sanskrit
stringlengths
2
508
english
stringlengths
2
924
prasādhitodayānantaravināśāś ca /
And [they are entities whose] destruction immediately follows [their] arising, as has been established.
tenaiteṣvapi samayakālaparidṛṣṭasya svabhāvasya na vyavahārakāleṣvanvayo 'stīti nāsiddhatā hetoḥ //
Therefore, even in these cases, the nature that was observed at the time of convention is not present at the times of usage; hence the reason is not unproven.
aśakyaṃ samayasyāsya jāte 'jāte ca kalpanam / nājāte samayo yukto bhāviko 'śvaviṣāṇavat //
Convention cannot be conceived of in relation to either the arisen or the not-yet-arisen. No real convention is possible regarding the not-yet-arisen, just as [no convention is possible] regarding a horse's horn.
upajāte gṛhītānāṃ pūrvaṃ vācāmanusmṛtau / kriyate samayas tatra cirātīte kathaṃ nu tat //
Regarding what has arisen, convention occurs upon recollection of previously apprehended words. How could that [convention] occur regarding what has long since passed away?
sarva eva bhāvāḥ pūrvaṃ prasādhitodayānantarāpavargās teṣu samayaḥ kriyamāṇaḥ kadācidanutpanneṣu vā kriyeta, utpanneṣu vā /
All entities, as previously established, cease immediately after [their] arising. Convention regarding them, if made, would have to be made either before they have arisen or after they have arisen.
tatra na tāvad anutpanneṣu paramārthna samayo yuktaḥ, asataḥ tenājāte 'pi putrādau samayadarśanān na dṛṣṭavirodhaḥ, tasya vikalpanirmitārthaviṣayatvenābhāvikatvāt /
In this regard, convention regarding not-yet-arisen [things] is not ultimately possible, as [they are] non-existent. Therefore, although convention is observed regarding not-yet-born sons and such, [this] does not contradict [our] observation, because such [convention] is unreal, having as its object something constructed by conceptual thought.
aśvaviṣāṇavad iti / saptamyantād vatiḥ /
"[It is] like a horse's horn"; the affix -vat [is added] to a word ending in the locative case.
nāpyutpanne samayo yuktaḥ, tathā hi tasminn anubhavotpattau satyāṃ tat pūrvake ca nāmabhedasmaraṇe sati samayaḥ kāryo nānyathātiprasaṅgāt /
Nor is convention possible regarding something [already] produced, because a convention can only be made when there has been an apprehension of it and when there has been a prior remembrance of its name and distinguishing features – [it cannot be] otherwise, as [this would lead to] unwanted consequences.
tataś ca nāmabhedasmaraṇakāle kṣaṇadhvaṃsitayā ciraniruddhaṃ svalakṣaṇamiti, nājātavajjāte 'pi bhāvikaḥ samayaḥ samasti, samayakriyākāle dvayor apy asannihitatvāt /
And thus, at the time of remembering the name and distinguishing features, the particular [object] has long since ceased due to [its] momentary destruction; therefore, just as with something unborn, even for something [already] produced there can be no effective convention, since at the time of making the convention both are equally absent.
tathā hy anubhavāvasthāyām api tāvat tat kāraṇatayā svalakṣaṇaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ na sannihitasattākaṃ bhavati /
For even at the very moment of perception, the particular, being momentary, does not have present existence as the cause of that [perception].
kiṃ punar anubhavottarakālabhāvinām abhedābhogasmaraṇotpādakāle bhaviṣyati /
How much less will it exist at the time when there arises the memory of non-difference of things that occur after the perception?
yaścāpi tatsajātīyas tadbalena tadāparaḥ / na tatra samayābhogaḥ sādṛśyaṃ ca vikalpitam /
And regarding that other [thing] which is of the same kind [and which appears] through the power of that [first thing], convention cannot apply to it, and [its] similarity [to the first] is merely conceptual.
yadyapi samayakriyākāle sannihitaṃ kṣaṇāntaram asti tathāpi tatra samayābhogāsambhavān na samayo yuktaḥ na hyaśvamupalabhya tannāmasmaraṇopakramapūrvakaṃ samayaṃ kurvāṇas tatkāla sannihite gavādāvābhogāviṣayīkṛte 'śva iti samayaṃ samayakṛtkaścitkaroti /
Although another moment is present at the time of making the convention, nevertheless convention is not possible because convention cannot apply to it – for when someone making a convention perceives a horse and makes a convention after first remembering its name, they do not make the convention "this is a horse" regarding a cow or other [animal] that happens to be present at that time [but] which has not been made the object of that awareness.
athāpi syāt sarveṣāṃ svalakṣaṇānāṃ sādṛśyam asti tenaikatvamadhyavasāyasamayaḥ kariṣyata ity āha sādṛśyaṃ ca vikalpitam iti /
If it should be objected that "there is similarity among all particulars, therefore convention will be made based on the determination of their unity," [the author] states "and similarity is conceptual."
vikalpabuddhisamāropitaṃ hi sādṛśyaṃ, tasya ca dhvanibhiḥ pratipādanaṃ sati svalakṣaṇamavācyam eva syāt /
For similarity is superimposed by conceptual cognition, and if that [similarity] were to be denoted by words, the particular would indeed be inexpressible.
tadevaṃ na svalakṣaṇe samayaḥ sambhavati /
Thus convention is not possible regarding the particular.
nāpi śabdasvalakṣaṇasya, tathā hi samayakāraḥ smṛtyupasthāpitam eva nāmabhedamarthe yojayati /
Nor [can this be valid] with respect to the specific individuality of the word, for the maker of convention merely applies a particular name, [which has been] brought up by memory, to an object.
na ca smṛtirbhāvato 'nubhūtam evābhilāpamupasthāpayituṃ śaknoti, tasya ciraniruddhatvāt /
And memory cannot bring up the verbal expression that was actually experienced before, because that [expression] has ceased [to exist] long ago.
yaccoccārayati tasya pūrvamananubhūtatvān na tatra smṛtiḥ, nacāviṣayīkṛtastayā samupasthāpayituṃ śakyaḥ /
And what one pronounces [now] cannot be remembered because it was not experienced before, and what has not been made an object [of memory] cannot be brought up by it.
ataḥ smṛtyupasthāpitamanusandhīyamānaṃ vikalpanirmitatvenāsvalakṣaṇam eveti na svalakṣaṇasya samayaḥ /
Therefore, what is brought up by memory and [subsequently] recognized, being constructed by conceptual thought, is not the specific individuality; thus there can be no convention regarding the specific individuality.
tasmād avyapadeśyaṃ svalakṣaṇam iti siddham //
Therefore it is established that the specific individuality is indefinable [by words].
atraiva svalakṣaṇāvācyatvasiddhyaiḥ pramāṇāntaram āha uṣṇādītyādi /
Here [the author] states another proof for establishing the inexpressibility of the specific individuality, [beginning with] "uṣṇādi" etc.
yathā hyuṣṇādyarthaviṣayendriyabuddhiḥ sphuṭapratibhāsā vedyate na tathoṣṇādiśabdabhāvinī, na hyupahatanayanarasanaghrāṇādayo mātuliṅgādiśabdaśravaṇāt tadrūparasādyanubhāvino bhavanti yathānupahatanayanādaya indriyadhiyānubhavantaḥ /
For just as the sensory cognition regarding objects like heat is experienced as having a clear appearance, the [cognition] arising from words like 'hot' is not so; for those whose eyes, tongue, nose etc. are impaired do not experience the form, taste etc. of that [object] upon hearing words like 'mātuliṅga' [citron], whereas those whose eyes etc. are unimpaired experience [these] through sensory cognition.
yathoktam "anyathaivāgnisambandhād dāhaṃ dagdho 'bhimanyate / anyathā dāhaśabdena dāhārthaḥ samprakāśate" //
As it has been said: "The burned person conceives of burning one way through contact with fire, [but] the meaning of burning appears differently through the word 'burning.'"
tadarthendriyabuddhivad iti vaidharmodāharaṇam /
This is an example of dissimilarity with respect to sense-object cognition.
yadi nāma sā tathā na bhavati, tathāpi kimiti śabdasya svalakṣaṇamartho na bhavatītyāha na sa tasyetyādi /
Even if that [word-generated cognition] is not like that [sense cognition], why can't the specific individuality be the object of the word? [To this he] says "na sa tasya" etc.
pratyaye sati bhātyartho rūpabodhe tathā rasaḥ //
When [a cognition exists], the object appears [in it], just as taste does not appear in the cognition of form.
prayogaḥ yo hi tatkṛte pratyaye na pratibhāsate na sa tasyārthaḥ, yathā rūpajanite pratyaye rasaḥ, na pratibhāsate ca śabde pratyaye svalakṣaṇam iti sthāpakānupalabdhiḥ /
When something does not appear in the cognition produced by [another] thing, it cannot be the object of that [thing], just as taste [does not appear] in the cognition produced by form, and the unique particular does not appear in the cognition [produced] by words - thus [there is] non-apprehension of the establishing [factor].
atra cātiprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam /
Here, [the proof of] overextension is the invalidating means of knowledge.
tathā hi śabdasya tadviṣayajñānajanakatvam eva tadvācakatvam ucyate nānyatnaca yadvijñānaṃ yadākāraśūnyaṃ tat tadviṣayaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /
For indeed, when a word is said to be denotative of something, it means only that it generates knowledge of that object, nothing else; and a cognition that is devoid of the form of something cannot properly be [said to be] about that object, due to overextension.
na caikasya rūpadvayam asti spaṣṭāspaṣṭaṃ, yenāspaṣṭaṃ vastugatam eva rūpaṃ śabdair abhidhīyata iti syāt /
And one [thing] cannot have two forms - distinct and indistinct - by which the indistinct form inherent in the object could be what is denoted by words.
ekasya dvitvavirodhāt bhinnasamayasthāyināṃ ca parasparaviruddhasvabhāvapratipādanāt // naiyāyikās tu bruvate "vyaktyākṛtijātayastu padārtha" iti /
Because oneness contradicts twoness, and because it has been established that things existing at different times have mutually contradictory natures. The Naiyāyikas, however, declare: "The Individual, Configuration and Universal - these are the meaning of a word."
padasyārthaḥ padārthaḥ" śabdārtha iti yāvat /
"Padārtha" [means] the "meaning (artha) of a word (pada)," that is, the meaning of a verbal expression.
tatra vyaktiśabdena dravyaguṇaviśeṣakarmāṇyabhidhīyante /
There, by the term "Individual" are meant substances, qualities, ultimate particulars and actions.
tathāca sūtraṃ "vyaktir guṇaviśeṣāśrayo mūrtir" iti /
And thus [states] the sūtra: "The Individual is the corporeal [entity] which is the substrate of qualities and particulars."
asyārtho vārtikakāramatena tāvad ucyate viśeṣyata iti viśeṣaḥ, guṇebhyo viśeṣo guṇaviśeṣaḥ karmābhidhīyate /
According to the opinion of the author of the Vārtika, the meaning of this is stated thus: "particular" is that which is differentiated; "quality-particular" is that which is differentiated from qualities, [which means] action is referred to.
dvitīyaścātra guṇaviśeṣaṇaśabda ekaśeṣaṃ kṛtvā nirdiṣṭaḥ tena guṇapadārthaḥ
Here, this same term 'guṇaviśeṣaṇa', taken a second time through ekaśeṣa, refers to [the category of] Quality.
guṇāś ca te viśeṣāśceti guṇaviśeṣāḥ viśeṣagrahaṇamākṛtinirāsārtham / tathā hyākṛtiḥ saṃyogaviśeṣaḥ svasvabhāvāt saṃyogaś ca guṇapadārthāntargataḥ tataścāsati viśeṣagrahaṇe ākṛter api grahaṇaṃ syāt /
[The compound] 'guṇaviśeṣāḥ' means 'qualities and particulars'; the term 'viśeṣa' is used to exclude Configuration [ākṛti], because Configuration is a particular type of Conjunction, and Conjunction is included under the category of Quality; thus, without the term 'viśeṣa', Configuration would also be included.
naca tasyā vyaktāvantarbhāva iṣyata pṛthakśabdena tasyā upādānāt /
And [Configuration] is not meant to be included under 'Individual' [vyakti], as it is mentioned by a separate word.
āśrayaśabdena dravyamabhidhīyate teṣāṃ guṇaviśeṣāṇām āśrayas tadāśrayo dravyamity arthaḥ /
The term 'āśraya' denotes Substance, [which is] the substratum of those particular Qualities; thus the meaning is "that substance [which is] their substratum."
sūtre tacchabdalopaṃ kṛtvā nirdeśaḥ kṛtaḥ /
In the sūtra, the indication is made by dropping the word 'tat'.
evaṃ vigrahaḥ kartavyaḥ guṇaviśeṣāś ca guṇaviśeṣāśceti guṇaviśeṣāḥ, guṇaviśeṣāś ca tadāśrayaśceti guṇaviśeṣāśrayaḥ, samāhāradvandvaścāyam lokāśrayatvāl liṅgasyeti napuṃsakaliṅgānirdeśaḥ /
The compound should be analyzed thus: 'guṇaviśeṣāḥ and guṇaviśeṣāḥ [makes] guṇaviśeṣāḥ, and guṇaviśeṣāḥ and tadāśrayaḥ [makes] guṇaviśeṣāśrayaḥ'; this is a collective dvandva compound, but the neuter gender is not used since gender usage depends on common practice.
tenāyam artho bhavati yo 'yaṃ guṇaviśeṣāśrayaḥ sā vyaktiścocyate mūrtiśceti /
Thus the meaning becomes: "That which is the substratum of particular qualities is called Individual [vyakti] and Composite [mūrti]."
tatra yadā dravye mūrtiśabdas tadādhikaraṇasādhano draṣṭavyaḥ mūrcchantyasminnavayavā iti mūrtiḥ /
There, when the word 'mūrti' is applied to Substance, it should be understood as having locative derivation, [meaning] "that in which parts adhere [is called] mūrti."
yadā tu rūpādiṣu tadā kartṛsādhanaḥ mūrcchanti dravye samavayantīti rūpādayo mūrtiḥ /
But when [applied] to Color and other [qualities], it has an agentive derivation, [meaning] "Color and other [qualities] which adhere [or] inhere in substances [are called] mūrti."
vyaktiśabdas tu dravye karmasādhano rūpādiṣu karaṇasādhanaḥ /
The word 'vyakti', however, has an objective derivation when [applied] to Substances and an instrumental derivation when [applied] to Color and other [qualities].
bhāṣyakāramatena tu yathāśruti sūtrārthaḥ guṇaviśeṣāṇām āśrayo dravyameva vyaktir mūrtiśceti tasyeṣṭam
According to the Bhāṣyakāra [Vātsyāyana], the meaning of the sūtra is to be taken literally [as]: "That which is the receptacle of specific qualities is the Individual [vyakti], and that [same thing] is the material body [mūrti]."
yathoktam ---"guṇaviśeṣāṇāṃ rūparasagandhasparśānāṃ gurutvadravatvaghanatvasaṃskārāṇām avyāpinaś ca parimāṇaviśeṣasyāśrayo yathāsambhavaṃ taddravyaṃ mūrtimūrcchitāvayavatvavad"iti
As it has been stated: "That substance which is the receptacle of specific qualities - color, taste, odor and touch - and [also] of gravity, fluidity, solidity, faculty, and of the non-pervasive specific dimension, is [called] 'mūrti' because it possesses consolidated parts."
ākṛtiśabdena prāṇyavayavānāṃ pāṇyādīnāṃ tadavayavānāṃ cāṅgulyādīnāṃ saṃyogo 'bhidhīyate
The term 'ākṛti' denotes the conjunction of the limbs of living beings such as hands and their parts such as fingers.
asya bhāṣyam ---"yayā jātir jātiliṅgāni cākhyāyante tāmākṛtiṃ vidyāt, sā ca nānyā sattvāvayavānāṃ tadavayavānāṃ ca niyatād vyūhāt" iti
The Bhāṣya on this [states]: "One should know as ākṛti that by which the universal and the characteristics of the universal are indicated, and this [ākṛti] is nothing other than the definite arrangement of the parts of an entity and their components."
vyūhaśabdena saṃyogaviśeṣa ucyate
By the term 'vyūha' [arrangement] a specific type of conjunction is meant.
niyatagrahaṇena kṛtrimasaṃyoganirāsaḥ
By the use of [the word] 'niyata' [definite], artificial conjunctions are excluded.
tatra jātiliṅgāni prāṇyavayavāḥ śiraḥpāṇyādayaḥ, tair hi gotvādilakṣaṇā jātir liṅgyate
In this context, the characteristics of the universal are the limbs of living beings such as head and hands, for by these the universal characterized as cowness and so forth is indicated.
ākṛtyā tu kadācit sākṣāj jātir vyajyate yadā śiraḥpāṇyādisaṃniveśadarśanād gotvaṃ vyajyate
Sometimes the universal is manifested directly through the configuration, [such as] when cowness is manifested from seeing the arrangement of head, hands, and so forth.
kadācijjātiliṅgāni yadā viṣaṇādibhir avayavaiḥ pṛthakpṛthaksvāvayavasanniveśābhivyaktair gotvādir vyajyate
Sometimes [it is manifested] through the characteristics of the universal, [such as] when cowness and so forth is manifested by parts like horns which are manifested through the arrangement of their own parts separately.
tena jātes talliṅgānāṃ ca prakhyāpikā bhavatyākṛtiḥ
Thus configuration becomes that which indicates both the universal and its characteristics.
jātiśabdenābhinnābhidhānapratyayaprasavanimittaṃ sāmānyākhyaṃ vastūcyate
By the term 'jāti', that entity called 'universal' [sāmānya] is meant which is the basis for the production of non-different names and cognitions.
tathāca "sūtraṃ samānaprasavātmikā jāti"riti samānapratyayotpattikāraṇaṃjātir ity arthaḥ
And thus [according to] the sūtra "jāti is that which has the nature of producing similar [cognitions]," the meaning is that universal is the cause of the production of similar cognitions.
tatra vyakyākṛtyor etenaiva svalakṣaṇasya śabdārthatvanirākaraṇena śabdārthatvanirākaraṇaṃ boddhavyam
With regard to individual and configuration, their rejection as word-meanings should be understood through this very rejection of specific characteristic as word-meaning.
jātes tu paścān nirākaraṇaṃ bhaviṣyatītyabhiprāyaḥ /
[It means that] the rejection of the jāti [Universal] will come later.
nirākṛtir iti śabdārthatveneti śeṣaḥ /
[The term] 'nirākṛti' [rejection] [is to be understood] as forming the śabdārtha [import of words].
kasmād ity āha svalakṣaṇātmataivetyādi / tayor iti vyaktyākṛtyoḥ /
[When one asks] "why?," [the answer is that] both of these (tayoḥ) [namely] vyakti and ākṛti [Individual and Configuration] are of the nature of svalakṣaṇa [Specific Individuality].
tena yathā svalakṣaṇasyākṛtasamayatvādaśabdārthatvaṃ tathā tayor apītyato 'kṛtasamayatvādityasya hetor nāsiddhir nāpyanaikāntikateti bhāvaḥ //
Therefore, just as svalakṣaṇa cannot be śabdārtha [denoted by words] due to [its] akṛtasamayatva [inability to be subject to convention], similarly for these two also; hence this reason [of akṛtasamayatva] is neither unproven nor inconclusive.
kiṃ ca vyaktir dravyaguṇaviśeṣakarmalakṣaṇā, ākṛtiś ca saṃyogātmikā ete ca dravyādayaḥ prāgeva pratiṣiddhā ityato 'pi śabdārthatvamanayor asadbhāvān
Moreover, since vyakti [Individual] characterized by substance, quality, particularity and action, and ākṛti [Configuration] consisting of conjunction, and these [categories] beginning with substance have already been rejected, therefore due to their non-existence, [their] being śabdārtha [word-meaning] [is impossible].
na yuktam iti darśayati dravyādītyādi /
[Thus] he shows through [the words] beginning with "dravyādi" that [their being word-meaning] is not proper.
dravyādiyogayoḥ prāktu pratiṣedhābhidhānataḥ / na tātvikī tayor yuktā śabdārthatvavyavasthitiḥ //
Because substance etc. and [their] connection have been previously rejected in detail, their establishment as real śabdārtha [word-meanings] is not possible.
evaṃ tāvat svalakṣaṇe samayāsambhavaṃ pratipādya jātyādiṣu triṣu samayāsambhavaṃ pratipādayann āha jātisambandhayor ityādi /
Having thus first explained the impossibility of convention regarding svalakṣaṇa [Specific Individualities], [now] explaining the impossibility of convention regarding the three beginning with jāti [Universal], he states [the verse] beginning with "jātisambandhayor."
nānāntarāḥ prakalpyante śabdārthās trividhāḥ pare // anantarā iti /
The remaining three types of śabdārtha [word-meanings] are conceived as "the others" [namely] jāti [Universal], [its] connection, and [that which] possesses it.
svalakṣaṇamuktā jātis tadyogo jātimāniti jātitadyogayorabhāvāt tadvato 'pyasambhava eva, tat kṛtatvāt tadvyapadeśasya, tadvataś ca svalakṣaṇātmakatvāt /
Apart from svalakṣaṇa [Specific Individuality], [there are] jāti [Universal], its connection, and [that which] possesses jāti; due to the non-existence of jāti and its connection, [that which] possesses it is also impossible, because naming is done with reference to that [Universal], and because that which possesses it is of the nature of svalakṣaṇa.
tat pakṣabhāvī doṣaḥ samāna eveti bhāvaḥ /
[This means that] the defect pertaining to [that] position is exactly the same.
jātiḥ padārtha iti vājā{kā}tyāyanaḥ, dravyam iti vyāḍiḥ, ubhayaṃ pāṇiniḥ /
"The Universal is the referent of words," says Kātyāyana; "Substance is [the referent of words]," says Vyāḍi; "Both [Universal and Substance are the referents]," says Pāṇini.
tadapyanenaiva nirastam jāter ayogāddravyasya ca svalakṣaṇātmakatvāt tat pakṣabhāvidoṣānivṛtteḥ //
This too is refuted by the same [argument], because the Universal has no [real] connection [with words], and because Substance has the nature of a Specific Individual, [and thus] the defects pertaining to that position cannot be removed.
upasaṃharann āha tadvyaktyākṛtītyādi /
Summing up, [the author] states "tadvyaktyākṛti" etc.
taditi tasmāt /
'Tat' means "for these reasons."
nīrūpateti niḥsvabhāvatā //
'Nīrūpatā' means "having no intrinsic nature."
buddhyākāraś ca buddhistho nārthabuddhyantarānugaḥ /
And the form-of-cognition resides in cognition [itself] and does not follow either the object or another cognition.
nābhipretārthakārī ca so 'pi vācyo na tattvataḥ //
And it does not serve the intended purpose, nor can it truly be denoted [by words].
buddhyākāro hi tādātmyena buddhāvevāvasthita iti nāsau tadbuddhisvarūpavat pratipādyamarthaṃ buddhyantaraṃ vānugacchati, tataś ca saṅketavyavahārāptakālāvyāpakatvāt svalakṣaṇavan na tatrāpi samayaḥ sambhavati, bhavatu vā tasya vyavahārakālānvayas tathāpi na tatra samayo vyavahartrṇāṃ yuktaḥ /
Indeed, the form-of-cognition, being identical in nature [with cognition], exists only in cognition, and therefore, like the nature of that cognition [itself], it follows neither the object to be cognized nor another cognition; consequently, since it is not present at the time of convention and usage, no convention regarding it is possible, just as with a Specific Individual; and even if it were to be present at the time of usage, a convention regarding it would not be reasonable for users [of language].
tathā hi api nāmetaḥ śabdād arthakriyārthī pumān arthakriyākṣamānarthān vijñāya pravartiṣyate teṣviti manyamānair vyavahartṛbhir abhidhāyakāni yojyante na vyasanitayā na cāsau vikalpabuddhyākāro 'bhipretaṃ śītāpanodādikāryaṃ tadarthinaḥ sampādayitumalam tadanubhavotpattāvapi tadabhāvāt /
For indeed, [thinking] "from this word, a person seeking to accomplish something will proceed after understanding which things are capable of [producing] effects," users [of language] employ expressive [words], not out of mere habit; and that conceptual form-of-cognition is not capable of accomplishing the intended purpose such as removal of cold for one who desires it, because even when such experience arises, that [desired effect] is absent.
tena tatrā samayābhāvān nāsiddho 'kṛtasamayatvād iti hetuḥ //
Thus, since there can be no convention [made] in this case, our reason "because no convention can be made regarding it" cannot be [considered] unproven.
syād etat astyarthadayo 'pare śabdārthāḥ santi
[Someone] might say this: "There are other word-meanings, [such as those] denoted by [the verb] 'asti' and others."
tataś ca tatra samayasambhavād asiddhataiva hetor ityata āha ye 'nye 'nyathaivetyādi
And therefore, since convention would be possible regarding these, the reason would indeed be unproven - to [address] this [objection], [the text] states "ye 'nye 'nyathaiva" etc.
ye 'nye 'nyathaiva śabdārthamastyarthādīn pracakṣate
[Those] others who declare the meaning of words differently, [namely] as [consisting in] the meaning of 'asti' and similar [verbs]
nirastā eva te 'pyetais tathāpi punar ucyate
They too are already refuted by these [arguments], yet [this] is being stated again.
etair iti svalakṣaṇādiśabdārthapratiṣedhaiḥ
[It is refuted] by these, namely by the refutations of word-meanings [like] svalakṣaṇa and others.
teṣāṃ svalakṣaṇādiṣvevāntarbhāvād iti bhāvaḥ
Because these [meanings] are included within svalakṣaṇa and other [categories] themselves - this is the intended meaning.
astyarthaḥ sarvaśabdānām iti pratyāyyalakṣaṇam
They say that the characteristic of what is to be conveyed is the meaning of [the verb] 'asti' for all words.
apūrvadevatāsvargaiḥ samamāhur gavādiṣu
They declare [this to be] similar to [words like] apūrva, devatā and svarga in [relation to words like] 'cow' etc.
itiśabdo bhinnakramaḥ astyartha ityasyānantaraṃ sambadhyate
The word 'iti' has a different order [and] is to be connected immediately after "astyartha".
tenāyam artho bhavati astyartha iti yadetat pratīyate tat sarvaśabdānāṃ pratyāyyasyābhidheyasya lakṣaṇam
Therefore this is the meaning: what is understood as the meaning of [the verb] 'asti' - that is the characteristic of what is to be denoted [and] expressed by all words.
śabdārthasya lakṣaṇam iti yāvat
That is to say, [it is] the characteristic of word-meaning.
tena gavādiṣvartheṣu viṣayabhūteṣu yadgavādiśabdapratyāyyaṃ tadapūrvadevatāsvargais tulyamityāhuḥ
[They say that] in the case of referents like 'cow' etc., what is denoted by words like 'cow' is similar to [what is denoted by words like] 'apūrva', 'devatā', and 'svarga'.
apūrvādiśabdārthais tattulyamityevam āhur ity arthaḥ
The meaning is that they say it is similar to what is meant by words like 'apūrva' etc.
yathaiva hyapūrvādiśabdā nārthākāraviśeṣaṃ buddhiṣu sanniveśayanti kevalaṃtatraitāvat pratīyate santi ke 'pyarthā yeṣvapūrvādayaḥ śabdāḥ prayujyanta iti
Just as words like 'apūrva' do not produce any specific form of their objects in cognitions, [but] only this much is understood: that there exist certain things to which words like 'apūrva' are applied.
tathā dṛṣṭārtheṣvapi gavādiśabdeṣu tulyam
Similarly it is the same with words like 'cow' etc. whose referents are perceptible.
yatas tebhyo 'pyevaṃ pratīyate asti ko 'pyartho gavādiśabdābhidheyo gotvādisāmānyasambaddho veti
Because from these [words] too it is thus understood that there exists something that is denoted by the word 'cow' or that is connected with the universal 'cowness' etc.
yastu tatrākāraviśeṣaparigrahaḥ keṣāñcid upajāyate, sa teṣāṃ siddhāntabalāt
However, the grasping of a particular form that arises in some [people's minds] is due to the force of their doctrinal positions.
ādiśabdenopāttāṭśabdārthāndarśayann āha samudāya ityādi
Showing the meanings of words included by the term "ādi", he says "samudāya" etc.
samudāyo 'bhidheyo vāpyavikalpasamuccayaḥ
Either an aggregate without distributive or collective determination is what is denoted,
asatyo vāpi saṃsargaḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiściducyate
Or an unreal relation is said by some to be the meaning of words.