buddhist-nlp/tatpa-cleaned · Datasets at Hugging Face

sanskrit stringlengths 2 508	english stringlengths 2 924 ⌀
tathā hi yadeva dravyaṃ kasyacic chrotriyāder aśucitvenābhāti tad evānyasya kauṭikādeḥ śucitvena na caikasya parasparapratyanīkarūpasampāto yukta ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt	For the very same substance that appears as unclean to someone like a Vedic scholar appears as clean to another like a hunter, and it is not reasonable for contradictory forms to combine in one [thing], as that would result in the loss of its unity
athā bhavatu bhāvikam aśucitvaṃ bhāvānāṃ tathāpi nedaṃ dṛṣṭāntena samam	Let it be granted that uncleanness of things is real; even so, this is not equivalent to the example
tathā hi śvamāṃsādikāśucidravyasamparkād annādayo bhāvāḥ parityaktapūrvaśucisvabhāvā anya evāśucayo jāyante	For when things like food grains come into contact with unclean substances like dog's flesh, they abandon their previous clean nature and are born anew as different, unclean [entities]
ato yuktam eṣāṃ paropādhikam aśucitvam /	Hence it is appropriate that their impurity is [something] dependent on external conditions.
natvevaṃ kiñcit paramāṇvādiṣu nibandhanam asti, yenaiṣāṃ paropādhikaṃ vailakṣaṇyaṃ bhavet tathā, nityatvād evājanmato 'nutpatteḥ /	But there is no such basis in [the case of] atoms and other [eternal substances] by which such an externally conditioned distinctiveness could arise in them, because due to their eternality they cannot originate [with new properties].
evaṃ pradīpadṛṣṭānte 'pi ghaṭādīnāṃ jñānotpattihetutvaṃ paropādhikaṃ yojyam /	Similarly, in the example of the lamp too, the property of being a cause of cognition for jars and other [objects] should be understood as dependent on external conditions.
netyādinā viśeṣāṇāṃ bādhakaṃ pramāṇam āha tasyāpi pūrvavat svarūpaṃ pratibandhaś ca vācyaḥ //	With [the word] "no" etc. [the text] states the refuting proof regarding the particulars; its nature and its logical connection must be stated as before.
iti viśeṣaparīkṣā //	Thus [ends] the examination of particulars.
KAPITEL SAMAVAAYAPADAARTHAPARIIK.SAA	[Chapter on] the examination of the category of inherence.
samavāyadūṣaṇārtham āha tantuṣvityādi /	For the purpose of refuting inherence, [the text] states "in threads" etc.
tantuṣveva paṭo 'mīṣu vīraṇeṣu kaṭaḥ punaḥ /	[Just as] the cloth [inheres] in threads, and the mat [inheres] in these reeds.
ityādīhamater bhāvāt samavāyo 'vagamyate //	From the existence of such locative cognitions, inherence is understood.
ayutāsiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām ihabuddhihetur yaḥ sambandhaḥ sa samavāyaḥ, sa cāyam iha tantuṣu paṭa ityādīhabuddhiviśeṣato dravyādibhyo 'rthāntaratvenāvagamyate /	Inherence is that relation which is the cause of the locative cognition regarding [things] that are inseparably established as the contained and container, and this [relation] is understood as something different from substances etc. through the specific locative cognition such as "the cloth [is] here in the threads."
yathāhi sattādravyatvādīnāṃ svādhāreṣvātmānurūpapratyayakartṛtvāt svāśrayādibhyaḥ parasparataścārthāntarabhāvas	Just as sattā (existence), dravyatva (substanceness) and other [universals] produce cognitions conforming to their nature in their respective substrates and are distinct entities from their substrates and from each other
iha tantuṣu paṭaḥ, iha dravye guṇakarmaṇī, iha dravye dravyatvam, iha guṇeṣu guṇatvam, iha karmaṇi karmatvam, iha dravyeṣvantyā viśeṣā ityādipratyayadarśanāt pañcabhyaḥ padarthebhyo 'rthāntaratvaṃgamyate	From seeing cognitions such as "the cloth [inheres] in these threads," "qualities and actions [inhere] in this substance," "substanceness [inheres] in this substance," "qualityness [inheres] in these qualities," "motionness [inheres] in this motion," "the ultimate particulars [inhere] in these substances," etc., it is understood that [inherence] is distinct from the five categories
prayogaḥ yo yeṣu yadākāravilakṣaṇaḥ pratyayaḥ sa tadarthāntaranibandhanaḥ yathā devadatte daṣḍīti pratyayaḥ	The logical formulation is: Whatever cognition appears with respect to certain things in a form different from them must be based on something distinct from them, just as the cognition "stick-bearer" with respect to Devadatta
tathācāyaṃ pañcasu padārtheṣvihapratyaya iti svabhāvahetuṃ manyate	And similarly this cognition of "inherence in" with respect to the five categories is considered to be a natural reason [for inherence's distinctness]
tasyābhāve sa cetkiṃ hi mater asyā nibandhanam	If that [inherence] did not exist, what indeed would be the basis of this cognition?
na viśeṣamatir dṛṣṭā nimittāntaravarjitā	No particular cognition is seen without a specific cause
ihabuddhyaviśeṣāc ca yogavan na vibhidyate	And due to the non-difference of the cognition "in this," [inherence] does not differ [in different cases] like conjunction
sarvasmin bhāvavatveṣa eka eva pratīyate	This [inherence] is cognized as one and the same in everything, just like existence
kāraṇānupalabdheś ca nityo bhāvavadeva saḥ	And because no cause [for its production] is apprehended, it is eternal just like existence
na hyasya kāraṇaṃ kiñcit pramāṇenopalabhyate	For no cause of this [inherence] is apprehended by any means of valid cognition
nibandhanamantareṇa bhavato nityaṃ sattādiprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam	Without [some] basis, there would be the unwanted consequence of eternally [cognizing] existence etc. - this is the refuting proof
evaṃ tāvad vaiśeṣikāṇāṃ matena ihabuddhiliṅgānumeyāḥ samavāyaḥ naiyāyikamatena tu ihabuddhipratyakṣagamya eva	Thus according to the Vaiśeṣika view, inherence is inferred from the sign of the cognition "in this," while according to the Naiyāyika view it is directly perceptible through the cognition "in this"
tathā hi te akṣavyāpāre satīha tantuṣu paṭa ityādipratyayotpatteḥ pratyakṣatvamācakṣate	For they [the Naiyāyikas] declare its perceptibility from the fact that when the sense organ is functioning, cognitions arise such as "the cloth [inheres] in these threads"
sa cāyaṃ samāvāyo yathā saṃyogaḥ sambandheṣu bhinnas tathā nāyaṃ bhidyate kiṃ tarhibhāvavat sattāvat talliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāt sarvatraika eva samavāyaḥ	And this inherence does not differ [in different cases] as conjunction differs among relations, but rather like existence or being it is one and the same everywhere, because its indicative sign [the cognition "in this"] is non-different and there is no sign of difference
akāraṇatvāc ca bhāvavadeva nityaḥ siddhaḥ, akāraṇatvaṃ ca pramāṇataḥ kāraṇānupalabdheḥ siddham //	[Samavāya,] having no cause, is established as eternal just like 'existence'; and [its] having no cause is established through [valid] means of cognition due to the non-perception of [any] cause.
tadetad ityādinā dūṣaṇamārabhate	[The author] begins the refutation with [the words] "tadetad" etc.
svasiddhāntānurāgeṇa na dṛṣṭaṃ laukikaṃ tu tat //	That [notion of inherence] is not found in ordinary experience, [but exists only] due to attachment to their own doctrine.
tadanena hetor āśrayasiddhatām āha iha tantuṣu paṭa ityādikā hi dhiyaḥ svasiddhāntānurāgopakalpitā eva /	By this [statement], he points out that the reason has the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha, for such cognitions as "the cloth [inheres] in these threads" are merely constructed through attachment to one's own doctrine.
natu loke tathotpadyamānāḥ saṃvedyanta ityataḥ sādhyadharmī na siddhaḥ //	But [such cognitions] are not experienced as arising in that way in ordinary life; therefore, the subject of the probandum is not established.
nānātvetyādinā tāmeva dharmyasiddhiṃ samarthayate	With [the words] beginning with "nānātve," he supports that very same non-establishment of the subject.
nānātvalakṣaṇe hi syād ādhārādheyabhūtayoḥ / idam atreti vijñānaṃ kuṇḍādau śrīphalādivat //	For the cognition "this [is] in that" occurs only when there is a characteristic of distinctness between container and contained, as with bel fruits in a pot.
naiva tantupaṭādīnāṃ nānātvenopalakṣaṇam /	There is indeed no perception of distinctness between cloth, threads, and so forth.
yayor hi nānātvamupalakṣitaṃ bhavet tayor evādhārādheyabhāve satīhabuddhirudbhavanti loke dṛṣṭā yatheha, kuṇḍe śrīphalānīti, naca tantupaṭayor nānātvamupalakṣitaṃ vidyate, ca tat kathaṃ tatrehabuddhir bhavet //	For only when distinctness is perceived between two things does the notion of container and contained arise in ordinary experience, as in [the case of] "bel fruits [are] in the pot"; and since no distinctness is perceived between cloth and threads, how could there be such a notion [of inherence] in that case?
syād etad yadi nāmāsmābhiḥ siddhāntabalād upakalpiteyam ihamatis tathāpyasyā bhavadbhir nibandhanaṃ vaktavyam ity āha svecchetyādi /	[Someone] might say this: "Even if this notion has been assumed by us based on the strength of [our] established doctrine, still you must explain its basis." Thus [the author] speaks beginning with "svecchā."
svecchayā racite vāsmin kalpiteṣviva vastuṣu / na kāraṇaniyogo 'yaṃ paraṃ pratyupapadyate //	In the case of this [notion] constructed by mere whim, just as in the case of imagined things, it is not appropriate to demand [from] another person [the explanation of] its cause.
yo hi yatkāraṇam eva necchati sa kathaṃ kāryaṃ svayam upakalpya tatkāraṇaṃ paryanuyujyate	For how can one who does not wish [to accept] any cause be questioned about the cause of an effect that he himself has assumed?
ātmaiva hi bhavatā paryanuyoktavyaḥ, yenedaṃ kāryamupakalpitamitamicchāvaśāt, naivecchānāṃ vastusvabhāvānurodhaḥ	Indeed, you must question yourself, by whom this effect has been assumed under the influence of [mere] whim, [for] whims do not conform to the nature of real things.
tathā hi bhavadupakalpitasyāpi hi vastunaḥ kaiścidanyathāpi kalpayituṃ śakyatvāt	For indeed, even what has been assumed by you could be imagined differently by others.
vṛkṣe śākhāḥ śilāścāga ityeṣā laukikī matiḥ /	This is the ordinary cognition: "[There are] branches in the tree, and stones in the mountain."
agākhyapariśiṣṭāṅganairantaryopalambhanāt // tau punas tāsviti jñānaṃ lokātikrāntamucyate /	This cognition arises from the perception of continuity with the remaining parts of what is called "mountain" [and tree]; but [the notion that] these [branches and stones] are in them [through inherence] is said to transcend ordinary experience.
ghaṭe rūpaṃ kriyādīti tādātmyaṃ tvavagacchati //	But [the cognition] "color in the pot" or "action [in the pot]" apprehends identity.
rūpakumbhādiśabdā hi sarvāvasthābhidhāyakāḥ /	For words like "color" and "pot" denote [things] in all [their] states.
tadviśeṣābhidhānāya tathā te viniveśitāḥ // tānāścityaiṣu vijñānaṃ tenākāreṇa vartate / samavāyān na bhedasya sarveṣām apyanīkṣaṇāt //	They are arranged in that way to express their particulars; the cognition occurs in that form due to those [particulars], not due to inherence, because no distinction among all [these things] is perceived.
vṛkṣe śākhāḥ parvate śilā ityevaṃ loke dṛśyate, natu śākhāyāṃ vṛkṣaḥ śilāsu parvata iti	In ordinary life, such notions are observed as "the branches in the tree" [and] "the stones in the mountain," but not [notions] such as "the tree in the branches" [or] "the mountain in the stones."
sāpi ca vṛkṣe śākhetyādikā matir na samavāyavaśāt, kintu agākhyāni yāni pariśiṣṭāni vivakṣitaśākhāśilāvyatiriktānyadhovyavasthitāni skandhādīnyaṅgāni, teṣāṃ nairantyopalambhāt	Moreover, that notion of "branches in the tree" etc. is not due to inherence, but due to the perception of continuity with those parts called "immovables" which are the remaining parts situated below, such as the trunk etc., [which are] different from the branches and stones being discussed.
agaśabdenātra na gacchantīti kṛtvā taravo girayaścābhipretāḥ	Here, by the term "immovables" trees and mountains are meant, because they do not move.
tāviti agavṛkṣau	"Those two" [refers to] the immovable [and] the tree.
tāsviti śilāśākhāsu	"In these" [refers to] in the stones and branches.
yattarhīdamiha ghaṭe rūparasagandhasparśāścalanaṃ cetyādi loke prasiddhaṃ jñānaṃ tasya samavāyaṃ muktvā ko 'nyo viṣaya ity āha ghaṭa ityādi	[When asked:] "What then could be the basis, other than inherence, for this well-known notion among people such as 'color, taste, smell, touch, and movement in the jar'?" [The answer] begins with [the word] "jar."
tādāmtyam ghaṭasvabhāvaṃ rūpaṃ na ghaṭādyātmakam ity arthaḥ	The meaning is that identity [means] the color has the nature of the jar, [but] is not identical with the jar and so forth.
bahuṣu rūpādiṣu sādhāraṇaśaktiviśeṣapratipādanecchayā tadanyarūpādivyavacchedena ghaṭādiśruter niveśaḥ	When there is a desire to express specific common powers among many qualities like color etc., the term "jar" etc. is employed to distinguish [these qualities] from other colors etc.
rūpādiśrutis tu pratyekamasādhāraṇacakṣur vijñānādikāryanirvartanasāmarthyadyotanāya niveśite	The terms "color" etc. are each employed to indicate their unique capacity to produce visual cognition and other effects.
tyato ghaṭādiśrutī rūpādibhedānakṣipatīti sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvād vaiyadhikaraṇyenaiva tādātmyaṃ pratipādyate	Therefore, since the term "jar" etc. implies differences in color etc., due to the absence of co-ordination, identity is expressed through different substrata.
ubhayos tu kimarthaṃ prayoga	"Why then are both [terms] used?"
rūpādiṣabdā hi sarvāvasthasya rūpāder vācakāḥ	For the terms "color" etc. denote color etc. in all conditions.
tathā hi yathā ghaṭātmanāvasthitarūpādi rūpādītyucyate tathā paṭādyātmanāvasthitam api	For just as color etc. existing in the form of a jar is called "color" etc., so too is [color] existing in the form of cloth etc.
tataś ca kevalebhyo rūpādiśabdebhyo na viśeṣaḥ pratīyate kimavasthā rūpādaya iti	And therefore from the mere terms "color" etc., no particular [instance] is understood [regarding] in what condition the colors etc. [exist].
ghaṭe rūpādaya ityevaṃ tu prayoge ghaṭātmakās ta iti paṭādivyavacchedena pratīyante	But when used in the expression "colors etc. in the jar," they are understood as having the nature of the jar, distinguished from [those] in cloth etc.
tathā ghaṭaśabdo 'pi sarvāvasthaṃ ghaṭaṃ brūte śuklaṃ pītaṃ calaṃ niścalamityādikam	Similarly, the word "jar" also expresses the jar in all conditions, [such as] white, yellow, moving, stationary, etc.
ataḥ kevalān na viśeṣapratītiḥ ghaṭe śuklaṃ rūpam ityādiprayoge tu tadanyarūpādivyavacchedena pratipattir bhavati	Therefore, from [the term] alone there is no understanding of the particular, but in expressions like "white color in the jar," understanding occurs through distinction from other colors etc.
tataś ca tasyaivambhūtasya viśeṣasyābhidhānāya yathā tathā ghaṭe rūpam iti te niveśitāḥ	And therefore, they are employed in expressions like "color in the jar" to denote such particulars.
śabdā iti śeṣaḥ /	[The word] śabda [remains to be supplied, this is] the remainder.
tān śabdānāśrityaiṣu ghaṭādiṣu tenākāreṇa ghaṭe rūpam ityādinā pravartate jñānaṃ natu samavāyamāśritya vartata iti sambandhaḥ /	Knowledge proceeds depending on those words with regard to these [things] like jars in the form "the color [is] in the jar" and so on, but it does not proceed depending on inherence - this is the connection.
atra kāraṇam āha bhedasyetyādi /	Here [the text] states the reason [beginning with] "of the distinction" and so forth.
nahi samavāyaghaṭarūpādīnāṃ sarveṣāṃ parasparato bheda upalabhyate /	For no mutual distinction is perceived among inherence, jar, color and the rest.
etena hetor anaikāntikatvaṃ pratijñāyāścānumānādibādhitatvam uktam //	By this both the inconclusiveness of [the opponent's] reason and the invalidation of [his] thesis by inference etc. is stated.
yadyekaḥ samavāyaḥ syāt sarveṣveva ca vastuṣu /	If there were one [and the same] inherence in all things,
gajādiṣvapi gotvādi samastītyanuṣajyate / tato gavādirūpatvam amīṣāṃ śāvaleyavat //	Then it would follow that cowness etc. exists even in elephants etc., [and] therefore these [elephants etc.] would have the form of cows etc., like a brindled cow.
paṭatantuṣu yo 'stīti samavāyāt pratīyate /	What is cognized through inherence as "existing in threads of cloth"
asti cāsau kapāleṣu tasyeti na tatheti kim //	And that [same inherence] exists in potsherds - why is there not [cognition] like that?
nāśritaḥ sa kapāle cen nanu tantuṣvapīṣyate / āśritaḥ samavāyena sa kapāle 'pi nāsti kim //	If [you say] it is not present in the potsherd, then surely it is desired [to be present] in threads too - being present through inherence, is it not present in the potsherd too?
tantor yaḥ samavāyo hi paṭasyetyabhidhīyate /	For what is called the inherence of cloth in threads
sa ghaṭasya kapāleṣu taddhīranavadhir bhavet //	[Would be] the same as [the inherence] of the pot in potsherds, therefore it would be unlimited.
yadyekastrailokye samavāyaḥ syāt tadā kapāleṣu{paṭa} ityādayo 'pi dhiyaḥ prasūyeran /	If there were only one samavāya [inherence] in all the three worlds, then such cognitions as "cloth [inheres] in potsherds" would also arise.
aśvādiṣu ca gotvādir vidyata ityevaṃ syāt / tataś ca sāvaleyādibhedavad gajādiṣvapi gavādipratyayo bhavet /	And it would be the case that cowness etc. exists in horses etc., and consequently, just as [the notion of cow appears] with respect to different kinds [of cows] like the Sāvaleya, the notion of cow etc. would arise even with respect to elephants etc.
tathā hi tantuṣu paṭa iti yat samavāyabalāt pratītir upavarṇitā sa samavāyas tasya paṭasya kapālādiṣvapyastīti tathā pratyayo na bhavatīti /	For the cognition that "cloth [inheres] in threads" which is described as being due to the force of samavāya - that same samavāya of that cloth exists even in potsherds etc., [so] why does not such a cognition arise?
etad api mithyā /	This too is false.
yatas tantuṣvapi paṭa āśrita iti yat samavāyabalād upavarṇyate, sa samavāyaḥ kapāleṣu kiṃ nāsti, yena tatra tantuṣviva paṭo 'stīti tadbuddhir na bhavet / kintu ya eva tantau paṭasya samavāya iti nirdiśyate sa eva paṭasya samavāyaḥ kapāleṣu, tat kathaṃ saṅkaro na syāt / tat tasmāt dhīranavadhiḥ avadhirahitā bhavet /	Since what is described by the force of samavāya as "cloth inheres in threads" - is that samavāya not present in potsherds, due to which the cognition that "cloth exists [there] just as in threads" would not arise? Rather, that very samavāya of cloth which is specified as being in thread would be the same samavāya of cloth in potsherds, so how could there not be confusion? Therefore, cognition would be unlimited [i.e., without restrictions].
tataś ca dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ dravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvādiviśeṣaṇaiḥ sambandhasyaikatvāt /	And consequently, because of the oneness of the relation between substances, qualities and actions with their respective qualifiers like substancehood, qualityhood, and actionhood etc.,
pañcapadārthavibhāgo na syāt //	the division into five categories would not be possible.
evam ityādinā gajādiṣu gavādibuddhiprasaṅgaṃ samarthayate / evaṃ yaś ca gajatvādisamavāyo gajādiṣu / gotvādijātibhedānāṃ sa eva svāśrayeṣvapi //	With "evam" etc. [the text] establishes the undesired consequence of cognitions of cow etc. in elephants etc. And thus, the inherence of elephanthood etc. in elephants would be the same [inherence] as that of the different universals like cowness etc. in their respective substrates.
ādhārādheyaniyamaḥ sa caikatve 'pi vidyate /	Even though [inherence] is one, the restriction of container and contained exists,
dravyeṣviva hi tajjātikarmasveva ca karmatā //	just as substancehood [inheres] in substances and actionhood [inheres] only in actions.
sa hyāha yadyapyekaḥ samavāyastathāpi pañcapadārthasaṅkaro na bhavati ādhārādheyaniyamāt /	He [Praśastamati] indeed says: "Although Inherence is one, there is [still] no admixture of the five Categories because of the restriction between container and contained."
tathā hi dravyeṣveva dravyatvaṃ, guṇeṣveva guṇatvaṃ, karmasveva karmatvam, ityevaṃ dravyatvādīnāṃ pratiniyatādhārāvacchedena pratipattir upajāyate //	"For instance, substanceness [exists] only in substances, qualityness only in qualities, actionness only in actions - thus the cognition of substanceness and other [universals] arises as limited to [their] respective substrata."
iheti samavāyotthavijñānānvayadarśanāt / sarvatra samavāyo 'yam eka eveti gamyate //	"From observing the presence of the cognition arising from Inherence [in the form] 'in this' everywhere, it is understood that this Inherence is indeed one in all cases."
dravyatvādinimittānāṃ vyatirekasya darśanāt / dhiyāṃ dravyādijātīnāṃ niyamastvavasīyate //	"From observing the distinction of the causes like substanceness etc., the restriction of the cognitions of the universals like substance etc. is ascertained."
iheti samavāyanimittasya pratyayasya sarvatrābhinnakāratayānvayadarśanāt sarvatraikaḥ samavāya iti gamyate /	"From observing the presence of the cognition caused by Inherence [in the form] 'in this' everywhere in an undifferentiated form, it is understood that Inherence is one everywhere."
satyapi caikatve dravyatvādinimittānāṃ dhiyāṃ pratiniyatādhārāvacchedenotpatteḥ vyatirekasyānanvayalakṣaṇasya darśanād dravyatvādijātīnāṃ vyatirekovijñāyate /	"Even though there is oneness [of Inherence], from observing the distinction characterized by non-presence, due to the arising of cognitions caused by substanceness etc. as limited to their respective substrata, the distinction of universals like substance etc. is understood."
tena pañcapadārthasaṅkaro na bhavati //	"Therefore there is no admixture of the five Categories."
kathaṃ punaḥ sambandhāviśeṣe 'pyamīṣāmādhārādheyapratiniyamo yujyata ity āha tadyathetyādi /	[Someone] asks: "How is this restriction of container and contained possible even though the relation [of Inherence] is not different?" He [Praśastamati] answers with "Just as" etc.
ādhārādheyaniyamas tatheha niyamo mataḥ //	"Thus here the restriction of container and contained is considered [valid]."
vyaṅyavyañjakasāmarthyabhedād dravyādijātiṣu /	"Due to the difference in the capacity of the manifested and manifester with respect to the universals like substance etc."
samavāyaikabhāve 'pi naiva cet sa virudhyate //	Even in the case of [there being] a single inherence, if that [restriction] does not exist, it is contradictory.
yathāhi kuṇḍadadhnoḥ saṃyogaikatve 'pi bhavatyāśrayāśrayipratiniyamaḥ, tathā dravyatvādīnāṃ samavāyaikatve 'pi vyaṅgyavyañjakaśaktibhedādādhārādheyapratiniyama iti /	Just as in the case of the pot and curds, even though conjunction is singular, there is a fixed relation between container and contained, similarly in the case of substantiality etc., even though inherence is singular, there is a fixed relation between substrate and superstratum due to the difference in the power of manifester and manifested.
sa ityādhārādheyaniyamaḥ //	"That" refers to the restriction of [the relation between] substrate and superstratum.
ādhārādheyaniyamo natvekatve 'sya durghaṭaḥ /	The restriction of substrate and superstratum is not impossible even if this [inherence] is singular.

tathā hi yadeva dravyaṃ kasyacic chrotriyāder aśucitvenābhāti tad evānyasya kauṭikādeḥ śucitvena na caikasya parasparapratyanīkarūpasampāto yukta ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt

For the very same substance that appears as unclean to someone like a Vedic scholar appears as clean to another like a hunter, and it is not reasonable for contradictory forms to combine in one [thing], as that would result in the loss of its unity

athā bhavatu bhāvikam aśucitvaṃ bhāvānāṃ tathāpi nedaṃ dṛṣṭāntena samam

Let it be granted that uncleanness of things is real; even so, this is not equivalent to the example

tathā hi śvamāṃsādikāśucidravyasamparkād annādayo bhāvāḥ parityaktapūrvaśucisvabhāvā anya evāśucayo jāyante

For when things like food grains come into contact with unclean substances like dog's flesh, they abandon their previous clean nature and are born anew as different, unclean [entities]

ato yuktam eṣāṃ paropādhikam aśucitvam /

Hence it is appropriate that their impurity is [something] dependent on external conditions.

natvevaṃ kiñcit paramāṇvādiṣu nibandhanam asti, yenaiṣāṃ paropādhikaṃ vailakṣaṇyaṃ bhavet tathā, nityatvād evājanmato 'nutpatteḥ /

But there is no such basis in [the case of] atoms and other [eternal substances] by which such an externally conditioned distinctiveness could arise in them, because due to their eternality they cannot originate [with new properties].

evaṃ pradīpadṛṣṭānte 'pi ghaṭādīnāṃ jñānotpattihetutvaṃ paropādhikaṃ yojyam /

Similarly, in the example of the lamp too, the property of being a cause of cognition for jars and other [objects] should be understood as dependent on external conditions.

netyādinā viśeṣāṇāṃ bādhakaṃ pramāṇam āha tasyāpi pūrvavat svarūpaṃ pratibandhaś ca vācyaḥ //

With [the word] "no" etc. [the text] states the refuting proof regarding the particulars; its nature and its logical connection must be stated as before.

iti viśeṣaparīkṣā //

Thus [ends] the examination of particulars.

KAPITEL SAMAVAAYAPADAARTHAPARIIK.SAA

[Chapter on] the examination of the category of inherence.

samavāyadūṣaṇārtham āha tantuṣvityādi /

For the purpose of refuting inherence, [the text] states "in threads" etc.

tantuṣveva paṭo 'mīṣu vīraṇeṣu kaṭaḥ punaḥ /

[Just as] the cloth [inheres] in threads, and the mat [inheres] in these reeds.

ityādīhamater bhāvāt samavāyo 'vagamyate //

From the existence of such locative cognitions, inherence is understood.

ayutāsiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām ihabuddhihetur yaḥ sambandhaḥ sa samavāyaḥ, sa cāyam iha tantuṣu paṭa ityādīhabuddhiviśeṣato dravyādibhyo 'rthāntaratvenāvagamyate /

Inherence is that relation which is the cause of the locative cognition regarding [things] that are inseparably established as the contained and container, and this [relation] is understood as something different from substances etc. through the specific locative cognition such as "the cloth [is] here in the threads."

yathāhi sattādravyatvādīnāṃ svādhāreṣvātmānurūpapratyayakartṛtvāt svāśrayādibhyaḥ parasparataścārthāntarabhāvas

Just as sattā (existence), dravyatva (substanceness) and other [universals] produce cognitions conforming to their nature in their respective substrates and are distinct entities from their substrates and from each other

iha tantuṣu paṭaḥ, iha dravye guṇakarmaṇī, iha dravye dravyatvam, iha guṇeṣu guṇatvam, iha karmaṇi karmatvam, iha dravyeṣvantyā viśeṣā ityādipratyayadarśanāt pañcabhyaḥ padarthebhyo 'rthāntaratvaṃgamyate

From seeing cognitions such as "the cloth [inheres] in these threads," "qualities and actions [inhere] in this substance," "substanceness [inheres] in this substance," "qualityness [inheres] in these qualities," "motionness [inheres] in this motion," "the ultimate particulars [inhere] in these substances," etc., it is understood that [inherence] is distinct from the five categories

prayogaḥ yo yeṣu yadākāravilakṣaṇaḥ pratyayaḥ sa tadarthāntaranibandhanaḥ yathā devadatte daṣḍīti pratyayaḥ

The logical formulation is: Whatever cognition appears with respect to certain things in a form different from them must be based on something distinct from them, just as the cognition "stick-bearer" with respect to Devadatta

tathācāyaṃ pañcasu padārtheṣvihapratyaya iti svabhāvahetuṃ manyate

And similarly this cognition of "inherence in" with respect to the five categories is considered to be a natural reason [for inherence's distinctness]

tasyābhāve sa cetkiṃ hi mater asyā nibandhanam

If that [inherence] did not exist, what indeed would be the basis of this cognition?

na viśeṣamatir dṛṣṭā nimittāntaravarjitā

No particular cognition is seen without a specific cause

ihabuddhyaviśeṣāc ca yogavan na vibhidyate

And due to the non-difference of the cognition "in this," [inherence] does not differ [in different cases] like conjunction

sarvasmin bhāvavatveṣa eka eva pratīyate

This [inherence] is cognized as one and the same in everything, just like existence

kāraṇānupalabdheś ca nityo bhāvavadeva saḥ

And because no cause [for its production] is apprehended, it is eternal just like existence

na hyasya kāraṇaṃ kiñcit pramāṇenopalabhyate

For no cause of this [inherence] is apprehended by any means of valid cognition

nibandhanamantareṇa bhavato nityaṃ sattādiprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam

Without [some] basis, there would be the unwanted consequence of eternally [cognizing] existence etc. - this is the refuting proof

evaṃ tāvad vaiśeṣikāṇāṃ matena ihabuddhiliṅgānumeyāḥ samavāyaḥ naiyāyikamatena tu ihabuddhipratyakṣagamya eva

Thus according to the Vaiśeṣika view, inherence is inferred from the sign of the cognition "in this," while according to the Naiyāyika view it is directly perceptible through the cognition "in this"

tathā hi te akṣavyāpāre satīha tantuṣu paṭa ityādipratyayotpatteḥ pratyakṣatvamācakṣate

For they [the Naiyāyikas] declare its perceptibility from the fact that when the sense organ is functioning, cognitions arise such as "the cloth [inheres] in these threads"

sa cāyaṃ samāvāyo yathā saṃyogaḥ sambandheṣu bhinnas tathā nāyaṃ bhidyate kiṃ tarhibhāvavat sattāvat talliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāt sarvatraika eva samavāyaḥ

And this inherence does not differ [in different cases] as conjunction differs among relations, but rather like existence or being it is one and the same everywhere, because its indicative sign [the cognition "in this"] is non-different and there is no sign of difference

akāraṇatvāc ca bhāvavadeva nityaḥ siddhaḥ, akāraṇatvaṃ ca pramāṇataḥ kāraṇānupalabdheḥ siddham //

[Samavāya,] having no cause, is established as eternal just like 'existence'; and [its] having no cause is established through [valid] means of cognition due to the non-perception of [any] cause.

tadetad ityādinā dūṣaṇamārabhate

[The author] begins the refutation with [the words] "tadetad" etc.

svasiddhāntānurāgeṇa na dṛṣṭaṃ laukikaṃ tu tat //

That [notion of inherence] is not found in ordinary experience, [but exists only] due to attachment to their own doctrine.

tadanena hetor āśrayasiddhatām āha iha tantuṣu paṭa ityādikā hi dhiyaḥ svasiddhāntānurāgopakalpitā eva /

By this [statement], he points out that the reason has the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha, for such cognitions as "the cloth [inheres] in these threads" are merely constructed through attachment to one's own doctrine.

natu loke tathotpadyamānāḥ saṃvedyanta ityataḥ sādhyadharmī na siddhaḥ //

But [such cognitions] are not experienced as arising in that way in ordinary life; therefore, the subject of the probandum is not established.

nānātvetyādinā tāmeva dharmyasiddhiṃ samarthayate

With [the words] beginning with "nānātve," he supports that very same non-establishment of the subject.

nānātvalakṣaṇe hi syād ādhārādheyabhūtayoḥ / idam atreti vijñānaṃ kuṇḍādau śrīphalādivat //

For the cognition "this [is] in that" occurs only when there is a characteristic of distinctness between container and contained, as with bel fruits in a pot.

naiva tantupaṭādīnāṃ nānātvenopalakṣaṇam /

There is indeed no perception of distinctness between cloth, threads, and so forth.

yayor hi nānātvamupalakṣitaṃ bhavet tayor evādhārādheyabhāve satīhabuddhirudbhavanti loke dṛṣṭā yatheha, kuṇḍe śrīphalānīti, naca tantupaṭayor nānātvamupalakṣitaṃ vidyate, ca tat kathaṃ tatrehabuddhir bhavet //

For only when distinctness is perceived between two things does the notion of container and contained arise in ordinary experience, as in [the case of] "bel fruits [are] in the pot"; and since no distinctness is perceived between cloth and threads, how could there be such a notion [of inherence] in that case?

syād etad yadi nāmāsmābhiḥ siddhāntabalād upakalpiteyam ihamatis tathāpyasyā bhavadbhir nibandhanaṃ vaktavyam ity āha svecchetyādi /

[Someone] might say this: "Even if this notion has been assumed by us based on the strength of [our] established doctrine, still you must explain its basis." Thus [the author] speaks beginning with "svecchā."

svecchayā racite vāsmin kalpiteṣviva vastuṣu / na kāraṇaniyogo 'yaṃ paraṃ pratyupapadyate //

In the case of this [notion] constructed by mere whim, just as in the case of imagined things, it is not appropriate to demand [from] another person [the explanation of] its cause.

yo hi yatkāraṇam eva necchati sa kathaṃ kāryaṃ svayam upakalpya tatkāraṇaṃ paryanuyujyate

For how can one who does not wish [to accept] any cause be questioned about the cause of an effect that he himself has assumed?

ātmaiva hi bhavatā paryanuyoktavyaḥ, yenedaṃ kāryamupakalpitamitamicchāvaśāt, naivecchānāṃ vastusvabhāvānurodhaḥ

Indeed, you must question yourself, by whom this effect has been assumed under the influence of [mere] whim, [for] whims do not conform to the nature of real things.

tathā hi bhavadupakalpitasyāpi hi vastunaḥ kaiścidanyathāpi kalpayituṃ śakyatvāt

For indeed, even what has been assumed by you could be imagined differently by others.

vṛkṣe śākhāḥ śilāścāga ityeṣā laukikī matiḥ /

This is the ordinary cognition: "[There are] branches in the tree, and stones in the mountain."

agākhyapariśiṣṭāṅganairantaryopalambhanāt // tau punas tāsviti jñānaṃ lokātikrāntamucyate /

This cognition arises from the perception of continuity with the remaining parts of what is called "mountain" [and tree]; but [the notion that] these [branches and stones] are in them [through inherence] is said to transcend ordinary experience.

ghaṭe rūpaṃ kriyādīti tādātmyaṃ tvavagacchati //

But [the cognition] "color in the pot" or "action [in the pot]" apprehends identity.

rūpakumbhādiśabdā hi sarvāvasthābhidhāyakāḥ /

For words like "color" and "pot" denote [things] in all [their] states.

tadviśeṣābhidhānāya tathā te viniveśitāḥ // tānāścityaiṣu vijñānaṃ tenākāreṇa vartate / samavāyān na bhedasya sarveṣām apyanīkṣaṇāt //

They are arranged in that way to express their particulars; the cognition occurs in that form due to those [particulars], not due to inherence, because no distinction among all [these things] is perceived.

vṛkṣe śākhāḥ parvate śilā ityevaṃ loke dṛśyate, natu śākhāyāṃ vṛkṣaḥ śilāsu parvata iti

In ordinary life, such notions are observed as "the branches in the tree" [and] "the stones in the mountain," but not [notions] such as "the tree in the branches" [or] "the mountain in the stones."

sāpi ca vṛkṣe śākhetyādikā matir na samavāyavaśāt, kintu agākhyāni yāni pariśiṣṭāni vivakṣitaśākhāśilāvyatiriktānyadhovyavasthitāni skandhādīnyaṅgāni, teṣāṃ nairantyopalambhāt

Moreover, that notion of "branches in the tree" etc. is not due to inherence, but due to the perception of continuity with those parts called "immovables" which are the remaining parts situated below, such as the trunk etc., [which are] different from the branches and stones being discussed.

agaśabdenātra na gacchantīti kṛtvā taravo girayaścābhipretāḥ

Here, by the term "immovables" trees and mountains are meant, because they do not move.

tāviti agavṛkṣau

"Those two" [refers to] the immovable [and] the tree.

tāsviti śilāśākhāsu

"In these" [refers to] in the stones and branches.

yattarhīdamiha ghaṭe rūparasagandhasparśāścalanaṃ cetyādi loke prasiddhaṃ jñānaṃ tasya samavāyaṃ muktvā ko 'nyo viṣaya ity āha ghaṭa ityādi

[When asked:] "What then could be the basis, other than inherence, for this well-known notion among people such as 'color, taste, smell, touch, and movement in the jar'?" [The answer] begins with [the word] "jar."

tādāmtyam ghaṭasvabhāvaṃ rūpaṃ na ghaṭādyātmakam ity arthaḥ

The meaning is that identity [means] the color has the nature of the jar, [but] is not identical with the jar and so forth.

bahuṣu rūpādiṣu sādhāraṇaśaktiviśeṣapratipādanecchayā tadanyarūpādivyavacchedena ghaṭādiśruter niveśaḥ

When there is a desire to express specific common powers among many qualities like color etc., the term "jar" etc. is employed to distinguish [these qualities] from other colors etc.

rūpādiśrutis tu pratyekamasādhāraṇacakṣur vijñānādikāryanirvartanasāmarthyadyotanāya niveśite

The terms "color" etc. are each employed to indicate their unique capacity to produce visual cognition and other effects.

tyato ghaṭādiśrutī rūpādibhedānakṣipatīti sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvād vaiyadhikaraṇyenaiva tādātmyaṃ pratipādyate

Therefore, since the term "jar" etc. implies differences in color etc., due to the absence of co-ordination, identity is expressed through different substrata.

ubhayos tu kimarthaṃ prayoga

"Why then are both [terms] used?"

rūpādiṣabdā hi sarvāvasthasya rūpāder vācakāḥ

For the terms "color" etc. denote color etc. in all conditions.

tathā hi yathā ghaṭātmanāvasthitarūpādi rūpādītyucyate tathā paṭādyātmanāvasthitam api

For just as color etc. existing in the form of a jar is called "color" etc., so too is [color] existing in the form of cloth etc.

tataś ca kevalebhyo rūpādiśabdebhyo na viśeṣaḥ pratīyate kimavasthā rūpādaya iti

And therefore from the mere terms "color" etc., no particular [instance] is understood [regarding] in what condition the colors etc. [exist].

ghaṭe rūpādaya ityevaṃ tu prayoge ghaṭātmakās ta iti paṭādivyavacchedena pratīyante

But when used in the expression "colors etc. in the jar," they are understood as having the nature of the jar, distinguished from [those] in cloth etc.

tathā ghaṭaśabdo 'pi sarvāvasthaṃ ghaṭaṃ brūte śuklaṃ pītaṃ calaṃ niścalamityādikam

Similarly, the word "jar" also expresses the jar in all conditions, [such as] white, yellow, moving, stationary, etc.

ataḥ kevalān na viśeṣapratītiḥ ghaṭe śuklaṃ rūpam ityādiprayoge tu tadanyarūpādivyavacchedena pratipattir bhavati

Therefore, from [the term] alone there is no understanding of the particular, but in expressions like "white color in the jar," understanding occurs through distinction from other colors etc.

tataś ca tasyaivambhūtasya viśeṣasyābhidhānāya yathā tathā ghaṭe rūpam iti te niveśitāḥ

And therefore, they are employed in expressions like "color in the jar" to denote such particulars.

śabdā iti śeṣaḥ /

[The word] śabda [remains to be supplied, this is] the remainder.

tān śabdānāśrityaiṣu ghaṭādiṣu tenākāreṇa ghaṭe rūpam ityādinā pravartate jñānaṃ natu samavāyamāśritya vartata iti sambandhaḥ /

Knowledge proceeds depending on those words with regard to these [things] like jars in the form "the color [is] in the jar" and so on, but it does not proceed depending on inherence - this is the connection.

atra kāraṇam āha bhedasyetyādi /

Here [the text] states the reason [beginning with] "of the distinction" and so forth.

nahi samavāyaghaṭarūpādīnāṃ sarveṣāṃ parasparato bheda upalabhyate /

For no mutual distinction is perceived among inherence, jar, color and the rest.

etena hetor anaikāntikatvaṃ pratijñāyāścānumānādibādhitatvam uktam //

By this both the inconclusiveness of [the opponent's] reason and the invalidation of [his] thesis by inference etc. is stated.

yadyekaḥ samavāyaḥ syāt sarveṣveva ca vastuṣu /

If there were one [and the same] inherence in all things,

gajādiṣvapi gotvādi samastītyanuṣajyate / tato gavādirūpatvam amīṣāṃ śāvaleyavat //

Then it would follow that cowness etc. exists even in elephants etc., [and] therefore these [elephants etc.] would have the form of cows etc., like a brindled cow.

paṭatantuṣu yo 'stīti samavāyāt pratīyate /

What is cognized through inherence as "existing in threads of cloth"

asti cāsau kapāleṣu tasyeti na tatheti kim //

And that [same inherence] exists in potsherds - why is there not [cognition] like that?

nāśritaḥ sa kapāle cen nanu tantuṣvapīṣyate / āśritaḥ samavāyena sa kapāle 'pi nāsti kim //

If [you say] it is not present in the potsherd, then surely it is desired [to be present] in threads too - being present through inherence, is it not present in the potsherd too?

tantor yaḥ samavāyo hi paṭasyetyabhidhīyate /

For what is called the inherence of cloth in threads

sa ghaṭasya kapāleṣu taddhīranavadhir bhavet //

[Would be] the same as [the inherence] of the pot in potsherds, therefore it would be unlimited.

yadyekastrailokye samavāyaḥ syāt tadā kapāleṣu{paṭa} ityādayo 'pi dhiyaḥ prasūyeran /

If there were only one samavāya [inherence] in all the three worlds, then such cognitions as "cloth [inheres] in potsherds" would also arise.

aśvādiṣu ca gotvādir vidyata ityevaṃ syāt / tataś ca sāvaleyādibhedavad gajādiṣvapi gavādipratyayo bhavet /

And it would be the case that cowness etc. exists in horses etc., and consequently, just as [the notion of cow appears] with respect to different kinds [of cows] like the Sāvaleya, the notion of cow etc. would arise even with respect to elephants etc.

tathā hi tantuṣu paṭa iti yat samavāyabalāt pratītir upavarṇitā sa samavāyas tasya paṭasya kapālādiṣvapyastīti tathā pratyayo na bhavatīti /

For the cognition that "cloth [inheres] in threads" which is described as being due to the force of samavāya - that same samavāya of that cloth exists even in potsherds etc., [so] why does not such a cognition arise?

etad api mithyā /

This too is false.

yatas tantuṣvapi paṭa āśrita iti yat samavāyabalād upavarṇyate, sa samavāyaḥ kapāleṣu kiṃ nāsti, yena tatra tantuṣviva paṭo 'stīti tadbuddhir na bhavet / kintu ya eva tantau paṭasya samavāya iti nirdiśyate sa eva paṭasya samavāyaḥ kapāleṣu, tat kathaṃ saṅkaro na syāt / tat tasmāt dhīranavadhiḥ avadhirahitā bhavet /

Since what is described by the force of samavāya as "cloth inheres in threads" - is that samavāya not present in potsherds, due to which the cognition that "cloth exists [there] just as in threads" would not arise? Rather, that very samavāya of cloth which is specified as being in thread would be the same samavāya of cloth in potsherds, so how could there not be confusion? Therefore, cognition would be unlimited [i.e., without restrictions].

tataś ca dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ dravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvādiviśeṣaṇaiḥ sambandhasyaikatvāt /

And consequently, because of the oneness of the relation between substances, qualities and actions with their respective qualifiers like substancehood, qualityhood, and actionhood etc.,

pañcapadārthavibhāgo na syāt //

the division into five categories would not be possible.

evam ityādinā gajādiṣu gavādibuddhiprasaṅgaṃ samarthayate / evaṃ yaś ca gajatvādisamavāyo gajādiṣu / gotvādijātibhedānāṃ sa eva svāśrayeṣvapi //

With "evam" etc. [the text] establishes the undesired consequence of cognitions of cow etc. in elephants etc. And thus, the inherence of elephanthood etc. in elephants would be the same [inherence] as that of the different universals like cowness etc. in their respective substrates.

ādhārādheyaniyamaḥ sa caikatve 'pi vidyate /

Even though [inherence] is one, the restriction of container and contained exists,

dravyeṣviva hi tajjātikarmasveva ca karmatā //

just as substancehood [inheres] in substances and actionhood [inheres] only in actions.

sa hyāha yadyapyekaḥ samavāyastathāpi pañcapadārthasaṅkaro na bhavati ādhārādheyaniyamāt /

He [Praśastamati] indeed says: "Although Inherence is one, there is [still] no admixture of the five Categories because of the restriction between container and contained."

tathā hi dravyeṣveva dravyatvaṃ, guṇeṣveva guṇatvaṃ, karmasveva karmatvam, ityevaṃ dravyatvādīnāṃ pratiniyatādhārāvacchedena pratipattir upajāyate //

"For instance, substanceness [exists] only in substances, qualityness only in qualities, actionness only in actions - thus the cognition of substanceness and other [universals] arises as limited to [their] respective substrata."

iheti samavāyotthavijñānānvayadarśanāt / sarvatra samavāyo 'yam eka eveti gamyate //

"From observing the presence of the cognition arising from Inherence [in the form] 'in this' everywhere, it is understood that this Inherence is indeed one in all cases."

dravyatvādinimittānāṃ vyatirekasya darśanāt / dhiyāṃ dravyādijātīnāṃ niyamastvavasīyate //

"From observing the distinction of the causes like substanceness etc., the restriction of the cognitions of the universals like substance etc. is ascertained."

iheti samavāyanimittasya pratyayasya sarvatrābhinnakāratayānvayadarśanāt sarvatraikaḥ samavāya iti gamyate /

"From observing the presence of the cognition caused by Inherence [in the form] 'in this' everywhere in an undifferentiated form, it is understood that Inherence is one everywhere."

satyapi caikatve dravyatvādinimittānāṃ dhiyāṃ pratiniyatādhārāvacchedenotpatteḥ vyatirekasyānanvayalakṣaṇasya darśanād dravyatvādijātīnāṃ vyatirekovijñāyate /

"Even though there is oneness [of Inherence], from observing the distinction characterized by non-presence, due to the arising of cognitions caused by substanceness etc. as limited to their respective substrata, the distinction of universals like substance etc. is understood."

tena pañcapadārthasaṅkaro na bhavati //

"Therefore there is no admixture of the five Categories."

kathaṃ punaḥ sambandhāviśeṣe 'pyamīṣāmādhārādheyapratiniyamo yujyata ity āha tadyathetyādi /

[Someone] asks: "How is this restriction of container and contained possible even though the relation [of Inherence] is not different?" He [Praśastamati] answers with "Just as" etc.

ādhārādheyaniyamas tatheha niyamo mataḥ //

"Thus here the restriction of container and contained is considered [valid]."

vyaṅyavyañjakasāmarthyabhedād dravyādijātiṣu /

"Due to the difference in the capacity of the manifested and manifester with respect to the universals like substance etc."

samavāyaikabhāve 'pi naiva cet sa virudhyate //

Even in the case of [there being] a single inherence, if that [restriction] does not exist, it is contradictory.

yathāhi kuṇḍadadhnoḥ saṃyogaikatve 'pi bhavatyāśrayāśrayipratiniyamaḥ, tathā dravyatvādīnāṃ samavāyaikatve 'pi vyaṅgyavyañjakaśaktibhedādādhārādheyapratiniyama iti /

Just as in the case of the pot and curds, even though conjunction is singular, there is a fixed relation between container and contained, similarly in the case of substantiality etc., even though inherence is singular, there is a fixed relation between substrate and superstratum due to the difference in the power of manifester and manifested.

sa ityādhārādheyaniyamaḥ //

"That" refers to the restriction of [the relation between] substrate and superstratum.

ādhārādheyaniyamo natvekatve 'sya durghaṭaḥ /

The restriction of substrate and superstratum is not impossible even if this [inherence] is singular.