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kecid brāhmaṇādiśabdais tapojātiśrutādisamudāyo vinā vikalpasamuccayābhyām abhidhīyata ityāhur yathā vanādiśabdair dhavādaya iti | Some say that by words like "brāhmaṇa" etc., an aggregate of austerity, caste, learning etc. is denoted without distributive or collective determination, just as by words like "forest" etc. [are denoted] the dhava trees etc. |
tathā hi vanamityukte dhavo vā khadiro vā palāśo veti na vikalpena pratītir bhavati, nāpi dhavaś ca khadiraś ca palāśaśceti samuccayena apitu sāmānyena, pratīyante dhavādayaḥ | For when "forest" is uttered, the cognition does not arise distributively as "either dhava or khadira or palāśa", nor collectively as "dhava and khadira and palāśa", but rather the dhava etc. are cognized generally. |
tathā brāhmaṇa ityukte tapo vā, jātir vā śrutaṃ vā, tapaś ca jātiś ca śrutaṃ ceti, na pratipattir bhavati | Similarly when "brāhmaṇa" is uttered, there is no cognition either [distributively] as "either austerity or caste or learning" or [collectively] as "austerity and caste and learning". |
api tu sākalyena sambandhyantaravyavacchinnās tapaḥprabhṛtayaḥ saṃhatāḥ pratīyanta iti | Rather, austerity etc. are cognized as combined in their entirety, distinguished from other correlates. |
tatra bahuṣvaniyataikasamudāyibhedāvadhāraṇaṃ vikalpaḥ, ekatra yugapad abhisambadhyamānasya niyatasyānekasya svarūpabhedāvadhāraṇaṃ samuccayaḥ / | The term 'vikalpa' refers to the distinct conception of [selecting] any one individual from among a group consisting of an indefinite number of individuals; and 'samuccaya' refers to the distinct conception of multiple definite individuals related together simultaneously. |
avidyamānau vikalpasamuccayau yasya sa tathoktaḥ / | That [verbal cognition] which is devoid of both vikalpa and samuccaya is called thus. |
anye tu dravyatvādibhir anirddhāritarūpair yaḥ sambandho dravyādīnāṃ sa śabdārthaḥ, sa ca sambandhināṃ śabdārthatvenāsatyatvādasatya ity ucyate / | Others however hold that what is denoted by a word is the relation of things like substances to undefined universals like substancehood; and this is said to be 'unreal' because the relata are not truly denoted by the word. |
yadvā tapaḥśrutādīnāṃ mecakavarṇavadaikyena bhāsanādeṣāmeva parasparamasatyaḥ saṃsargaḥ / tathāhyete pratyekaṃ samuditā vā na svena rūpeṇopalabhyante, kintvalātacakravadeṣāṃ samūhaḥ svarūpamutkramyāvabhāsata iti // | Or, just as [in the case of] dark complexion, [properties like] austerity, learning etc. appear as a single unity, and hence their mutual relationship is unreal. For these are not apprehended in their own form either individually or collectively; rather, their aggregate appears transcending their individual forms, like a whirling firebrand. |
asatyopādhi yat satyaṃ tadvā śabdanibandhanam / | Or the real [entity] with unreal adjuncts is what grounds verbal usage. |
śabdo vāpyabhijalpatvam āgato yāti vācyatām // | Or the word itself, having reached the state of 'abhijalpa', becomes the denoted meaning. |
anye tvāhuḥ yadastyopādhi satyaṃ sa śabdārtha iti / tatra śabdārthatvenāsatyā upādhayo viśeṣā valayāṅgulīyakādayo yasya satyasya, sarvabhedānuyāyinaḥ suvarṇādes sāmānyātmanaḥ, tat satyamasatyopādhi / | Others declare that what has unreal adjuncts while being real is the meaning of words. Here, adjuncts like bracelets and rings are unreal qua word-meanings but belong to something real like gold which has a generic nature and pervades all particular instances - that real [entity] with unreal adjuncts. |
śabdanibandhanam iti śabdapravṛttinimittamabhidheyam ity arthaḥ / | The term "śabdanibandhanam" means that which is to be denoted [and] which is the basis for the application of words. |
anye tubruvate śabda evābhijalpatvam āgataḥ śabdārtha iti // | Others however say that the word itself, having reached the state of 'abhijalpa', is the meaning of words. |
so 'yam ityabhisambandhād rūpamekīkṛtaṃ yadā / śabdasyārthena taṃ śabdam abhijalpaṃ pracakṣate // | When through the connection [expressed as] "this [is] that", the form of the word becomes unified with the object, they call that word [to be in the state of] 'abhijalpa'. |
śabda evārtha ityevaṃ śabde 'rthasya niveśanaṃ so 'yam ityabhisambandhaḥ, tasmāt kāraṇād yadā śabdasyārthena sahaikīkṛtaṃ rūpaṃ bhavati taṃ svīkṛtārthākāraṃ śabdam abhijalpyam ityāhuḥ | When [there is] an imposition of the object upon the word through [expressions] such as "the word is the object" [and] "this is that," [and] when, for this reason, the form of the word becomes unified with the object, they call such a word that has assumed the form of the object "abhijalpya" ["coalesced"]. |
anye tu buddhyārūḍham evākāraṃ bāhyavastuviṣayaṃ bāhyavastutayā gṛhītaṃ buddhirūpatvenāvirbhāvitaṃ śabdārthamāhuḥ | Others, however, say that the meaning of a word is [the form] that has entered consciousness, relates to an external object, is grasped as an external thing, [and] is manifested in the form of consciousness. |
sa bāhyaṃ vastviti jñātaḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiścid iṣyate | Some maintain that the meaning of a word is that which is known as an external object. |
buddhiviṣaya iti | [It means] "the object of consciousness." |
buddhau viparivartamānaḥ, buddhistha iti yāvat | [It means] revolving in consciousness, that is to say, existing in consciousness. |
bāhyavastunibandhana iti | [It means] "based on an external object." |
sadasadbāhyaṃ vastu nibandhanamakṣaracihnasthānīyaṃ svarūpamupadarśayituṃ prakamyate yasya, sa bāhyavastunibandhanaḥ | That which has the real-unreal external object as its basis, standing in place of letter-symbols, whose form is intended to be manifested - that is [called] "based on an external object." |
bāhyaṃ vastvitijñāta iti | [It means] "known as an external object." |
buddhirūpatvenāvirbhāvito bāhyatayādhyavasita ity arthaḥ | The meaning is: manifested in the form of consciousness [but] determined as external. |
tathā hi yāvad buddhirūpamartheṣvapratyastaṃ buddhirūpameveti tattvabhāvanayā gṛhyate, tāvat tasya śabdārthatvaṃ nāvasīyate tatra kriyāviśeṣasambandhābhāvāt | Indeed, as long as the form of consciousness is not imposed upon objects and is grasped through true understanding as merely the form of consciousness, it is not recognized as being the meaning of words, because there [in that case] is no connection with specific action. |
sa śabdārthaḥ | That [alone] is the word-meaning. |
na hi gāmānaya dadhi khādetyādikāḥ kriyās tādṛśi buddhirūpe sambhavanti kriyāyogasambhavī cārthaḥ śabdair abhidhīyate | Indeed, actions such as "bring the cow" [and] "eat the curd" are not possible in relation to a mere mental form, and what words denote is an object capable of [performing] action. |
ato buddhirūpatayā gṛhīto 'sau na śabdārthaḥ | Therefore, that which is grasped as [mere] mental form is not the meaning of words. |
yadā tu bāhyavastuni pratyasto bhavati tadā tasmin pratipattā bāhyatayā viparyastaṃ kriyāsādhanasāmarthyaṃ tasya manyata iti bhavati śabdārthaḥ | However, when [the mental form] becomes superimposed on an external object, then the cognizer, being influenced by its external character, considers it as capable of accomplishing action, and thus it becomes denoted by words. |
nanu cāpohavādipakṣādasya ko viśeṣaḥ | "What indeed is the difference between this [view] and the position of the Apoha-theorist?" |
tathā hi apohavādināpi buddhyākāro bāhyarūpatayā gṛhītaḥ śabdārtha iti bhāṣyata eva | For indeed, even the Apoha-theorist declares that the meaning of words is the form of cognition grasped as something external. |
yathoktam | As has been stated: |
"tadrūpāropagatyānyavyāvṛttyadhigateḥ punaḥ / śabdārtho 'rthaḥ sa eveti vacane na virudhyate" | "There is no contradiction in saying that the object-meaning is precisely that [which is known] through the superimposition of that form and through the understanding of the exclusion of others." |
naitadasti | This is not [correct]. |
ayaṃ hi buddhyākāravādī bāhye vastunyabhrāntaṃ saviṣayaṃ dravyādiṣu pāramārthikeṣvadhyastaṃ buddhyākāraṃ paramārthataḥ śabdārthamicchati | For this proponent of the mental-form theory maintains that the meaning of words is ultimately the mental form [which is] non-erroneous, having a [real] object, [and] superimposed on ultimately real substances and so forth. |
nanu nirālambanaṃ bhinneṣvabhedādhyavasāyena pravṛtter bhrāntamitaretarabhedanibandhanam icchati | [The opponent:] "Does he not accept [it as] groundless, false due to the determination of non-difference in different [things], [and] based on mutual exclusion?" |
yadi tu yathāsmābhirucyate "sarvo mithyāvabhāso 'yam artheṣvekātmanā grahaḥ / itaretarabhedo 'sya bījaṃ saṃjñā yadarthikā" | But if [he held the view] as we state [it]: "All this is a false appearance—this grasping of objects as having one nature; mutual exclusion is its seed, which is what the conventional designation [refers to]." |
tathā ca vakṣyati "itaretarabhedo 'sya bījaṃ cet pakṣa eṣa naḥ" | And thus he will say: "If mutual exclusion is its seed, then this is [exactly] our position." |
na cāpohavādinā paramārthataḥ kiñcid vācyaṃ buddhyākāro 'nyo vā śabdānām iṣyate | And the Apoha-theorist does not accept anything as ultimately expressible by words, whether [it be] the mental form or something else. |
tathā hi ya eva śābde pratyaye vyavasīyamānatayā pratibhāsate sa śabdārthaḥ | For indeed, that which appears as being determined in verbal cognition is the meaning of words. |
naca buddhyākāraḥ śābdapratyayena vyavasīyate, kiṃ tarhi bāhyam evārthakriyākāri vastu | And the mental form is not determined by verbal cognition, but rather the external object capable of causal efficacy. |
nacāpi tena bāhyaṃ paramārthato vyavasīyate, yathātattvam anadhyavasāyāt, yathāvyavasāyam atattvāt | Nor is the external [object] ultimately determined by it, because there is no determination according to reality, [and] according to determination there is no reality. |
ataḥ samāropita eva śabdārthaḥ / | Thus the meaning of words is [something that is] merely superimposed. |
yacca samāropitaṃ tan na kiñcid iti na kiñcidbhāvato 'bhidhīyate śabdaiḥ / | And since what is superimposed is nothing, therefore nothing real is denoted by words. |
yat punar uktam ---"śabdārtho 'rthaḥ saḥ eve"ti tat samāropitamevārtham abhisandhāya / | As for what was said [by the opponent] that "the meaning of words is that very object," [that was] said only with reference to the superimposed object. |
buddhyākāravādinā tu buddhyākāraḥ paramārthato vācya iṣyata iti mahānviśeṣaḥ // | But according to the proponent of the mental-form theory, the form in consciousness is what is truly denoted [by words] - this is the major difference. |
abhyāsāt pratibhāhetuḥ sarvaḥ śabdaḥ samāsataḥ / | In brief, every word becomes a cause of intuitive understanding through repeated usage. |
bālānāṃ ca tiraścāṃ ca yathārthapratipādane // | [This is seen] in making objects known to both children and animals. |
śabdasya kvacid viṣaye punaḥ punaḥ pravṛttidarśanamabhyāsaḥ / | 'Repeated usage' means observing a word being applied again and again to some particular object. |
niyatasādhanāvacchinnakriyāpratipattyanukūlā prajñā pratibhā / | 'Intuitive understanding' is the mental capacity conducive to grasping an action as limited by specific means. |
sā prayogadarśanāvṛttisahitena śabdena janyate / | This [capacity] is generated by words accompanied by repeated observation of their usage. |
prativākyaṃ pratipuruṣaṃ ca sā bhidyate / | It differs with each sentence and with each person. |
sa tu tasyā aparimāṇo bhedaḥ śabdavyavahārasyānantyān na śakyate vidhātumityata āha bālānāṃ ca tiraścāṃ cetyādi / | But since that diversity of it is immeasurable due to the endlessness of verbal usage, it cannot be prescribed - hence [the author] mentions [the example of] children and animals, etc. |
yathaiva hyaṅkuśābhighātādayo hastyādīnām arthapratipattau kriyamāṇāyāṃ pratibhāmātropasaṃhārahetavo bhavanti na tvarthaṃ sākṣāt pratipādayanti / | Just as the stroke of the goad [and similar actions], when employed to make elephants [and other animals] understand things, become causes for mere intuition and do not directly convey the meaning, |
anyathā hi kathaṃ parasparaparāhatāḥ pravacanabhedā utpādyakathāprabandhāś ca svavikalpoparacitapadārthabhedadyotakāḥ syur iti // | For otherwise, how could there be mutually contradictory interpretations of sacred texts, and how could there be literary compositions and stories revealing objects constructed by one's own imagination? |
tatretyādinā pratividhatte | [The text] responds with [the word] "tatra" and so forth. |
tatrāstyartho 'bhidheyo 'yaṃ kiṃ svalakṣaṇamiṣyate / jātir yogo 'tha yadvānya{t} buddher vā pratibimbakam // ete svadoṣāḥ pūrvoktā astyarthe kevale 'pi ca / | Is this denotable "existence" meant to be the particular, the universal, the relation, or something else that reflects cognition? These respective faults that were previously stated [apply] even to mere existence. |
pratipādye na bhedena vyavahāro 'vakalpate // | In what is to be conveyed, differentiated usage is not possible. |
yadyastyarthaḥ pūrvoditasvalakṣaṇādisvabhāva iṣyate / tadā pūrvoditadoṣaprasaṅgaḥ / | If existence is held to be of the nature of the particular and other [categories] mentioned before, then the previously stated faults would follow. |
kiñcānirdhāritarūpaviśeṣatvād astyarthasya tasmin kevale śabdaiḥ pratipadyamāne gaurgavayo gaja ityādibhedena vyavahāro na syāt tasya śabdair apratipāditatvāt // | Moreover, since existence has no determinate specific form, if that alone were to be conveyed by words, there could not be differentiated usage through [words] like "cow," "gavaya," "elephant," etc., because these would not be denoted by words at all. |
gotvetyādinā parasyottaramāśaṅkate | [The text] anticipates the opponent's reply with [the words] "gotva" and so forth. |
gotvaśabdaviśiṣṭārthasattāmātragater bhavet / | "[Usage] would be based on mere existence as qualified by the universal cowness and the word ['cow']." |
viṣāṇākṛtinīlādibhedākhyātestu tanmatam // | "And that view [arises] due to the appearance of differences such as horns, shape, blue [color], etc." |
syād etat gotvaśabdābhyāṃ viśiṣṭasyārthasattāmātrasya sāvaleyatvādibhedarahitasya gośabdādgateḥ pratīteḥ kāranāt / bhedena vyavahāro bhaviṣyatīti / | "[It might be argued that] the diverse usage would proceed from the cognition of mere being [as expressed by the verb 'to be'], qualified by the Universal 'cow' and the word 'cow', devoid of distinctions like variegated color, etc., as cognized from the word 'cow'." |
yadyevaṃ kathaṃ tarhi śabdārthatvamastyarthamātrasya mataṃ yāvatā gavādiviśeṣaḥ pratipādyo 'styevetyāśaṅkya paraḥ parihāram āha viṣāṇākṛtītyādi / | "If that is so, then how can the denotation of the word be said to consist in mere being, when such particulars as 'cow' etc. are also meant to be denoted?" — [thinking thus], the opponent gives [his] answer beginning with 'horns and form'." |
viṣāṇāder viśeṣasya śabdākhyāter apratīteḥ kāraṇāt tadyuktam asti kaścid arthaḥ pratyāyya iti na tu gotvādigotvādiśabdayor viśeṣaṇabhūtayor apratīter ityadoṣaḥ // | "Because particulars like horns etc. are not cognized from verbal expression, therefore it is proper [to say] that there is some object to be conveyed, but there is no fault [in this view] since the two qualifying entities — the Universal 'cow' and the word 'cow' — are not [directly] cognized." |
nanvevam ityādinā pratividhatte | "[The author] responds with [the words] beginning with 'if this be so'." |
nanvevaṃ tadvato 'rthasya bhedānāṃ cābhidhā bhavet / | "If this be so, then there should be denotation both of the thing possessing those [qualities] and of the diverse particulars." |
tadbhāve tatra doṣaś ca nānyo 'styarthaś ca dṛśyate // | "In that case there would be the [aforementioned] fault, and no other being [apart from these] is observed." |
yadā gotvādinā viśiṣṭārthamātram ucyate iti mataṃ, tadā tadvato 'rthasyābhidhānamaṅgīkṛtaṃ syāt / tatra ca jātes tat samavāyasya ca niṣedhāt tadvato 'rthasyāsambhava iti pūrvokto doṣaḥ / | "When it is held that only the object qualified by cowness etc. is expressed, then the denotation of the object possessing that [universal] would have to be accepted. And in that case, due to the rejection of the universal and its inherence, there would be impossibility of an object possessing these — this is the previously stated fault." |
kiṃ ca tadvato 'rthasya svalakṣaṇātmakatvād aśakyasamayatvam anyavahāryatvamaspaṣṭāvabhāsaprasaṅgaś ca pūrvavadāpadyate eva / | "Moreover, since the object possessing these [qualities] would be of the nature of specific particularity, it would follow, as before, that [such an object] could not be subject to convention, could not be dealt with [through language], and would have unclear manifestation." |
svalakṣaṇādivyatirekeṇānya evāstyartha iti cedāha nānyo 'styarthaś ca dṛśyata iti / | "If it is claimed that there is some being different from specific particularity etc., [the author] states that 'no other being is observed'." |
svalakṣaṇādivyatirekeṇānyo 'styartho nirūpyamāṇo na buddher gocaratāmavatarati // | "When examined, no being different from specific particularity etc. comes within the range of cognition." |
samudāyābhidhāne 'pi jātibhedābhidā sphuṭā / tapojātikriyādīnāṃ sāmastyenābhidhānataḥ // | Even when [what is] denoted is the aggregate, there is clear conception of universals and particulars, due to the collective denotation of austerity, caste, conduct and the rest. |
samudāyābhidhānapakṣe sphuṭataram eva jāter bhedānāṃ ca tapaḥprabhṛtīnāmabhidhānamaṅgīkṛtam iti pratyekābhidhānapakṣabhāvino doṣāḥ samudāyābhidhāne sarve yugapat prāpnuvanti | Under the view that what is denoted is the aggregate, an even clearer denotation of universals and particulars in the form of austerity and the rest is admitted; hence all the defects that exist in [the view of] individual denotation apply simultaneously to the denotation of the aggregate. |
nirddhāritasvarūpāṇāṃ dravyādīnāṃ tu yogataḥ / sambandho yac ca sāmānyaṃ satyaṃ tadvāritaṃ purā // | Any relation between substances and the rest whose natures have been ascertained, as well as any real universal, has been previously rejected. |
bhedajātyādirūpeṇa śabdārthānupapattitaḥ / arthenaikīkṛtaṃ rūpaṃ na śabdasyopapadyate // | Since the meaning of words cannot consist of particulars, universals and the like, no form of the word as unified with its meaning is possible. |
jalpo buddhistha evāyaṃ bāhyayogavibhedataḥ | This verbal expression exists only in the mind, as it is different from external relation. |
tataḥ ko bheda etasya truṭipakṣād anantarāt // buddhyākāro 'pi śabdārthaḥ prāgeva vinivāritaḥ / jñānādavyatiriktasya vyāpakatvaviyogataḥ // | Therefore, what difference is there between this [view] and the immediately preceding momentariness view? [Moreover,] the view that the meaning of words is the form of cognition has already been rejected, because what is non-different from cognition cannot be pervasive. |
pūrvaṃ ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣāyāṃ saṃyogasamavāyalakṣaṇasya vāritatvāt, sāmānyasya ca triguṇātmakasya satyasyāvyatiriktasya sāṅkhyaparīkṣāyāṃ, vyatiriktasyāpi ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣāyāṃ nirastatvān nāsatyasaṃyogo nāpyasatyopādhisāmānyaṃ vācyam | Since relations characterized as conjunction and inherence were rejected in the earlier examination of the six categories, and since the universal consisting of three qualities, being real and non-different [from particulars], was rejected in the examination of Sāṅkhya, and since [the universal] as different [from particulars] was also rejected in the examination of the six categories, neither unreal conjunction nor the universal with unreal adjuncts can be what is denoted. |
abhijalpapakṣe 'pyāha yadi śabdasya kaścid arthaḥ sambhavet, tadā tena sahaikīkaraṇaṃ bhavet, yāvatā svalakṣaṇādirūpasya śabdārthasyāsambhavaḥ pūrvaṃ pratipāditas tatkathaṃ tenaikīkaraṇaṃ bhavet | Regarding the view of verbal expression too, [he] says: if there were some meaning of a word, then unification with it would be possible; [but] since the impossibility of word-meaning in the form of unique particulars and so forth has been previously established, how could there be unification with it? |
apicāyamabhijalpo buddhistha eva tathā hi bāhyayoḥ śabdārthayor bhinnendriyagrāhyatvādibhyo bhedasya siddhes tayor aikyāpādanamayuktam eva bhāvikam | Moreover, this verbal expression exists only in the mind, because the external word and meaning are established as different due to being grasped by different sense organs and so forth; hence their unification cannot possibly be correct. |
ato buddhisthayor eva śabdārthayor ekabuddhigatatvād ekīkaraṇaṃ yuktam | Therefore, unification is only possible for word and meaning as they exist in the mind, since they occur in one [and the same] cognition. |
tathāhyupagṛhītābhidheyākarastirobhūtaśabdasvabhāvo buddhau viparivartamānaḥ śabdātmā svarūpānugatamarthavibhāgenāntaḥsanniveśayannabhijalpa ucyate / | Thus when the verbal essence, having assumed the form of the denoted [object] and having its word-nature obscured, appears in the cognition [and] internally arranges [itself] with a division of meaning following its own nature, [then] it is called "abhijalpa" [mental verbalization]. |
sa ca buddher ātmagata evākāro yukto na bāhyas tasyaikāntena parasparaṃ viviktasvabhāvatvāt / | And this form must be internal to cognition, not external, because of its having a nature entirely distinct from external [things]. |
tataś ca buddhiśabdārthapakṣādanantaroktād asya ko bhedaḥ --- naiva kaścit / | Therefore, what difference is there between this [view] and the previously stated view about cognition being the meaning of words? None whatsoever. |
ubhayatrāpi bauddha evārthaḥ / | In both cases, the meaning is purely mental. |
etāvanmātraṃ tu bhidyate, śabdārthāvekīkṛtāv iti / | The only difference is that word and meaning are unified [in this view]. |
doṣas tu samāna eva "jñānādavyatiriktaṃ ca katham arthāntaraṃ vraje"diti / | But the flaw remains the same: "How could that which is non-different from cognition become something different?" |
pratibhāpi ca śabdārtho bāhyārthaviṣayā yadi / ekātmaniyate bāhye vicitrāḥ pratibhāḥ katham // | Moreover, if intuition as the meaning of words relates to external objects, how could there be various intuitions when the external [object] is restricted to one nature? |
atha nirviṣayā etā vāsanāmātrabhāvataḥ / pratipattiḥ pravṛttir vā bāhyārtheṣu kathaṃ bhavet // | If these [intuitions] are objectless, existing only as mental impressions, how could there be either comprehension or activity regarding external objects? |
bāhyarūpādhimokṣeṇa svākāre yadi te mate / | If according to your view these [cognition and activity] abandon the external form [and rest] in their own form... |
nirbījā na ca sā yuktā sarvatraiva prasaṅgataḥ / | And [such] intuition cannot be without basis, as that would lead to [its occurrence] everywhere. |
itaretarabhedo 'sya bījaṃ cetpakṣa eṣa naḥ // | If mutual difference is considered its basis, then that is our position. |
yadi pratibhā paramārthato bāhyārthaviṣayā tadaikatra vastuni śabdādau viruddhasamayāvasthāyināṃ vicitrāḥ pratibhā na prāpnuvanti, ekasyānekasvabhāvasambhavāt / | If intuition truly relates to external objects, then various intuitions cannot occur in people living at mutually contradictory times regarding a single thing like sound, because one [thing] cannot have multiple natures. |
atha nirviṣayās tadārthe pravṛttipratipattī na prāpnutaḥ, atadviṣayatvācchabdasya / | If [these] intuitions are devoid of objects, then activity and comprehension in connection with those objects cannot arise, since words would have no connection with [those] objects. |
atha svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena bhrāntyā te pravṛttipratipattībhavatas tadā bhrāntaḥ śabdārthaḥ prāpnoti / | If it is held that comprehension and activity arise through illusion, by superimposing objects upon what is [in reality] objectless in its own appearance, then the meaning of words becomes illusory. |
tasyāś ca bhrānter bījaṃ kāraṇaṃ vaktavyam, anyathā nirbījā bhrāntir bhavantī sarvataḥ sarvadaiva syāt / | And for this illusion, a cause [lit. seed] must be stated, otherwise, if the illusion were without cause, it would occur everywhere and at all times. |
atha bhāvānāṃ parasparato bheda eva bījamasyā abhyupagamyate tadāsmatpakṣameva bhavān sādhayatīti siddhasādhyatā / | If mutual difference among entities is accepted as the cause of this [illusion], then you are [merely] establishing our own position, resulting in proving what is [already] proven. |
yadi vā sarvamevedaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ syān na vā tathā / kṣaṇikatve 'nvayāyogaḥ kramijñānaṃ ca nānyathā / | Moreover, is all this momentary or not so? If [it is] momentary, there can be no connection; and if otherwise, successive cognition would be impossible. |
sarvam etat svalakṣaṇajātyādi kṣaṇikaṃ vāsyād akṣaṇikaṃ vā / tatrādye pakṣe saṅketakāladṛṣṭasya vyavahārakāle 'nvayāsambhavān na tatra samayaḥ / | Is all this - particular characteristics, universals, etc. - momentary or non-momentary? In the first case, since there can be no connection between what was seen at the time of convention and [what exists] at the time of usage, no convention would be possible in that case. |
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