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dravyatvaṃ dravya eveṣṭaṃ kathaṃ tat samavāyataḥ // | Substantiality is accepted [to inhere] in substance alone - how could that be due to inherence? |
tasyāsau samavāyaś ca guṇādiṣvapi vidyate / | And this same inherence of that [substance] exists in qualities etc. as well. |
guṇajātyādisambandhād eka eva hyayaṃ tayoḥ // | Because of the connection with the universal of quality etc., this [inherence] is indeed one and the same for both. |
na hyasmākaṃ rūpatvādīnāṃ rūpādiṣvādheyaniyamaḥ siddhaḥ, kintu bhavatām eva, sa ca sarvatra samavāyamekamevābhyupagacchatāṃ durghaṭa ityādiprasaṅgāpādānaṃ kriyate / | For us, the restriction of inherence of colorness etc. in colors etc. is not established; rather it is [accepted] by you alone, and for those who accept inherence as one everywhere, this [restriction] is impossible - thus this unwanted consequence is being pointed out. |
tathā hi dravya eva dravyatvam ityevaṃ yo niyama iṣyate sa samavāyabalād, eva tasya ca dravyatvāder yaḥ samavāyaḥ sa eva guṇādiṣvapyasti, guṇatvādijātyā teṣāṃ sambandhatvāt / | For the restriction that is accepted thus - that substantiality [inheres] in substance alone - [is said to occur] by force of inherence, and that same inherence of substantiality etc. exists in qualities etc. as well, because of their connection with the universal of quality etc. |
yadi nāma sambandhas tathāpi sa eva tatra samavāyo 'stīti katham avastīyata ity āha eke evetyādi / | Even if there is a relation, how is it determined that that very [relation] there is inherence? - thus [the opponent] says "one and the same" etc. |
tayor iti dravyaguṇatvādijātyoḥ / tataścābhinnanimittatvāt tatsaṅkaraprasaṅgo durnivāra iti bhāvaḥ // | "Of both" refers to the universals of substance and quality etc. Therefore, because of having an undifferentiated cause, the unwanted consequence of their mixing is unavoidable - this is the meaning. |
anyathā guṇajātyādibhinna eva bhavedayam / yogibhedāt prativyakti yathā yogo vibhidyate // | If [it were] not so, then this [inherence] would be different in the various universals like "quality" [and] others, just as conjunction varies with each conjunct factor. |
anyatheti yadi dravye dravyatvasya yaḥ samavāyaḥ sa eva guṇādiṣu guṇatvādīnāṃ na bhavet tadā saṃyogavat pratyādhāraṃ samavāyo bhidyate // | "If [it were] not so," i.e., if the inherence of the universal "substanceness" in substances were not the same as the inherence of the universal "qualityness" [and others] in qualities [and others], then inherence would vary with each substratum, just as conjunction [does]. |
yaccoktaṃ dravyatvādinimittānām ityādi, tatrāha dravyatvādītyādi / | As for what was said about the causes of substanceness [and others], to that [the author] says [what follows]. |
dravyatvādinimittānāṃ vyatireko na yujyate / dhiyāṃ nimittasadbhāvād atastanniyamo 'pi na // | The absence of cognitions based upon [universals like] substanceness [and others] is not possible when their cause exists. Therefore, there can be no restriction of that [inherence] either. |
na hyavikale nimitte sati kāryasya vyatireko 'bhāvo yukto 'tat kāryatvaprasaṅgāt / | For when a cause is present in its complete form, the absence [or] non-existence of [its] effect is not reasonable, as [otherwise] it would follow that it is not [really] its effect. |
tataśca dhiyāṃ vyatirekāyogāt tasyāpyādhārādheyabhāvasya niyamo na yuktaḥ // | Therefore, since the absence of these cognitions is impossible, the restriction of that relation of container and contained is also not reasonable. |
nanu dravya eva dravyatvamāśritaṃ sthitamityādivyapadeśato niyamo bhaviṣyatītyāha tadāśritatvetyādi / tadāśritatvasthānādi tasmād evābhidhīyate / | [An objector:] "The restriction could be based on such expressions as 'substanceness inheres and subsists in substances alone'." [In response to this, the author] states about [the notion of] "being inherent" etc. [that] inherence, subsistence and so forth are expressed from that [inherence] alone. |
samavāyād ataścaitan na yuktaṃ tanniyāmakam // | Therefore this is not reasonable as a restrictor of that [inherence]. |
tasmād eva hi samavāyādāśritatvādivyavasthānam upavarṇyate bhavadbhiḥ, tasya ca sarvatrāviśiṣṭatve katham eṣa niyamo yokṣyate / tasmād etad apyāśritatvādi na tasyādhārādheyabhāvasya niyāmakaṃ yuktam, ādhārādheyabhāvena sahaikayogakṣamatvādeṣām // | For the determination of inherence, subsistence and so forth is described by you [as proceeding] from that very [inherence], and since that [inherence] is undifferentiated everywhere, how could this restriction be justified? Therefore, these [notions of] inherence, subsistence and so forth cannot reasonably be restrictors of that container-contained relation, because these [notions] are capable of occurring together with the container-contained relation. |
vyaṅgyavyañjakasāmarthyabhedo 'pi samavāyataḥ / | The difference in the capacity of the manifested and the manifestor also [proceeds] from inherence. |
nānyatas tu sa nityānām utpādānupapattitaḥ // | [And] it cannot be due to anything else, because there can be no 'production' of eternal [things]. |
dravyatvādisāmānyavyañjakatvaṃ dravyādīnāṃ yaducyate tat samavāyabalādeva / tathā hi yata eva dravyatvaṃ dravye samavetaṃ tata eva tena tadvyajyata ity ucyate / | When it is said that substances etc. are manifesters of universals like "substanceness," this is solely due to the force of inherence; for it is said to be manifested by it precisely because the universal "substanceness" inheres in that substance. |
anyata iti / saugatopavarṇitāt jñānotpādanayogyasvabhāvotpādanāt / | "Due to anything else" means [it cannot be] due to the production of a nature capable of generating cognition, as postulated by the Buddhist. |
yasmānnityānām api sattādīnāṃ samavāya iṣṭaḥ, sa na nityānām utpattir yuktā // | Because inherence is accepted even for eternal [entities] like "existence" etc., and it is not logical that there should be any production of eternal [things]. |
etad eva na hītyādinā samarthayate / | This very [point] is supported by [the words] beginning with "na hi" [in the next verse]. |
nahi dīpādisadbhāvāj jāyante yādṛśā ime / vijñānajanane yogyā ghaṭādyā jātayas tathā // | Just as [things] do not become capable of producing cognition merely from the presence of a lamp etc., similarly universals like "jar" [cannot become capable of producing cognition]. |
yaścāpi dadhikuṇḍasaṃyogo dṛṣṭāntatvenoktaḥ, so 'pyasmākam asiddha iti darśayati kuṇḍadadhnorityādi / | The conjunction of the curd and pot that was cited as an example [by Praśastamati], that too is not established for us - this is shown [in the verse] beginning with "kuṇḍadadhnoḥ." |
kuṇḍadadhnoś ca saṃyoga ekaḥ pūrvaṃ nirākṛtaḥ / | The [notion that] the conjunction between the pot and curd is single has been rejected earlier. |
na cāsau niyatas tasmād yujyate{tiprasaṅgataḥ} // | And therefore any restriction based on that is not possible, as it would lead to undesired consequences. |
pūrvam iti / saṃyogapadārthadūṣaṇe / | "Earlier" [means] in the refutation of the category of conjunction. |
bhavatu nāma saṃyoga ekaḥ, tatrāpi tulya eva prasaṅga iti darśayati na cāsāvityādi / | Even if conjunction is [assumed to be] one [entity], the same objection still applies - this is what is shown by [the words] "na cāsau" etc. |
tasmād iti saṃyogāt / | [The phrase] "tasmāt" [means] "on account of conjunction." |
dadhni kuṇḍamityādibuddhiprasaṅgo 'tiprasaṅgaḥ / saṃyogasya nimittasya nirviśiṣṭatvāt // | The unwanted consequence is the possibility of [absurd] cognitions like "the pit [is] in the curd," since the causal factor of conjunction would be equally [applicable] without distinction. |
yaccoktaṃ kāraṇānupalabdher nityaḥ samavāya iti tatrāha nityatventyādi / nityatvenāsya sarve 'pi nityāḥ prāptāḥ ghaṭādayaḥ / | Regarding what was said [earlier] that "inherence is eternal because no cause [of it] is perceived" - to this [the author] responds with [the words] "nityatvena" etc.: Through its eternality, all things including pots etc. would [absurdly] become eternal. |
yadi hi samavāyo nityaḥ syāt tadā ghaṭādīnām api nityatvaprasaṅgaḥ svādhāreṣu teṣāṃ sarvadāvasthānāt / | For if inherence were eternal, then pots and other [things] too would have to be eternal, because they would exist forever in their substrates. |
tathā hi samavāyāstitvād evaiṣāṃ svādhāreṣvavasthānamiṣyate, sa ca samavāyo nitya iti kimiti sadāmī na saṃtiṣṭheran // | Indeed, these [things] are accepted to subsist in their substrates precisely due to the existence of inherence, and [if] this inherence is eternal, why would these [things] not persist forever? |
svārambhaketyādinā parasyottaram āśaṅkate | With [the words] beginning with "svārambhaka," [the author] anticipates the opponent's reply. |
svārambhakavibhāgād vā yadi vā tadvināśataḥ / te naśyanti kriyādyā yogāderiti cen na tat // | "[Things] perish either through the separation of their components or through their destruction, just like actions etc. [perish] due to conjunction and such [causes]" - if [this is] claimed, [then] that is not [correct]. |
svādhāraissamavāyo hi teṣām api sadā mataḥ / | Because the inherence of those [components] too with their substrates is considered eternal. |
teṣāṃ vināśabhāve tu niyatāsyāpi nāśitā // | But if those [components] were to be destroyed, then [inherence] too would necessarily be destructible. |
syād etat ghaṭādīnāṃ ye svārambhakāvayavās teṣāṃ vibhāgād vināśād vā ghaṭādīnāṃ vināśaḥ / | [One might object that] the jar and other [objects] are destroyed either through the separation or destruction of those component parts which produce them. |
yathā ghaṭasyodveṣṭanapākāvasthayoḥ kriyādayaḥ sparśavad dravyasaṃyogādibhyo vinaśyanti / | Just as, when a jar is in the state of being whirled or baked, its motion [and other properties] are destroyed through contact with tangible substances and other [causes]. |
yathoktam sparśavad dravyasaṃyogāt karmaṇo nāśaḥ kāryavirodhi ca karmeti / | As it has been stated: "Motion is destroyed through contact with tangible substances, and [also] motion [is destroyed when it is] opposed to [the production of] an effect." |
tathā buddher buddhyantarād vināśaḥ śabdasya śabdāntarād iti paraprakriyā / | Similarly, [according to] the opponent's system, one cognition is destroyed by another cognition, [and] one sound by another sound. |
tena satyapi samavāye 'vasthitihetau sahakārikāraṇāntarābhāvād virodhipratyayopanipātāc ca na nityatvaprasaṅgo ghaṭādīnām iti parasya bhāvaḥ / | The opponent's meaning is that even though inherence exists as the cause of [an object's] continuance, jars and other [objects] cannot be eternal due to the absence of other auxiliary causes and the occurrence of opposing factors. |
na tadityādīnāṃ svārambhakeṣvavayavāntareṣu samavāyaḥ sarvadāstyeveti kuto vināśo vibhāgo vā / | [The reply is:] This cannot be so, because inherence in their constituent parts always exists for these [objects], so how could there be destruction or separation? |
na kevalaṃ tadārabdhānāṃ dravyāṇāṃ kriyādīnāṃ cetyapiśabdena darśayati / | The particle 'api' shows that this applies not only to substances composed of those [parts] but also to motion and other [qualities]. |
yadi tu svārambhakāṇām avayavānāṃ vināśo 'bhyupagamyeta, tadā niyatam asya samavāyasyāpi vināśaḥ prāpnoti / | If the destruction of the constituent parts were admitted, then necessarily the destruction of this inherence also would follow. |
kasmād ity āha sambandhino nivṛttau hītyādi / | [If one asks] "Why?", [the answer] is stated [beginning with] "Because when the relata cease..." |
sambandhino nivṛttau hi sambandho 'stīti durghaṭam / nahi saṃyuktanāśe 'pi saṃyogo nopatiṣṭhate // | For when the relata have ceased, it is impossible for the relation to exist; indeed, when the conjoined [things] are destroyed, conjunction cannot persist. |
yathā saṃyogabhāve tu saṃyuktānām avasthitiḥ / samavāyasya sadbhāve tathā syāt samavāyinām // | And just as conjoined [things] exist while conjunction exists, so should the inherents exist while inherence exists. |
etad eva ghaṭayann āha nahītyādi / | Supporting this very [point], he states [the verse beginning with] "indeed..." |
tataś ca vinaṣṭasambandhitvān naṣṭasaṃyogisaṃyogavad anityaḥ samavāyaḥ prāpnotītyuktaṃ bhavati | [It] means that Inherence becomes non-eternal due to the destruction of [its] relatives, just like a Conjunction [becomes non-eternal] due to the destruction of [its] conjuncts. |
sambandhināṃ vā sthitiḥ prāpnoti, avinaṣṭasambandhatvāt anuparatasaṃyogadravyadvayavat | Or [alternatively], the relatives continue to exist because of the non-destruction of the relation, like two substances whose conjunction has not ceased. |
anyathā tat sambandhasvabhāvahānirubhayeṣām api prasajyeta | If [it were] otherwise, then in both cases there would follow the loss of the essential nature of that relation. |
ekasambandhanāśe 'pītyādinā paraḥ pratyavatiṣṭhate | The opponent makes a counter-argument beginning with "even on the destruction of one relative..." |
ekasambandhināśe 'pi samavāyo 'vatiṣṭhate | Even when one relative is destroyed, Inherence continues to exist. |
anyasambandhisadbhāvād yogo no cen na bhedataḥ | [This is] not [the case] with Conjunction, due to the existence of another relative, because there is difference. |
evaṃ manyate yadi prathame hetau vinaṣṭāśeṣasambandhitvād iti hetvartho 'bhipretaḥ | [The opponent] thinks thus: if in the first reason what is meant is "because of the destruction of all relatives..." |
na hyaśeṣāṇāṃ sambandhināṃ vināśaḥ kvacid asti | For the destruction of all relatives is never possible. |
pralaye 'pi paramāṇvādīnām avaśiṣyamāṇatvāt | Because even during universal dissolution, atoms and such [entities] remain. |
atha yathākathañcidvinaṣṭasambandhitvasambandhamadhikṛtya hetur ucyate, tadānaikāntikatā, yadi nāmaikaḥ sambandhī kvacid vinaṣṭas tathāpyaparasambandhinibandhanāvasthitir asya bhaviṣyati | If the reason is stated with reference to the destruction of some relatives in whatever way, then [there is] inconclusiveness, because even if one relative is destroyed somewhere, [its] existence will still be maintained due to other relatives. |
saṃyogo hi pratisaṃyogi bhidyate | For Conjunction differs with respect to each conjunct. |
tenāsyānityatvaṃ yuktaṃ, samavāyas tu iha pratyayanibandhanasyābhinnatvād eka eva jagati | Therefore its non-eternality is reasonable, but Inherence is unique in the world because its cognitive basis remains undifferentiated. |
tenāsyānityatvamayuktamanyatrāpi sambandhyantare tasyopalabhyamānatvāt // | Hence it cannot be right to regard samavāya as non-eternal, since it is perceived [to continue] in other relatives [even after the cessation of one relative]. |
yadyevam ityādinā pratividhatte | [The author] responds with "if it is thus" and so forth. |
teṣāṃ vṛttyātmako yo 'sau samavāyaḥ prakalpitaḥ // sa eva vyavatiṣṭheta kiṃ sambandhyantarasthiteḥ | That samavāya which has been postulated as constituting the existence of those [things] - does that very same [samavāya] persist due to [its] existence in other relatives? |
athānya eva saṃyoga .......bahutādivat | Or is it something entirely different, like conjunction, plurality and so forth? |
nādyas tallakṣaṇasyaiva samavāyasya saṃsthitau | [It] cannot be the first [option], because if that defined samavāya continues to exist... |
pūrvavat te sthitā eva prāpnuvanti ghaṭādayaḥ | ...then those jars etc. would necessarily continue to exist just as before. |
na teṣām anavathāne teṣāṃ vṛttyātmakaḥ kvacit | If they [the jars etc.] do not exist, then that which constitutes their existence could not exist anywhere. |
samavāyo 'vatiṣṭheta saṃjñāmātreṇa vā tathā | Or the samavāya might persist merely as a name in that way. |
ataḥ prāgapi sadbhāvān na te vṛttāḥ syurāśraye / paścādiva tathā hyeṣā vṛttis teṣām avastutaḥ | Therefore, even before [their destruction], just as after, they could not exist in their substrate, since this existence of theirs is unreal. |
tathā hi ye te vinaśyanti ghaṭādayaḥ svakāraṇādisamavāyinas teṣāṃ svakāraṇeṣu vṛttyātmako yo 'sau samavāyaḥ kalpitaḥ sa eva kiṃ teṣu vinaṣṭeṣu sambandhyantareṣvasti, āhosvidanya eva, yathā saṃyogo bahutvaṃ vā pratisaṃyogi bhidyate | For when those jars etc., which are said to inhere in their causes, are destroyed, does that same samavāya which was postulated as constituting their existence in their causes exist in other relatives after their destruction, or is it something different [in each case], like conjunction or plurality which differs with each conjunct? |
tatra yadyādyaḥ pakṣas tadā prāgavasthāvadapracyutapravṛttitvād avasthitā eva ghaṭādayaḥ prāpnuvanti teṣāṃ vā ghaṭādīnām anavasthāne 'navasthitapravṛttitvān nāvasthitiḥ samavāyasya prāpnoti, anyathā na vṛttyātmakaḥ syāt | If the first alternative [is accepted], then since their mode of existence would remain unchanged from its previous state, the jars etc. would necessarily continue to exist; or if the jars etc. do not persist, then since their existence would not persist, the samavāya could not persist either - otherwise it would not constitute their existence. |
tathābhūtasya ca svatantrasyānupakāriṇo vṛttiḥ samavāya iti vā nāmakaraṇesaṃjñāmātram eva syāt, na tu vastutathābhāvas tatheti | And if such an independent [entity] that serves no purpose were posited as "existence" or "samavāya", it would be merely a name - there would be no corresponding reality. |
tadvṛttyātmaka ityevaṃ tataḥ saṃjñāmātrānvayo doṣastaṃ darśayati ata ityādi / prāgapi sambandhināśāt / | [The statement that] "it consists of their existence" would thus be mere verbal association, a defect which is pointed out by [the words] "therefore" etc., [even] before the destruction of the relatum. |
svāśraye vṛttās tasya samavāyasya bhāvāt sadbhāvabalān na sidhyeyuḥ / paścādiha vinaṣṭasamavāyikāraṇavat, paramārthato vṛttyabhāvāt / | [Things] could not be established as existing in their substrate by force of the existence of that inherence, just as [they cannot exist] afterwards when their inherent cause has been destroyed, due to their not really having existence. |
tathāhītyādinā hetvarthaṃ darśayati // | [The phrase] "thus" etc. shows the meaning of the reason. |
athānya eva saṃyogavibhāgabahutādivat / sambandhyantarasadbhāve samavāyo 'vatiṣṭhate // saṃyogādivad evaṃ hi nanvasya bahutā bhavet / | If inherence remains while another relatum exists [and] is different [from the first one], like conjunction, disjunction, plurality etc., then indeed there would be plurality of this [inherence], just as with conjunction etc. |
evamādyasya sadbhāve bahu syād asamañjasam // | If such [inherence] exists, there would be many incongruities. |
athānya eveti dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā saṃyogādivat samavāyabahutvaṃ prāpnoti tataś ca na samavāyo bhedanityasyābhyupetasya hāniḥ / | If the second alternative - that [what remains] is something different - is accepted, then plurality of inherence would result, just as with conjunction etc., and thus there would be abandonment of the accepted [doctrine] that inherence is without difference. |
evamādītyādiśabdena kāraṇavaiphalyaṃ anekasūtravirodhaḥ pratyakṣādivirodhaḥ sarvapadārthānām akramotpattirityādidoṣāntaraparigrahaḥ / | By the word "etc." [in] "such etc." is meant the inclusion of other defects such as futility of causes, contradiction of multiple sūtras, contradiction of perception etc., and simultaneous production of all things. |
tathā hi svakāraṇasamavāyaḥ sattāsamavāyo vā janmocyate samavāyaś ca nitya iti na kvacid api kāryajanmani kāraṇānāṃ sāmarthyam iti kāraṇavaiphalyam / | For birth is described as inherence in one's cause or inherence in existence, and inherence is eternal, therefore causes would have no capacity whatsoever in producing effects - hence [there would be] futility of causes. |
tathā anyatarakarmaja ubhayakarmajaḥ saṃyogajaś ca saṃyogaḥ indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam ityādijanmapratipādakasūtravirodhaḥ / | [There would be] contradiction of the sūtras establishing origin, such as "conjunction arises from the motion of either [thing], from the motion of both, and from conjunction" [and] "cognition arises from the contact between sense faculty and object." |
tathā pratyakṣādipratītikāraṇāni cakṣurādīni virudhyante / | And thus [this would] contradict [the fact that] eyes etc. are causes of perceptual and other cognitions. |
tathā samavāyalakṣaṇasya janmano nityatayā na kramostīti kramotpattir dṛṣṭabhāvānāṃ virudhyate / | Since birth, characterized by inherence, is eternal, there cannot be any sequence [in it]; thus [this view] contradicts the sequential production of observed entities. |
tataś ca yugapajjñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam iti svasiddhāntavyāhatiḥ / | And consequently, [this leads to] a contradiction with their own doctrine that "the non-simultaneous arising of cognitions is the mark of [the existence of] mind." |
nityatvāc ca janmano 'nupakāryopakārakabhūtaṃ jagaditi vyarthaṃ śāstrapraṇayanamityādibahutaramasamañjasamālūnaviśīrṇaṃ syāt // | And since birth would be eternal, the world would consist of entities neither benefiting nor being benefited [by others], thus the composition of [philosophical] treatises would be futile; and many other such incongruities would arise that would cut apart and destroy [their position]. |
yadi nopādhayaḥ kecid vidyante pāramārthikāḥ / | If no conditioning factors exist in ultimate reality, |
daṇḍī śuklaś calaty asti gaur ihetyādi dhīdhvanī // | [how would] cognitions and verbal expressions such as "man with stick," "white," "moves," "exists," "cow," "here," [arise]? |
syātāṃ kiṃviṣayāv etau nānimittau ca tau matau / | What would these two [cognitions and expressions] have as their objects? And these two cannot be considered groundless, |
sarvasminn avibhāgena tayor vṛttir asambhavī // | nor is it possible for these two to occur undifferentiatedly with respect to everything. |
vastv eva hi paramārthataḥ śabdapratyayagrāhyam | What is apprehended by word[s] and cognition is indeed a real entity in the ultimate sense. |
ataḥ śabdaiḥ sākṣād vidhiniṣedhābhyāṃ vastusvabhāvapratipādanād vidhir eva śabdārtha iti vidhiśabdārthavādināṃ darśanam | This is the view of those who hold that affirmation is the meaning of words, [namely] that since words directly express the nature of reality through affirmation and denial, affirmation alone is the meaning of words. |
apohavādināṃ tu na paramārthataḥ śabdānāṃ kiñcid vācyaṃ vastusvarūpam asti | According to the Apohavādins, however, there exists no real entity that is ultimately expressible by words. |
sarva eva hi śabdapratyayo bhrāntaḥ, bhinneṣv artheṣv abhedākārādhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ | Indeed all verbal cognition is erroneous, because it operates by imposing a form of non-difference upon different things. |
yatra tu pāramparyeṇa vastupratibandhaḥ, tatrārthāsaṃvādo bhrāntatve 'pīti darśanam | [Their] view is that where there is an indirect connection with reality, there is correspondence with the object even though [the cognition] is erroneous. |
tatra yat tad āropitaṃ vikalpadhiyārtheṣv abhinnaṃ rūpam, tad anyavyāvṛttapadārthānubhavabalāyātatvāt | That uniform form which is superimposed on objects by conceptual cognition [arises] from the force of experiencing objects as excluded from others. |
svayaṃ cānyavyāvṛttatayā prakhyānād bhrāntaiś cānyavyāvṛttārthena sahaikyenādhyavasitatvād anyāpoḍhapadārthādhigatiphalatvāc ca anyāpoḍha ity ucyate | It is called "excluded from others" because it appears itself as excluded from others, because it is mistakenly determined to be identical with what is excluded from others by those under delusion, and because it results in the apprehension of objects as excluded from others. |
tenāpohaḥ śabdārtha iti prasiddham | Therefore it is well-known that apoha [exclusion] is the meaning of words. |
tatra vidhivādinaś codayanti yadi bhavatāṃ dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyalakṣaṇā upādhayo viśeṣaṇāni śabdapratyayaṃ prati nimittāni paramārthato na santi, tat kathaṃ loke daṇḍītyabhidhānapratyayāḥ pravartante dravyādyupādhinimittāḥ | On this point, the Realists object: "If according to you there ultimately do not exist qualifying factors characterized as substance, quality, action, universal, particular and inherence as grounds for verbal cognition, then how do verbal expressions and cognitions like 'stick-bearer' arise in the world based on adjuncts like substance etc.?" |
tathā hi daṇḍī viṣāṇītyādidhīdhvanī loke dravyopādhikau prasiddhau, śuklaḥ kṛṣṇa iti guṇopādhikau, calati bhramatīti karmanimittau, asti vidyata iti sattāpravṛttinimittakau, gaur aśvo hastīti sāmānyaviśeṣopādhī, iha tantuṣu paṭa iti samavāyabalāt | For indeed, expressions and cognitions like 'stick-bearer' and 'horned one' are well-known in the world as based on substance-adjuncts, [expressions like] 'white' and 'black' are based on quality-adjuncts, [expressions like] 'moves' and 'revolves' are based on action, [expressions like] 'is' and 'exists' are based on being, [expressions like] 'cow', 'horse', 'elephant' are based on universal-particular adjuncts, [and expressions like] 'cloth in these threads' [arise] from the force of inherence. |
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