etc. |
na hi tena sahotpannā nityatvān nāpyavasthitāḥ / tatra prāgavibhutvena nacāyāntyanyato 'kriyāḥ // | [The universals] neither arise together with it [i.e. the jar] because they are eternal, nor were they already present there because of [their] non-pervasiveness, nor do they come from elsewhere because they are devoid of motion. |
tathā hi yadi ghaṭādinā vyaktibedena sahotpannās te bhaveyuḥ prāg vā tatrāvasthitāḥ syur anyato vā deśāntarād āgaccheyus tadā tatra dṛśyeran varteran vā / | For if they would either arise together with the different individual jars etc., or would have been present there before, or would come from another place, then they could be perceived there or could subsist [there]. |
yāvatā na teṣām utpādo nityatvāt, nāpi prāgavasthānaṃ sarvavyāpitvāt nāpyanyadeśādāgamanamakriyatvāt, tat kathaṃ teṣu teṣāṃ vṛttir upalabdhir vā bhavet / | However, there can be no origination of them because of [their] eternality, nor prior presence because of [their] non-pervasiveness, nor coming from another place because of [their] immobility, so how could their subsistence or perception occur in those [things]? |
prayogaḥ ye yatra notpannā nāpi prāgavasthāyino nāpi paścād anyato deśādāgatimantas te tatra nopalabhyante nāpi vartante, yathā śaśaśirasi tadviṣāṇam, tathāca sāmānyaṃ tacchūnyadeśotpādavati ghaṭādike vastunīti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ / | The formal argument [is as follows]: Those things which in a certain place are neither produced, nor pre-existent, nor subsequently coming from another place, are neither perceived there nor do they subsist [there] – like a horn on a hare's head; and thus [it is with] a universal in respect to a thing like a jar which comes into existence in a place previously devoid of it – [this is] non-perception of the pervader. |
na cāyam anaikāntiko hetuḥ, tatra vṛttyupalambhayoḥ prakārāntarābhāvāt // | And this reason is not inconclusive, because there is no other way for [their] subsistence and perception there. |
svāśrayendriyayogāder ekasmiṃstadgrahe sati / sarvatraivopalabhyeraṃstatsvarūpāvibhāgataḥ // | When the contact between its substrate and the sense organ etc. exists [and] brings about its cognition in one [place], [the universals] would be perceived everywhere due to their nature being undivided. |
svāśrayendriyasaṃyogādeḥ upalambhahetoḥ | [Due to] the contact between sense organs and their substrates, etc., [which are] the causes of perception. |
ādiśabdenātmamanaḥsannikarṣādiparigrahaḥ | By the word "ādi" [is meant] the inclusion of the contact between the soul and mind, etc. |
ekasmin vyaktibhede teṣāṃ jātibhedānāṃ grahaṇe sati sarvatraiva vijātīye 'pi vyaktibhede 'ntarāle copalabhyeran teṣāṃ yathāsvamekarūpatayā pratyekaṃ gṛhītarūpāvyatirekāt | When these universals are perceived in one particular individual, they should be perceived in all other [individuals], even heterogeneous ones, and in the interval [between them], because their respective uniform natures cannot differ from what has been perceived. |
etad eva spaṣṭayann āha jñātādityādi | Explaining this very [point], he states [the verse beginning with] "jñātāt." |
jñātādavyatiriktaṃ cet tasyāpi grahaṇaṃ bhavet | If [the universal] is non-different from what has been perceived, then there should be perception of that [universal] also. |
tadvadeva na vā tasya grahaṇaṃ bheda eva vā | Or like that [first case], there should be no perception of it, or there must be a difference. |
tathā hi dṛṣṭavyaktisamavetasāmānyarūpād vijñātādavyatiriktaṃ ced vyaktyantarālavarti sāmānyarūpaṃ tadā tasyāpi grahaṇaṃ bhavet gṛhītād abhinnatvāt gṛhītasvarūpavat | That is, if the form of the universal residing in the intervals between individuals is non-different from the form of the universal inherent in the perceived individual, then that [former universal] should also be perceived, because of [its] non-difference from what is perceived, just like the form that has been perceived. |
atha tasya grahaṇaṃ na bhavati tathāsatyagṛhītarūpāvyatirekāt tad dṛṣṭavyaktisamavāyino 'pi grahaṇaṃ na syāt | If, however, there is no perception of that [universal], then, due to [its] non-difference from the unperceived form, there should also be no perception of the [universal] inherent in the perceived individual. |
athobhayarūpatāṅgikriyata tadā svabhāvabhedaprasaṅgaḥ, parasparaviruddhadharmādhyāsāt | If both forms are accepted, then there would be the unwanted consequence of a difference in essential nature, due to the superimposition of mutually contradictory properties. |
na hyanyonyapratyanīkagrahaṇāgrahaṇadharmādhyāsitam api sadekam iti yuktamabhidhātuṃ svacchacetasaḥ atiprasaṅgāt | For it is not reasonable for a clear-minded person to call something "one" when it is characterized by mutually contradictory properties of perceptibility and imperceptibility, as this would lead to [unwanted] over-extension. |
evaṃ hi viśvam ekam eva dravyaṃ syāt, tataś ca sahotpādavināśādiprasaṅgaḥ, anyathaikam iti nāmamātram eva syāt, naca nāmni vivādaḥ // | In such a case the entire universe would be a single substance, and this would lead to the absurd consequence of simultaneous origination and destruction [of everything]; otherwise it would be "one" in name only, and there can be no dispute regarding mere names. |
nānyakalpitajātibhyo vṛkṣādipratyayā ime / | These notions of "tree" and such [things] cannot [arise] from the universals postulated by others, |
kramitvānugamādibhyaḥ pācakādidhiyo yathā // | because [they appear] in succession and are comprehensive, just like the notions of "cook" and similar [terms]. |
nityasyājanakatvaṃ ca bādhakaṃ sampratīyate / | And [the fact that] what is eternal cannot be productive [of effects] is recognized as invalidating [the opponent's view]. |
saṃyogadūṣaṇe sarvaṃ yadevoktaṃ prabādhakam // | All that was stated as refuting [the theory of] conjunction serves equally as invalidating [here]. |
ye kramitvānugāmitvavastutvotpattimattvādidharmopetās te paraparikalpitanityaikasarvagatasāmānyato na bhavanti, yathā pācakādipratyayāḥ tathācāmī vṛkṣādipratyayā iti viruddhavyāptopalabdhiḥ / | [Those] notions which possess the properties of succession, comprehensiveness, entityness, being produced and so forth cannot arise from an eternal, single, all-pervading universal as conceived by others - just as [in the case of] notions of "cook" etc., so too [with] these notions of "tree" etc. - this is the perception of contradictory pervasion. |
nityatābhāvaviruddhānityatābhāvena kramitvāder vyāptatvāt / | Because succession etc. are pervaded by non-eternality, which contradicts eternality. |
nityasya ca kramākramābhyām arthakriyāvirodhān nānaikāntikatā hetoḥ / | And because what is eternal conflicts with effective action, whether successive or simultaneous, there is no inconclusiveness of the reason. |
dṛṣṭāntasya ca sādhyāvikalatāyāḥ pūrvaṃ vistareṇa prasādhitatvānnāsiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ / | And since the [alleged] lack of the probandum in the example has been thoroughly refuted earlier, the example is not unestablished. |
bādhakāntaram apyāha saṃyogetyādi / | [The author] states another invalidating argument with "[regarding] conjunction" etc. |
tatra saṃyogadūṣaṇe bādhakamuktam "ekasyānekavṛttiś ca na yukteti prabādhaka"mityanena / | The objection [against this] has been stated in the refutation of conjunction through the statement "that one [thing] cannot subsist in many [things] serves as a refutation." |
yathācānekatraikasya vṛttir na yuktā, tathāvayavidūṣaṇe "taddhyekavṛttibhājetyādinā pradarśitā" // | Just as the subsistence of one [thing] in many [places] is not possible, so [this point] has been shown in the refutation of the composite whole through [the statement] beginning with "that which possesses one subsistence..." |
evam ityādinopasaṃharati | [The author] concludes with "thus" and so forth. |
evam ekāntato bhinnajātireṣā nirākṛtā / | Thus has been rejected this universal [which is supposedly] entirely different [from its particulars]. |
jaiminīyābhyupetā tu syād vāde pratiṣetsyate // | However, the [universal] accepted by the followers of Jaimini will be refuted in the [chapter on] syādvāda. |
yair vaiśeṣikādibhir vyaktito jātir ekāntabhinneṣṭā teṣām idaṃ dūṣaṇam uktam / | This refutation has been stated against those Vaiśeṣikas and others who maintain that the universal is entirely different from [its] particulars. |
ye punar abhinnām ubhayarūpāṃ ca jātim icchanti jainajaiminīyasāṅkhyādayaḥ tadupavarṇitā jātiḥ prastāvāt syād vāde niṣetsyate / | As for those who maintain that the universal is non-different [from particulars] and of both forms – the Jainas, followers of Jaimini, Sāṃkhyas and others – that described universal will be refuted in due context in the [chapter on] syādvāda. |
iha tu vaiśeṣikanaiyāyikopakalpitāyā jāteḥ prastutatvān na dūṣyate prastāvābhāvād iti bhāvaḥ // | Here, however, since the universal postulated by the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣikas is under discussion, [the other view] is not refuted due to lack of contextual relevance – this is the meaning. |
iti sāmānyaparīkṣā // | Thus ends the examination of the universal. |
ye punaḥ kalpitā ete viśeṣā antya bhāvinaḥ / | These ultimate individualities which have been postulated [by others]... |
nityadravyavyapohena te 'pyasambhavitāḥ kṣaṇāḥ // | Through the rejection of eternal substances, those moments too are impossible. |
yattāvannityadravyavṛttitvamantyadravyabhāvitvaṃ ca viśeṣāṇāṃ lakṣaṇam uktaṃtadasambhavadoṣaduṣṭatvād alakṣaṇam eva nahi nityaṃ kiñciddravyam asti tasya pūrvaṃ dravyaparīkṣāyāṃ vyapoḍhatvāt, tat kathaṃ tadvṛttittvam eṣāṃ siddhyet // | That which has been stated as the definition of individualities - [namely] their subsistence in eternal substances and their existence in ultimate substances - is not a [valid] definition at all due to being flawed by the fault of impossibility, for there exists no eternal substance, since that has been rejected earlier in the examination of substance; so how could their subsistence in that [eternal substance] be established? |
yadapi yogināṃ viśeṣapratyayabalāt sattvam eṣāṃ sādhyate, tatrāpyanaikāntikateti darśayati aṇvākāśadigādīnām ityādi / | And even if their existence is established through the force of the yogins' cognition of particulars, [the author] shows that this too is inconclusive by [stating] "of atoms, space, etc." |
aṇvākāśadigādīnām asaṅkīrṇaṃ yadā sthitam / svarūpaṃ ca tadaitasmād vailakṣaṇyopalakṣaṇam // | When the intrinsic nature of atoms, space, and other [things] is established as unmixed, then from this [comes] the apprehension of their distinctness. |
nānyabhāve 'pyavibhrāntaṃ vailakṣaṇyopalaṣaṇam // | Even in the absence of others, the apprehension of distinctness is not confused. |
kathaṃ teṣu viśeṣeṣu vailakṣaṇyopalakṣaṇam / | How [does one arrive at] the apprehension of distinctness among those particulars? |
svata eveti cennaivamaṇvādāvapi kiṃ matam // | If [you say] "by themselves," then why is this not accepted for atoms and other [things] as well? |
tathā aṇvādīnāṃ rūpaṃ svasvabhāvāvasthānāt parasparamasaṅkīrṇaṃ vābhavet, miśrībhūtaṃ vā / | Thus the form of atoms and other [things] may either be unmixed with each other due to maintaining their own nature, or mixed. |
yadyādyaḥ kalpas tadā svata evāsaṅkīrṇavastūpalambhāt teṣu yogināṃ parasparavailakṣaṇyabuddhir bhaviṣyatīti vyarthā viśeṣāntarakalpanā / | If [it is] the first alternative, then since unmixed things are apprehended by themselves alone, the yogins will have cognition of their mutual distinctness, [and thus] the assumption of additional particulars is pointless. |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā katham iva viśeṣākhyapadārthāntarasannidhāne 'pi teṣu parasparavyatibhinnasvabhāveṣu vilakṣaṇaṃ jñānaṃ yoginām abhrāntamutpadyate bhrāntam eva tat syād atismiṃstathāvṛttatvāt / | If the second alternative [is accepted], then how could the yogins' cognition of distinctness arise without error even in the presence of another category called "particulars," when [the things] have mutually different natures? That [cognition] would indeed be erroneous, because it occurs in that way. |
tataścāyogina eva syuḥ, bhrāntajñānasaṃsargitvād iti bhāvaḥ / | [They] would therefore not be true yogins, due to being associated with erroneous knowledge. |
kiṃ ca yadi viśeṣākhyapadārthāntaramantareṇa vilakṣaṇā dhīr na jāyate tat kathaṃ teṣveva viśeṣeṣu vilakṣaṇā dhīr bhavati, nahi teṣvapare viśeṣāḥ santyanavasthāprasaṅgāt / | Moreover, if distinct cognition cannot arise without a separate category called "viśeṣa" [Ultimate Particularity], then how could distinct cognition arise regarding these viśeṣas themselves? For there cannot be other viśeṣas in them, as [this would lead to] infinite regress. |
nityadravyavṛttayo 'ntyā iti cābhyupagamahāniprasaṅgāc ca, viśeṣeṣvapi vṛtteḥ / | And [it would lead to] the consequence of contradicting [their own] accepted doctrine that [viśeṣas] are ultimate [entities] inhering in eternal substances, since [other viśeṣas] would [then] inhere in viśeṣas as well. |
ataḥ svata evaiṣāṃ parasparavailakṣaṇyam atihetutvam aṅgīkriyate tadā paramāṇvādīnām api taddhetutvaṃ svata evāstu ko hyatra teṣu pradveṣo yena teṣāṃ svata eva parasparavyāvṛttamūrtinām api satāṃ paramāṇvādīnāṃ parasparavailakṣaṇyajñānotpattihetutvaṃ neṣyate viśeṣāṇāṃ tviṣyata iti / | Therefore, if it is accepted that their mutual distinctness is self-established, then let the atoms etc. also have this [distinctness] self-established - for what is this aversion towards them, due to which their capacity to produce cognition of mutual distinctness is not accepted for atoms etc., even though they have mutually exclusive forms by their very nature, while it is accepted for viśeṣas? |
nātra kiñcit kāraṇamutpaśyāmo 'nyatra jāḍyāt // | We do not see any reason for this except stupidity. |
svata evāśucitvaṃ hi śvamāṃsāder yathā sthitam / tadyogādapareṣāṃ tu tathehāpi yadīṣyate // | Just as impurity exists inherently in dog's flesh and [comes] to other things through contact with it, so also it is maintained in this case. |
yathā prakāśako dīpo ghaṭādeś ca svataḥ sthitaḥ / | Just as a lamp is inherently an illuminator and [illuminates] the jar etc. [through contact], |
tat prakāśātmatāyāṃ ca niyato 'yam idaṃ tathā // | So also in this case, this [refers to] the jar, and that [refers to] the fixed [nature] of being luminous. |
sa hyāha yathā śvamāṃsādīnāṃ, svata evāśucitvaṃ tadyogāccānyeṣāṃ tathehāpi tādāmtyādantyeṣu viśeṣeṣu svata eva vyāvṛttipratyayahetutvaṃ, tadyogāt paramāṇuṣu / | For he says: just as impurity belongs inherently to dog's flesh and [comes] to other things through contact with it, similarly in this case too, the capacity to cause the cognition of distinctness belongs inherently to the ultimate viśeṣas, and [comes] to atoms through contact with them. |
kiñcātadātmakeṣvapyanyanimittaḥ pratyayo bhavatyeva, yathā ghaṭādiṣu pradīpāt, natu pradīpeṣu dhaṭādibhya iti / | Moreover, even in things that do not have that nature, cognition arises through other causes - just as [cognition] of jars etc. [arises] from a lamp, but not [cognition] of lamps from jars. |
ghaṭādiḥ / | [The word] ayam [refers to] the jar etc. |
idaṃ tatheti vailakṣaṇyopalakṣaṇaṃ, viśeṣebhya evāṇvādīnāṃ viśeṣāṇāṃ svata evetyarthaḥ // | "So also in this case" refers to distinctness - meaning that the distinctness of atoms etc. [comes] from viśeṣas, while [the distinctness] of viśeṣas is inherent. |
nanu cetyādinā pratividhatte | [Now] this is answered by [beginning with] "nanu ca" [in the following verses] |
nanu cāśucibhāvo 'yaṃ sāṃvṛto na tu tāttvikaḥ | Indeed, this unclean nature is [merely] conventional, not real |
tat svayaṃ parato vāyaṃ kathaṃ nāma bhaviṣyati | How then could it possibly exist either intrinsically or through [something] else? |
athavā bhāvikatve 'pi śvamāṃsādivaśādime jāyante 'śucayo bhāvā naiva nityā ajanmataḥ | Or even if [uncleanness] were real, things become unclean due to [contact with] dog's flesh and so forth, [but] eternal [entities] never [become unclean] because they cannot be born [i.e., undergo change] |
pradīpādiprabhāvāc ca jñānotpādasvarūpatāṃ labhante kṣaṇikā hyarthāḥ kalaśābharaṇādayaḥ | Through the influence of lamps and such, momentary objects like jars, ornaments and so forth acquire the nature of producing cognitions |
na vivādāspadībhūtaviśeṣabalabhāvinī vailakṣaṇyamatis teṣu kramotpatteḥ sukhādivat | The cognition of distinction regarding these [objects] does not arise through the power of the disputed particular qualities, since it arises gradually like pleasure and so forth |
aśucitvam hi nāma bhāvānāṃ kalpanoparacitaṃ na pāramārthikam anavasthitatvāt | Indeed, the so-called uncleanness of things is constructed by imagination, not ultimately real, due to its lack of fixity |
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