sanskrit
stringlengths
2
508
english
stringlengths
2
924
vasturūpeti vidhirūpāvasāyinī /
"Vasturūpā" means: determining a positive entity.
sā buddhiriti / anālambanāśvādibuddhiḥ /
"That cognition" means: the cognition of horses etc. without a [real] substrate.
śabdārtheṣviti / aśvādiṣvadhyavasiteṣu /
"[The phrase] 'in connection with śabdārtha' [means] in connection with horses and other [things] that are conceived of."
vastveveti /
"[The phrase] '[it is] indeed a real entity' [means just that]."
aśvādipiṇḍādhyavasāyibuddhyātmakam /
"[It is] in the form of a cognition that apprehends the collection of horses and other [things]."
avadhāraṇaphalaṃ darśayati buddhyanapohakam iti /
"[The text] shows the result of the restriction [by saying] 'buddhyanapohakam' [cognition not involving exclusion]."
avidyamāno 'poho yatra vācye buddhyātmake vastuni tat tathoktam /
"That which is expressed, having the nature of cognition, in which apoha is not present, is called thus."
buddher anapohakam / buddhyantarāpoharahitam ity arthaḥ / athavā apohata ityapohakaṃ, nāpohakamanapohakaṃ, buddher anapohakaṃ buddhyanapohakam iti samāsaḥ /
"[The compound] 'buddher anapohakam' [means] 'free from exclusion of other cognitions.' Or alternatively, 'apohaka' means 'that which excludes,' 'anapohaka' means 'that which does not exclude,' [thus] the compound means 'that which does not exclude cognition.'"
etad uktaṃ bhavati /
"This is what is being said:"
yadyapi buddhir buddhyantarād vyavacchinnā, tathāpi sā na buddhyantaravyavacchedāvasāyinī jāyate /
"Although a cognition is distinct from other cognitions, nevertheless it does not arise as determining the exclusion of other cognitions."
kiṃ tarhiaśvādiṣvartheṣu vidhirūpāvasāyinī, tena vastveva vidhirūpaṃ vācyaṃ kalpeta yuktimat, nāpohaḥ, buddhyantarasya buddhyantarānapohakatvāt //
"Rather, it arises as determining positive forms in objects like horses, etc. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that what is denoted is indeed a positive entity, not apoha, because one cognition does not exclude another cognition."
kiṃ ca yo 'yaṃ bhavadbhirapohaḥ padārthatvena kalpitaḥ sa vākyādapoddhṛtya kalpitasya padasyārtha iṣṭo vākyārthastu pratibhālakṣaṇa eva /
"Moreover, this apoha which you have postulated as the meaning of words is supposed to be the meaning of a word extracted from a sentence, while the meaning of a sentence is characterized by [immediate] intuition alone."
yathoktam "apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyādartho vivecitaḥ /
As has been stated: "Thus far the meaning of a word [when] extracted from a sentence has been analyzed;
vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyo 'yaṃ tenādāvupajanyate" //
[but] this sentence-meaning, which is called pratibhā [intuitive flash], is what is produced first."
atrocyate asatyapītyādi /
In this context, [the verse] beginning with "asatyapi" is stated.
asatyapi ca vākyārthaḥ pratibhālakṣaṇo yathā / padārtho 'pi tathaiva syāt kimapohaḥ prakalpyate //
Just as the sentence-meaning is characterized as pratibhā even though [there is] no [external referent], similarly the word-meaning could also be [characterized as pratibhā] - why then is apoha postulated?
dvayor api padavākyārthayor vidhirūpatvamevāstviti bhāvaḥ //
The idea is that both word-meanings and sentence-meanings should simply have a positive form.
syād etat pratibhāyāḥ pratibhāntarād vijātīyād vyavacchedo 'stītyato 'pohaḥ kalpyata ity āha buddhyantarād ityādi /
One might object: "Since there is exclusion of one pratibhā from another heterogeneous pratibhā, therefore apoha is postulated" - [to this] he says [the verse] beginning with "buddhyantarād."
yadyapyasau na pratīyate tathāpyastyeveti cedāha svarūpotpādetyādi /
If one says "even though it is not apprehended, it still exists," [the author] states [the part] beginning with "svarūpotpāda."
yadyapi buddher buddhyantarādvyāvṛttir asti tathāpi tasyāṃ na śabdavyāpāro 'sti /
Even though there is differentiation of one cognition from another, the word has no operation in that [differentiation].
tathā hi śabdādiyaṃ buddhirutpadyamānā na svarūpotpādavyatirekeṇānyaṃ buddhyantaravyavacchedalakṣaṇaṃ śabdādavasīyamānamaṃśaṃ bibhratī lakṣyate, kiṃtarhividhirūpāvasāyinyevotpadyata ity arthaḥ /
For when this cognition arises from a word, it is not observed to bear any aspect ascertained from the word characterized by exclusion of other cognitions apart from the production of its own form - rather, it arises only as determining something positive.
na ca śabdādavasīyamāno vastvaṃśaḥ śabdārtho yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt /
And an aspect of reality that is not ascertained from a word cannot reasonably be the meaning of that word, as [this would lead to] overextension.
tasmāt pratītibādhitatvaṃ pratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ //
The meaning [of this] is that [the Buddhist's] proposition is invalidated by direct perception.
bhinnasāmānyavacanā viśeṣavacanāś ca ye / sarve bhaveyuḥ paryāyā yadyapohasya vācyatā //
If apoha were to be what is denoted [by words], then all words would become synonyms - both those expressing different universals and those expressing particulars.
ye hi bhinnasāmānyavacanā gavāśvādayo ye ca viśeṣavacanāḥ śābaleyādayas te sarve bhavatāṃ paryāyāḥ prāpnuvantyarthabhedābhāvāt, vṛkṣapādapādiśabdavat //
For those [words] which express different universals like 'cow', 'horse', etc., and those which express particulars like 'śabaleya' etc., all these would become synonyms for you due to absence of difference in meaning, like the words 'vṛkṣa' and 'pādapa'.
kasmāt punar arthabhedo na sambhavatītyāha saṃsṛṣṭetyādi /
[One asks:] "Why is there no difference in meaning?" [The answer] is stated beginning with "saṃsṛṣṭa".
avastutvādapohānāṃ naiva bhedo 'pi vidyate //
Because apohas are non-entities, there cannot even be any difference [among them].
vastunyeva hi saṃsṛṣṭatvaikatvanānātvavikalpāḥ sambhavanti, nāvastuni, apohānāṃ cāvastutvān na parasparaṃ saṃsṛṣṭatvādivikalpo yuktaḥ, tat katham eṣāṃ parasparaṃ bhedaḥ siddhyati //
For concepts like 'being related', 'unity', and 'multiplicity' are possible only for entities, not for non-entities; and since apohas are non-entities, concepts like 'being mutually related' etc. are not possible for them; so how can any mutual difference between them be established?
yadi vā bhidyamānatvād vastu sādhāraṇāṃśavat /
If [apohas] are different [from each other], then they must be entities due to [their] being different, just like the common aspects [of things].
avastutve tvanānātvāt paryāyatvān na mucyate //
However, if they are non-entities, then due to [their] not being many, they cannot escape being synonyms.
vastviti sādhyanirdeśaḥ /
The term 'vastu' indicates what is to be proved.
prayogaḥ ye parasparaṃ vibhidyante te vastu, yathā svalakṣaṇāni, parasparaṃ vibhidyante cāpohā iti svabhāvahetuḥ /
The argument [is as follows]: Those things which differ from each other are entities, like particular characteristics; and apohas differ from each other - this is a natural reason.
tataś ca vastutve sati vidhireva śabdārtha iti siddham /
And therefore, since they are entities, it is established that the meaning of words is indeed positive.
etena cānumānabādhitatvaṃ pratijñāyā uktaṃ bhavati /
By this it is shown that the [apoha] proposition is invalidated by inference.
athāvastutvamabhyupagamyate 'pohānāṃ tadā nānātvābhāvāt pūrvavat paryāyatvaprasaṅga ityekānta eṣaḥ //
If, on the other hand, apohas are accepted to be non-entities, then due to their lack of plurality, they would necessarily be synonymous [just] as before—this [conclusion] is certain.
atra paro bauddhasya parihāramāśaṅkate nanu cetyādi /
Here [the author] anticipates the Buddhist's response [beginning with] "but."
nanu cāśvādibhedena bhedo 'pohasya setsyati /
"But surely the difference of apoha will be established through the difference of [things excluded like] horses etc."
yathoktam ---"apohyabhedād bhinnārthāḥ svārthabhedagatau jaḍā" iti /
As has been stated: "[The apohas] are different through the difference of what is excluded, [but] are inert regarding the difference in their own nature."
tataś ca svato bhedābhāve 'pyapohyasyāśvāder bhedādapohasyāgavādivyāvṛttirūpasya bhede siddhe na paryāyatvaṃ bhaviṣyati /
Therefore, even though there is no difference in themselves, when difference is established through the difference of what is excluded like horses etc., [and] through [their] nature as exclusion of non-cows etc., they will not be synonymous.
na viśeṣa ityādinā paro dūṣaṇam āha na viśeṣaḥ svatas tasya parataścopajāyate //
[Beginning with] "no distinction," the opponent states the refutation: "No distinction arises for it either from itself or from others."
svato na tasyāpohasya viśeṣo nānātvam asti abhāvaikarasatvāt /
That apoha has no distinction or plurality in itself because it has the single essence of non-existence.
parato 'pyasau bhavan kālpanikaḥ syān na pāramārthikaḥ /
Even if it were to arise from others, it would be merely conceptual, not ultimately real.
na hi svato 'sato bhedasya parataḥ sambhavo yuktaḥ //
For it is not reasonable that difference, which does not exist inherently, could arise from others.
kasmān na yukta ity āha saṃsargiṇa ityādi /
[To the question] "Why is it not reasonable?" he says [beginning with] "of related things" [etc.].
saṃsargiṇo 'pi hyādhārā yaṃ na bhindanti rūpataḥ / apohyai{rbahiraṅgais sa bhidyetetya}tikalpanā //
When even the substrata [i.e. the cows] to which [the apohas] are related do not differentiate their form, [the idea] that they would be differentiated by excluded things which are external [to them] would be an over-reaching assumption.
tathā hi saṃsargiṇaḥ sambandhinaḥ śābaleyādayaḥ, ādhārā antaraṅgā api santo, yam apohaṃ rūpataḥ svabhāvato bhettumaśaktāḥ, bahuṣvapi śābaleyādiṣvekasyāgovyavacchedalakṣaṇasyāpohasya pravṛtter iṣṭatvāt, sa kathaṃ bahiraṅgabhūtair apohyairaśvādibhir bhidyeta
For when the related entities like variegated [cows] etc., though being internal substrata, are unable to differentiate the apoha in terms of its essential nature - since even among many [cows] like variegated ones etc., a single apoha characterized as "exclusion of non-cow" is accepted to function - how could it be differentiated by excluded things like horses etc. which are external?
na hi yasyāntaraṅgo 'pyartho na bhedakas tasya bahiraṅgo bhaviṣyati / bahiraṅgatvahāniprasaṅgāt /
For that which cannot be differentiated even by what is internal [to it] certainly cannot be differentiated by what is external [to it], because [if it could], there would be the unwanted consequence of loss of [its] externality.
tasmād atiśayavatī kalpaneyam ityupahasati //
Therefore, this is ridiculed as being an excessive assumption.
tathaivādhārabhedenāpyasya bhedo na yujyate /
In the same way, its [i.e. the apoha's] differentiation through differentiation of [its] substrate is not possible.
na ih sambandhibhedena bhedo vastunyapīṣyate //
For even in the case of real things, differentiation through differentiation of [their] relatives is not accepted.
kimutāvastvasaṃsṛṣṭamavyāvṛttaṃ nivartate / a{ta evā}viśeṣāṃśaṃ ya{ddhima}tyanirūpitam //
How much less [possible is] exclusion for that which is unreal, unconnected, undifferentiated, [and] which is unspecified because it is precisely non-particular [and] undetermined?
asyeti apohasya /
"Its" [refers to] "of the apoha."
kasmān na yujyata ity āha na hītyādi /
To [the question] "why is it not possible?" he states "For... not" etc.
āstāṃ tāvadyadavastu sambandhibhedān na bhidyata iti tasya niḥsvabhāvatvāt /
Let it rest for now that a non-entity cannot be differentiated through differentiation of [its] relatives because it is devoid of own-nature.
vastunyapi hi yāvat sambandhibhedād bhedo nopalabhyata eva
As regards entities also, no diversity whatsoever is found to arise from the diversity in relations.
tathā hi devadattādikam ekaṃ vastu yugapat krameṇa vānekairāsanādibhiḥ sambandhyamānamanāsāditabhedamevopalabhyate
For instance, when Devadatta, [who is] a single entity, becomes connected with different seats and such things either simultaneously or successively, he is perceived as remaining without any acquired diversity.
kiṃ punar yadanyavyāvṛttirūpamavastu
How much more [must this be true] in the case of that which is a non-entity [and merely] has the form of exclusion of others?
avastutvād eva ca kvacid asaṃsṛṣṭam asambadhām, anyataś ca vijātīyād avyāvṛttamavastutvād eva
Because it is a non-entity, it is unrelated [and] unconnected with anything, and undifferentiated from heterogeneous things, precisely because of [its] being a non-entity.
ata evānadhigataviśeṣāṃśaṃ tat tādṛśaṃ sambandhibhedādapi katham iva bhedam aśnuvīta
For this very reason it is without any specified aspects - how could such a [thing] acquire diversity even through diversity in relations?
kiñca bhavatu nāma sambandhibhedād bhedas tathāpi vastubhūtasāmānyānabhyupagame bhavatāṃ sa evāpohāśrayaḥ sambandhī na siddhyati
Moreover, even if it be granted that diversity [arises] from diversity in relations, still, since you do not accept a real universal, that very relation which would be the substrate of apoha cannot be established.
yadi hi gavādīnāṃ vastubhūtaṃ sārūpyaṃ prasiddhaṃ bhavet tadāśvādyapohāśrayatvameṣām aviśeṣeṇa siddhyennānyathā
For if a real similarity among cows and such were admitted, then their being the substrate of the exclusion of horses and such would be established without distinction, [but] not otherwise.
tataścāpohaviṣayatvam eṣāmicchatāvaśyaṃ sārūpyamaṅgīkartavyam
And therefore one who desires these to be the domain of apoha must necessarily accept [their] similarity.
tadeva sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ śabdavācyaṃ bhaviṣyatītyapohakalpanā nirarthakaiveti bhāvaḥ
[In that case,] that very [similarity] would be the real universal denoted by the word, and thus the postulation of apoha would be entirely pointless - this is the meaning.
viṣayaśabdo 'trāśrayavacanaḥ, jalaviṣayā matsyā iti yathā
The word "viṣaya" here means "substrate," just as in [the expression] "water-dwelling fish."
api cāpohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyām eva pratipādyata iti bhavadbhiriṣyate /
[It is] indeed held by you that the apoha is indicated by word and inferential mark only.
tayoś ca śabdaliṅgayor vastubhūtasāmānyamantareṇa pravṛttir na yuktā /
And the operation of these two, word and inferential mark, is not possible without a real universal.
tataś ca kenāpohaḥ pratipādyatām ityetad darśayati na cānvayetyādi /
"Thus, how could the apoha be indicated?" - this [question] is shown by [the words] beginning with "na cānvaya".
na cānvayavinirmuktā pravṛttiḥ śabdaliṅgayoḥ /
And [there can be] no operation of word and inferential mark divorced from co-presence.
tābhyāṃ ca na vināpoho na cāsādhāraṇe 'nvayaḥ //
And without these [two], [there can be] no apoha, and [there can be] no co-presence in what is unique.
śabdaliṅgābhyāṃ vinā nāpohaḥ /
[There can be] no apoha without word and inferential mark.
svalakṣaṇenaivānvayaṃ kṛtvā śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttiḥ kariṣyata iti cedāha
If [someone] says that "word and inferential mark can operate by making co-presence with the particular alone," [then the answer is given...]
na cāsādhāraṇe 'nvaya iti /
[As stated:] "And [there can be] no co-presence in what is unique."
svalakṣaṇamasādhāraṇamananyabhāk, tat kathaṃ tenānvayo bhavet /
The particular is unique [and] not sharing [its nature] with anything else - how could there be co-presence with it?
tadevam appohakalpanāyāṃ śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttireva na prāpnoti //
Thus, in the conception of apoha, the operation of word and inferential mark becomes impossible.
bhavatu vā pravṛttis tathāpyanayoḥ prāmāṇyamabhyupagataṃ hīyata iti darśayati apohaścetyādi /
Even if there were operation [of word and inferential mark], still their accepted validity would be lost - this is shown by [the words] beginning with "apohaśca".
tasminnadṛśyamāne ca na tayoḥ syāt pramāṇatā //
And when that [apoha] is not perceived, there cannot be validity of those two.
pratipādyārthāvyabhicāre sati śabdaliṅgayoḥ prāmāṇyaṃ syāt, pratipādyaścārtho 'pohastvayeṣyate, sa cābhāvarūpatvādaniṣpanno niḥsvabhāvataḥ /
The validity of word and inferential mark would exist only when there is no deviation from the object to be indicated; and the object to be indicated is held by you to be apoha; and that [apoha], being of the nature of absence, is not established because [it is] without own-nature.
tataś ca sāhacaryamavyabhicāritvaṃ kva kasmin viṣaye kathyatāṃ śabdaliṅgayoḥ / kiṃ tena kathiteneti cedāha tasminnityādi /
[And] in which domain could the concomitance [and] invariable connection of Word and Indicative be stated? If [one asks] "What [is gained] by stating that?", [the author] says "In that..." etc.
tayor iti śabdaliṅgayoḥ /
[The phrase] "of these two" [refers to] Word and Indicative.
avisaṃvādalakṣaṇatvāt prāmāṇyasyeti bhāvaḥ //
Because validity has non-deviation as its characteristic - this is the meaning.
na cādarśanamātreṇa tābhyāṃ pratyāyanaṃ bhavet /
And signification could not occur through those two by mere non-perception;
sarvatraiva hyadṛṣṭatvāt pratyayo na viśiṣyate //
because, due to non-perception being [present] in all cases, cognition would not be differentiated.
mātragrahaṇamanvayadṛṣṭivyavacchedārtham /
The word "mere" serves to exclude the perception of concomitance.
kasmān na bhaved ity āha sarvatraivetyādi / sarvatra sajātīye vijātīye svārthe ca /
[If one asks] "Why could it not occur?", [the author] states "in all cases" etc. "In all cases" [means] in homogeneous things, in heterogeneous things, and in the thing itself.
tataścāyaṃ svārtho 'yaṃ parārtha ityevaṃ pratyayo jñānaṃ na viśiṣyeta /
And hence there could not be any differentiated cognition such as "this is the thing itself" [or] "this is something else";
svārtham api na gamayet, tatrāpyadṛṣṭatvāt parārthavad iti yāvat /
[it] would not indicate even its own object, because there too [there would be] non-perception, just as in the case of other objects.
kvacitpratyāyya iti pāṭhaḥ /
In some [texts] there is the reading "pratyāyya."
tatra pratyāyyo 'bhidheyo 'rtho na viśiṣyate na bhidyata ity arthaḥ /
In this case, the denoted meaning that is to be conveyed neither becomes distinguished nor different.
tadevaṃ śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttiprāmāṇyābhyupagamahāniprasaṅgānnāpohaḥ śabdārtho yuktaḥ //
Thus, since [this would lead to] the possibility of losing the validity of the operation of words and gender markers, apoha cannot be correct as the meaning of words.
athāsatyapi sārūpye syād apohasya kalpanā /
"Even if similarity of form is absent, there could be an assumption of apoha."
gavāśvayor ayaṃ kasmādago 'poho na kalpyate //
"Why then is this apoha of non-cow not assumed in [the case of] the cow and horse?"
yadi sārūpyamantareṇa śābaleyādiṣvagopohasya kalpanā syāt tadā gavāśvayor api kasmān na prakalpyeta, aviśeṣāt /
If, even without similarity, the apoha of non-cow can be assumed in [the case of] spotted cows and others, then why could it not be assumed in [the case of] the cow and horse also, since there is no difference [between these cases]?
gavāśvaprabhṛtīni cetyasya lakṣaṇasya vismṛtatvād vipreṇa gavāśvayor ityuktam //
The author has used the form "gavāśvayoḥ", having forgotten the rule [beginning with] "gavāśvaprabhṛtīni ca" [which applies] in technical terms.
tamevāviśeṣaṃ darśayati śābaleyāccetyādi /
[The author] shows this very non-difference [through the words] beginning with "śābaleyāc".
śābaleyāc ca bhinnatvaṃ bāhuleyāśvayoḥ samam /
"The difference from the spotted cow is equal in [the case of] the black cow and the horse."
sāmānyaṃ nānyadiṣṭaṃ cetkvāgo 'pohaḥ pravartatām //
"If no other universal is accepted, where would the apoha of non-cow apply?"
yathaiva śābaleyād vailakṣaṇyādaśve na pravartate, tathā bāhuleyasyāpi tatovailakṣaṇyam astīti tatrāpi na pravarteta /
Just as [the apoha of non-cow] does not apply to the horse due to [its] distinction from the spotted cow, similarly, since the black cow too has distinction from it, [the apoha] should not apply there either.
evaṃ śābaleyādiṣvapi yojyam, sarvatra vailakṣaṇyāviśeṣāt //
[This is] likewise applicable in the case of spotted [cows] and others, since difference is equally [present] in all cases.
indriyair nāpyago 'pohaḥ prathamaṃ vyavasīyate /
The apoha [exclusion] of non-cow is never previously apprehended by the sense organs;
nānyatra śabdavṛttiś ca kiṃ dṛṣṭvā sa prayujyatām //
and word-operation does not lie anywhere else; having perceived what then could it [the word] be used?